Arthur Ruppin and the Production of the Modern Hebrew Culture

THESIS SUBMITTED FOR THE DEGREE “DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY”

by

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SUBMITTED TO THE SENATE OF TEL AVIV UNIVERSITY
(1st December, 2008)
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נואת

אמית בלום

הוגש להסנאם של אוניברסיטת תל-אביב

1 בדצמבר 2008
עבודת וنعשה במדרiosa

פרופ’ איתי אנדר-זר
פרופ’ סנדר גלמון
For my beloved Sharon and Lili
Acknowledgments

I would like to acknowledge and thank those people who helped me write this work.

My thanks first go to Prof. Itamar Even-Zohar, who has been my mentor ever since I began my studies at the University of Tel Aviv. I am indebted to him not only for inspiring, amazing and amusing me with his vast knowledge and wisdom, but also for demonstrating to me the practice of intellectual integrity.

Similarly, my deep appreciation goes to Prof. Sander L. Gilman for providing me a new vivid critical perspective of Jewish history and identity and for his invaluable advice and support throughout all the stages of my research. I thank him for the many fertile insights along the crossroads of my journey.

My thanks go wholeheartedly to the most inspiring Dr. Magdalena Drexl, for her hospitality, constructive criticism, and for her resurrecting transcription of Ruppin’s German handwriting.

I would also like to thank my linguistic editor, Mrs. Aliza El-Dror, for her kindness, as well as for her extremely thorough and professional work. I deeply appreciated the time she spent reviewing and uplifting my English.

Ever since I started my research work, Mr. Menashe Ida and Dr. Yuval Amit were always there to lend a helpful ear to my long experimental speeches and to offer their highly valuable comments. Special thanks go to these dear friends.

Those who have helped me over the years in bringing my research to fruition are too numerous to mention, although I also would like to acknowledge Prof. Yehuda Nini for his wise hints and encouragements, Prof. John Milfull for his valuable comments and friendly correspondence, and Dr. Snait B. Gissis for her constant support and encouragement.

I would like to thank the Unit of Culture Research faculty and staff for the most pleasant and fruitful years of learning and study, and in particular to Prof. Gideon Toury and Prof. Rakefet Sela-Sheffy for their guidance and nurture, as well as the most efficient secretaries of the unit, Ms. Lea Goldman and Ms. Revital Zipori who made the whole bureaucratic process as smooth as possible.

I sincerely appreciate all the help I received from members of the Tel Aviv University Faculty of Humanities and the School of Cultural Studies. I could not have pursued my research without the Tel Aviv University Presidential Scholarship.

I am obliged to Prof. Dan Diner for the unforgettable stay at the Simon Dubnow Institute for Jewish History and Culture, as well as to the most hospitable University of Leipzig and to the IQN-Program of DAAD, for enabling me to study and research for almost three years in Leipzig, Berlin, Bochum and Amsterdam. I wish to thank Dr. Stephan Wendehorst (Deputy to the Director) for his most kind help, as well as the
SDI faculty, staff and guest scholars, among them Dr. Karina Pfützner, Ms. Marion Hammer, Ms. Grit N. Scheffer, Dr. Veronika Lipphardt, Dr. Miriam Ruerup, Dr. Tobias Brinkmann, Dr. Omry Kaplan-Feuereisen, Dr. Omar Kamil, Prof. Yechiam Weitz, Mr. Kelvin Crombie and Prof. Todd M. Endelman.

I am thankful for the multifarious assistance of the following colleagues and friends: Ms. Astrid Gottwald, Mr. Herzl Schubert, Mr. Jörg Eckhardt, Dr. Benjamin Baader, Dr. Uwe Hossfeld, Dr. Amnon Raz-Karkotzkin, Dr. Ari Barell, Prof. Raphael Falk, Dr. Denis Sweeney, Dr. Yitzhak Laor, Mr. Yosef El-Dror, Dr. Eran Rolnik, Dr. Ofer Nur, Dr. Boaz Neumann, Dr. Dafna Hirsch, Mr. Haggai Ravid, Mr. Doron Ashkenazi, Prof. Luisa Passerini, Prof. Mitchell B. Hart, Prof. Derek Penslar, Prof. Richard Whatmore, Prof. Todd Presner, Prof. Ruth Pierson, Prof. Steven E. Aschheim, and Ms. Chantal Osterreicher.

I am perpetually grateful to my father, Yehuda (Leon) Bloom, who was always the first reader and linguistic editor of each draft, and to my mother Alegria, for her immense love and support. Finally, I want to warmly acknowledge my sister, Limor, and my beloved brothers, Gadi, Ilan, and Gilad.

Etan Bloom, September 2009
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Summary (Heb.)
1. Introduction

This research is a study of Arthur Ruppin (1876-1943) as a cultural agent and his activities in Palestine from 1908 to 1942. It describes and analyzes the perceptions of the leading officials and agents of the Palestine Office, directed by Ruppin, and their impact on the culture planning of the Modern Hebrew social field.

1. The first part concentrates on the aspirations, ideas and images of the heads of the office with regard to the imagined Jewish or Hebrew culture in Palestine.
2. The second part deals with questions regarding the practical ways in which these perceptions were transferred to the Jewish community of Palestine (known as the New Yishuv).

The research framework combines cultural and historical research as it analyzes how theoretical or abstract products come into practice in the social field, using the particular historical case of the transference of Zionism from Europe (mainly Germany and Russia) to Palestine, and thus showing the transfer of components from European culture to the renewed Hebrew culture.

Arthur Ruppin, one of the dominant characters in these processes, will serve as the axis and lens that enable us to present and analyze them.

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1 The Palestine Office was established in Jaffa in 1908 by Ruppin as the representative of the WZO in Palestine. Over the decade, the PO (which would be replaced in 1918 by several institutions including the Jewish Agency) was the central agency for Zionist settlement activities in Palestine, forming the core of the administrative institutions and activities of the New Yishuv.
2 On the concept of transfer see: (Even-Zohar 1997, 373-381).
3 A Modern-Hebrew concept designating most of the Jewish community in Palestine from the Second Aliya period (1903-1914) until 1948 and the establishment of Israel (the word Yishuv is used for settlement (as verb and noun), as well as for the people of the settlement.)
1.1 The Conceptual Framework

1.1.1. Repertoire, Habitus and Culture Planning

In a variety of disciplines (sociology, anthropology, semiotics, and culture research), the stock of options available to a group for managing its social life has often been termed *repertoire* (Swidler 1986; Even-Zohar 1978, 1990), while the context in which such repertoires were functional is termed *system or field* (any system or field theory, from Marx to Bourdieu, from Jakobson to Even-Zohar).

The concept of *repertoire* emphasizes, as Swidler puts it, that:

“Culture influences action not by providing the ultimate values toward which action is oriented, but by shaping a repertoire or ‘tool kit’ of habits, skills, and styles from which people construct ‘strategies of action’” (Swidler 1986, 273).

Even-Zohar explained this concept in different terms, as:

“The aggregate of rules and materials which govern both the making and handling, or production and consumption, of any given product. […] If we view culture as a framework, a sphere, which makes it possible to organize social life, then the repertoire in culture, or of culture, is where the necessary items for that framework are stored” (Even-Zohar 1997, 15-34; 2000).

One of the main understandings that underlie the concept of repertoire is that the “tool kit” or “aggregate of rules” that regulate culture do not evolve by themselves, i.e. through “natural causes,” but rather that social “nature” or “reality” are products of the *repertoire’s history*. The concept of repertoire must be taken into consideration – in one form or another – in any historical analysis since the repertoire constitutes our perceptions and sense of “history”; the past being determined by the current dominant repertoire which is directed towards the future. The concept of repertoire thus provides us with the inter-dimensional insight for understanding the connections between past, present, and future.
This insight leads us to recognize that the social world is constructed by social agents through cognitive structures that may be applied to all “things” of or in the world and in particular to social structures. As Bourdieu puts it:

“These structuring structures are historically constituted forms and therefore arbitrary in the Saussurian sense, conventional, ‘ex instituto’ [by an arbitrary institution] as Leibniz said, which means that we can trace their social genesis” (Bourdieu 1999, 67).

The conceptual framework described above gave birth to Even-Zohar’s concept of culture planning (i.e., the initiation of a culture plan and its operation, reevaluation and revision with regard to the changing needs of the social field. See: Even-Zohar 1994). Effective culture planning has taken place when a dominant group manages to impose its repertoire on the social field and generates a social cohesiveness that regulates the various personal and institutional interactions.

The ability of a group to impose its repertoire is dependent on its ability to gain control over what Bourdieu calls statist capital (capital étatique) (Bourdieu 1999, 57), i.e., its ability to centralize and organize the different bodies and institutions that are responsible for the distribution of symbolic capital (the education system, the press, the artistic field, etc.) and material capital (private capital, national banks, public foundations, etc.).

By succeeding in imposing its repertoire, the group can be referred to as the dominant group and its repertoire becomes the dominant repertoire. Since the identity of the group is connected to a specific repertoire – “one indivisible repertoire for one group” – the concept of dominant repertoire is more or less the habitus of that group,

4 Cassirer called these principles of vision and division “symbolic forms” and Durkheim “forms of classification” these are so many ways of saying the same thing in more or less separate theoretical traditions (Bourdieu 1999, 67).

5 Bourdieu expressed this idea also with regard to what he called “ritual practice”: “To bring order is to bring division … the limit produces difference and the different things ‘by an arbitrary institution’, as Leibniz put it, translating the ‘ex instituto’ of the Scholastics. This magical act presupposes and produces collective belief, that is, ignorance of its own arbitrariness” (Bourdieu 1990, 210).

6 “In various current research traditions, the connection between repertoires and groups has been conceived of as an inherent relation, meaning that a certain identifiable repertoire is conceived of as built into the very ‘nature’ of a certain identifiable group. Such a view, even if not always formulated in such explicit terms, characterizes not only the earlier stages of anthropology but even later parts of
which evolved when a certain repertoire succeeded in materializing itself in a specific group.

Thus the conceptual framework of this research deals with the history of the formative stages of the Modern Hebrew repertoire as well as with the habitus it generated for both groupal and individual practices. In other words, the history of the ways in which the repertoire became available to the dominant group, and how it succeeded eventually in generating a particular pattern of behavior, i.e., a particular habitus.

“The habitus is a set of dispositions which incline agents to act and react in certain ways. The dispositions generate practices, perceptions and attitudes which are ‘regular’ without being consciously co-ordinated or governed by any ‘rule’” (Bourdieu 1993, 12).

The specific distinction drawn between the concepts of repertoire and habitus in this research underlines the fact that the history of the habitus is the history of the memory, this being understood not only as something abstract, ideological or symbolic but also as a memory which shapes and regulates the body. As Talal Asad puts it: “The concept of habitus invites us to analyze the body as an assemblage of embodied aptitudes, not as a medium of symbolic meanings” (Asad, 1993, 75).

1.1.2 Cultural Identity

The concept of cultural identity that this research employs is based on Sander L. Gilman’s theory concerning individual identity formation via his relationship with his reference group, i.e. that group in society that defines him; that creates his reality for him (Gilman 1986, 2). The reference group in Gilman’s definition is equivalent to the concept of the dominant group and is only one example of the correlation between Gilman’s conceptual framework and the conceptual framework described above.

Gilman’s theories are extremely useful to this research also because they were formed in the context of his studies of the cultural identity crisis of the Jews in the modern sociology, on the one hand and ‘the history of mentalities’ on the other. In simplistic terms, this stand actually hypothesizes ‘one indivisible repertoire for one group’” (Even-Zohar 2000, 42).
era, in which he analyzed the function of European and American cultures in the formation processes of Jewish cultural identities. In terms of his theory, Modern Hebrew culture was one of a series of identity options that arose following the crisis of the Jews in Europe at the end of the nineteenth century.

1.1.3 Modern Hebrews

My use of the definition “Modern Hebrews” is based on the perceptions and representations of the Jewish intelligentsia and the Zionist groups which operated in both Europe and Palestine at the end of the 19th century. In Palestine, they conceived themselves explicitly as the continuation of the ‘ancient Hebrews’ as opposed to the ‘Jews’ who were linked to what seemed to them the degenerate tradition of the galut.

More than reformers of Judaism or the Jews, they regarded themselves as revivalists of the ancient Hebrew culture and it was for this reason that they tried to emulate the ancient Hebrew heroes, as is evident from their naming Zionist sport clubs and para-military organizations after such figures as Samson, Bar Kochba, Yehuda Hamaccabi (Judas Maccabaeus), Shimon bar Giora and others whom they considered models for the Modern Hebrews. Concerning Zionist revivalism, Mosse notes that, in reality, the body and looks so essential to the making of the new Jew were a product, not of Biblical times, but of the Greek revival in late 19th century German culture:

“The conditions of the galut Jews, out of their original soil, were to be blamed for their stunted bodies, for in Biblical times they had produce strong men who could compete on equal terms with Greek athletes or Nordic barbarians” (Mosse 1991, 166).

We can find this differentiation between the Jew and the Hebrew among the first Zionist thinkers such as the writer Micha Berdyczewski (1865-1921) who wrote that “the Jews have the choice of being the last Jews or the first Hebrews.” One of those first new Hebrews, Avshalom Feinberg, 8 wrote to his friend Segula Bekman:

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8 Avshalom Feinberg (1889-1917) was born in Palestine (Gederah) and studied in France. He returned to Palestine to work at the research station in Atlit. Soon after the beginning of World War I, he was one of the founders of the NILI underground organization which assist the British forces to overcome the Turks and to occupy Palestine at the end of the war.
“We are the children of our land, we are not from the galut and the ghetto, and we are not ill with black-mood, we are...Oh you Hebrew [woman]! Don’t be a Jew (Yehudia)” (in: Elboim-Dror 1996, 123).

This quotation is typical of many “new Hebrews” and, as we can see here, women as well as men were expected to be “Hebrews” as opposed to “Jews.” In fact, according to Elboim-Dror, in the vocabulary of the New Yishuv’s youth, “Jew” was a curse and one can frequently find in their letters and diaries the expression “yehudonim”, a degrading utterance, similar to “kikes.”

It must be remembered, then, that the new social field in Zionist Palestine was built, not by Jews but by Hebrews: The workers’ organization was called the General Federation of Hebrew Workers and, similarly, the first teachers were organized under the title of the Hebrew Teachers’ Association. The first units that joined the British army in the First World War were called The Hebrew Regiment, the banners in the Zionist demonstrations called for “Hebrew work” and a “Hebrew state,” the slogan of the Hebrew language revivalists was “Ivri daber Ivrit” (Hebrews, speak Hebrew), the university in Jerusalem was the first “Hebrew University,” Tel Aviv was “the first Hebrew city” and so on.

The dichotomy of Jew and Hebrew was at the core of identity formation in the Zionist community in Palestine, and, to a large extent, shaped pre-Israel cultural identity, an identity that evolved in opposition to the galut Jew as he was pictured in European culture by all, from anti-Semites to Zionists, and also as a result of the tension

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9 (Ibid.). This term is still in use. In 2002, a member of the Israeli parliament Zvi Hendel called the American ambassador Dan Kerzer “Yehudon,” and when he apologized for it, he explained: “I meant a small person and mistakenly I said small Yehudon.” Smadar Shmueli, Storm in the Knesset, Ynet, internet version of Yediot Acharonot, the biggest daily in Israel [09.01.02]. In the year ago debate concerning Avraham (Avrum) Burg’s (a former MP) controversial declarations (such as that Israel is a militaristic state and that “to define the State of Israel as a Jewish state is the key to its end.”) he referred to his early cultural identity: “in the prevailing terminology here [in Israel]: [I was] Yehudon” (Ari Shavit, (Heb.) Divorce Certificate, Haaretz [07.06.07]). In many of the furious talkbacks Burg was designated as “stinking,” “poor,” or “traitor” “Yehudon” (Google Heb.: Burg+Yehudon). On the use of zhid (or yehudon) as designating “sickness” in Israeli culture, see e.g.: (Oz 1983, 73).

10 Many scholars dealt with this conflict from different positions. A summary and bibliography of this discourse can be found in: (Sela-Sheffy 2004, 480-481).
between the perception of Judaism as a religion and the “new Hebrews”’ secular perception of the Jews as a nation or a race.

After the Holocaust and the establishment of the State of Israel, both opposition and tension were repressed, in part because of the aspiration of the new state’s leadership to gain undisputed world recognition as the sole representative of all the Jews in the world, and they eventually became obsolete as the state was gradually re-Judaized as a result of mass immigration.11

Nevertheless, the split between Hebrews and Jews does still exist in contemporary Israel, albeit in repressed form, and seems far from being resolved. Common usage and popular historiography have, however, blurred the distinction between them and they have become more or less synonymous in public memory.12 In the course of this work I will discuss the history of this repressed tension and its meaning for understanding the Modern Hebrew/Jewish social field.

1.1.4 The Symmetrical Opposition

The opposition between the Jew and the Hebrew must be contextualized by the relationship of the modern Hebrews to their reference group, i.e., European culture. The Land of Israel/Palestine developed within an intricate dialogue with Europe and, in many ways, established its repertoire as a reaction to European culture’s perception and treatment of the Jews. From the beginning, the founders and agents of the Modern Hebrew space had an urge to prove their competence to the Europeans.

11 For a description of this tension in the context of the mass immigration in the 1950s see: (Bloom 2003).
12 We can find a reaction to this blurring of the distinction between the Jewish and Hebrew identities in the “Canaanite Movement” (called originally “the Committee for the Crystallization of Hebrew Youth”) which was active in the 1940s and 1950s. Although the movement had an important influence on some aspects of Israeli culture (especially art) it did not have any significant political impact, and did not succeed in achieving its goal of differentiating between Jews and Hebrews.
The legendary warrior Yosef Trumpeldor\textsuperscript{13} who immigrated to Palestine in 1912, wrote:

“if only the Gogols, and the Dostoyevskis […] could see the brave and bold chaps [the pioneers], they would have depicted their Jewish characters in a different way […].”\textsuperscript{14}

Similarly, the German Jewish-Zionist socio-economist Franz Oppenheimer (1864-1943),\textsuperscript{15} believed that the aim of Zionist activity was to improve the image of the Jews in the world and to make the Jews in the West – who did not intend to leave Europe – “proud” of their “working brothers” in Palestine (Oppenheimer 1924, 220).

Indeed, to become active and courageous fighters, or “productive” agricultural workers, was the ideal accepted by the new Zionist culture as the model to aspire to. If we examine the relationship between the repertoire of the modern Hebrew community and the European repertoires, it would seem that the qualities that the Modern Hebrew repertoire promoted were more or less the symmetrical opposites of all the negative qualities that the European repertoires attributed to the Jews:\textsuperscript{16} Greed and materialism versus socialist and idealist ideology; non-productivity versus the pioneers’ call for “the conquest of labor”; the femininity of the male Jewish body and mind versus the cult of masculinity and activism; lack of creativity versus the tendency for innovative actions with the specific stamp of “originality”; excessive intellectualism versus emphasis on practical thinking and disdain for extensive reflection; primitivism (being non-modern or uncivilized) versus the advantages of technology and modernity, which were emphasized as immanent to Zionism; low standards of hygiene versus an

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{13} Trumpeldor was already hailed as a hero in the 1905 Russian-Japanese war, where he lost an arm. In 1920 he died in one of the formative battles of Palestinian-Zionist military history, the battle of Tel Hai – a remote settlement in the Northern Galilee attacked by Arabs. His allegedly last words “It’s good to die for our country” became an inspiration for generations of patriots in Israel.
  \item \textsuperscript{14} Yosef Trumpeldor in his diary, in (Elon 1971, 137).
  \item \textsuperscript{15} Oppenheimer was a German sociologist and political economist. As a worldwide expert on colonization he became Herzl’s advisor and formulated the first program for Zionist colonization which he presented at the 6\textsuperscript{th} Zionist Congress (Basel/1903). Merchavia (the first cooperative settlement, 1910) was based from the outset on Oppenheimer’s cooperative schemes.
  \item \textsuperscript{16} On the idea of the symmetrical relations between Zionism and modern Anti-Semitism see: (Even-Zohar 1990, 178; Milfull 1993, 105-117).
\end{itemize}
intensive upgrading of the hygienic standards of the individual and the nation; lack of soldiering ability versus militarism and the encouragement of acts of bravery; anti-social behavior versus solidarity and loyalty to the state and the community; over-mercifulness versus the idea of “cruel Zionism”\textsuperscript{17} and even, blackness.\textsuperscript{18}

It must be noted that these opposites or contrasts were recognized not only in abstract ideological or symbolic forms but as concrete physical flaws that had to be corrected through new regulations and practices of intervention. To note one example, in the concluding paragraph of the (Heb.) \textit{A Summary of Physical Education History} (1953), which was “approved by the Ministry of Education and Culture’s Inspectorate of Physical Education in the Schools” one of the first (if not the first) gymnastics teachers\textsuperscript{19} in Palestine wrote:

“the shortcomings that the nations of the world ascribed to us – cowardice, evading military service, hatred of physical work, degenerate bodies (crooked back) etc. etc. disappeared over time thanks to the physical education that we began to foster, and thanks to the national spirit that began to pulsate among the people of our nation” (Nishri 1953, 56).

\textsuperscript{17} On this concept which is a frequent trope in Palestinian-Zionist discourse see: (Sharon 1944).
\textsuperscript{18} Blacks were not considered by the PO as part of the Jewish \textit{Volk}; the Ethiopian Jews were recognized as Jews by the State of Israel only in 1979.
\textsuperscript{19} Zvi Nishri, a gymnastic teacher in Palestine since 1907. The Ministry of Education texts on the history of sport presents him as “the father of physical culture in the Land of Israel.” He was an expert in the gymnastic systems of Sweden and Germany where he studied. When he returned to Palestine he instilled these methods and became a teacher of teachers. He was known as the “oldest gymnastics teacher”, and wrote a lexicon of physical education terms that were used by the first generations of teachers. See: [www.realit.org.il/data/files/22282014.doc].
1.2. History and Historiography

1.2.1 The Historiography of the Second Aliyah (1903-1914)

The accepted historiography of pre-Israel society (the *New Yishuv*) emphasized, in most cases, Zionist *ideology* as the main factor shaping the social field. The assertion was that the “new Hebrew” culture evolved from political activity – in particular that of the workers’ parties. In accordance with this perception, almost no attention was paid to the impact of the European cultural space on the creation of the Hebrew social field; this obliviousness resulted from the perception which became fixed as self-evident (at least in the popular narrative), that pre-Israel society “sprouted” of its own accord. The historical description of the Second Aliyah (1903-1914) period, the first models of which were formed at the end of the twenties (among others by the leadership of the workers’ parties: David Ben Gurion, Berl Katznelson and Yitzhak Tabenkin) emphasized the motif of “Anu bemo yadenu” (we with our own hands); i.e. with the originality, exclusiveness and creativity of the leaders of the workers’ parties. This was in accordance with their attempt to accumulate symbolic fortune towards the establishment of Mapai (The party of the Land of Israel Workers; the dominant workers’ party) (Zeeve Zachor 2005).

This perception changed to some extent, towards the end of the 1980s, with studies carried out by people like Yehonatan Frenkel (1989; 1996) and, recently, Gur Alroey (2004). Nevertheless, even in these works the European influence is researched mainly with regard to East Europe, while the crucial impact – through the *Palestine Office* – of German culture on the formation of society in the Second and Third Aliyot received minor attention. Jonathan Penslar was the first historian, to my knowledge, to undertake extensive research into the influence of German internal and external colonialism on the *New-Yishuv* via the PO (Penslar 1987; 1991). Nevertheless,

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20 To note just one example regarding this issue, Ruppin was the first to conceive the idea of settling the Negev as well as the first to research its possibilities (Goldstien 2003, 265), (He would seem to have been following Aaron Aharonson (1876-1919), who researched it even earlier). In the common narrative however, the idea and enterprise of settling the Negev is attributed to Ben-Gurion; it is one of his main symbolic virtues.

21 The conceptual link between the PO and the PLDC and the *Prussian Colonization Commission* (PCC) was posited for the first time by Shalom Reichman; a professor of Geography at the Hebrew University, see: (Reichman 1984, 57-70).
Penslar and others who followed him (e.g., Shilony 1998) presented German culture as providing the material and administrative means, but not the cultural models, and certainly not those responsible for the production of a cultural identity.

Frenkel emphasized this point (though without developing it) in his article The “Yizkor” Book of 1911, in which he claimed that:

“what were considered ‘the bold experiments’ which eventually proved to be of decisive importance in the development of the Labor movement, were initiated for the most part without the help of the parties or even in contradiction to their avowed principles. [...] They had, at most, nominal control, and often had to adapt their ideological formulations to accommodate the new polices developed by other groups” (Frankel 1996, 423).

What I intend to demonstrate is that the “other groups” mentioned by Frankel are those which supported and directed the Palestine Office, and that “the bold experiments” were actually the initiatives of the directors of that office as part of their culture planning.

Frankel’s thesis expresses the view (when translated into concepts prevailing in culture research) that the people of the Second and Third Aliyot were not the producers of the repertoire, but mainly its reproducers. This research will endeavour, in the spirit of Bourdieu’s classic article, to answer the question of the “blind spot” in Second Aliyah historiography: “but who created the creators?,” and to show that in many ways, the directors of the PO – the representatives of the German-World Zionists in Palestine/Land of Israel – were, more than has been estimated up till now, the creators of the “creators”.

This attitude differs from the approach of the common historiography, one of whose main representatives is Anita Shapira. When she deals, for example, with the question of the origin of the first Collective Groups (kevutzot), she discovers how minor the attention of the workers was to matters of socialism and how extensively they dealt with the problem of “Hebrew work” (in other words, that nationalism was more important to them than socialism). At the end of her account she concludes that it was
not a “socialist philosophy” but “the actual state of affairs in Palestine” that led to the creation of the first Collective Group (Shapira 1982, 110). Shapira repeats here, in other words, what Yosef Baraz of Degania (the first collective group) had said in 1923:

“The group is not the [fruit of] the world cooperative idea. We didn’t learn from it, and at the beginning of our way we didn’t pay attention to it either. For us, this is a typical creation of the Land of Israel; it was created from life, and its source – the reality in the Land of Israel.” (The Book of the Group 1925, 15-16)

The similarity between the conclusion of the historian and the description of the actual historical agent, expresses a sometimes seemingly unconscious tendency in Zionist historiography to make uncritical use of the speech and writing of the subject of the research. If we consider that culture is created through the activity of agents and institutions, the assertion that the Collective Group’s (kevutza’s) creation resulted from “the actual state of affairs,” can merely explain the rhetoric of the members of the group and reflects the tendency of some Israeli historians for uncritical endogenous self-representation in the service of the nation, behaviour well-known from many other ‘revival’ movements.

Shapira’s typical approach, which reflects the dominant model used for understanding culture’s effects on action in the history of the Second Aliyah, is fundamentally misleading. It derives from the above-mentioned assumption that Modern Hebrew culture was shaped by the ideological sphere (nationalist or socialist) which, by providing ultimate ends or values toward action, was the central causal element for its emergence. Analysing the activities of Ruppin may expose the foundations of the culture planning which eventually generated this assumption, in other words, the ways in which “the actual state of affairs” was produced.

As opposed to the common narrative, this study will demonstrate that the directors of the PO, and Ruppin in particular, had a distinct perception of themselves as culture planners, and that, from 1908 – the year the PO was established – the Jewish and Hebrew social field in Palestine was organized to a large extent according to their
culture planning. However, as will be elaborated later, this does not mean that the results conformed in all cases to their planning.

In the period that followed its establishment, the PO devised a plan aimed at introducing a new repertoire that differed not only from the repertoire of the *First Aliyah* (1882-1902), but also from the repertoire developed by the first wave of the Second Aliyah and by the later *Third Aliyah* (1919-1923). It is my contention that the Second and Third Aliyot\(^{22}\) must be divided into two periods: in the first, (1903-1908) there existed beliefs and perceptions that were fundamentally different from those developed in the second period, after the appearance of the PO. (1908-1925).

I maintain that the history of the Modern Hebrew repertoire is not compatible with the division made in the historical research, which perceived the *Second Aliyah* as one indivisible period, and differentiated it from the Third Aliyah (1919-1923). Examination of the pre-Israel repertoire reveals that not only were the two periods of the Second Aliyah different with regard to the repertoire of the dominant group, but also – following the negative mass emigration (about 90%) – we can say that they were different, too, in the identity of their population. In other words, most of the immigrants from the first period had already left Palestine by the time of the second part of the *Second Aliyah* and the *Third Aliyah*. This negative emigration, like the positive immigration after the First World War, was conducted to a large extent by the PO’s culture planning.

The groups and the initial or partial repertoires (i.e., repertoires which were still in the planning stage and whose creators did not have enough statist capital) that were contested in the Zionist field in which the PO operated, underwent a significant shift that resulted, to a large extent, from Ruppin’s culture planning. This change in the social field can be described as the emergence of a new Zionist repertoire that merged the different groups into a new cultural structure, with far-reaching implications for the formation of the Modern Hebrew cultural identity.

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\(^{22}\) Which may differ slightly in terms of ideology but were quite similar in terms of their repertoire.
1.2.2 Ruppin’s Activities: An Overview

Dr. Arthur Ruppin was sent to Palestine for the first time in 1907 by the heads of the German [World] Zionist Organization in order to make a pilot study of the possibilities for colonization. After a few months of extensive work he presented his report and a concrete operative plan. A few weeks later, he was appointed representative of the Zionist movement in Palestine and director of the Palestine Office, which he established, cautiously and discreetly, in a two room apartment in Jaffa (1908).

Ruppin was, as the preceptor of the labour movement Berl Katzenelson describes, the central “colonizer” of the new Zionist community (Katzenelson 1968, 30). Between 1908 and 1942 there was hardly any large scale national undertaking in Palestine – economic, juridical, diplomatic or educational – in which Ruppin was not involved at the highest level of planning and direction. From the start, he worked to implement his vision and plan of creating a Modern Hebrew social field, in a model state. In his account of 1907 he described the function of the Office thus:


This text reflects Ruppin’s ambition to create an administrative and cultural autonomy in the country that would be independent of the authorities (first Ottoman and, later, the British government) on the one hand and the Arab population on the other.23

Ruppin’s most important and urgent responsibility and activity was to purchase land in Palestine and to establish on it Jewish settlements of every possible type. In the complex bureaucracy and political tensions of the fading Ottoman Empire that ruled

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23 It must be remembered that as a result of the political and economic conditions in Palestine the new administrative field could be formed almost without the need to take into consideration the Jewish social structure which preceded it, see: (Lisak 1981, 16).
Palestine, this was not an easy task. Ruppin’s successful handling of this mission was due to his high skills as a professional lawyer and an experienced businessman. His activities paved the way for many others and made the purchasing of the land accessible as never before.

A short time after his arrival in Palestine, he initiated the Palestine Land Development Company (PLDC), an institution that, together with the Jewish National Fund (JNF) (of which Ruppin was an important member) regulated the Zionists’ land purchases. It was Ruppin’s land purchasing policy and practical ability that created the possibility for the first extensive land purchase in the Central Eastern and Western Jezreel Valley and the subsequent acquisitions in other parts of the Jezreel Valley, in Wadi Hawarith (now Emek Hefer) and the Haifa Bay area (now known as Emek Zebulun) and as far as the Beth-Shean Valley and the Hula Valley. Similarly, large contiguous areas of land were purchased under his close direction in Haifa (Carmel, Hadar Ha-Carmel, etc.), Tel Aviv (the first large scale acquisitions) and Jerusalem (Mount Scopus and barren lands belonging to the Greek Patriarchate which became King George Avenue, Rehavia, etc.). These purchases were made by various means, sometimes through companies specially established for the purpose and all this was part of a consistent policy (Bein 1972, 136).

Ruppin’s abilities and achievements made him, within a short time, the movement’s “primus inter pares” expert in all matters connected with Palestine (Penslar 2000, 206), and led the Zionist Executive to call upon him to present and defend the settlement policy of the Zionist Organization at the various Commissions of Inquiry which were set up, seriatim, by the British, from the time of the Arab riots/rebellion of 1929 onwards. Consequently, the distribution of the population within the Jewish enclave and the frontiers of the Jewish state in the first Partition Proposal of the Royal (Peel) Commission in 1937 as well as the subsequent one of the United Nations Special Commission in Palestine just a decade later, in 1947, actually followed what Ruppin had prepared when he began his activities in Palestine, and which he re-drafted at several later stages of his career (Bein 1972, 136).

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24 From 1902 until 1907 – the year he first came to Palestine – he practiced law as a Referendar (junior barrister), Assessor and then (German) State Prosecutor (Bertisch 1980, 2).
25 The Palestine Land Development Company was established in 1909 by Ruppin and Otto Warburg as an instrument for the acquisition and development of land in Palestine.
At the beginning of the twenties, Ruppin established the Workers’ Bank (Bank HaPoalim) and, during the thirties, he was a dominant party in the negotiations which led to the Transfer Agreement signed with the Nazi regime, and then in its implementation. At the same time, he established The Institute for Economic Research and Planning, which created economic and demographic plans for the following decades of Jewish settlement, and included a compensation claim from Germany after the Second World War.

Ruppin sat on many forums and boards many of which, he himself had established. He was, for example, a member of the board of the Workers’ Bank and of the board of Mekorot (the central water company), until his last days; in both of them he was the head of the directorate) (Goldstien 2003, 219). Among the many institutions he initiated or shaped were the previously mentioned PLDC and JNF, the Kibbutz movement, the Histadrut, the Anglo-Palestine Bank (since 1948 Bank Leumi- Hebrew for The National Bank), the Israeli Mortgage Bank, and many others, most of them still operating in Israel today.

However, Ruppin did not deal only with purchasing real estate and establishing economic institutions; he was just as concerned with building a nation and planning its culture. His economic activities were interconnected with his cultural and educational ones, and he recognized that the new Zionist identity would arise, above all, from Zionist educational plans and institutions. The ultimate product of this specifically Zionist form of Bildung was to be the new Jewish man; the New Hebrew bound to his ancestral home of Eretz Yisrael (the Land of Israel).

One of Ruppin’s first moves was to gain control over the education system and to change the educational approach of the First Aliyah teachers’ association. He was an honored member of the education committee of the Herzlia Gymnasium (the first Zionist gymnasium/secondary school in Palestine), promoted the establishment of a Hebrew Gymnasium in Jerusalem, was involved in establishing the Hebrew

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26 Pinchas Rozen, whom Ruppin helped economically and professionally was also on the board of Mekorot (Goldstien 2003, 265).

27 On the concept “Zionist Bildung” see: (Berkowitz 1989).
University and the Haifa Technion, and had a formative impact on the educational programs of the Kibbutz movement and the New Yishuv in general. According to historians of education, it was actually Ruppin who established the pre-state of Israel’s system of education (Elboim-Dror 1986, 32-36; Shilo 1998, 194; Shur 2001, 183).

It is interesting to note that in spite of all the above achievements, Ruppin knew no language other than German. Though his personal Hebrew language teacher was the young writer S. Y. Agnon, he never acquired fluency in the Hebrew language, and, even after more than 20 years in Palestine, he used to read his lectures from a Hebrew text written in Latin characters – one of his listeners was amazed by his accent, realizing that he was hearing Hebrew with a Magdeburgian accent.

In 1925 he wrote in his diary:

"From the time when the German language became odious in public life in Eretz Yisrael, I became ‘dumb.’ And I will stay ‘dumb’ for ever, since even if I continue to learn Hebrew, it will not become as refined an instrument as the German used to be” (Bein 1968, II, 94 [12 Feb. 1925]).

Nevertheless, Ruppin was an ardent supporter of the Hebrew language from the outset and played a significant role in resolving the “language quarrel” (riv haleshonot; 1913) – an important step, psychologically and practically, in the dissemination of the Hebrew language before World War I (Shur 2001, 182). As will be explored later, the revival of the Hebrew language was central to Ruppin’s perception of culture, and in particular to his image of the Modern Hebrews.

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28 This is according to Shur (Shur 2001,180). Nevertheless, Ruppin probably knew some English. According to his diaries, he lectured in English during one of his journeys to America (Bein 1968, III, 51). However, it seems that Ruppin did not need to use English very often. One can say that, until the 1920s, the German language was the dominant language of the Zionist discourse and bureaucratic field. The offices of the movement were in Germany and Austria, the central newspaper Die Welt was published in German, and even the language used by the Palästina-Amt (the PO) was German until the mid 1920s.

In addition to and parallel with his functions in the Zionist organization, Ruppin carried out intensive academic research and was internationally renowned as an expert in the sociology, demography and anthropology of the Jews. He was the director of the *Büro für Statistik der Juden* (1904) (Bureau for Jewish statistics and demography) in Berlin and the editor of the influential and formative journal *Zeitschrift für Demographie und Statistik der Juden*. (Journal for Jewish statistics and demography) More than a decade later he was the founder of the *Department for the Sociology of the Jews* at the Hebrew University (1926). Ruppin wrote numerous books and articles which are considered the first serious attempt in the modern era to carry out scientific research on the Jews. For these scientific achievements, he has earned the epithets, in recent historiography, of “founder of German-Jewish demography” (Gilman 1993c, 9), “father of Israel sociology” (Ram 1993, 13), “founder of the sociology of the Jews” (Gilman 1996, 77) and “the leading social scientific authority on the Jews” (Hart 2005, 49).

Ruppin’s high prestige as a scientist and his positivistic, numerical style of presentation was one of the factors that gave him a unique “objective” or “impartial” position in the Zionist movement. This position enabled him to avoid being identified with any political party and to detach himself from the popular political sphere. Ruppin despised festive receptions with long, grandiloquent speeches full of “Zionism” and cocktail parties with Zionists celebrities; he much preferred the practical atmosphere behind the scenes. This strategy of detachment stemmed, not only from his particular personality and the fact that he could not speak Hebrew, but also from his firmly held opinion regarding the very marginal impact of ideological discussions and dissensions, a point that will be clarified later in this work. Ideologically speaking, Ruppin did not prefer one form of settlement or colonization over another, and gave each one the support needed for its establishment and flourishing. We see, for example, that at the same time as he was planning and establishing working “socialist” groups, he was also an entrepreneur of luxury holiday villas for rich Jews from abroad – on the banks of that same Sea of Galilee.

Nevertheless, although Ruppin was not attached to any political party or camp, he had a special relationship with two important groups that actually constituted the dominant group of pre-Israel society. The first was that of the immigrants from
Eastern Europe who arrived in the Second and Third Aliyot (1903-1924), and the second, that of the German Jews of the Fifth Aliyah (1934-1940), who arrived in Palestine after the rise of the Nazis.

Ruppin’s talent for mediating, at the beginning of the century, between the German Zionists in Berlin and the young pioneers in Palestine, as well as later, in the 1930s, between the Jekkes and the institutions of the Yishuv, gave him another important title that will be analysed in a later chapter: “He who built the bridge between East and West” – between the “brothers and strangers” who returned to work here together.

As will be explored in chapter five, Ruppin played a formative role in molding the identity of the poor, young and restless East European Jews who arrived sporadically in Palestine from the end of 1903 onwards. It was he who generated the energy that gave them, as a group, their socio-semiotic-cohesiveness and, within a very short time, their dominant position in pre-Israel culture so that, after the establishment of the state, it was they who, in fact, controlled the political and cultural system – without any serious opposition – until the end of the 1970s. Their leaders, David Ben-Gurion, Itzhak Ben-Zvi, Joseph Sprintzak, Berl Katznelson, Yitzhak Tabenkin, Zalman Shazar, Levi Eshkol – were all influenced by him and received his support – while their political heirs from the Third Aliyah (1918-1923), such as Eliezer Kaplan and Golda Meir, gave a determinate shape to the emerging Israeli society and simultaneously fashioned its labor movement into a political force that remained dominant until 1977. The importance of Ruppin in the formation of this group cannot be overestimated as he was the main figure in the consolidation of what Sternhal called the “package deal” between the “national bourgeoisie” and the workers’ movement (Sternhal 2005). Ruppin’s book, Der Aufbau des Landes Israel, (The Superstruction of the Land of Israel), published in Berlin in 1919, became an indispensable reference in all future deliberations on the economy of Palestine (Lavsky 1996, 48).

30 (Katznelsson 1968, 12). This function was attributed to Ruppin by many others too.
31 As in the title of Aschheim’s canonical work.
More than twenty years after the period of the Second Aliyah, Ruppin became an important figure for a quite different group, the so-called Jekkes – the German and Austrian Jews who arrived in sunny Palestine soon after the rise of Hitler, in the Fifth Aliyah (1934-1940). According to the common Zionist narrative, Ruppin was one of the first to recognize the danger of the Nazis and to act energetically for the rapid evacuation of the German Jews. For that purpose he established and directed a special department, known as the German Department (with the official title of The Central Office for the Settlement of the German Jews) in the framework of which he established RASSCO (Rural and Suburban Settlement Corporation), for the purpose of building agricultural settlements and suburbs especially for the German-Jewish newcomers (Lichtheim 1953, 172).

Within a very short time, this group had a significant impact on the social field and became an integral part of the dominant group. If for the first group Ruppin was “the father,” for the latter, he was the “good uncle from Palestine.” According to researchers of the Jekkes, Ruppin is the person most often mentioned in the document bank of what Rakefet Sela-Sheffy terms “the Jekke pack.” The daughter of Zmora, a distinguished member of the pack, described a party in their house in 1941:

“In one corner of the living room there gathered a group of admirers around Arthur Ruppin […]. His work already yielded blessed fruits and made him [...] the lion of the pack” (Zmora 1997, 20-22).

Indeed, there is a clear parallel between the economic and career development of the “Jekke pack” and the development of the “workers’ organizations.” One of the main roles of the German Jews was the establishing of the juridical field. The first magistrates court was initiated and established by the PO already in 1909, and was meant to be a Zionist alternative to the existing (Ottoman, then Mandatory) legal system (Sela-Sheffy 2003, 31). According to Sela-Sheffy, Ruppin’s activities during that period systematically prepared the basis for a possible legal system and its institutions, and for the establishment of the Ministry of Justice (Sela-Sheffy 2003, 31, 38).

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32 See for example the case of Moshe Zmora in: (Sela-Sheffy 2004, 32).
In the mid-thirties, with his work in the German Department almost concluded, Ruppin felt that he had finished most of the important part of his mission. The only thing that was still needed, he wrote in his diary, was to “reproduce and expand what is already planned.”

Nevertheless, Ruppin could not rest and, in his last years, he concentrated on planning the future. In his last official position as the head of The Institute for Economic Research and Planning that he had established, he worked energetically to create an economic and demographic plan for the next decades of Zionist settlement. This work proved to be an important contribution to the Zionist claims at the international conference that took place after the war, though he himself was no longer alive, having died of a sudden heart attack while working in his garden, in January 1943, at the age of 67.
1.2.3 Ruppin’s Ambiguous Position in Zionist Historiography

Ruppin’s immense contribution to the Zionist movement gave him the title, in Zionist historiography — from high-school text books through Encyclopedia Judaica to the so-called post-Zionists historians — of “The Father of Jewish settlement in Palestine.” Many historians agree that Ruppin was responsible for the “foundation and structure of the settlement in the land from the 1920s until the establishment of the State” (Shilo 1984, 47), and that he is one of the few “to whom so many owe so much […] whose actions we are experiencing until today” (Goren 2005, 550).

Nevertheless, in spite of the emotional charge and formative meaning of the title “Father,” Zionist historiography actually treats him as a “Zionist clerk, though one progressive in his views” (Halpern and Rienharz 2000, 237), and he is usually depicted as an apolitical and external expert on bureaucracy and the economy. In the Israeli collective memory, as reflected in education and the media, Ruppin’s persona does not hold any notable significance and is only vaguely delineated.

Contrary to the perception of him as a “Zionist clerk” or functionary this research will present Ruppin as a culture planner and as one of the main producers and disseminators of the Modern Hebrew identity models and habitus. The reasons for his ambiguous position – which reflect some of the limits and taboos of Zionist historiography and memory, especially in Israel – will be discussed in various places throughout the work.
1.3 The Main Questions of the Research

- What was the process that formed the dominant group in Modern Hebrew settlement, and how did it succeed in ruling and enforcing its repertoire.

- In what ways did the new repertoire mold the individuals in the first stages of the Hebrew social field; in what way was it different from competing repertoires, and what was the source of its attraction.

- Following the transfer of the repertoire from Europe to Palestine, what role was played by the clash between the vision and perceptions of the immigrants, including the heads of the PO, and the reality they experienced in Palestine/Land of Israel in the formation of the Modern Hebrew cultural identity.

- How was Palestine/Land of Israel portrayed to the Europeans and the Americans, especially to their Jewish communities, in the first decades of the twentieth century. What did these portrayals reflect and what were the interests of the PO in producing and disseminating them.

- What was the nature of the transfer to Palestine/Land of Israel of the institutions and parties that had emerged in Europe. What was the impact of this transfer on those institutions and on their organizational and personal structure.

- For what reasons did Zionist historiography evade, disparage or repress Ruppin’s important and significant role in the production of Modern Hebrew culture.
1.4. Sources

The written sources for this study can be divided into the following categories:

1. Ruppin’s un-edited or unpublished writings and documents, stored nowadays mainly in the Central Zionist Archive but also in the Leo Baeck Archives in Berlin and New York, and in Ben Gurion’s Archive (Ben Gurion University, Sede Boker). These include early articles published in his pre-Zionist period that have either not yet appeared or have not received proper attention in the literature, and several documents – diary entries, letters, diagrams and drafts – never previously published.\(^{33}\)

2. Secondary literature. The main part of the research is based on a crosscheck of the many studies which present Ruppin’s activity in a fragmentary manner; as a sub-theme of their research or concentrating on one particular aspect of his work. For example, his land purchase policy (among others: Shilo, Penslar, Shafir, Duchan-Landau, Shilony, Katz) his attitude towards the Yemenites, (Nini, Shafir, Kamon, Meir, Goren) and the Arabs, (Landuaer, Shapira, Lavski, Gorni), his economic theory, (Bertisch, Friedlander) his relationship with the Second Aliyah immigrants,(Frenkel, Almog, Gorni, Alroey), his educational activities, (Elboim-Dror, Shur) his sociological theories, (Doron, Efron, Penslar, Hart,), his demographic work, (Della Pergola) his relationship with the “Jekke pack”, his activities in the juridical field (Sella-Shefi) and in Brit Shalom (Lavski, Shapira, Ratzabi), etc.

\(^{33}\) Between 1901-1936 Ruppin published 372 items (Bein 1968, III, 308) and since he continued to write until his last years, we can assume that he published more than 400 items. It is estimated that Ruppin left 10,000 diary pages (Hapoel Hatzair 19-20, 1943, 4).
1.4.1 Ruppin’s published Diaries and Alex Bein’s portrayal of him

The most important historian responsible for Ruppin’s historical representation is indubitably Alex Bein, director of the CZA in the years 1955-1971, who edited Ruppin’s Diaries, Letters and Memories, editions of which appeared in Hebrew (1968), with an introduction by Berl Katznelson, and an afterword by Bein and in English (1972) (with a preface by another of Ruppin’s admirers, Moshe Dayan). Bein also wrote the afterword to the German edition, edited by Shlomo Krolik (85).

All these editions have obviously been edited in such a way as to meet Bein’s (and Krolik’s) perception of Zionist history, and they omit or change many entries and paragraphs. Most of the cuts concern Ruppin’s ambiguous attitude towards Germany, including such matter and tropes as might be detrimental to Bein’s description of Ruppin as a far-sighted thinker with an attentive Zionist sense and Jewish genius that enabled him to be well prepared for – if not actually to forecast – the Holocaust. Bein’s portrayal of Ruppin tends to reaffirm Zionism as the ultimate solution to the jüdische Frage – the most typical characteristic of Ruppin according to Bein is his “simplicity” (pashtut), “he saw himself and others without complications or psychological complexes” (Bein 1968, III, 391).

Nevertheless, Bein was not only the editor and the keeper of Ruppin’s documents; it was he, too, who wrote the seminal article, and certainly the most quoted one, of Ruppin’s historiography: Arthur Ruppin: The Man and his Work, published in 1968 as the afterword to the Hebrew edition of Ruppin’s Diaries, Letters and Memories, and later, in English, in the Leo Baeck Year Book of 1972.
In this article, Bein gives Ruppin the title of the “Father,” and thus becomes the first person to emphasize that:

“It is impossible to describe the period of settlement by the Zionist Organization from the year 1908 onward without Ruppin. He stamped the impress of his personality so deeply upon it indeed, that he can, without exaggeration, be called the Father of the Zionist Settlement” (Bein 1972, 132).

Bein’s portrayal must also be understood as a product of his personal relationship with Ruppin. As Bein’s autobiography reveals, Ruppin was his first patron and was involved in his work as an “important authority” (Bein 1992, 186-187).

Although Ruppin’s importance is emphasized by many, no full biography of him appeared until 2005. Nevertheless, Yaakov Goren’s comprehensive biography (Heb.) Arthur Ruppin – His Life and His Work (556 pages), is similar in its approach to Bein’s glorified portrayal. While containing valuable material for students of Ruppin, Goren tends to explain his weltanschauung as a result of his “unconscious” sense of “Jewish tradition” (Goren 2005, 86, 100).

Many research works, chapters and articles have been written on Ruppin, but none of them deals, in the manner that this research aspires to explore, with the relationship between the different fields and dimension of his life and work or, in particular, with the impact of his cultural identity and weltanschauung on his activities in Palestine.

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34 As compared to Baron Edmond de Rothschild, who had the title “The Father of the Yishuv.”

35 In the mid 1930s, the unemployed Bein was given a job by Ruppin: to collect materials concerning the history of the Jewish settlement and to conduct a research. Ruppin took care of the finances and gave Bein more money than he requested; unique behavior in the Zionist Organization according to the amazed Bein. Ruppin was involved in the collection of the materials and in the preparation of the list of interviewees, as well as in frequently advising Bein.
2. Cultural Identity

*The price of admission into a culture is the acquiring of its projective identifications.*
R. M. Young

*Only he who has courageously sworn upon the truth /
Counts as a man in the German Fatherland.*
A ballad from the Kulturkampf days

2.1 The Culture Space of Ruppin’s Childhood and Youth

Arthur (Shimon) Ruppin was born on the first of March 1876, in Rawitsch (Polish: Rawicz), a small town in the eastern Prussian province Posen, to his father Albert (Yitzhak) Ruppin (born 1842) and his mother Cäcilie Borck (born 1854). Both of his parents came from the area, as is evidenced by their names (Rypin is a town 150 kilometers from Warsaw and Borck is near Posen).

This area constituted a vague cultural and geographical space between Germany, which aspired to intensify its presence in the area, and Poland, which considered Poznan (the Polish name of the region) part of its historical and national territory.

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36 Although the oedipal elements in Ruppin’s life story and psyche are striking, it is not my intention to analyze his psychological identity but rather to limit myself to an interpretation of his cultural identity, as this concept provides a framework in which both individual and cultural processes can be staged as a series of mutually reinforcing interactions.
37 (Young 1992b, 3).
39 Cäcilie Borck was a daughter of a merchant belonging to a family that claimed to be directly related to Rabbi Kalisher. Ruppin discovered this to be false during his deep research into his family tree (Bein 1968, III, 287).
40 In Prussian Poland in 1861, the German population, which represented the dominant or oppressing nation, was in a slight majority (about 57%). The Germans suppressed the Poles financially, for example by confiscating estates ─ one form of the occupying power’s repressions. As a result, the amount of German possessions grew steadily. For example, in 1848 the percentage of land owned by the Junkers in Posen was 29.7% while by 1871 it had increased to 46.2% (Trzeciakowski 1990, 12).
In addition to their numerical and material superiority, the Germans had also substantial cultural and symbolic capital, a fact which placed the Polish population in a difficult cultural situation. The 1880s were marked, on the one hand, by splendid Prussian military successes and on the other, by the end of Polish hopes of regaining independence. Prussian victories over Denmark, Austria, and France led to considerable changes in the attitude of the German population towards the Poles.

From the beginning of the 19th century, the Prussians operated in this space as “cultural colonizers” and, in addition to confiscating Polish lands, they tried to establish their dominance by Germanizing the population and rejecting the Polish culture and language. The grounds for this so-called Polenpolitik lay partly in the high percentage of Polish speakers in Germany (about 10% — 3 million people — in 1890), whose presence there intensified the Prussians’ traditional fear of invasion from the “barbaric” East. In addition, Bismarck reinforced the existing German fear of the power of an “international Catholic Church” centered in Rome, fuelling the tension between (German) Protestantism and (Polish) Catholicism. Thus for almost ten years, first with Prussia and then with Germany as whole, Bismarck thought to limit the authority of the Catholic Church. However, this policy — which was part of the so-called Kulturkampf — should not be perceived as a mere attack on Polish and Catholic culture, or as a means of fulfilling the colonialist aspiration of Prussia, but rather as part of the nation building and unification of the Germans and Germany. Polishness, with all its pregnant meanings, became here the otherness of the German self.  

According to Walser Smith, the official Kulturkampf was a strategy of nation building, supported by the state and centered on an attempt to create a common high culture in which national values, largely synonymous with those of enlightened Protestantism, would be shared. The vision of the poets and the polemicists of the Kulturkampf contained, as its counterpart, an ethos of complete assimilation to the values of the new nation state (Walser Smith 1995, 36). "For us” wrote Treitschke

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41 On the concept “otherness of the self” see: (Bhabha 1990, 187).
“the state is not, as it is for the Americans, a power to-be-contained, so that the will of the individual may remain uninhibited, but rather a cultural power from which we expect positive achievements in all areas of national life.”

In 1872, soon after Bismarck’s appointment of Adalbert Falk (1827-1900) as Minister for Education and Cultural Affairs, Prussia passed a school inspection law that gave the state the sole right to inspect public and private schools. Bismarck directed this law, harmless enough on the surface, against what he perceived to be “un-German” clerical and Polish influences in public education. In May 1873, Bismarck introduced, and the Prussian Landtag passed, a series of bills ensuring state control over the appointment and education of priests. These laws, known as the May Laws, required that Catholic priests possess German citizenship and a certificate of German higher education, and that they pass an examination in philosophy, history, and German literature. The May Laws also gave the state the right to veto the appointment of a priest to a particular parish as well as the power to relieve him of his position if he proved politically unacceptable (Walser Smith 1995, 41-42). It was clear to all the German political parties, from right to left, that “it was not possible for the state to liberate itself from clerical domination without interfering in the course of events.”

Treitschke declared plainly that “the German state forces parents to have their children educated; it does not give them the right to their Catholic stupidity” (in: ibid., 39).

Bismarck’s plan was outwardly simple. It would be enough to distance the wide masses of loyal Polish subjects from anti-state propaganda, to be achieved through the spread of fluency in German. The first step to be taken was to organize schools that would educate the Poles in a spirit of loyalty to the state and teach the pupils good German. After leaving the confines of the school, the now adult citizen would be able to use German in order to realistically confront hostile, factually unsupported, nationalistic agitation.

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43 Eugen Richter, a German liberal and the leader of the progressive party. in: (ibid., 38).
44 Treitschke, Zehn Jahre deutsche Kämpfe, in: (ibid., 39).
Two years before Ruppin’s birth, this Germanization of the education system of Posen became even harsher and a total prohibition was placed on teaching in languages other than German. In addition to the exclusivity of the German language, the education system was so planned as to fulfill the mission of educating the youth to become patriotic citizens. The education system’s goal was to imprint in the child’s mind, at a very early stage, the superiority of German culture, and the spiritual and material wealth he could share if he chose to become part of it. In that spirit, the partition of Poland was presented as an historical necessity and emphasis was placed on the advantages of the Prussian constitution (Wosner 1941, 87).

The education system placed particular stress on the individual’s dependence on the nation. It defined the individual and his free will as part of a nation. The individual himself was considered worthless – everything he possessed, his knowledge, feelings and actions, were all for the nation. This indoctrinization underscores the fact that when an individual speaks or fights against his nation, he is doing something “unnatural” that reveals his ingratitude (Wosner 1941, 76). The dichotomies that underlie the Kulturkampf discourse and that informed national identity were indeed stark. In the national imagination, German patriots were loyal, steadfast, and honest; in the Kulturkampf they struggled for light and truth. “Only he who has courageously sworn upon the truth/ counts as a man in the German Fatherland,” insisted one balladeer.45

The social and geographical space in which Ruppin spent his first decade was undergoing a very fast process of transformation, as Ruppin himself describes in his diary:

“Die Bevölkerung der Stadt (von etwa 13 000 Seelen) war zu meiner Zeit zum ganz überwiegenden Teile deutsch; die Nähe Schlesiens hatte viele deutsche Elemente hingeführt, und sie hatten die Polen, einst die Herren der Stadt, verdrängt. [...] So war auch der frühere polnische Name der Stadt „Rawicz“ in das deutsch klingende Rawitsch umgewandelt worden. [...] Während in den umliegenden Dörfern das Polnische vorherrschte, wurde in der Stadt die

deutsche Sprache mit seltener Reinheit und grammatischer Richtigkeit gesprochen [...] die Stadt Rawitsch hatte eine jüdische Gemeinde von etwa 3000 Seelen, die ein Viertel der gesamten Einwohner ausmachten. Die anderen drei Viertel entfielen beinahe zu gleichen Teilen auf Protestanten und Katholiken. Die Protestanten waren fast ausschließlich deutscher, die Katholiken vorwiegend polnischer Nationalität. Die Juden fühlten sich zur deutschen Kultur hingezogen und sprachen deutsch” (Korolic 1985, 32).

During the last years of the 19th century, many Posnian Jews acculturated rapidly and with considerable success. From the late 1830s and especially after the events of 1848, the way of immigration to Prussia was opened, and many of the Jews of Posen took this opportunity and settled mainly in Berlin and its vicinity. The Jews of Posen were the last group whose absorption into German culture (including German Jewish culture), can be considered a successful and relatively moderate process, achieved with no special struggle.46

In Ruppin’s school, as he remembered it, the attitude towards Jews was good and inviting:


Those years are described in his diary and memoirs as harmonious and full of happiness and love. He was a very successful pupil, actually at the top of his class:

“[…] so dass meine Eltern stolz auf mich waren und mein Vater bei Verwandten und Bekannten des Rühmens über mich kein Ende wusste. Meine Zensuren wurden an alle Verwandten eingeschickt und jedem gezeigt, mochte er sie sehen wollen oder nicht. Ich erblicke hierin den ersten Anstoß zu der Selbstüberschätzung, die mir zu eigen wurde” (Korolic 1985, 34).

46 Between the years 1824 and 1871 about 50,000 Jews emigrated from Posen to other parts of Prussia. 50,000 more emigrated between the years 1877-1905.
In those happy days, Ruppin was immersed in a deep initiation process in which he absorbed the messages of the German education system, and developed a great desire to be an active participant in the German nation. These were the years of “invitation” (as opposed to the years of “rejection” to be described later). Bismarck, as Ruppin noted in his diary, supported intermarriage. In 1892 Bismarck declared “the Jews bring to the mixture of the different German tribes a certain mousseaux (sparkle), which should not be underestimated” in: (Low 1979, 361). This sympathy emerged, at least partly, from his political interest, namely to fight the liberal parties, especially the Freisinn party which supported emancipation and was supported by the German Jews (ibid. 360-363).

When, at the age of sixteen, Ruppin writes in his diary “[…] ich mich voll und ganz als Deutscher fühle,” it is as if he were answering Treitschke’s demand of the Jews, uttered ten years before “[…] sollen Deutsche werden, sich schlicht und recht als Deutsche fühlen” (Treitschke 1879, 573). Treitschke’s demand reflected the interaction between Ruppin and German culture, at least until he converted to Zionism. Treitschke undoubtedly had some traces of anti-Semitism in him, since he openly expressed the premise that the “jüdische Geist” obstructed the search for a national identity of German-Christian “Wesen” (nature). Nevertheless, his views were still within the framework of the emancipation model; they still expressed belief in the mutability of the Jew. Treitschke believed that the Jews were adaptable (assimilierbar). The belief in the mutability of the Jew which was prevalent in Ruppin’s childhood and youth made him optimistic that it was possible for even a Jew to become part of the German Volk by sheer willpower, through conscious identification and intellectual cultivation, expressed mainly in the ability to master the German language and literature.

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47 Bismarck’s support of the intermarriage law (1872) resulted mainly from his attempt to break Catholicism. Nevertheless, Ruppin explained this support as part of Bismarck’s alleged understanding of the importance of the Jews to German culture.
49 Ibid. This belief would change gradually towards the turn of the century, as the new racial categories emphasized the immutability of the Jew and defined him as unassimilierbar.
2.2 The Relationship of “The Father” to his father

When Ruppin began the second decade of his life, at the age of 11, the economic situation of his family changed dramatically. He no longer lived in a well-to-do home, and in the atmosphere of a respectable small-town shop. For most of his childhood and youth his family was impoverished and supported mainly by the largesse of relatives. It was not until Ruppin and his brothers and sisters were old enough to work that the family emerged from its subsistence level of poverty.

The bankruptcy of the business of Albert (Yitzhak) Ruppin — the father of the “Father” — and the collapse of the family seem to have been caused by the rapid economic changes in the region, to which he was unable to adapt himself. He had always conducted his business in the old-fashioned, traditional manner, with no fixed prices and bargaining taken for granted. Now, he failed irrevocably at numerous business ventures due to his inability to cope and gradually became a compulsive gambler (Goren 2004, 16).

It was a period that Ruppin describes plainly as “Katstrophe.” The day his father's business closed, one of his friends passed in front of the store and shouted “Pleite! Pleite!”


Almost fifty years later, when he wrote about that period in his autobiography his feelings were still strong:

The sudden change of class made the family’s life in Rawitsch impossible. In 1886, they moved to Magdeburg in order to escape the shame caused by their impoverishment. The move to Magdeburg, however, did not improve the economic situation, and marked the beginning of a long process of pawning the dwindling possessions of the family. One day Ruppin returned home and found that his father had pawned his Collected Works of Schiller, which he had received for his bar mitzvah from his Berliner aunt Laser (Bein 1968, I, 140-141). This was a moment of crisis — the only diary entry where he reports that he cried (ibid., 72). It was one of the many low points in his long, poverty stricken youth — Ruppin recounts that he bought his first new pair of shoes at the age of twenty-three (ibid., I, 68-87).

Ruppin’s admiration of German culture did not result only from his exposure to the systematic indoctrination of the German Bildungssystem, but also from the cultural crisis he experienced which led him to reject the culture represented by his father. In his last book The Jews Past and Future (1940) Ruppin writes about the “split” between fathers and sons as a result of modernization and his own personal case would seem to underlie his theoretical analysis:

“There is no doubt that education enriches the world knowledge of a son of Israel, yet it casts doubts and vacillation on his world view. The new language brings about a split between fathers and sons […] Yiddish, the only language of the parents, seems to the children who study in general schools a rejected language. They [the sons, E. B.] avoid speaking it, because in their view it is a sign of a low culture” (Ruppin 1940b, 235).

As we shall see in later chapters, Ruppin’s belief in the inevitable detachment from the galut father and his tradition became a central idea in his weltanschauung concerning the modern Hebrews. This negation of the galut was always expressed by Ruppin as a radical and absolute cut; a “burning of the bridges” (as opposed, for example, to the American Jewish sentimental or nostalgic farewell to the shtetel). This expressed itself in many ways, one of which was his absolute opposition to Yiddish. He did not only want to ban it for the sake of Hebrew, he seems actually to have demanded that it be erased from memory and he was one of the vehement opponents
of the introduction of an academic course in Yiddish at the Hebrew University (Myers 1995, 80). The German nationalistic socialization of his formative years had imprinted in him a disgust of the “impure” Yiddish language and its speakers. Yiddish became for him not only a repulsive, uncultured language, but also one of the causes of Jewish degeneration.

Much as he rejected Yiddish, so he admired German; according to his own testimony he read Goethe’s Complete Works at the age of 12 “from A to Z,” and when, for his bar mitzvah, he received the aforementioned volume of Schiller’s Complete Works, he copied out one of the plays word for word, in order to be inspired by memorizing it. This was Ruppin’s first expression of his desire to become a deutscher Dichter (German poet), an ambition and fantasy of many acculturated German Jews who adopted the models of emancipation. This appellation — deutscher Dichter — testifying to their ultimate control over the language, seemed to them a life-long guarantee of their integration into German intellectual society, as well as a source of respect and fame (Albinas 2002, 45).

Ruppin expressed his passion to become a deutscher Dichter in a play, Arnold von Brechia, that he wrote over a period of 10 years. This was a Schiller-like play on an early reformer of the Christian church who was burned at the stake as a martyr because of his struggle against the corrupt church. This play expressed Ruppin’s identification with German-Protestant values, with Kultur – the opposite of both Catholicism and Judaism – as the desired object. Ruppin’s preoccupation with the story of the pre-Lutheran Arnold of Brechia (whose main criticism was based on Jesus’ condemnation of the Temple usurers and the greed of the Catholic clergy), reflected Bismarck’s Kulturkampf criticism of the catholic clergy, as well as of one of the main stereotypes attributed to the Jews in Europe: greed and materialism.

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50 In the German cultural discourse, the Poles and their church paralleled the East European Jews and their rabbinical system. Compared with the rabbinical Jewish system, Kultur became associated with the values of Protestantism (Walser Smith 1995, 22). In his Religion and Philosophy in Germany, Heinrich Heine reveals one of the important sources of this link. After emphasizing Mendelssohn’s rejection of the Talmud, he concludes: “Moses Mendelssohn, then, deserves the highest praise for having destroyed, in Germany at any rate, Jewish Catholicism; for what is superfluous is injurious” (Heine 1959, 95).

51 This stereotype appeared not only in the popular culture and in the various racial theories but also among the best minds of the period. In the article On the Jewish Question, Marx writes: “what is the worldly ground of Judaism? Practical need, self-interest [Eigennutz]. What is the worldly cult of the
When, years later, he reflected on his dramatic aspirations, he wondered why he had spent so much time writing such a play, and concluded that he derived from it the illusion that he was still connected to the “highest values of humanity.” Ruppin’s desire to have contact with the “highest values of humanity,” epitomized for him by the German high culture of his time, was in him from an early age and he deals with it in numerous diary entries. He desired to promote and advance humanity, and his greatest fear was to be forgotten: “This chance that my life will be without fame is like a nightmare [...] all my work and ambitions have one end – fame in the following generations” (Bein 1968, I, 147; 140-150).

Ruppin’s fantasies about gaining fame as a playwright faded when they clashed with his intolerable economic reality. One of the moments when he realized this disparity was when his family could no longer afford tuition fees so that, aged 15 and an excellent, promising student, he had to leave school and go to work in a grain firm managed by Richard Nathan, one of the family’s Jewish neighbors (Bein 1968, I, 103). Starting as an apprentice, he was quickly promoted to a key executive position and, already before the age of seventeen, he became an adviser to the manager and represented the firm in deals usually negotiated only by senior clerks (Goren 2004, 40).

The grain firm was an excellent place to develop organizational and managerial qualifications (Bein 1972, 120), and certainly helped him in the future, but, at the time, it was the last position he desired; the ultimate opposite of the “highest values of humanity.” His greatest fear was to become a simple merchant without any ideals:

“I can’t grasp how I would become a merchant among merchants, how I would abandon my dreams of the honor and fame that the art of poetry would
give me in the future, dreams with which my head and myself were totally imbued".  

Most of his bitterness and anger at that time were directed towards his father. He blamed him for the economic collapse of the family, and depicted him in his diaries as a compulsive gambler who could not be trusted (Bein 1968, I, 155-156). Ruppin’s criticism of his father and the way he perceived his parents and Jewish tradition, are manifestations of his attempt to differentiate himself from the stereotypical figure of the Ostjude, which prevailed in the German culture of the time:

“[…] father who always counted on the future big win which was sure to come, and mother who found comfort for all her sorrows in belief in the Creator” (Bein 1968, 225).

Ruppin’s cultural identity developed in opposition to these characteristics. From an early stage of his life, he aspired to study scientific economics and he gradually adopted a “protestant-skeptical” and, later, a bio-positivist criticism of religion. In his first years at the grain firm, Ruppin’s economic perceptions were identical to those of the German protestants who espoused, in his view, caution and frugality, and he rejected with repugnance the “Jewish” greed and irresponsibility which, among other faults, made people like his father speculators and gamblers (Doron 1977, 138). According to Ruppin, his father’s failure was caused by his affinity to the Jewish-Polish social field:

“Vater konnte sich schlechterdings nicht denken – und bei der an langes Feilschen gewöhnten, meist polnischen Landkundschaft nicht ohne Grund –, dass ein Geschäft ohne Handeln zustande kommen könne” (Korolic 1985, 47).

Ruppin’s diaries are full of strong, uncontrollable feelings of shame for everything that his father – who became a simple peddler after his bankruptcy – represented, and he lived in constant fear that his friends would see them together:

“Ich hatte immer schreckliche Angst, dass meine Mitschüler, die zum Teil Bauernsöhne auf diesen Dörfern waren, mich sehen könnten, und meine erste Sorge war, dass ich in einem Dorfe, in dem ein Mitschüler wohnte, mir seine Wohnung zeigen ließ und dann in einem großen Bogen um diese herumging” (Korolic 1985, 53).

Ruppin’s father seems to have been aware of his son’s feelings and tried to mend his behavior:


His fear of becoming like his father, who represented the opposite of the “highest values of humanity,” who was the “other” in the culture he longed to belong to, resulted in his experiencing deep feelings of shame and strengthened his ambition to shape his identity in a completely opposite way. From a very early age, he ceased to keep the Sabbath and ate non-kosher food. Goren points out that Ruppin referred to the synagogue as the “Temple,” an indication that he did not regard himself as a traditional German-Jew and that, although he may have wavered in his youth, his indifference to Judaism was decisive and his conversion to German secular culture unencumbered by any feelings of pain or guilt (Goren 2004, 20-21).

Ruppin’s cultural identity was a clear product of Prussian indoctrination in Posen and, like most of the Jews of the region, he aspired to be accepted into the German culture.54 As the eldest son of a family with low symbolic and material capital – especially in comparison with their emancipated Jewish aspirations – Ruppin

54 Many Jews in this area considered themselves to be pioneers and disseminators of modernization in the Eastern Provinces of Prussia (a self image that was created partly as result of governmental manipulation) (Rieker 1997, 109).
identified with the education system of the Prussian state, and its heroes served him as substitutes for his Jewish-Polish father. With this move from his Jewish-East European-Polish identity to a modern, German identity, from the “superstitious” beliefs of his mother and the embarrassing Yiddish language, hand gesticulations and strange behavior of his bankrupt peddler father, to a culture which sanctified masculinity and science, Ruppin differentiated himself from his parents and from Jewishness (Rieker 1997, 112; Kaplan 2002). His diaries are full of his aversion to the Jewish physique and appearance, and revulsion for the “Jewish face” (“Abneigung gegen jüdische Gesichter”), paralleled with admiration and deification of blonde-haired people and Aryans (in a very similar way to Herzl and many others). After a visit to the theatre, he wrote that what spoilt his enjoyment was the “Jewish physiognomy of one of the actresses” and he admitted that he frequently sensed a “strong antipathy” towards Jewish women and girls (in: Doron 1977, 141). This disgust was consistent with the emancipated German-Jewish Selbstkritik model. It was also a reflection of the code of “honesty” and “trustfulness” of the German Kulturkampf days. His low esteem for his own “Jewish” body is a prevailing subject in his diaries. Ruppin disliked his body, did not rely on it, and described himself as “ugly” (Bein 1968, I, 131). This cultural identity crisis would seem to confirm the assertion that the Jews’ experience of their bodies was so deeply influenced by the anti-Semitic discourse that they experienced it as flawed and diseased (Gilman 1991, 178-179). Ruppin’s self-stereotyping process was paralleled, as noted, by projections onto other Jews, and accompanied him in his hyperbildung, a long and demanding process of acquiring the body and mentality of the ideal Prussian models.

Ruppin did not give up his studies while working at the grain firm. He prepared, in his spare time, for the external matriculation examinations for a high school diploma and, in addition, he planned and developed his own autodidactic initiation practices to prepare himself for German culture, and differentiate himself from the Jewish milieu of the Magdeburgian grain firm and his family. He taught himself to swim from a

55 In the 1920s Jacob Wassermann chronicled the ambivalence of the German Jews towards their own bodies, their own difference. “I have known many Jews who have languished with longing for the fair-haired and blue eyed individual. They knelt before him, burned incense before him, believed his every word; every blink of his eye was heroic; and when he spoke of his native soil, when he beat his Aryan breast, they broke into a hysterical shriek of triumph” (Wasserman 1933, 156; in: Gilman 1991, 178).

56 Almog notes that Zionists like Ravnizki and Nordau emphasized the short height of the Jews; both of them were extremely short (Almog 1982, 80).
manual (he had no money for lessons) and excelled in the afternoon classes he took in fencing, gymnastics and dancing. He practiced cycling and, having purchased a gun, also shooting, in distant corners of that forest with which he aspired to “unite” through long walks and meditative observation of bush and grass, influenced by mystical völkisch astralism. He also took very seriously all kind of health fads (such as freezing himself, and eating herbs) in order to immunize his body, especially since he feared getting tuberculosis (Bein 1968, I, 167, 132; Korolic 1985, 91).

2.3 The Fear of Becoming a Greedy Jew

Ruppin’s resentment of the “Jewish” business world grew as he advanced in his career at the grain firm. His interaction with Jewish merchants was negative and reaffirmed for him the anti-Semitic views that accused the Jews of speculation and the manipulation of wheat prices. During the years 1891-1893, he expressed in his diaries his identification with the publications and speeches of the anti-Semitic ideologists. “Jews,” he wrote in his diary, “do not work gladly, and should gradually change their livelihoods to agriculture and handicrafts; anti-Semites are fully in the right when they accuse the Jews of an abnormal lust for profit.”

As already discussed, the model of emancipation, which presupposed the mutability of the Jew through acculturation, was still dominant in Ruppin’s early childhood (especially in the region where he was born). However, by the end of the 19th century, when he was still in the phase of his bizarre journey of acceptance by the dominant group, a conflicting model arose which perceived the Jew as immutable. This model stressed not only the purity and superiority of the German nationality, but also the Social-Darwinist-Völkisch proposition that national differences are caused by immutable genetic factors beyond the influence of culture and historical circumstances. One of the most predominant arguments given by the promoters of the immutability model was related to the Jew’s greed, and his strong urge for money, part of a set of stereotypes depicting the Jew and Judaism as the essence of materialism, what Werner Sombart named later the “mercantile sense” of the Jews.

57 According to Goren, Ruppin prepared himself to join the German army (Goren 2004, 34, 52).
58 On the perception of tuberculosis in the medical system and it impact on Jewish cultural identity, see: (Gilman 1995).
59 Ruppin, Tagebuch, (CZA A107), [25 Nov., 12 Dec. 1891]; see also, [23 Sep. 1892].
Ruppin internalized this model of perception and tried to change himself, i.e., to suppress his alleged Jewish materialistic impulse. This stressful situation was accompanied by anxiety caused by his constant uncertainty as to his ability to rid himself of this materialistic mercantile nature. “Richard Nathan,” he wrote about the Jewish manager of the grain firm, “is the kind of businessman who thinks only about money. The thought that I will lose my ideals and become a mere businessman shocks me” (Bein 1968, I, 148).

This fear haunted him all through his youth and, at the age of 17, when he began to write the play that was supposed to connect him to the “highest values of humanity,” he described his fear of becoming a greedy Jew in his dairy [31 Dec. 1893]:


In this early reflection, the legendary character of “Knecht Rupprecht” represents Ruppin’s self-censorship and reflects his internalization of the anti-Semitic perceptions of German culture. “Knecht Rupprecht” appears in German-Christian mythology as the servant (knecht=servant) of Saint Nikolaus, who comes visiting every year a few weeks before Christmas. Rupprecht was a dark and sinister figure, usually depicted as black and frequently with horns (a mark of the devil), who hit naughty children before placing them in his ragged sack. The figure of Rupprecht is actually similar to the figure of the “wandering Jew” (in some of the pictures Rupprecht has a “Jewish nose”), who had already appeared in the Middle Ages as the old-Jew, the Antichrist who threatened the peace of Christians
Ruppin’s fear of “Knecht Rupprech” is a reflection of his suffering in the straitjacket of self-censorship in which he was bound by his uncertain position as a Germanized Jewish-Polish young man, and illustrates his fear of the sanctions that German culture might inflict upon him if his alleged Jewish “greediness” and “blackness” were to emerge. This fear was always followed by projections of resentment towards his repressed reference group. “I hate the wild thorns of Judaism,” he wrote in his diary, “more than the worst anti-Semite” ([4 August 1893] in: Borot & Heilbruner 2000, 151).

Like many of the Zionist leaders, Ruppin arrived at Judaism through Zionism, to which he came after a long process of assimilation and many attempts to become accepted by the German culture. He (as well as Herzl, Nordau and other Zionist luminaries), did not perceive Judaism through direct contact with its tradition or languages (Yiddish or Hebrew), but derived his understanding of it and of the Jews through the German repertoire and habitus. This feature of his cultural identity is one of the reasons for his ambivalent and fragmented representation in the Israeli historiography.

This reading of Judentum through Deutschtum adopted a new vocabulary and meaning as a result of the change in the categories and definitions of the Jew in fin-de-siècle German culture. In his late youth and early adulthood, Ruppin began to formulate his perceptions of culture in racial terms which reflected the new popular Darwinist literature that he read feverishly. He seems to have felt that this literature concealed some kind of “truth,” some key for solving a riddle that might lead him to redemption or destruction. After reading the anti-Semitic book Der Einzige und sein Eigentum (Ego and his Own, 1845) by Max Stirner, a disturbing thought troubled him, what if the Jews:

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60 There are many examples of this pattern from Herzl to Blumenfeld. On Herzl see: (Boyarin 1997, 125); on Blumenfeld see: (Pierson 1970, 13); with regard to Herzl, Nordau and Jabotinski, see: (Stanislavski 2001). Goren points out that when Ruppin writes in his diary on Jewish matters, his description of them is detached: “objective […] as if directed to non-Jewish readers” (Goren 2004, 57).

61 The first time Ruppin studied Hebrew in a formal way (for one semester) was together with Gustav Wyneken at the Institute for Protestant Theology at the University of Berlin.
“at least in their ability to perceive ideas, are inferior to the Christians, in other words to the Indo-Germanics?” (Bein 1968a, 198).

2.4 The Janus-Faced Message of the German Repertoire

This tense double-bind situation, which resulted from the Janus-faced message of the German repertoire, is expressed in a most striking way in Ruppin’s experience of reading Gustav Freytag’s novel Soll und Haben (published in English as Debit and Credit) (Freytag 1953). Between the ages of 18 and 20, he read the novel at least twice and was deeply influenced by its message. When he took the decision to accept the job at the grain firm a picture from that book “comes to my mind suddenly” and he decided to be the “good merchant,” as Freytag depicted this type in his novel (Bein 1968, I, 103).

In the center of Freytag’s novel stands the relationship between a Jewish father and his son. The son, Bernhard, has amiable and noble traits, while his father, Ehrenthal, is a stereotypical, unscrupulous Jewish merchant. In his extreme honesty and pure naïveté, the shy young scholar, an expert in ancient languages, is the exact opposite of his father.

Freytag, living in the ethnic “frontier” region, disliked Poles in general, including Polish Jews. He was, much like Ruppin, “a product of the border regions of Germanic and Slavic civilizations, with all their national tensions, prejudices, and fears.” Mosse finds that the character of the son in Freytag’s novel represents the model of the “good Jew” in the German culture of the 1890s. The son despises

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62 Some of Stirner’s ideas in this book reflects Ruppin’s fears of Jewish alleged materialism: “The Christian has spiritual interests, because he allows himself to be a spiritual man; the Jew does not even understand these interests in their purity, because he does not allow himself to assign no value to things. He does not arrive at pure spirituality […] Their lack of spirituality sets Jews forever apart from Christians; for the spiritual man is incomprehensible to the unspiritual, as the unspiritual is contemptible to the spiritual. But the Jews have only ‘the spirit of this world’” (Stirner 1907, 24).
63 Ruppin, Tagebuch, [17. September 1894]. See also his reading list for 1896 in: (CZA, A107/142).
64 (Low 1979, 342). On Freytag and popular stereotypes of Jews in nineteenth century Germany, see: (Mosse 1957, 218-227).
his father’s business and way of life, and his salient trait is to be as “un-Jewish” as possible. Realizing the nature of his parents and his coreligionists, he almost dies of shame. It is indeed his failure to convert his father to “decency” that provides the immediate setting for his suicide (Mosse, 1957, 223), which was connected to his father’s not changing his Jewish business ways – he ceased to be a simple peddler but became one on a large scale. “Honest” labor triumphs in the novel. Rootlessness means dishonesty, dirt and shiftlessness. The father failed to settle and to become integrated with the Volk. Bernhard, the son, represented the “good Jew” because he ceased to be a Jew, at first consciously and finally when he commits suicide. The “bad Jew” in Freytag’s novel is the Jew who refuses complete assimilation and sticks to his old habits.

The success of Freytag’s book was extraordinary – 15 editions within a few years. According to Mosse, the book was an essential item in the libraries of Jewish households in Germany. Accepting this stereotype by reading literature of the Freytag type became a sign of Jewish assimilation (Mosse, 1957, 226). The differentiating message of the repertoire that welcomed the “good son” and rejected the “bad father” was connected to the traits represented mainly by the East European Jews. As the latter’s immigration into Germany increased, the German Jews differentiated themselves from them by projecting upon them this set of stereotypes.

In the years that followed Ruppin’s readings of Freytag’s novel, his relations with his father were extremely tense. In 1898 he insulted his father and attacked his gambling habits “a deed which later I felt sorry for” (Bein 1968, 159). This quarrel was followed by an intimate conversation. His father explained to him that he gambled because of his sorrow at being dependent on his sons. Ruppin cried “for the first time in many days.” Full of surprise, he realized that his father was not thinking only about “matters of finance” but also had “vigorou aspirations” and “sublime ideas” (Bein 1968, I, 159). Nevertheless, Ruppin knew that his father would continue to gamble, and his partial reconciliation with him, as he described their relationship in his last years, only came about when the father confessed his failure and admitted his blame; only then could he feel some kind of sympathy for him.
Freytag’s dichotomy between the “bad Jew” father and the “good Jew” son represents the message of the dominant group which shaped, to a large extent, Ruppin’s self-formation. This process included the internalization of the projective identification of the dominant group together with a simultaneous attempt to correct it. In the course of this process, Ruppin adopted substitutes for his real father and shaped a new identity. Nevertheless, it was an unconscious process which required, first of all, the ‘recognition of non-recognition,’ a feeling that by getting into this double-bind situation he would gain independence:

“Wie schön muß es sein, wenn man einst sagen kann: alles, was ich bin, bin ich durch mich selbst geworden! Ich wenigstens kenne nichts Schöneres”
(Korolik 1981, 89).

### 2.5 Auto-Stereotyping and Self-Differentiation

Ruppin’s most admired friends in those years, right up to his “homecoming” to Judaism through Zionism, were German-Protestants, whom he took, with the admiring gaze of an outsider, as an exemplary model. He was the only Jewish member of the gymnastics association and, after the work-out, went with his Christian friends Lidrich and Tagart to play cards and drink beer. Pretending, in front of the Germans, to enjoy drinking beer was one of his ways of proving he belonged. In his diary, he describes an incident in which he drank twenty-two (!) glasses, much against his will:

“I felt a terrible nausea. However, this did not show, only inwardly. Outwardly I was sitting resilient, as if I were someone not drunk at all, preferring my intestines to rupture, just to pass the test” (Bein 1968, I, 183).

Even this drinking of beer tested him in his own eyes and probably also in the eyes of his German companions, for the inability of Jews ‘to drink’ was often mocked. In the German popular tradition, it was known that the invention of the *kleines Bier* (small-
(beer) was made especially for Jews (or for women). Altogether, Ruppin’s cultural identity was formed in a very similar way to that of his response to the beer drinking test. On the one hand, he was invited to drink but on the other, the invitation was pervaded by implied doubts as to his ability to change the characteristics of his asserted Jewish nature (in this case, physical weakness and femininity). This ambivalent message also set the boundaries for Ruppin’s cultural identity. The invitation of the dominant group, accompanied by testing, suspicions and differentiation, reinforced his fear that he had good reason to believe his ‘Jewishness’ to be immutable. His cultural position was an extreme example of what Bourdieu calls hypercorrection. Hypercorrection in this sociological sense, results from “the disparity between knowledge and recognition, between aspirations and the means of satisfying them – a disparity that generates tension and pretension [...] This pretension, a recognition of distinction which is revealed in the very effort to deny it by appropriating it, introduces a permanent pressure into the field” (Bourdieu 1994, 62).

The tension involved in hypercorrection results from the fact that a given society holds a preconceived reservation regarding specific abilities of particular individuals or groups. In this situation the individuals or groups must prove that they do indeed possess the abilities denied them by the dominant group. Thus, at the cost of constant anxiety, they seek to [re]produce a repertoire other than their traditional one (as conceived by their reference group). In this position of hyper-concern with what their imagined social betters might discredit, their self-regulation becomes excessive or radical compared to the group they aspire to belong to. In order to reduce this hypercorrection anxiety in himself, Ruppin differentiated himself from the ‘bad Jews,’ those who had no desire to conform to the repertoire or were incapable of doing so and, for as long as he perceived himself to be a “complete” German, was subject to bursts of resentment and rejection of his Jewishness, coupled with admiration for the ideal Aryan German type.

The “double-bind” that was the cause of Ruppin’s “self-hatred” must be conceived as in Gilman’s particular analyses of this concept, translatable in the conceptual
framework of this research as self-differentiation. As opposed to the emotional charge or value judgment often implied by the concept of “self-hatred” (also as used by Ruppin himself), the concept of self-differentiation stresses the connection between the cultural identity and the projecting process of the dominant group, the producer of the “visions and divisions” (i.e., practices of differentiation).

Ruppin’s diaries are full of descriptions in which he differentiated himself from other Jews who denied their “nature” and pretended to be Germans although they were no more than shallow and superficial imitations; their physiognomy revealed their Eastern foreignness, and he called them “imitierte Germanen” (in: Doron 1977, 142).

The function of self-differentiation was dominant in Ruppin’s process of self-formation during his youth and adolescence: “By the way, I have remembered: just as I am the only Jew in our gymnastics class, I am also the only Jew among the participants in the swimming class” (Bein 1968, I, 197) (He was also the only Jew in the fencing class) (ibid., 199). His self-differentiation is also reflected in the way he described his Jewish friend’s (Sally Halbreich’s) personality as a product of his “particular Jewish racial characteristics” (die spezifisch jüdischen Rasseneigenschaften), such as a “loud voice” (er besitzt ein wildes, vorlautes Wesen), and “hasty, illogical speech with no feel for what is tactful” (spricht hastig, unlogisch und verletzend und hat kein ausreichendes Taktgefühl) (Goren 2004, 320). The opposites of all these traits can be found in Ruppin’s personality.

The perception and formation of his body through the projections of the dominant group can be demonstrated as well in the way Ruppin related to his sexuality and his lust. In many entries in his diaries he writes, sometimes very openly, about his desire for a woman and his attempts to overcome and suppress these desires. At the age of fifteen, he describes his first sexual experience (probably some kind of masturbation):

The entry concludes with Halbreich telling Ruppin that this lust is “especially strong among the Jews” and Ruppin accepting it as a fact.65

One can see here the dynamics of auto-stereotyping and self-differentiation; the two German-Jewish friends accept their excessive sexual desires as a ‘biological fact.’ A few years later, as a young student, Ruppin will vow, together with another two German protestant students, to avoid premarital sex, a vow which, according to Goren, he kept until his marriage when he was almost thirty (Goren 2004, 86). This was another Jewish “instinct” he succeeded in overcoming (with much pain, as he testified in his diary).

In 1893, prior to the Reichstag elections, Ruppin felt complete identification with the anti-Semitic parties, a position which he explained to himself by his belief that, in future, their anti-Semitic ideas would lose their power as people recognized that social democracy was the “true fighter against the owners of capital.”66 During the 1890s, there arose in Hessen an anti-Semitic peasant movement, whose leader, Dr. Otto Böckel (1859-1923), declared war on Jewish and Christian capitalism. Ruppin was so enthusiastic about this movement that he wrote to Böckel, asking him if his new party would accept a “non-capitalistic patriotic Jew?”67 Böckel’s movement gained popularity among the German nationalists and its importance, according to Mosse, lay in the fact that it gave anti-Semitic nationalism a democratic dimension. Böckel’s popularity, especially in the provinces, was achieved, to a large extent, by his playing on the peasants’ national and economic fears of Jewish world control. His message was clear: if we get rid of the Jews, financial speculation will disappear and the

65 This sentence was deleted from the German edition of Ruppin’s diaries [1982], the sentence however appears in the Hebrew version: (Bein 1968, I, 145).
67 Ibid. See also: (Goren 2004, 33).
peasants will be able to return to living a “good life.” These ideas, as will be demonstrated in the next chapter, will influence Ruppin’s weltanschauung. It is important to note that Böckel claimed that the Jewish conspiracy affected all areas of life but one: that of productive work – the area from which all Jews recoil as from a plague. Ruppin’s identification with Böckel and his like was probably a naïve expression of his “honest” willingness to do everything necessary in order to feel like a “true German,” a task that demanded of the Jews extreme effort and gratitude to Germany. After attending a political gathering at which there was a debate on the “Jewish question,” Ruppin accepted the anti-Semitic speaker’s view as to the need to adopt a hard line with Jewish criminals (although this contradicted the liberal argument for equality), as well as his opinion regarding the dishonesty of Jewish merchants and their involvement in financial frauds (Doron 1977, 133). He wrote “I hate the weeds of Judaism more than the worst anti-Semite.”

Ruppin’s identification with the new trend in the cultural atmosphere of Germany reflects his growing discontent with the model of emancipation, both for himself personally and as a solution to the general “Jewish question.” He began to believe that it was not the galut as such that was responsible for the deficiencies of the Jew but rather the hasty emancipation and, above all, the illusion that it would result in their ability to become true citizens. Acculturation, which Ruppin called “Bildungsgang” (course of education), was not something to be acquired rapidly but rather the product of the cultural accumulation of many generations (Doron 1977, 133).

Ruppin’s identification with anti-Semitism was mainly an expression of his disappointment with German Jewish liberalism and his aversion to its “enlightened” plans for emancipation, which he saw as superficial and artificial. As will be described in the next chapter, this criticism led him to explore different methods for transforming the Jews.

68 Böckel was mainly a demagogue and he could not build up a substantial political organization. He is considered as a “starting point (Ansatzpunkt) for the anti-Semitism of the NSDAP […] Many adherents of the Böckel movement […] enthusiastically joined the NSDAP” (Tromsdorf 2003, 2). The Nazis erected a monument to his memory in Magdeburg.

69 Ruppin, Tagebuch [4 August 1893], in: (Borot & Heilbruner 2000, 151).
3. Weltanschauung

3.1 The Sources of Ruppin’s Weltanschauung

Although Ruppin had matriculated at the university in 1896, his work at the grain firm kept him in Magdeburg until April 1899. Then, at the age of 23, he enrolled in the faculty of law at the University of Berlin, although it was the subject that interested him the least, as he ironically told one of his friends (Bertisch 1980, 2). His studies in Berlin reflected his hunger for learning and his attempt to learn as much as possible in a very short time. In his one semester in Berlin he studied intensively, 12 hours a day, and attended lectures in various departments – from natural science to philology, art and history, philosophy and anthropology, sociology, economics and statistics, botany and even Egyptology. However, he attended the university in Berlin for one semester only and then completed the rest of his studies by correspondence. This way of studying was not exceptional. In those years there was academic and student freedom, and there was almost no supervision of study. No one checked whether a student attended lectures or not; the only thing required of him was a certain amount of knowledge at examination time (Goldman 1970, 35).

After the semester in Berlin, Ruppin transferred to Halle. But in Halle, as in Berlin, Ruppin concentrated on political (or national) economy (Nationalökonomie), although he continued his law studies. Ruppin’s attraction to political economy was quite common at that time. His university years marked the peak of a period that, in the words of Hintze: “called the economic discipline to the forefront” (in: Barkin, 1969 144). Courses in political economy grew in number and popularity. After the fall from power of Bismarck in 1890 and the subsequent increase in strength of the Social Democrats, universities became increasingly politicized. Jarausch wrote that they sought to “destroy Marxism by exposing its unscientific nature and by presenting a conservative reformism in its place” (Jarausch 1982, 185).

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70 In 1878 Bismarck had the party outlawed for its pro-revolution, anti-monarchy sentiments; but in 1890 it was legalized again.
As will be shown, this approach shaped Ruppin’s perception of economics in the years to come and was one of the reasons for his ‘non-ideological’ or rather ‘post-ideological’ Weltanschauung of economics and society.

It is important to understand Ruppin’s *models of perception* (including his theories) in the context of the specific meaning of the German concept *Weltanschauung*, which he used many times in his diary when describing his aspirations and later, when stating explicitly that he had finally obtained a true *Weltanschauung*.\(^7^1\) In one of the chapters of his memoirs, entitled *Die Suche nach einer Weltanschauung*, he wrote:

> “Für mich (und wahrscheinlich für die ganze Generation, der ich angehörte) war es selbstverständlich, daß man sich eine „Weltanschauung“ erwerben müsse, d.h. eine Bewertung des Weltgeschehens und eine Einschaltung seiner selbst in dieses Geschehen” (Bein 1968, I, 139).

The meaning of the concept of *Weltanschauung* in the German discourse, especially at the end of the 19th century, was different from the meaning of the more contemplative term *world view* (*Weltbild* or *Weltandenken*), which is perhaps the reason that this term is one of the few German words accepted into the American English vocabulary. The concept of Weltanschauung is

> “Eine auf das Denken, Fühlen, Wollen und Tun des Menschen bezogene gedankliche Zusammenführung des Wissens, der Erfahrung bzw. der Vorstellung von der Welt und vom menschlichen Dasein als Sinnganzen” (Eibicht 2001, 3).

Dilthey writes that “Die Weltanschauungen sind nicht Erzeugnisse des Denkens. Sie entstehen nicht aus dem Lebensverhalten, der Lebenserfahrung, der Struktur unserer psychischen Totalität gehen sie hervor” (ibid., 5). As opposed to “theory,” the concept of Weltanschauung had the meaning of “activation” (Einschaltung); a constant urge to influence reality. Ruppin’s need to define himself in terms of this concept must be understood also as part of his attempt to ‘feel’ the German habitus and to ‘correct’ in

\(^7^1\) Ruppin, *Tagebuch* [2 April 1903], CZA, A107/905.
himself the prevailing stereotype of the Jew as a passive observer, detached from ‘real life.’ In one of his early reflections regarding the Jews, Ruppin imagined that:

“The Jews of the ancient Jewish kingdom were religious through and through; they had courage and a deep sense of myth and the works of nature. That is, they were farmers. Since the Jews have stopped pushing the plough, they have become degenerate; they have for the most part lost a natural, human outlook and have become a reflective people [Reflexionisten]” (Ruppin, [26 August 1898], CZA, A107/217).72

It is in the context of this struggle against the “reflective” nature of the Jew – his excess intellectualism – that we must place Ruppin’s particular weltanschauung, which always included an urge to change the physical and mental reality of the Jews in the modern world. He frequently rebutted any alleged sign of such reflectiveness in his own personality, claiming, against those who tried to detract from the importance of his researches, that his scientific work was no less important for the Zionist movement than his participation in the executive committee; in this context he wrote that “the ideology of Zionism is part of the Sociology of the Jews which I wrote” (Bein 1968 III, 215).

The theoretical sources of this sociology can be traced to several schools, scholars and scientists from the end of the nineteenth century, some of whom he met personally during the short period he studied at the universities of Berlin and Halle. The main figures were the cultural historian Houston Stewart Chamberlain (1855-1927), the biologist Ernst Haeckel (1834-1919), the economist Werner Sombart (1863-1941), the zoologist August Weismann (1834-1919), the anthropologist Felix von Luschan (1854-1924), the philosophers Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900) and Hans Vaihinger (1852-1933), and his close friend, the young Reformpädagoge and one of the future leaders of the German youth movement, Gustav Wyneken (1875-1964). The only Zionist – and the only Jew – who affected him in the same meaningful way was Max

72 According to some physicians of the period, excess intellectualism could lead to a “reflection addiction,” and to “a chronic tendency to displace psychic energy with abstract ‘theoreticizing’” (Rabinbach 1992, 156).
Nordau (1849-1923), whom Ruppin had admired since his youth and with whom he had a warm personal relationship.\(^{73}\)

### 3.1.2 The *Weichensteller* and the Internalization of Academic Stereotypes

According to Weber, the ideal personality in the German universities at the time, in particular for middle-class students, was that of a *Weichensteller* (literally, a pointsman or switchman), a concept that indicated the intellectual status of a producer of knowledge, which is linked to the creation of change.\(^{74}\) Although Ruppin was not a member of any student association – a fact that marks him as different from most of the Jewish and non-Jewish students at the time – he developed his Weltanschauung as a Weichensteller through his close relationship with two students who had similar aspirations. The most influential figures in his university years were Fritz Fiedler, an avowed socialist and racialist and Gustav Wyneken, the future leader of the German youth movement. Ruppin’s admiration for them, especially for Wyneken, cannot be overestimated:

> "Er war [Wyneken, E. B.] ein prächtiger Germanentyp (wie Darwin, Häckel), ein Mann von großem Schwung und tiefem Wissen."\(^{75}\)

Both of his friends came from religious protestant families,\(^{76}\) whom Ruppin adored and often visited; he even called Fiedler’s mother “Frau Aja” because she reminded him of Goethe’s mother in her “nature and education” (ibid.); his German friends and colleagues supplied him with models for imitation:

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\(^{73}\) According to Buber, Ruppin met Nordau in 1901 (Buber 1943, CZA, S25/1203, 6). On their close relations see their correspondence in 1913-1914 (CZA, A107/549). It seems that, at that time, their admiration was mutual. Nordau refers to Ruppin as “Cher confrère et ami” [7 Jun. 1913] (ibid.).

\(^{74}\) The political potential of the *Weichensteller* enables the intellectual to be a model for imitation. Weber’s concept expresses not only a relationship to others but also a disposition and a state of mind, in other words, a specific self-perception and weltanschauung.

\(^{75}\) (Korolik 1981, 95). Ruppin’s contacts with Wyneken lasted until 1935 (Goren 2004, 81)

\(^{76}\) Wyneken came from a family of clergymen; his father was the pastor at Edesheim, near Göttingen. Ruppin described the family as “enlightened protestant,” (Bein 1968, I, 162). Wyneken’s ideas had a significant influence on Zionist self-formation in Palestine and on the Zionist youth movement *HaShomer HaTzair*, see: (Peled 2002, 73-74; 100-109).
“Trotzdem sich mir bei jedem neuen Zusammentreffen mit Fiedler immer mehr ergibt, wie groß meine Inferiorität ist, so ist doch ein Gespräch mit ihm immer wie ein Trunk aus einem lebensspendenen Brunnen und wirkt tagelang wohltätig nach. Er ist einfach unendlich groß” (Korolik 1981, 96).

This admiration for his German friends and their families was in complete contrast to his attitude towards his Jewish-Berliner family, whom he visited occasionally on Sabbaths. “Sie waren nett zu mir, aber die flache, kleinbürgerliche Atmosphäre gab mir nichts.” (Korolik 1981, 95; Bein 1968, I, 161).

His worshipful descriptions of his friends are typical expressions of the outsider who sees the dominant group as perfect:

“[…} wenn ich auch selbst mal in meinem Leben nichts leiste, so kann ich mich doch glücklich schätzen, daß das Geschick mich mit diesem Fiedler und Wyneken zusammengeführt hat, denn sie werden nach meiner festen Überzeugung in der Geschichte der Menschheit sicher mal eine hervorragende Rolle spielen. Es sind beides Leute, wie sie die Welt bisher noch nicht gesehen hat, von solch universalem Wissen und solcher Genialität, dabei 21 resp. 22 Jahre alt” (Korolik 1981, 97).

In the same pattern described above, Ruppin’s admiration for his two German-Protestant student friends was paralleled by his belittling of himself:

Ruppin’s feelings of inferiority (in relation to Christians) and superiority (in relation to Jews) was a prevailing theme in his diary. In a much later and different period of his life [31 Jan. 1925], he reflected in his diary on this complex:

“My know how much I suffered during my school days as a child of poor parents and as a Jew; and it may be that a certain sense of restraint and shyness which I still feel in relation to persons of high rank, non-Jews in particular, has its roots here” (Bein 1972, 119).

In his early university years, Ruppin internalized more and more stereotypes through his interaction with his friends. This set of stereotypes was prevalent at the time in the German universities; the Jewish students (especially those from East Europe) were considered to be lacking in any true inspiration, mere absorbers of knowledge with no inherent intelligence but only the ability to memorize and repeat, idiots savants (Gilman 1986, 215). These stereotypes suggested that the Jewish student could not “truly” comprehend the essence or nature of the German discourse, and especially of the language, in which the German soul reveals itself. The Jews were at best ‘smart’ and ‘prosaic’ while the Christians/Aryans had ‘genius’ and were ‘poetic.’ This was the difference between the merely smart and the truly creative (Gilman 1996, 110).

Ruppin’s friends presented him with a set of stereotypical models of perception, which he, in his hyper-correctional manner was inclined to adopt:

“There are vague things in the soul of the German nation that we smart Jews for the most part cannot comprehend at all, or at least do not understand properly” (Bein 1968, I, 198).77

77 This point is demonstrated paradoxically in the following entry of his diary: “Wyneken meinte, als die Rede auf Spinoza kam: Ich rate Ihnen, den Spinoza vorläufig noch nicht zu lesen, denn er ist ganz objectiv und abstrakt, und sie sind durch und durch subjektiv und konkret. W. hat in allen Gebieten ein phänomenales Wissen” (Korolik 1981, 97).
Ruppin’s sense of inferiority led him to try and reform his soul, for he felt the inadequacy of his affinity with Nature:


According to his friends, his inability to comprehend nature was connected to his inability to feel the “aesthetic” in general and music in particular. At some point, he started to learn music although he realized that he had neither talent nor interest in it. Though he bought an old piano, he could not decipher this “magical world of sounds,” and he was envious his entire life of those who, after a good concert, could declare that it had opened for them a “world whose gates were closed for me” (Bein 1968, I, 134).

Gustav and Fritz (both of whom doffed their hats when they passed the Hegel memorial) recognized the borders between themselves the Aryans and Arthur the Jew:

“Es wird eine Zeit kommen, wo sie einsehen, dass der Verkehr mit Wyneken und mir kein Unglück für Sie gewesen ist. Sie haben einsehen gelernt, dass die Welt doch tiefer ist, als Sie bisher glaubten” (Korolik 1981, 97).

What may seem to us today as mere stereotypes were conceived by Ruppin and his friends as ‘scientific truths’, which meant, in their young, nineteenth century, positivistic minds, also ‘facts of life.’ The racialization of the stereotypes enabled them to discuss their superiority in a most explicit way:

“Things that Fiedler told me [...] ‘do not think that I obtained my position due to my work and my strength, a poor human strength. Only by the mercy of the Lord did I achieve being preferred over you and I shaped for myself a special Weltanschauung’” (Bein 1968, 164).
Ruppin internalized this set of stereotypes and beliefs, and as a ‘good’ and ‘honest’ Selbstkritik Jew accepted his position among them:

“sich mir bei jedem neuen Zusammentreffen mit Fiedler immer mehr ergibt, wie groß meine Inferiorität ist” (Korolik 1981, 96).

At the end of the 1890s, Ruppin still perceived his cultural identity according to the emancipation model, and still believed his integration into German culture a possibility. Nevertheless, his interpretation of this model would gradually move away from the Jewish-German perception of acculturation through enlightenment Bildung. In those years he began to define his cultural identity through the popular racial theories concerning the Jews, and even expressed in his diary some Rassekunde reflections on the “Jewish question:”

“Spiritual and physical regeneration can be achieved only through the end of inbreeding and the mixture with healthy, strong races like Germans and Slavs. Only then will there be a possible future for the Jewish spirit” (Bein 1968, 164).

As we shall see, within a few years Ruppin would reject this particular idea, after becoming immersed in the more up-to-date racial knowledge prevailing at the turn of the century, and grasping the fundamental importance of racial purity.
3.1.3 The Krupp [Haeckel] Prize and Ruppin’s Breakthrough

3.1.3.1 Haeckel

Although Ruppin obtained a law degree and had a promising career in the field of law, and although he wrote a doctoral thesis in political economy (Nationalökonomie),\(^78\) his real intellectual curiosity and his first academic success lay in the new interdisciplinary field which became known in the following years as “racial hygiene” (Rassenhygiene) or “eugenics.” One of the main initiators of this paradigm in Germany, as well as of its popular repertoire, was the blond, blue eyed biologist Ernst Haeckel, one of Ruppin’s academic patrons and a central father figure of his weltanschauung, who was depicted by him as a “prächtiger Germanentyp” (Korolik 1981, 95).\(^79\)

In recent years, as the centrality of Haeckel’s work and activities for the bio-medical vision of society that emerged in the 1920s has come to be recognized, his legacy and impact on German culture has been reevaluated. In his monistic interpretation of Goethe, Darwin and Lamark, Haeckel perceived the principal of natural selection as the gravitational force of human culture, and viewed the world as a constant struggle for existence. In Haeckel’s monistic universe, all forces, the purely physico-chemical as well as the organic and human, sprang ultimately from one primal “life force” (Lebenskraft) (Kleeberg 2005, 25, 40, 44, 52, 70).

Haeckel’s influence on Ruppin cannot be overestimated and we can find traces of it even in his last book (1940) in which he presented Heackel’s thoughts as his own:

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\(^79\) Thünen was a skilled farmer who was knowledgeable in economics. Early in the 19\(^{th}\) century, he developed a model of land use that showed how market processes could determine how land in different locations would be used. His theory became a paradigm for rural development.

\(^79\) Ernst Heinrich Haeckel was born in Potsdam in 1834, where his father Karl, a jurist, served as a Privy Counselor to the Prussian Court. According to historians of science: “Haeckel’s judicial heritage may also have fostered a lingering impulse to bring legal clarity, through the promulgation of numerous laws, into what he perceived as ill-ordered biological disciplines” (Richards 2003, 4).
“The environment can create, by natural or social selection, species of man which are different in their qualities from those of the original group, in so far as the difference between the external conditions is greater and longer. By weeding out the less fit, the environment influences the development of the important qualities for existence in the given conditions for one group in this direction and for another group in the opposite way. What we call today the human race is actually [made up of] species which were created through crossing and selection” (Ruppin 1940, 16).

Haeckel’s Darwinism was actually a kind of Lamarckism, as the changes in the organic world were, according to him, conditioned by the fact that certain needs are developed that guide the activities of the organism in a definite direction, until finally the new function leads to the formation of a new organ (Bowler 1988, 164). He believed that the environment acted directly on organisms, producing new races. The “ability to transmit,” according to Haeckel, is a fundamental property of every living thing:

“Not only is the organism able to pass on to its descendants such characteristics as form, color, and size, which it, in turn, has inherited from its progenitors; it can also transmit variants of these qualities that have been acquired during its lifetime through the influence of external factors such as climate, nutriment, and so on, as well as of habits and training” (in: Weingart 1998, 399).

Haeckel’s theory of heredity constituted a revolution in the sterile anthropometrical research program, but it also gave focus to the hitherto diffuse fears of degeneration and the effect of racial mixing. All kind of physical traits, as well as psychological dispositions, were believed to be heritable – from common diseases to criminal behavior, alcoholism and even the urge to go to sea. Nevertheless, Haeckel’s

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80 Compare e.g. to Haeckel’s *Riddle of the Universe at the Close of the Nineteenth Century* where he wrote: “I established the view that this history of the embryo (ontogeny) must be completed by a second, equally valuable, and closely connected branch of thought – the history of race (phylogeny). Both of these branches of evolutionary science are, in my opinion, in the closest causal connection; this arises from the reciprocal action of the laws of heredity and adaptation […] ontogenesis is a brief and rapid recapitulation of phylogenesis, determined by the physiological functions of heredity (generation) and adaptation” (in: Bowler 1988, 83).
weltanschauung did not confine itself to the scientific field, and he combined it with a strong anticlerical stand, claiming that the church stood in the way of the development of science (a stand which Ruppin shared with him regarding Jewish rabbinical clericalism). His clear cut political solutions and his ability to popularize his ideas through inexpensive and simple publications full of pictures was one of the reasons for his success. Haeckel’s ideas gained such extraordinary popularity because they gave young readers a clear and legitimate weltanschauung as a substitute for the declining power of religion, and offered an immediate solution to the crisis of German culture following industrialization and urbanization. This crisis, which led to religious skepticism, also generated skepticism towards enlightenment, humanism and liberalism (Tal 1985, 38). For young readers in fin-de-siècle Germany, Haeckel’s texts felt “scientific” while also presenting a new pantheistic religion to incorporate with their own religiosity, with the troubled emotional energy of the young student faced with the fading shadows of the “dead god.” Haeckel’s weltanschauung can be described as a kind of messianic secularism; its implicit aim was to reveal, once and for all, the relationship between biology and culture, between the outside appearance and the inner self. Consequently, Haeckel felt that the purpose of the nation state was to enforce selective breeding and he praised the practices of the Spartans who killed all but “perfectly healthy and strong children” and were thus “continually in excellent strength and vigor” (Haeckel 1876, 170).

Haeckel refuted the biblical story through historical analysis, claiming that Jesus was human and not divine. Following Chamberlain, he asserted that Jesus’ religion of love had no connection with the Jews and their “typical oriental illusions” (Mosse 1978, 87). He saw the Jews as those who used Jesus’ gospel for their own needs and he worked within the framework of the hierarchy that claimed that the Germans were the superior race and blacks and Jews stood at the bottom of the racial ladder (ibid. 86-

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81 Haeckel wrote one of the most popular Social Darwinist works, *Die Welträtsel: Gemeinverständliche Studien über monistische Philosophie* (English edition: *Riddle of the Universe at the Close of the Nineteenth Century*), published in 1899, which deeply affected Ruppin, as well as many other students at the turn of the century. The book had a circulation of over 400,000 in Germany alone and was translated into twenty languages (Krüger 1998, 377).

82 See: (Mosse 1978, 87). It is not surprising that many of Haeckel’s followers gave him credit for being a national and religious prophet, and there were a few who saw him as a messiah (Gasman 1971, 14).
Haeckel described his weltanschauung as a new “natural religion” which finally made possible a true understanding of the “book of nature,” with scientists becoming priests able to solve the “Riddle of the Universe,” the title of his most popular book. This “scientific religion” or “secular mysticism” was able to re-enchant the materialistic world and fill the growing gap that the pushing back of Christianity had opened up (Kleeberg 2005b). The second and more radical step that Haeckel and his followers took was not only to “solve” the riddle of nature but also to “help” nature enforce on human society what they held to be its laws. They believed, for example, that the sick or crippled should not be allowed to exist and they supported the death penalty for habitual criminals. Improvising on themes from Gulton and Chamberlain, Haeckel proposed a special body, a committee of experts or social engineers that would decide matters of life and death. Morality was defined here through biological values.  

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83 Actually Haeckel didn’t see himself as a materialist because, unlike the materialists, he didn’t see matter as dead (Kelly 1981, 18).

84 Mosse sees Haeckel’s ideas as the direct origin of the Nazi practices of euthanasia (Mosse 1978, 87).
3.1.3.2 The Prize

With the encouragement of his fellow student Gustav Wyneken and his *Doktorvater* professor Johannes Conrad, Ruppin entered a unique academic competition – known later as *The Krupp Prize* – which was formulated and supervised by Haeckel. This academic competition asked for ways of applying Darwinism to the organization of society and state, and Ruppin, quite surprisingly, took second place.

The news that he had won the prize was published in one of the local papers of Halle and the amazed District Judge postponed all that day’s trials, and took Ruppin for a walk in the woods, asking him about his theories and success. The same evening Ruppin invited all the employees of the district court to a party at his hotel. The Judge honored him with a speech full of praise and Ruppin felt that from that evening on he had become an honorable member of the pack (Bein 1968, I, 187). It was the breakthrough that he thought he aspired to.

*The Krupp Prize* competition and its subsequent publications mark a turning point in the acceptance of eugenics in Germany by giving it scientific legitimization, public relations and a budget. It was, at the time, the most important academic prize to make a connection between science and society.

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85 Dr. Johannes Conrad (1839-1915), dealt in his doctorate and post doctorate (Habilitation) with questions of agriculture and was considered an important “agriculture politician” (Agrarpolitiker) and an expert in the field of agricultural statistics (Agrarstatistik). He was appreciated as an expert in political-economy” (Nationalökonomie) and was the editor of the influential journal *Jahrbücher für Nationalökonomie und Statistik* (since 1870). Conrad was an adherent of the social reformism school (Sozialreformismus). He recognized at a very early stage the social and economic importance of the “cooperative movement” (Genossenschaftsbewegung), and was the first to teach and research this movement in Halle university.

86 The question was: “Was lernen wir aus den Prinzipien der Descendenztheorie in Beziehung auf die innerpolitische Entwicklung und Gesetzgebung der Staaten?” (What can we learn from the principles of the theory of the origin of the species with regard to the development and inner political constitution of states?).

87 The first prize was won by Wilhelm Schallmayer for his essay *Vererbung und Auslese* (Inheritance and Selection), which is considered one of the texts that heralded the birth of German Eugenics or Rassenhygiene (Falk 1998, 592). The third place was given to Ludwig Woltmann, who promoted the Gobineau line of thought regarding the inequality between races and the advantage of the Nordic race over the rest.

88 On the connection between the *Krupp Prize* and the dissemination of ideas of racial hygiene see (Sweeny 1998, 56).

89 On the significance of the *Krupp Prize*, see the three journal volumes of Medizinhistorisches Journal, devoted to the subject (Thomann & Kümmel, 1995).
Haeckel and the Monist League which he established in Jena (1906) for disseminating “Darwinism as a weltanschauung” (Cassirer 1950, 161), were massively supported by the mega German factory owners, who increased their income significantly at the end of the 19th century and made Germany the most powerful industrial state in Europe. The anonymous sponsor of the high total of the prizes (100,000 Marks for several years), was the prominent industrialist Alfred Friedrich Krupp (1854-1902) who was also a passionate supporter of social Darwinism.

Powerful capitalists, such as Krupp in the Ruhr and Karl Ferdinand von Stumm (1843-1925) in the Saar, hoped to implement the Darwinist theories in their factories as well as to instill them into the structure of the state. Their particular interest was in theories concerning the selection (Selektionstheorie) of the work force, which was regarded more and more in terms of “energy” and “Menschenmaterial” (Thomann and Kümmel 1995, 102). Haeckel and his group established a network of scientists, experts, journals and institutions which provided the economic powers with scientific legitimacy and methodological practices; they were “experts in legitimation” as Gramsci puts it, for monitoring labor relations in Germany. Krupp’s funds were linked with the agenda promoted by the three noted German academics: Heackel, the head of the prize committee, Conrad (Ruppin’s supervisor), and the historian Dietrich Schäfer, (1845-1929), a disciple of Treitschke’s, who saw colonization as the highest goal of the German Volk. The agenda promoted by Haeckel and his colleagues also had ambitions to change the structure of the academic field and they stressed the importance and advantage of the natural sciences over philosophy and knowledge of the humanities (Thomann & Kümmel 1995, 106).

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90 Haeckel is also considered an important figure in the shift from religious to biological, race-based anti-Semitism (Hutton 2005, 154).
91 Krupp revealed his identity only after the competition ended.
92 The theories of productivism were seen as the “social equivalent of energeticism.” On the concept of energy at the turn of the century see: (Rabinbach 1992, 182).
93 Schäfer shared his teacher’s anti-Semitic views. He was a member of the Alldeutscher Verband which had nationalistic and expansionist views as well as anti-Semitic and anti-Slavic ones. The Nazis saw him as one of their prophets (Vorkämpfer), and in 1934 they honored him by naming a central road after him. On Schäfer’s views see: (Deutscher 1918).
Ruppin’s Weltanschauung and his position as a researcher were set, then, at the crossroads between the social Darwinist eugenicists, who wished to implement their theories in the academic field and in social reality, and the capital owners, who wished to organize their factories efficiently in order to increase their profits and thwart the rise of independent socialist organizations. Not surprisingly, the rise of eugenics was linked to a new constellation of science and politics concerned with the workforce and a new “science of work” was established at the crossroads of science, medicine and social policy (Rabinbach 1992, 23).

Winning the Krupp Prize gave Ruppin an entry into exclusive circles and academic journals, while the substantial prize money enabled him to continue his researches and to begin his Zionist activities. His winning essay, edited by the eugenicist Heinrich Ernst Ziegler (1858-1925), was published in 1903 under the same title, *Darwinismus und Socialwissenschaft* (Darwinism and the Social Sciences), as the second volume in the series: *Natur und Staat: Beiträge zur naturwissenschaftlichen Gesellschaftslehre. Eine Sammlung von Preisschriften, herausgegeben von Prof. Dr. H.E. Zigler, in Verbindung mit Prof. Dr. Conrad und Prof. Dr. Haeckel.*

It is quite clear that the members of the committee edited Ruppin’s text and helped him shape his theory, as is evident from the correspondence he had with Ziegler, who was responsible for editing the texts according to Haeckel’s lines. Ziegler asked Ruppin to change some of his views, especially those influenced by the philosopher Prof. Rudolf Stammler (1856-1938) who, according to Ziegler, did not accept the ideas the Krupp prize promoted (Doron 1980, 415).

Ruppin’s profound attraction to Haeckel can be explained as connected to his “belonging” difficulties, which he believed he might solve by taking the “objective” position of the observer. Biologists, at that time, were considered the ideal of neutral, nation-supporting scientists. This position opened for him a field that enabled him to acquire a “true” understanding of the *Volk* and to serve his beloved state. Since

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94 The 6000 Mark prize (a year’s salary of a senior clerk or businessman) also marked the economic recovery of his family. The money enabled him to open two successful businesses for his sister and brother (Bein 1968, I, 188; Goren 2004, 95).

95 Ruppin admired Stammler (a philosopher of Law) for his systematic scientific method (Bein 1968, I, 168).
winning the *Krupp Prize* and for the rest of his life, Ruppin declared that he had wanted, more than anything, to become a biologist, for he believed deeply that biology was the science that succeeded in finding the key to the “mystery of life,” as well as explaining the riddles of evolution, the individual and society.

Ruppin’s winning essay *Darwinismus und Socialwissenschaft* analyzed the applicability of Darwin’s theory to organizing society and the state and expressed enthusiastic belief in the power of social engineering to elevate man to a new level of morality and freedom. In presenting his euphemistic eugenics program, (which became much harsher later on when he applied it to the Jews), Ruppin acknowledged that he was demanding great sacrifices of human beings, but he believed people (i.e. Germans) would accept them if convinced of the social usefulness of their actions. Though he acknowledged the sacrifice his bio-medical vision inflicted upon the individual, he supported the state and its crucial function and gave it the decisive right to intervene in the life of the individual, promoting the idea that social welfare and education had to be combined with a program of eugenics, in which invalids and the mentally ill would be discouraged (Ruppin 1903a, 31, 36, 45-46, 64, 91-92, 123; Penslar 1991, 86-87).

“In an age of dwindling belief in the immortality of the soul, the individual will recognize, in his belonging to the state and his actions for the state, his share in eternity, in the history of the whole of mankind, and must look up to the state with genuine religious fervor. He must approach the state only as a wave in the ocean, which, barely arisen, quickly passes and sinks without a trace into the sea […] so for the peoples of old in honor of gods, so for the individual today may no sacrifice seem too great in honor of the state.” (Ruppin 1903a, 92, in: Penslar 1991, 86-87).

Ruppin’s putting the state in the place of God, as well as other views he expressed in his winning essay, was quite common at the time and did not present any kind of innovation, as the notable sociologist Ludwig Gumplowicz (1838-1909), who read the
essays of Ruppin and Albert Hesse remarked: “zwei seiner mittelmäßige Schülerarbeiten, die nichts Neues und Bemerkenswertes” (Thomann & Kümmel 1995, 339). This leads one to wonder why Ruppin won the prize, a feeling shared at the time by the third prize winner, Woltmann, who wrote to Haeckel in protest and pointed out that Ruppin and Hesse (the second prize winners) were both students of Conrad, a member of the committee (ibid., 338-342).

It was impossible for me, in the course of my research, to find the documents regarding the committee’s reasons for giving the Prize to Ruppin; nevertheless, if I may speculate (just for a moment), giving one of the prizes to a Jew could have legitimized the other winners: Wilhelm Schallmayer, who took first place for his essay *Vererbung und Auslese* (Inheritance and Selection), considered one of the texts that heralded the birth of German Eugenics or *Rassenhygiene* (Falk 1998, 592), and the third winner, Ludwig Woltmann, who promoted the Gobineau line of thought regarding the inequality between races and the advantage of the Nordic race over all others. Since the competition and its agenda seem to have been a kind of “experimental balloon” for checking the reactions of academic and public opinion, it is quite possible that a “winning Jew” could have been a “life belt” should Heackel and his fellows be accused of being anti-Semitic (which to us they clearly were); one must bear in mind here that, at the time, Jews played an important role in the German academic field.

### 3.1.4 Volk, Nature and the Cultural Position of the Jew

The rise of *Völkisch* ideology and its cultural repertoire stressed the relationship between the individual, the Volk and the land, and had a significant impact on the symbolic position of the Jew in German culture. The notion that prevailed in *Völkisch* German mythology, according to which each individual had an astral body parallel to his physical one, led to the belief that, with the necessary skills, one might establish a bond with the “life spirit of the universe.” This bond with nature could supposedly also be established through another vague entity: the “life force” (Lebenskraft), whose existence unites man and universe. According to Mosse, these pantheistic perceptions

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96 Hesse won the second prize together with Ruppin.

97 On the *Völkisch* ideas concerning Astralism, see: (Mosse 1964, 104)
were a mystical substitute for the biblical God, and facilitated his revelation, not through texts or laws, but rather through nature itself (Mosse 1964, 104). The German *Völkisch* ideology developed a mystical conception that suggested that Germans would overcome their anxieties if they could only accept the nature which surrounded them and absorb it into their souls. The *Volk*, which is based on one ethnic identity, was the mediator between the individual and the universe and filled him with the “life force.” The following entry, written at the end of the nineties [1898] demonstrates Ruppin’s attempts to experience a bond with the “life force” by merging with the German soil, a necessary step in fulfilling his fantasies of belonging to the German *Volk*:


However, Ruppin’s identification with the *Völkisch* movement led to a constantly increasing conflict within him which would be resolved gradually through Zionism. The reason for this conflict lay in the *Völkisch* idea that the soul of the *Volk* emerges from its *original* native soil. According to this line of thought, the Jews cannot be part of the German *Volk*, for their original soil is the desert. In the *Völkisch* mind, this georacial fact was also the reason for their superficiality, dryness and lack of creativity. The arid and infertile desert symbolized the mentality of the Jews, as opposed to that of the Germans, who lived in the shadows, in the deep black forest with its dark, morbid depths of mystery and fertility. The fact that the German *Volk* was living in
darkness made them, in the Völkisch mythological mind, the true Lichtmenschen, whose aspirations were directed toward the sun.

The myth linking the Volk to its original land developed into an ideology which rejected any fusion or amalgamation of people who were, by their very nature, unrelated (in terms of the connection of the Volk to its original native soil), and asserted that every Volk must spring from its own native soil and its own Volk homogeneity. As a result of these concepts, the German Völkisch ideology was unequivocally opposed to the principles of the bourgeois democratic revolution; it opposed the principle of equality, asserting the natural inequality of different Völker, and opposed individual liberty on the grounds that it was not the individual but the Volk that was the centre of human development. As we shall see in the following, Ruppin’s Weltanschauung and the theories he developed in the first years of the new century were shaped by these ideological trends and can be comprehended only in this context.

It is important to note, at this particular point, that my repeated use of the concept Volk stems from the fact that it is not translatable and, like weltanschauung, should be adopted as is by English and Hebrew. I use it also because, although Ruppin used and referred to the concept of Volk in most of his writings, its specific meaning and significance is lost in most Hebrew and English translations. Mosse pointed out that, in the specific context of the German discourse, the concept of Volk is quite different from that of nation or people. The term Volk is not used simply to define a group of interconnected people; it refers rather to a specific relationship which emphasized the connection or merging of this group with some kind of transcendent entity as well as with a particular soil. It is interesting to note that the specific meaning of Volk as presented above, and the specific connection between the Volk and the soil was internalized in Ruppin’s early cultural identity. There is an entry in his diary from 1898 which is similar to Mosse’s contention even in its wording:

“Only a Volk engaged in agriculture can be healthy, only a state with the majority of its people engaged in agriculture comprises a firmly bound, organized whole. Agriculture is the well-spring of mankind. England and other
states (whose agricultural populations are steadily declining) will always present only an aggregate of individual people who have been haphazardly thrown together” (Ruppin, Tagebuch, CZA, [26 August 1898], A107/217).

This quotation may very well affirm what Hans Kohn and Hannah Arendt stressed decades ago, that Zionist nationalism was shaped by the German model which rejected “Western civic ideals” and the democratic, universalistic models of the US and French revolutions (Kohn 1970, 187; concerning Arendt see Mosse 1964, 107).

3.1.5 The German Youth Movement 
and the Improvement of the Volk

In German culture at the turn of the century, many voices expressed discontent and disappointment regarding the long wait for the “true” unification of the German Volk. The negative impact of urbanization followed by the industrial revolution, which threatened socio-semiotic cohesion, generated a longing for a more “authentic” German Volk. The dominant social agents for this particular Völkisch mythology were the national youth movements. The educational establishment consistently encouraged the solution posed by the youth movements – which emphasized the connection with nature – as a means for solving the different problems of German culture.

Gustav Wyneken, Ruppin’s best friend from university, became, at the beginning of the century, one of the most charismatic leaders of the German youth movements. In 1906, he established an organization, a Freie Schulgemeinde (Free School Association), in the Thuringian forest. This organization represented the elitist and fiercely intellectualist wing of the German youth movement. In its first stages, the association was allegedly opposed to the Völkisch mythology and emphasized the molding of the individual as an ethical being. This was Wyneken’s ideal of an elite and highly ethical Männerbund devoted to the ideals of Kant, Hegel, Goethe and Nietzsche. However, during World War I, the association supported the war and had obvious anti-Semitic tendencies (Gelley 1999, 6). Walter Benjamin, who was a

98 On the cultural crisis in the last decades of the 19th century, which resulted from accelerated urban and industrial processes and its impact on the German consciousness, see: (Diner 1993, 143-145).
member of Wyneken’s *Freie Schulgemeinde* in its “philosophical phase,” left it because Wyneken supported participation in the war. Benjamin wrote to Wyneken:

> “you have ultimately sacrificed youth to the state, which has taken everything from you” (in: Wolin 1994, 13).

Wyneken, who had been interested in education ever since the 1890s, inspired Ruppin’s first experiences in culture planning. As mentioned above, Ruppin was one of the first to read and discuss Wyneken’s theories:


Influenced by Wyneken’s plans, in that same year Ruppin sketched out a plan for a new school system based on what he called *Einheitsschule* (uniform school). Like Wynecken’s *Freie Schulgemeinde*, the idea that Ruppin developed was for a school that, as the historian Laqueur described it, “combined agricultural work with a modified school syllabus, physical education, and life in a community, in an attempt to train a new type of man and woman” (Laqueur 1962, 54). But whereas the aim of Wyneken’s *Freie Schulgemeinde* was to develop the individual as a way to improve the community, the aim of Ruppin’s *Einheitsschule* was to educate youth to serve the fatherland. Students would be instructed in agriculture, factory work, sports, gymnastics and military training. Ruppin noted: “the school must become a self-contained organism that constitutes a state in miniature.”

Ruppin’s educational plans were directed towards German culture and were part of his attempts to legitimize his belonging by proving his contribution to the German state and *Volk*. As will be demonstrated in a later chapter, Ruppin clearly applied some of the ideas expressed in his *Einheitsschule* program when he began his activities in the Zionist movement. The most important points of Ruppin’s early plans,

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which would become the cornerstone of his Zionist Weltanschauung, can be detected here: the emphasis on the transformation of the body through productivization and militarization (as opposed to Wyneken’s focus on the intellect) and the importance of the state (as opposed to Wyneken’s focus on the individual).

3.2 Ruppin’s “Modern Weltanschauung”


Soon after his success and academic recognition, Ruppin began to publish articles in German journals. These articles are more revealing than his first academic and more reserved work, Socialwissenschaft und Darwinismus, and were written in the populärwissenschaftlichen style of Haeckel. The first three were published during 1902-1903 in the German vanguard journal Die Gegenwart, a fact that seems interesting when we remember that the title of his first book on the Jews published a year later was Die Juden der Gegenwart. In his Die Gegenwart articles, Ruppin expressed, with the decisiveness of a Weichensteller, his bio-utopian weltanschauung. The articles are revealing because it seems that Ruppin — being now recognized as a German intellectual — allowed himself to speculate in a freer and more daring way. The new, important influence on him was certainly that of Nietzsche, which gave his dry, scientific style a kind of romantic twist (something found until then only in his diaries).

3.2.1 The Importance of Quality over Quantity

In his first Die Gegenwart article: Die Volksmehrung (1902), Ruppin argued that, for fifteen hundred years, Christianity had succeeded in making the ideal of individual human life — the “unconditional worth of the individual” — central to culture. But this, Ruppin asserted, was not a universal principle that had to remain unchallenged. Perhaps there was justification for amending this idea, and making the worth of the

100 (Nietzsche 1968, 504).
individual dependent on something over and beyond it, such as the good of the state.
He challenged the liberal notion of the supremacy of the individual: “Should not
changes in the needs of the state entail revisions in morality?” he asked rhetorically
and, invoking Nietzsche, he concluded that the **quality** of individuals was, and must
be, of importance equal to or even greater than their **quantity** (Ruppin 1902c, 321-23;
Hart 2000, 62).

### 3.2.2 The Collapse of Religion

A few months later, he published a more elaborated article that showed clearly how
influenced he was by Nietzsche’s philosophy, *Moderne Weltanschauung* und
*Nietzsche’sche Philosophie* (1903). Ruppin opened the article by declaring that the
decline of religious institutions was symptomatic of the decline of the power of
religious feelings: “[...] daß Religion und religiöses Gefühl für das Denken und
Handeln des Einzelnen an Bedeutung verloren haben” (Ruppin 1903b, 147). This
statement, as we shall see, was also the opening statement of his book on the Jews;
Religion did not keep pace with political (staatliche), economic and scientific
development. The collapse of religion opened the way for a host of metaphysical
systems but these too were unable to supply a stable and coherent *Weltanschauung*.
The basic reason for that was that neither of these forms — the religious or the
metaphysical — could serve as the basis for the modern *Weltanschauung*, because
they were based on belief:

> “Religion und Metaphysik heischen für ihre Lehrsätze unbedingten Glauben:
die erstere mit Rücksicht auf ihren göttlichen Ursprung, die letztere, weil sie
ihre Sätze bewiesen zu haben glaubt. Eine Weltanschauung dagegen will und
soll ihre Sätze nicht zum Dogma machen” (Ruppin 1903b, 147).

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101 The term “*moderne Weltanschauung*” was used by many eugenicists and designated explicitly the
Darwinist worldview of the Monist League, see: (Weindling 1989, 128).
The moderne Weltanschauung had to be based, then, on something he believed to be non-dogmatic and that was science, especially natural science:


It is important to note that here, Ruppin accepts Haeckel’s idea with regard to the Urschleim, a concept that will determine Ruppin’s understanding of the connection between the Volk and the Boden. From the quotation above we can see that, although Ruppin seems to use Nietzsche’s criticism of religion and metaphysics, he actually understood them more or less in the context of August Comte’s (1798-1857) interpretation of the three stages of human cultural development: the religious-fantastic, the metaphysical and the positivistic, represented for him by Haeckel’s Weltanschauung.
3.2.3 The Importance of the Übermensch and the State

In *Moderne Weltanschauung und Nietzsche’sche Philosophie* Ruppin interpreted Nietzsche’s concept of the Übermensch in a biological sense – as a concept related to a positivistic-biological progress:

“Können wir aus den Naturwissenschaften nur die Vermuthung entnehmen, dass der Mensch, die Art homo sapiens, das Ziel der Entwicklung sei, so geben uns weiterhin Socialwissenschaft und Geschichte Anhalt dafür, dass nicht der Mensch als Mensch, sondern ein bestimmter Typus des Menschen das Ziel der Entwicklung bildet” (Ruppin 1903b, 148).

This ideal person, the aim of nature, is not an isolated individual (isolierter Mensch) but rather one connected in his essence to society. Hence the “natural” aim of society and its different cultural functions is to create this particular man:

“Man kann alle Bethätigungen des gesellschaftlichen und staatlichen Lebens, auch die Pflege von Kunst, Wissenschaft und Religion, als diesem Zwecke, im Menschen die socialen Instincte zu wecken und wach zu erhalten, untergeordnet ansehen” (Ruppin 1903b, 148).

Before clarifying the nature of the man that society is seeking, Ruppin argues that the proper environment for the development of this kind of man is among his own kind:

“Vielleicht liegt dieser Entwicklung als Triebfeder, uns unbewusst, die Thatsache zu Grunde, dass die Menschen nur im Verbande mit Gleichen – gleich in Bezug auf körperliche Organisation, Bedürfnisse und Empfinden – zu den höchsten Leistungen fähig sind” (Ruppin 1903b, 149).

This idea for the development of the human race to a higher level (über seinen heutigen Artcharakter hinaus) led inevitably, according to Ruppin, to the idea of Nietzsche’s Übermenschen, in the sense used by zoologists and anthropologists, who believed that a higher kind (höherer Art) of man could be produced through physical
and intellectual improvements. According to Ruppin, Nietzsche’s contribution to this concept lay only in his stressing the moral aspect of the *Übermensch*, which is:

“Er soll ein Wesen sein frei von den Fesseln socialen Gewissens, die heute den Menschen einschnüren. Ein Wesen, das sich selbst das Gesetz giebt, was gut und böse ist, und sich dieses Gesetz nicht von der herrschenden Meinung, der Masse als ein ewig gültiger Maßstab des Handelns aufdrängen lässt. Menschen also von der Art eines Julius Cäsar, Napoleon I., Bismarck. Wenn sich die Menschheit auf diese Weise über sich selbst erhoben hat, wenn sie aus ihrem Schoße den Übermenschen hat hervorgehen lassen, dann wird sie zu Leistungen fähig sein, von denen wir uns heute gar keine Vorstellung machen können” (Ruppin 1903b, 148).

Although Ruppin acknowledged Nietzsche’s harsh criticism of the state, especially with regard to the *Übermenschen*, he believed that it could be adapted to what he believed to be the modern weltanschauung:


He reasoned that without the state, Nietzsche’s *Übermensch* could not come into existence. The proof, according to Ruppin, lay in the fact that history is actually the history of states and that, without states, such figures as Julius Caesar, Napoleon I. and Bismarck, whom he took to be typical *Übermenschen*, could not have emerged upon the scene. The *Übermensch* had enormous importance for the state since he set an ideal model for imitation, which was not only mental, but also physical and biological (ibid 149).

The centrality of the state in Ruppin’s weltanschauung, mentioned already in other connections, appears here in a Darwinist interpretation of the Hegelian perception of the state as a natural development and a sign of a higher culture and morality.
According to Ruppin, it is the state that provides the background for excellence; without it, there can be no Übermenschen, and no excellence.

Ruppin’s self perception is clearly reflected in his assertion that the Übermensch is to Mensch as man is to animals.

“Der Übermensch bedient sich des Menschen mittels für seine Zwecke ebenso, wie sich der Mensch die Thiere, aus deren Schoße er hervorging, dienstbar gemacht hat” (Ruppin 1903b, 149).

According to Ruppin, there is no social form which is not subordinate to the Übermensch, and the ideal it presents is a natural and important function in human history and culture (for example, he sees the angels of the religious world as a kind of vague, early model for the Übermensch). Therefore, the ideal of the Übermensch is important to the state and connected to it, because the Übermensch presents an ideal for others to aspire to and improve themselves accordingly:

“Man braucht hierzu gar nicht einmal die Ansicht unserer Rassenfanatiker zu acceptiren, dass nur die reine Rasse in der Lage sei, Tüchtiges zu leisten und große Männer hervorzubringen. Es genügt die Erwägung, dass die Bildung von abgeschlossenen Nationen erstens durch die größere Gleichförmigkeit der Lebensbedürfnisse und Anschauungen der Einzelnen innerhalb der Nation den Anlaß zu Reibungen vermindert und das gesellschaftliche Zusammenleben erleichtert, und dass sie ferner die Entstehung hervorragender Charakere begünstigt, weil bei Fortpflanzung innerhalb der Nation immer solche Individuen zusammentreten, welche, ohne physiologisch näher verwandt zu sein und die Gefahren der Inzucht hervorzurufen, doch durch die nationale Gemeinschaft in ihren Anlagen in gewissem Grade einander verwandt und ähnlich sind. Hierdurch ist aber die Steigerung und Höherzüchtung bestimmter Anlagen wahrscheinlicher als in einem Volke, in dem Angehörige verschiedener Nationalität sich kreuzen und durch Amphimiris (Weismann) die in irgend einer Richtung hervorragende Veranlagung des einen Gatten durch den anderen, bei dem sie in der Regel nicht auch vorhanden sein wird, geschwächt oder ganz aufgehoben wird” (Ruppin 1903b, 149).
In the concluding paragraph, Ruppin emphasizes that, in the ideal state, the citizens must be fully aware of the impact of their sexual activities on the state, and must subordinate them to the “advancement” (Forderung) and “superior formation” (Höherbildung) of the race (Rupin 1903b, 149).

“Durch das Zeugen von Kindern hat jeder Mensch eine Einwirkung auf die Erreichung des höheren Menschentypus, denn er bestimmt hierdurch den Typus zukünftiger Generationen in’s Unendliche weiter. Und in dem der Mensch sich dieser Bedeutung und Verantwortlichkeit bewusst wird, wird es ihm hoffentlich als Pflicht einleuchten, nur dann Kinder in die Welt zu setzen, wenn von ihnen wirklich eine Forderung und Höherbildung der Rasse zu erwarten ist” (Ruppin 1903b, 149, my emphasis, E.B.).

The “Modern weltanschauung” recognition of Ruppin’s Übermensch is a biological and positivistic one, and the Übermensch mission must be to teach and direct the Volk to subordinate their sexual activities to the state’s constant attempt to advance and improve the race. These ideas (and later practices) are clearly derived from Heackel, one of whose main activities, through his Monist League, was to attempt to instill rules and models to mold the sexual behavior of German citizens and improve the racial health of the Volk (Gasman, 1971, 92).

3.2.4 “Continuität des Keimplasmas” as the Spiritual Tradition of the Volk

In the last article of his Die Gegenwart bio-social writings, Tod und Unsterblichkeit (Death and Immortality), Ruppin presented a populärwissenschaftliche explanation and reflection of the German zoologist August Weismann’s (1834-1914) theories (Ruppin 1903c). Weismann was the first to differentiate in human beings (like Mendel in plants) between genotype and phenotype, the germ plasma and the actual individual. It was a Mendelian theory of “independent, immutable germ plasma” which explained heredity, leading his followers to search for a “single gene” that built “even the most complex” body parts and to argue that the social environment “was impotent to alter the human condition” (Friedlander 1995, 2).
Although there are basic scientific contradictions between Weismann’s *Keimplasma-Kontinuität* theory and the Haeckelian *Neolamarcismus* (the heredity of acquired traits), Ruppin’s specific *Weltanschauung* allowed him to relate to both, mainly because both stressed the importance of selection. Weisman claimed that it was impossible to improve our progeny’s condition, in the long run, through physical or mental training but only through selection. For him, natural selection was the only mechanism for species change. Weismann’s ideas gave Ruppin an important insight into the essence of *Unsterblichkeit* (immortality), It is embedded, he revealed to his readers, within the *biological material* and not within that of the *human spirit*. In other words, the Jew is a Jew because he has a Jewish biology; thus a change in his biology will change his spirit:

> “Wir stehen mit allen unseren Vorfahren nicht nur durch die Tradition geistig, sondern durch die Continuität des Keimplasmas auch körperlich in Verbindung, denn unsere Keimzellen sind im wahrsten Sinne des Wortes ein (wenn auch natürlich verschwindend kleines) Stück dieser Vorfahren selbst” (Ruppin 1903c, 197).

Weisman’s germ plasma (Keimplasma) theory suggested that racial features were not permanently erased and could recur, an idea which would support Ruppin’s belief that the Jews could become a “vital race” (*Vitalrasse*) once more, if only their *Volkskörper* were properly managed.

Ruppin’s forgotten articles in *Die Gegenwart* reveal what his weltanschauung had been a few years prior to his activity in the Zionist movement. This weltanschauung, which will illuminate his actions in Palestine, fitted the “modern weltanschauung” of Haeckel and his like, a weltanschauung described by Rabinbach as “transcendental materialism” or, recently by Kleeberg, as “theophysis.” Both definitions reflect

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102 The concept of *Vitalrasse* means a stock that has a good intersection of genetic lines of transmission (Erblinien). *Vitalism* saw life as driven by a harmonious final stage, meaning that cells and organisms had an innate urge towards wholeness or a harmonious form (Hutton 2005, 17, 27).
103 Rabinbach summarized this kind of weltanschauung: “The Promethean power of industry (cosmic,
the paradoxical metaphysical and religious dimensions of Ruppin’s “modern weltanschauung.” Nevertheless, for him, as for Haeckel before him, this weltanschauung was not at all ideological, metaphysical or religious but assumed a rigorous scientific façade and conviction.

3.3 “Einen Stich ins Herz” – Rejection and Conversion to the Option of Zionist Identity

Early in the last decade of the 19th century, Ruppin began to sense a gradually increasing atmosphere of anti-Semitism and there began to appear in his diaries an increasing number of reports depicting incidents of anti-Semitic rejection, such as the following from 1895:


It was in those years that Ruppin became acquainted with Zionism. The first encounter mentioned in his diary took place when he attended one of the assemblies of the local Graetzverein in Magdeburg,105 with the intention of arguing that the Jews must stop their greediness and “Prozenhaftigkeit” (purse-pride.) (in: Penslar 1991, 84). Although he felt attracted to the idea, he dismissed the Zionist option on the threshold since he felt completely German:

Technical, and human) could be encompassed in a single productivist metaphysic in which the concept of energy, united with matter, was the basis of all reality and the source of all productive power – a materialist idealism, or, as I prefer to call it, transcendental materialism” (Rabinbach, 1992, 20).

104 On the links of Heackel’s weltanschauung to Romanticism and Naturtheologische (theology of Nature), see: (Kleeberg 2005).

105 Graetzverein was an association named after the historian Heinrich Graetz (1817-1891), which met to discuss Jewish history and literature.
However, it is important to note that his rejection of Zionism was not one-sided. The young members of the Magdeburg *Graetzverein* rejected him too. This was not uncommon, for the distinction and hostility between Western and Eastern European Zionists was a very common phenomenon in the movement from its early beginnings, as will be discussed further on.

Ruppin wrote in his diary that he left the *Graetzverein* in 1893, because its members were humiliating him and even sent him an anonymous letter in that spirit (Bein 1968, I, 201). This rejection by the German Zionists indicates Ruppin’s social position and may explain his later relations with them. Although later in his life he would become an important figure in German Zionism, it seems that his attitude towards them would always be marked by this experience of rejection, which coincided with the anti-Semitic rejection.

During the last decade of the nineteenth century, he adopted the Protestant criticism of religion and God. Although he still defined himself as a Jew, he universalized the meaning of Judaism: “Ich denke, daß man nicht dadurch ein Jude ist, daß man an einen einzigen, allmächtigen und ewigen Got glaubt”(Korolik 1981, 114), and he did not accept its practical aspects: “Ich bin mit der Art, wie der jüdische Gottesdienst abgehalten wird, durchaus nicht einverstanden“ (ibid.). He gradually stopped observing even the already lax *mitzvahs* (precepts) he used to keep and, in 1892 he ate, for the first time, food forbidden to Jews and commented: “I don’t even feel sorry about it” (Bein 1968, I, 194).

As the end of the century approached and as soon as he began his studies at the universities of Berlin and Halle, Ruppin began to lose even his universal belief in the “one God” and the “immortality of the soul” (Bein 1968, I, 195), and replaced this quite secular religiosity with a new weltanschauung that lacked the concept or belief in God. As already discussed, the theory concerning the “immortality of the soul”
seemed to him, after he read Nietzsche, a “metaphysical solace,” to be replaced with a new positivistic one; religious emotions had to be abandoned or transformed, and Man’s beliefs centered on the state and the *Vaterland*.

In April 1903 he recorded in his diary that:

“For the first time in my life I believe I have developed a coherent Weltanschauung. This Weltanschauung culminates in the idea that human individuals as such are worthless, that only as part of a nation can they be said to be worth something, and that the nation is the means to the higher breeding or cultivation [Züchtung] of humanity. Work for one’s nation is the metaphysical purpose of human beings and must replace the false dream of individual immortality […] Jewry only has a justification for its existence if it can exist as a nation and has in itself the power to acquire the basis for the survival of a nation - a territory. Otherwise it deserves to die out. Zionism or assimilation – tertium non datum [a third is not given].”

During Ruppin’s studies at the university, he began to be increasingly exposed to anti-Semitism, especially on the part of the growing number of students belonging to associations with a *Völkisch* and anti-Semitic character. The views of these students were fueled by a new recognition which marked the end to hopes of Jewish emancipation. The claim that became prevalent among the students was that emancipation only increased the “appetite” or “desire” of the German Jews. According to them, the Jews did not want equality but rather to control German society. Social Darwinism and the increasing prestige of racial science supplied new scientific reasons and explanations for the old German fantasy about the immutability of the Jew. It would seem that conversion, emancipation and all the enlightened Bildung solutions could not really solve the “Jewish problem” since “Jewishness” became increasingly to be considered a permanent factor of the race (Pickus 1999, 69). The following quotation from a Leipzig newspaper of 1848: “A Berlin Jew is blissfully happy when he is told that there is no longer anything Jewish about him”

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(ibid, 84) became increasingly problematic. As the German cultural repertoire of the turn of the century changed, the Jewish student had to redefine his identity accordingly.

From 1902 until 1907 – the year he came to Palestine for the first time – Ruppin practiced law as a junior barrister (Referendar), assessor and then State Prosecutor. In the juridical social field, he experienced anti-Semitic social rejection in a way that previously he had not. According to his description, the non-Jewish junior barristers were “full of hatred” towards the Jews, and interaction with them was “impossible” (Bein 1968, I, 189). In this period he began to be increasingly uncertain whether he wished to serve a nation that did not value his services, and to form the conviction that he would remain an outsider in German society no matter how much he contributed to it. In a draft of his memoirs, he wrote and then crossed out a sentence saying that, if he had stayed in Germany, he – like Walter Rathenau – would have been more hated the more he achieved.

It is possible that his encounters with Zionist activists such as Sami Grunaman (1875-1952), Albert Goldberg and Heinrich Loewe (1869-1951), who stressed the practical over the ideological, also influenced his decision to turn to Zionism. Loewe, who was the only German Jew in Jewish-Russian society in Berlin, explained anti-Semitism as a result of Jewish “self-hatred”: “How will others respect us if we show contempt for ourselves.” He saw the counterweight to humiliation in “presenting the glorious past and restoring the crown to its place (Heb. atara leyoshna) in the land of Jehuda,” where “the honor of the Jewish nation will be recognized again in the estimation of human beings” (in: Almog 1982, 17).

As in many other cases, Ruppin’s historical, “objective” description recorded his own autobiography. In the Jews of Today, in the chapter concerning Jewish nationalism, he says that, until Zionism appeared, the condition of young Jews was “miserable” and he explains this as resulting from the conflict between the “ideal aspiration to work

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109 On Ruppin’s relation with him see (Grunaman 1946, 168) Grunaman remembers Ruppin as a “young blonde man” who came to him after his lecture in Magdenburg and discussed his ideas with him for hours.
usefully in the temple of the homeland culture and the bitter experience of rejection and hatred on the part of the environment, between the feeling of self-recognition, of having something to be proud of, and the bitter interaction with an attitude of contempt and social annulment” (Ruppin 1913a).

In his diary he described the rise of anti-Semitism at that time as an “avalanche,” and he gradually came to the conclusion that he did not want to belong to a state that did not want him: “Without a Fatherland that will love me/ my heart is so heavy and sad/ my country from childhood, in which I was raised and disciplined, does not love me,” he wrote in his poem “No Fatherland” (Kein Vaterland). This period of crisis was the background to his move to Zionism, a move that was paralleled by the reversal of the set of racial hierarchies and stereotypes that he had internalized in his initiation process into German culture. This kind of change of cultural identity is similar to what Stepan and Gilman termed *transvaluation* (Stepan and Gilman 1993, 182). Instead of being ashamed of his Jewishness and rejecting it, as he did during his childhood and youth, he began to see positive sides to the Jewish *Volk* and his relationship with it. The first stage of his transvaluation was accompanied by strong emotional identification with the most rejected group of Jews in German culture at that time – the group from which he had differentiated himself so passionately in his youth – the *Ostjuden*. Thus, the poem cited above, which opens with his departure from his beloved Germany, concludes with the dramatic-theological motive of the homecoming:

“Suddenly – what is it I hear? A sound of ringing and burnishing and a sound of ram’s horns [shofarot].

[...]

Here they are, rising from the East and beckoning to me:

Come with us! Come, in God’s name!

We are – an army of war to the homeland,

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111 There are many indications for that in his diary. See, for example, his disturbed comments on the anti-Semitic attacks on Jews. Ruppin strongly identified with the victims and their plight (Bein 1968, I, 28).

112 Ruppin’s grand homecoming scene is expressed within the *Völkisch* model of the return to the “glorious past” which will become a trope in Ruppin’s weltanschauung for many years. It marks also the beginning of the deep emotional “Bünde” between him and the (young) Jews from Eastern Europe.
Homeland for the Israeli Volk.

Here I am! – I called – Hand me the sword!
Be blessed, my battalion!
With you I will fight until together we achieve
A homeland for the Jewish Nation!” (Bein 1968, I, 203).

It was the end of his journey as an outsider into the “perfect” dominant group of his imagination; his interaction with the anti-Semitism of the German juridical field was the last blow which shattered his fantasy of acceptance. At the same time as he reached the peak of his success and fulfilled his academic and personal ambitions beyond all expectation, he also felt the immutability of anti-Semitic rejection, and his inability to cope with it any longer.

3.4 First Role in the Production of the Modern Hebrews – Ruppin and the Rise of Zionist Statist[ics]113

In the year that he wrote his poem “Kein Vaterland” (1902) Ruppin already knew that he was not marked out for poetry, and that the exclusive and much aspired-to title of “German poet” (deutscher Dichter) would not give him entry into the dominant group. The following years will be stamped by the change in his outlook. In the same year that he wrote his poem, he published a demographic study of the social relations of the Jews of Prussia and Germany Die Sozialen Verhältnisse der Juden in Preussen und Deutschland (Ruppin 1902b). Apparently, this was the first statistical scientific study of Jews to be presented in a general scientific journal (Urofsky & Levy 1973, 318).

In 1903, he traveled to Galicia, where he recorded anthropological observations and collected material for a study of Eastern and Central European Jewry. At the end of 1903, he wrote that he had decided to dedicate his future studies and writings to Jewish subjects.114 In the fall of 1904, he went to Berlin to accept a post with the newly-founded office for Jewish statistics, Büro für Statistik der Juden. The Büro was

113 Statist: an advocate of statism, the concentration of economic controls and planning in the hands of a highly centralized government or institution.
114 Ruppin, Tagebuch (December 31, 1903), CZA, A107/950.
founded by Alfred Nossig (1864-1943) in 1902, and, within a year, a network of branches was set up in Hamburg, Vienna, Lemberg, Warsaw, Odessa, Tamsk and Bern. The aim of the Büro was to prevent increasing assimilation and to fight against anti-Semitism using statistical data. After a short period, Ruppin became director of the Büro, where he imposed progressive and professional methods (Efron, 1994, 167). The Büro collected statistical data concerning the Jews and published them in the periodical Zeitschrift für Demographie und Statistik der Juden, edited by Ruppin. The data collected by the Büro from publications around the world was the raw material for Ruppin’s demographic work. He organized this material with the most advanced methods of the time, and broke it down into tables of quantity, distribution, level of education, health, economic situation, occupation etc. Ruppin’s new position gave him unparalleled access to the fresh statistical data of the Jewish communities at the beginning of the twentieth century and filled him with new inspiration: “My employment at the Büro für Statistik der Juden” he wrote in his diary, “is perhaps the first in my life of which I can say that I feel it to be a vocation [Berufung] […] and for which I have an inclination.”

However, Ruppin’s first wave of enthusiasm changed after a short time as a result of his strained relationship with Nossig, with whom Ruppin clashed both personally and professionally. It seems that Ruppin’s perception of himself as a genuine scientist could not tolerate Nossig’s propagandist approach. Nossig who, according to Ruppin, “understood nothing about statistics” (Goren 2004, 99), used Jewish statistics in the struggle against anti-Semitism in an apologetic and defensive way, whereas Ruppin wanted not only to show that the Jews were “not at all” like what the anti-Semites said about them but also to improve their actual social and racial conditions, to cure them through a specific eugenic culture plan. His yearning for expert research, as well as his hunger for statistics in general, reflected his aspiration toward a society based upon knowledge and not upon ideology, faith, or superficial propaganda. Ruppin’s new attitude and practices mark a turning point in the history of Jewish statistics, which had initially aimed only at refuting anti-Semitic claims. His demography and

statistics became a tool for building the modern Jewish *Volk*, solidifying and unifying it as a first step in attaining direct access to its subjects.\textsuperscript{116}

\textsuperscript{116} On the first stage of Jewish statistics see: (Soffer 2004, 55-79, 74-75).
3.4.1 Statistics and the Unification of the Jews

Ruppin’s first source for statistical data and methods was the library of the “Prussian Central Office for Statistics in Berlin” (Bein 1968, I, 230). *The Prussian Bureau of Statistics* was established in 1810 and gradually extended its influence over the German Empire. The Prussian model of statistics was extremely centralized and played a major role in the unification of Germany.\(^{117}\) The recognition of the necessity to centralize and unify the nation, like many other ideas and models, was transferred to Zionist nationalism from German culture. One of the major efforts of the first generation of Zionists was to achieve the unification of the Jewish nation in order to become its sole representatives. This task was extremely complicated at the turn of the century, not only because the Jews were scattered all over the world and had fundamental differences in their cultural identity and religious perceptions, but also because all the traditions of the Diaspora and the ethos of the *galut* Jew were in *intrinsic* opposition to such unification, from the ultra-orthodox recognition of existence in dispersion “which did not recognize the form of its dispersion,”\(^{118}\) through the liberal and socialist perception of Judaism as, in essence, a universal identity.

In the age of increasing nationalism, as Funkenstein writes:

“Herzl understood the empty space in the power structure of Jewish society: no other group or party even tried to appear as representing all the Jews, because such a pretension would force such a group to recognize what most of the Jews had until then denied: that they had to act as a ‘political subject.’ Herzl perceived that if such a group appeared and professed to operate in the name of the collective, it would be recognized as such by other political subjects, without any relation to the actual size of the minority which the group represented. Herzl was master of ‘as-if’ politics (Als-Ob Politik) in a

\[^{117}\text{Desrosières indicated how the traditions set by the Prussian Büro of Statistics survive even in contemporary German statistics that still rely on a negotiated balance between the federation and the Lander in controlling the Federal Office of Statistics. (Desrosières,1998 181-184).}\]

\[^{118}\text{(Schechter 2005). For an historical and theological discussion of the reasons for the absence of unity and unified leadership in Judaism, see: (Steinsaltz 2005, 39-60).}\]
period in which theatricality was no less important than actual power. His political-practical message was already, in 1896, the call to act ‘as if.’”


Herzl’s death left the Zionist movement in shambles for a number of years. Chaim Weizmann suggested Max Nordau, Herzl’s closest friend and confident, as the next leader of the movement. Nordau declined the offer on several grounds, one of which was his feeling that he would be unable to put himself in Herzl’s particular position. “Herzl” wrote Nordau “was capable of building a façade without a house behind it, and believing that no one would ever think of peeking behind the façade to see if something was there.” Nordau’s metaphor reflects the excessive “as-if politics” or the “non-practical” approach of the first generation of Zionists. His metaphor may also serve to characterize Ruppin’s special role in the Zionist movement – it was he who had the opportunity, the skills and the courage to “peek behind the façade” and begin to build the foundations.

Ruppin wrote, regarding Herzl’s conception of Zionism, that “Zionism is tenable only if it is furnished with a completely different scientific foundation [from Herzl’s],” (Bein 1972, 205), and, after reading through Herzl’s diaries, he wrote that: “[Herzl] was overcome by an idea and kept faith with this idea […] but the foundation of this idea was superficial.” The new foundations had begun to appear even in the writings of Ruppin’s mentor, Nordau. According to Martin Buber, Ruppin and he himself were part of a young group of Zionists who “succeeded in convincing Max Nordau” to emphasize the role of statistics in the Zionist plan for “the revival of national culture” (Buber 1943, CZA, S25/1203, 6).

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119 The first was that he was married to a Christian woman, and thus a “bad example” for the faithful.
120 Nordau to Weizman, in: (Weizman 1988, 112).
121 (Bein 1968, III, 168). At the end of the 1920s he dismissed Herzl with contempt and wrote: “the shallow Herzlian ideology” (ibid., II, 159).
122 At an early stage of his life, after reading Nordau’s The Conventional Lies of our Civilization, he wrote in his diary that he wanted to be someone like Nordau, a “dramatist, world-improver, and social reformer” in: (Penslar 1991, 83).
Indeed, Nordau’s speech at the fifth Zionist Congress, held in December 1901 promoted such recognition:

"We must know more. We must possess reliable knowledge of the constitution of our Volksmaterial; for it is with this that we must create [our state]. We need a complete anthropological, biological, economic and intellectual statistic of the Jewish people.\[123\] [...] We must receive numerical answers to the questions [...] otherwise all that we wish to do for the people will be a groping in the dark."\[124\]

Without reliable statistical data on the Jewish people, Nordau concluded, "everything that is said about them is only a lyrical outpouring at best, and empty chatter at worst" (ibid.). Ruppin embraced Nordau’s call and became one of Zionism’s leading professional statisticians and demographers. It was he who first fully appreciated the importance of statistics in the process of the unification of a “Jewish People,” i.e. in building the image and body of the Jews as a race and nation. His devotion to his work seemed to indicate that he, more than his contemporaries, realized that the centralization and control of Jewish statistical data could give the Zionist movement a powerful tool with which to unify the Jews under its flag.

Ruppin’s appearance in the Zionist arena marks the beginning of a new direction and impetus, a period described in the common Zionist narrative as the graduation from “diplomatic” to “practical” Zionism,” one sign of which was the shift of the center of the Zionist movement from Europe to Palestine.\[125\] Not merely personal or bureaucratic, this shift signified a new recognition, with crucial ramifications, for the planning activity of Modern Hebrew culture. At the core of this shift was the recognition that Zionism was not only morally justified, but also politically and economically plausible. This practical and professional attitude was also linked to the Zionists’ goal of convincing other nations of their status as the most modern and

\[123\] Nordau, Fifth Zionist Congress in Basel [December 1901], in: (Hart 1995, 89).
\[124\] Nordau, Fifth Zionist Congress in Basel, [December 1901], in: (Bein 1972a, 124).
\[125\] It is important to note that this shift was accelerated by the hopes raised by the Young Turk revolution in 1908, which established a parliamentary republic on the ruins of the Ottoman Empire. It was Nordau who declared that if Zionism gained equal rights in the new regime it would not need a charter in the colonial style (Halpern & Reinharz 2000, 173).
advanced Jewish group and, as such, the best candidates to represent all Jews. In this regard, statistics were the most important language in the narrative legitimizing modernity, which Zionism claimed it aspired to spread in the Orient. This presentation of Zionism through diagrams and numbers, rather than in ideological, moralistic or religious terms, was a powerful tool in the public relations of the proponents of practical Zionism.

Short-lived as Ruppin’s term was as the director of the Büro, this period was significant both for his own development as a social scientist and for the establishment of the first database of Jewish statistics and demography. This database would form the basis of sociological research and of the extensive diplomatic and legal negotiations concerning the Jews in the twentieth century. The importance of Ruppin for the history of Zionist statistics is illustrated in the following typical words delivered by Arthur Cohen, cofounder and director of Munich’s Jewish Statistical Society:

“We see statistical organization arising wherever states exist; where the state’s life is felt, a living state flourishes in every sociologically distinct people or portion of a people. Jewish statistics arose with the strengthening of Jewish self-consciousness. The Büro für Statistik der Juden and the Zeitschrift für Demographie und Statistik der Juden are its aids” (in: Penslar 2000, 219).

This was said ten years after Ruppin gave momentum to the field of Jewish statistics as the director of the Büro and editor of the Zeitschrift. These two influential institutions came into existence as a result of Ruppin’s virtually sole initiative, made possible only by the Krupp Prize money. In the first years of the Büro Ruppin worked most of the time without pay. Only after his work made an impact did Nossig manage to secure generous contributions from Jewish communal institutions (Hart 2000, 60). This devotion and foresight, as well as an awareness of the particular importance of his deeds, was characteristic of most of Ruppin’s initiatives. In 1905, after agreeing to edit the 1906 volume of the Zeitschrift, Ruppin wrote in his diary that the Zeitschrift had a “significant value for the Jewish people” and described his work in the Büro as “enough to ensure my own immortality.” (Ruppin, Tagebuch [31 December 1905], CZA, A107/950 10). The enthusiasm and importance reflected in Ruppin’s words, as well as in Cohen’s remark
quoted above, that “Jewish statistics arose with the strengthening of Jewish self-consciousness,” show just how significant statistics were in the development of Zionism. Ruppin’s ability to formulate the political aims of Zionism in practical and scientific terms was praised by most of the factions of the Zionist Movement as well as by the various diplomatic functionaries with whom he negotiated. At almost every important political or administrative meeting during his long career, he was chosen, or undertook of his own accord, to write the official protocol or to formulate the required regulations. As Bein writes, his texts “were drafted with the utmost clarity and a deep comprehension of practical and political points alike […] the data of statistics served him as the basis of his argument. Many of his plans were based on numbers, statistics from all the realms of the social field” (Bein 1972a, 137, 126). Ruppin’s ability to control and analyze the statistical data of the Zionist movement made him the movement’s expert in all matters relating to Palestine. He gained this reputation also because, from his first days in the service of the Zionist Movement, he worked to organize the “informational capital,” and to stress its importance for the evolvement of the new social field.126

126 E.g., Vaad Hatzirim (1918-1921), of which Ruppin was an important member, established a department for “statistics and information.” The department was responsible for gathering information and statistical data concerning all kinds of groups, ethnic and professional (see, for example, a report by this department on the fur industry in Hebron, CZA S8/1943). As will be described later, the setting up of a system for the accumulation of informational capital was one of the important contributions of Ruppin to the bureaucratic field.
3.5 Ruppin’s Analysis of Judaism

3.5.1 Juden der Gegenwart

His book [The Jews of Today] contains, in succinct form, much of the information about Jews which is likely to be thought [suitable] for the ordinary reader. It gives their numbers, their wealth and poverty, their recent dispersion from Russia Galicia, and Rumania, their congestion in large cities of the world, their adoption of the vernacular, the numbers who have been baptized, or who have intermarried, and, in short, all the data which most of us would like to have about our Jewish neighbors.

A book review in the New York Times (1913)

Ruppin’s most influential book, Juden der Gegenwart (1904/1913), was not only “the first scientific exposition of Zionism,” according to Ruppin himself, but more important, it was also “the theoretical foundation of my [Ruppin’s] practical work [in Palestine].”

The bottom line of this book is that the Jewish nation is in danger of extinction and the only remedy is Zionism: “The structure of Judaism, once so solid”, he wrote in the first sentence,” is crumbling before our very eyes. Conversion and intermarriage are thinning the ranks of Jews in every direction.” In the last lines of the text, he writes: “Zionism is not a mere nationalistic or chauvinistic caprice, but the last desperate stand of the Jews against annihilation” (Ruppin 1913a, 300).

Ruppin’s explanation for the fall of the Jewish Volk is similar in its basic structure to the one he had expressed a few years previously regarding Europe – that it was the collapse of the religious framework that threatened to dissolve the cohesiveness of the Jewish nation. It is quite evident that the source of that perception, as well as of many others, lay in the writings of Houston Stewart Chamberlain, on which Ruppin’s understanding, interpretation and analysis of Judaism is based.

128 Soon after its appearance in the second edition of 1913 it was translated into the main European languages and became a standard work of reference.
129 Manuscript of Ruppin’s diary translated into English, LBI (NY), 117, 115.
130 He will express this concept repeatedly at Zionist congresses and other forums along his way in the Zionist movement, see: (Ben Gurion, 1972, 440-43; Ruppin 1931a, 325, 333).
Field has argued that all the major elements of German racism converged in the works of Chamberlain, primarily in his two-volume *Die Grundlagen des 19 Jahrhunderts*, published in 1899 (Field 1981, 223). Notions of Aryan supremacy, anti-Semitism, social Darwinism, eugenics, German myth and nationalism all combined into a philosophy of history that divided humanity into physically, mentally and morally superior and inferior races and defined the struggle among these races as the main propelling force in human history. Chamberlain defined the “Jewish Question” as a racial rather than a religious or cultural one, arguing that there would be no Jewish religion had there not first been a Jewish nation (Chamberlain 1919, I, 386-387). Following Gobineau, Chamberlain explained that the fall of ancient Rome was due to the physical and moral degeneracy of the Roman people occasioned by incongruous racial mixtures, “like a cataract, the alien blood poured down into the nearly depopulated city of Rome, and soon the Romans had ceased to exist” (in: Hertz 1970, 137).

According to both Chamberlain and Ruppin, throughout their history the Jews knew how to preserve their racial purity in a variety of ways and, in particular, by practices aimed at preventing assimilation. After the return from the Babylonian Exile, the prophets Ezra and Nehemiah decided to revive the much weakened faith in “Jehovah” in “the heart of the nation” and to curb the cultural influences of the Hittite deities and rites. This was a difficult mission and they had to take very precise and meticulous measures in order to achieve their goal: the “total exclusion of outside influences, by forbidding any mixture of blood, any adoption of foreign culture” (Ruppin 1913a, 138). This, according to Ruppin, was the reason for the prohibition on intermarriage and on eating with non-Jews, for the concept of the special “holiness” (Heb. *kedushah*), the sanctity of the Torah, and for the indifference of the Jews to all other world cultures. Ruppin explained this entire phenomenon as the outcome of the ambition to protect the race. According to him, we can explain the Jewish rituals and traditions – especially the dietary laws, which came into existence for reasons of hygiene – when we consider them as practices for conserving the race:
“It is not true if by religion we mean Jewish monotheism; it is true if by Jewish religion we mean the ritual incorporating it, instituted by Ezra’s reforms. In this form it became less a religious ‘faith’ than a religious organization admirably adapted for endurance – for the physical and cultural preservation of the Jewish people” (Ruppin 1913a, 139).

In Ruppin’s Jewish-racial Weltanschauung, Moses, the Rabbis of the Talmud, Maimonides, and other Jewish luminaries were first and foremost physicians (Ärzte) and men of state – the equivalents of modern medical authorities and sanitation officials – whose task was to preserve the physical and moral health of the Volk – a position that Ruppin would very soon assume in the newly emerging Jewish Volk (See: Hart 1995, 73).

Ruppin’s appreciation of Chamberlain resulted in particular from Chamberlain’s assertion that the Jew is mutable, at least in theory. By that, Chamberlain was different from other racial thinkers, who stressed the immutability of the Jewish race. Thus, Ruppin accepted Chamberlain’s premise that the inferiority of the Jews was connected to their adherence to the “religious doctrines” and not an outcome of their racial essence. He quoted Chamberlain at length, and accepted his basic way of thinking:

“It is senseless to call an Israelite [acculturated Jew] a Jew, though his descent is beyond question; if he has succeeded in throwing off the fetters of Ezra and Nehemiah, and if the Law of Moses has no place in his brain, and contempt of others no place in his heart – a purely humanized Jew is no longer a Jew, because by renouncing the idea of Judaism, he ipso facto has left that nationality, which is composed and held together by a complex of conceptions – by a ‘faith’” (Ruppin 1913a, 29).

However, although Ruppin praised Chamberlain for his “brilliant book” (Ruppin 1913a, 138), he disagreed with his conclusion that most Jews cannot or do not wish to reject their belief in the “Mosaic laws.” The conclusions of Ruppin’s statistical research proved that Chamberlain was not aware of the true condition of the “Jews of
Today.” Distancing themselves from religious “faith” (both Ruppin and Chamberlain put this word in quotation marks) was a process that had already been taken by a few million Jews, a fact of which Chamberlain was not aware. Chamberlain’s criticism, though justified in Ruppin’s view, was valid (and will probably remain so) only with regard to the “ultra-orthodox” Jews, who are a mere minority among the Jewish people (Ruppin 1913a, 139).

One can see here a pattern in Ruppin’s interpretation: he accepts anti-Semitic assumptions, adapts them according to the new statistical data he has organized, but attaches them only to certain marginal and declining groups (such as the ultra-orthodox or the Sephardic/Oriental/Arab Jews, as will be discussed later).

The practical consequence of defining the Jews in racial terms was the recognition that only if they accepted the function of the mitzvoth (the religious precepts) as purely biological was there a chance of their changing. They had to adapt themselves to the “Moderne Weltanschauung” and to the facts produced by the new socio-biological scientific research. The Jews were indeed different and were undergoing a process of degeneration, but this resulted from their current intolerable situation in Europe. The Jews could indeed change but only through a deep revitalization of their social structure as first expressed in their biology. This process required a particular kind of patience and the ability to look beyond the everyday political world. With regard to the question of racial mutability, Ruppin asserted that politicians, who dealt only with short-term consequences, would give a negative answer, while biologists, who were not interested in immediate change, would give a positive one (Ruppin 1913a, 218).

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Ruppin accepts Chamberlain’s premise that the inferiority of the Jews is partly connected to their adherence to “religious doctrines” and not an outcome of their racial essence. It must be remembered that, for both of them, the religious inclination of the Jew was considered a kind of “disease of the will”, i.e., as a biological flaw and not an outcome of free will.
3.5.2 Orthodox Judaism and Hassidut

According to Ruppin, the Mosaic laws, and later those of Ezra and Nehemiah, were preserved and developed by Hillel and Shamai, and the numerous Talmudist Rabbis and sages of the Middle Ages who followed them. In this way, they produced a network of rituals and customs that were true for their time but, when conditions changed, they lost their rational basis and became a “complicated system of laws” (Ruppin 1913a, 142).

Adhering to Chamberlain’s differentiation between Israelite and orthodox Jew, Ruppin claimed that, at the beginning of the twentieth century, there were six million “pious” Jews and about three million “enlightened” Jews and that all the rest were in different stages of transformation from “pious” to “enlightened.” Ruppin explained Orthodox Judaism in the positivist vocabulary of Comte (though without actually quoting him), and claimed that Orthodox Judaism was still in the “fantastic stage” (Ruppin 1913a, 142).

In Ruppin’s book, the orthodox group depicted the most negatively is the Hassidic group. This group he condemned to the point of attacking the corruption of their Rabbis who, according to him, lived in lavish houses that stood in a sharp contrast to the wretched dwellings of their followers. He described the admiration of the Hasidim for their rabbis as a kind of “hypnotism,” and their prayers as a kind of “illusion” and “ecstasy” which, in his opinion, was a regression and an obstacle to any spiritual development. Ruppin explained the success of Hassidut as a result of the hard material conditions of the Jews in East Europe: “The spiritual energy of the Jew created an imaginary world when the real world was lost to him” (Ruppin 1913a, 146). This was the reason the Jews took refuge in the mysticism and superstition offered them by the Hassidic Rabbis.

As already mentioned, Ruppin’s views concerning the Jewish religion were identical to those of Haeckel and Bismarck regarding Catholic clericalism.

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As noted, Ruppin was working in the context of “energeticism.”
Ruppin, indeed, saw a similarity between Judaism and Catholicism since both of them, he believed, were based on prayer, and from that he concluded that, like Catholicism, Judaism was still anthropomorphic (Ruppin 1913a, 150). However, the most important fault he saw in Judaism was its similarity to Islam. Jewish orthodoxy and Islam had the same type of faith, a “blind faith,” which did not permit any critical doubts and rejected all the discoveries of modern science. These characteristics differentiated them from the “protestant skeptic faith of our times.” What defined the Jewish worldview, according to Ruppin, was its lack of skepticism, its fear of any doubt and its inability to cope with conflicting thoughts: “As soon as he begins to doubt, his fate is sealed, his secession from orthodoxy is a necessary result. The skeptic will never more be a pious Jew” (Ruppin 1913a, 151).

Ruppin predicted a process in which the power of modern science and religious skepticism, which threatened Jewish orthodoxy, would eventually subdue it in every country they penetrated. What would remain with the Jews after the influence of these forces would be a “weak liberalism” which would be incapable of stemming increasing assimilation. This process was inevitable and its “fate already sealed”, since Orthodox Judaism would, sooner or later:

“fall to the ground. (Ruppin 1913a, 156). […] there is no bridge between the firm belief of the Russian Jew in an almighty God, His active intervention in the history of the world and the power of prayer, and the modern conception of life founded on natural science and evolutionary theories” (ibid., 235).

Orthodoxy and Jewish tradition had ceased to be a unifying and cohesive force for the Jewish Volk. Thus the question arose as to why continue preserving the Jewish race at all? His answer was a reflection of his transvaluation pattern:

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133 This criticism is important for understanding his attitude to the German Jews, a matter that will be discussed in the next part of this work.
“the basis for any rational justification for the continued existence of the Jews as a separate people is their high racial attributes” (Ruppin 1911, 271, 283-292).

It is clear that Ruppin conceived of Judaism through the anti-Semitic race theories that had shaped his cultural identity and Weltanschauung. According to what he writes in his diary, the first time he read a page from the Talmud was in 1928 (and even then briefly and by chance), years after writing *The Jews of Today* and setting up the settlements of the New Yishuv and the Department for Jewish Sociology at the Hebrew University. The Talmud and its cultural inheritance were irrelevant to the creation of the “new Jew,” or even for understanding Judaism and the Jews.

### 3.5.3 The ‘Mercantile Instinct’ of the Jewish Race

Ruppin’s theory was the outcome of his long quest for the true and proper way to transform the Jews. Instead of a superficial change, on the emancipation model, he suggested a profound and long process of biological improvement. One of the main aims of the eugenic plan that Ruppin developed in his *Juden der Gegenwart* and in other texts, was an attempt to achieve the collective suppression of the “mercantile instinct,” one of the deficiencies he aspired to heal in the new Jewish Volkskörper. The way to tackle the many problems, he thought, would be primarily through upgrading and preserving the purity of the Jewish racial attributes.

Ruppin’s theory concerning the “mercantile instinct” of the Jew was based to a large extent on the theory of the German economist Werner Sombart[^134] who believed that the Jews were biologically, intellectually and morally programmed to the capitalist enterprise, and inclined to undisciplined capitalist behavior. Following Sombart, Ruppin argued that when the Jews arrived in Europe in the Middle Ages, the Christian culture guild system rejected the Jews’ preoccupation with financial speculation and saw their mercenary tendencies as “dishonest.”

[^134]: Ruppin studied Sombart in his days at the university, and quoted him in *Juden der Gegenwart* and in other texts.
Nevertheless, when the guilds’ social structure collapsed and the European Christians became capitalists themselves, the pursuit of money turned out to be the basis of modern economy. At that point, when “Jewish economy” became legitimate, “the activities of the Jews came to be considered ‘honest’ because the general population adopted Jewish methods” (Ruppin 1913a, 48).

The corruption of the Jews, according to Ruppin, was basically a result of this legitimatization given them by Christian society. The Christians themselves became “Jewish” and they tolerated the Jews and let them indulge and develop their mercantile instincts. Sombart’s and Ruppin’s analysis led both of them to the same practical conclusions: they believed that most Germans were not prepared to incorporate the Jews as an integral part of the German Volk. The Jews and the Germans were two different racial entities, and the efforts of the Jews to penetrate into every level of German society created a daily social interaction that only intensified the German objection to accepting them. Sombart actually recommended the Jews to accept with understanding the informal ‘numerus clausus’ that was used regarding the promotion of Jews in the army, in senior government positions and in academic institutions (Rekem-Peled 2000, 144).

The Jews must, therefore, according to Ruppin and Sombart, reduce the effect of their “mercantile instinct” on the German Volk through detachment and self-restrain. The second step would be the suppression or diversion of this instinct in the context of Zionistbildung. As with many of his ideas, Ruppin always tried to give a personal example as a Zionist Weichensteller and Übermensch. In his 11th Zionist Congress speech (Vienna, 1913, the same year that he published the Jews of Today) he approached his audience with a confession:

“I tell you truthfully that I was also a merchant for a long time and my commercial instincts are perhaps no less developed than those of any other Jew, but I give myself credit for having been able to defeat my commercial instincts under the burden of the more important demands of our national movement.”

135 Ruppin gives himself credit several times in his dairies for taming his commercial instincts.
3.5.4 The Meaning of Agriculture

Only a people engaged in agriculture can be healthy, only a state with the majority of its people engaged in agriculture comprises a firmly bound, organized whole. Agriculture is the well-spring of mankind.

Ruppin\textsuperscript{136}

One of the themes that Ruppin stressed consistently in his \textit{Juden der Gegenwart} was that the necessary condition for the success of the Zionist enterprise was the changeover to a livelihood in agriculture. The sources for that idea appeared in much of the literature he read, such as Freytag’s previously mentioned novel \textit{Debit and Credit}. After reading the novel for the first time at the age of eighteen he wrote:

“Why does the farmer lead a happier life than the city-dweller? Why is he healthier? Why is he more content? Why is the love of God, long gone for the most part from the city-dweller, still alive in him? Because he lives in inner feeling with nature, to which he strives to adapt as closely as possible, because he has occasion daily to see in the working of nature the hand of God.”\textsuperscript{137}

In Ruppin’s writings, these \textit{Völkisch} ideas, based on a mystical connection between the \textit{Volk} and the soil, were gradually given an explanation which replaced the concept of a \textit{monotheistic} god with that of the \textit{monistic} god of nature: the success of nations is based upon their bond with the land, a bond which can be achieved only through a wide base of agriculture. In \textit{Darwinismus und Sozialwissenschaft} Ruppin wrote:

“To the prefatory question whether Germany should try to preserve its agriculture and, above all, its peasant class, we answer an unconditional yes. Prussia and Germany have grown great and strong, supported by the productivity and fighting ability of its peasant class. It was at best uncertain

\textsuperscript{136} Ruppin, \textit{Tagebuch} [26 August 1898] (CZA, A107/217).
\textsuperscript{137} Ruppin, \textit{Tagebuch} [17 September 1894], (CZA, A107/130).
whether an industrial population could provide such a good and firm basis for the preservation and service of the state” (Ruppin 1903a, 135).

According to the same transfer pattern delineated above, Ruppin transferred this view of agriculture from the German social context to the Jewish-Zionist one. The same ideas that he had for the Germans he applied here to the Modern Hebrews. Therefore the biological transformation of the Jew had to take place in contact with his original land: “[It is only on the land that] the springs of natural feeling (Naturempfinden), which are sealed up in the Jews of the ghetto, will begin to flow anew” (Ruppin 1911, 283). The idea he had already expressed in Darwinismus und Sozialwissenschaft concerning the “vital force” of patriotism, he now applied to the Jewish nation; this national feeling can develop only from the connection of the Volk to its own land. National feeling and love of the soil constituted the “vital force,” the particular “energy” that would enable the Jew to elevate himself and go beyond his biologically determined nature (see: Penslar 1987, 144). We can detect here again the traces of Nietzsche in a monistic dress; going “beyond” is not a matter of new recognition or consciousness but rather of a new biological setup.

Ruppin’s Völkisch-Darwinist theory tried to overcome the negative mercantile nature and instincts of the Jew. With this in mind, he harks back to an imagined distant point in the ancient Jewish past: the land of Israel before the first exile, where the Jews lived, according to him, “primarily by agriculture.” In that case, Ruppin realized, what the Zionists needed was to find the particular group of Jews whose biological structure was the most suitable to the original soil and climatic conditions of Palestine. In other words, those who were capable of agricultural work in Eretz Yisrael/ Palestine. This ability would serve as proof of their racial affinity to the ancient Hebrews, who lived, according to Ruppin’s mythological Weltanschauung, a simple, agricultural life without any corrupting Jewish financial speculations.
3.6 The Medicine: Segregation of the Jewish Volk

*Primitive peoples [...] have been preserved from crossing and selection by isolation and uniformity of environment from time immemorial.*

Ruppin

Social-Darwinist breeding theories maintained that in order to obtain noble breeds a certain amount of inbreeding (abstaining from new crosses) was needed at some stage so as to fix and strengthen the new racial type. It would almost seem as if inbreeding alone, even when the primary elements were unfavorable, was sufficient to produce a noble breed, as is indeed maintained by Lapouge (whom Chamberlain often followed) (Hertz 1970, 169). This basic concept is the rationale behind Ruppin’s program for healing and improving the Jewish Volk.

All high cultures, Ruppin claims, deteriorate rapidly when its members begin to “mate” with members of an inferior race. In most cases this mating between dissimilar races leads to negative results, the differences in the blood of the two parents producing an unbalanced offspring, lacking character and energy. While the differences between the Jews and the Europeans are not great enough to produce such a result, racial mixing (Rassenvermischung) is, nevertheless, not to be recommended since intermarriage weakens what he calls the “race-character”:

“the descendants of a mixed marriage are not likely to have any remarkable gifts. [...] Intermarriage being clearly detrimental to the preservation of the high qualities of the race, it follows that it is necessary to try and prevent it and preserve Jewish separatism” (Ruppin 1913a, 227-228).

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138 Ruppin 1940a, Chapter 4: *Race; the concept of race; racial purity*, 12.

139 Ruppin’s segregation theory must also be considered in the context of the ideologies of racial segregation that grew up to buttress white colonial settlement in East and central Africa in the years before and after the First World War. See: (Rich 1986, Chap. 3: *The Commonwealth ideal and the problem of racial Segregation*, 50-55).

140 The idea that Jewish anomaly results from racial mixture was shared by many anti-Semitic writers, such as Max Bewer (Tal 1985, 223) and Chamberlain (Gilman 1986, 7), as well as by most of the Jewish anthropologists (Efron 1994; Rogoff 1997, 206). This is another example of the way in which Ruppin accepted anti-Semitic racial theories but suggested solutions for correcting them. Efron notes that Ruppin himself married his first cousin, suggesting that he also placed a high
Ruppin’s constant aspiration for “Jewish separatism” emerged from within the scientific and medical discourse which praised racial purity, and perceived the Jewish race as a radical example of a race which violated this ideal. Consequently, he came to the conclusion that the new Jewish culture could not be based on a widely diverse racial pool:

“A civilization cannot be put together like a mosaic; it can only grow out of a living national life i.e. in this case, out of the culture of the East European Jews” (Ruppin 1913a, 235).

In order to prevent the racial mixture of the Jews, they had to accept four conditions for a way of life indispensable to their preservation:

“1) Jewish schools  
2) A self-contained Jewish life  
3) A common language  
4) Local segregation” (Ruppin 1913a, 273).

In order to prevent assimilation and improve their racial quality, the Jews had to be concentrated in closed communities:

“Just as an army in hostile territory is much more easily destroyed when it is divided into small groups than when it is concentrated in a mass, so the Jews could best withstand assimilation by being concentrated in great numbers in one area” (Ruppin 1913a, 265).\textsuperscript{141}

The idea of segregation was central to Ruppin’s eugenic planning, and he asserted that, in order to produce a culture of their own, the Jews had to live – at least for a short time (but long enough to enable a biological change) – separated from any other

\textsuperscript{141} It was the common view among eugenicists like Hans Günther, who wrote that a new race could never be born by crossing, but only by selection and rejection in a secluded environment (Günther 1927 82-83).
culture. In the Jews of Today Ruppin expressed the same views as he had held a few years previously in relation to the German Volk: the Jew needed to be segregated in a space that would enable him to be among his like; only such “kinship of race” would encourage him to be healthy and creative (Ruppin 1913a, 266). Ruppin emphasized that the segregation of the Jews was crucial not only for the first period and that it was important “to preserve this selected human type in the future as well, without mixing it with others, because only in such a way would a full restoration of its racial characteristics be possible” (Ruppin 1914a, 162).

3.6.1 The [Ashkenazi] Jews as non-Semites

Ruppin asserted that, although the Jews assimilated to some degree, they nevertheless represented a “well-characterized race” (Ruppin 1913a, 216) and it could definitely be accepted that they had preserved the racial characteristics of the ancient Hebrews to the extent that at least some of the Jews living today are descended from David, Ezra and Nehemiah, Bar-Cochba and their followers. This basic premise was followed by a complex analysis that Ruppin developed during his researches, in an attempt to define the sources and components of this “well-characterized race.”

The assertion of Jewish inferiority vis-à-vis the European and particularly the Germanic, peoples rested in large part on the conviction – well established in racial discourse since the 1870s – that the Jews were Semites and on the image of Semites as barbaric or uncivilized. The Zionist discourse before Ruppin generally accepted as self-evident the assertion that the Jews were Semites (racially, culturally or both). Indeed, in their discourse, this category was charged with new meanings, mainly of transvaluation rhetoric, which attached to the Semites new positive attributes and stressed its mutability and ability for racial regeneration (Rogoff, 1997, 195-230).

Ruppin’s new argument that the [Ashkenazi] Jews were not Semites, which will be discussed further on, was not entirely exceptional. Other writers and researchers also expressed this view, among them the American Reform Rabbi Emil Hirsch, who wrote under the explicit influence of Chamberlain that the modern Jew (as well as the Jews in ancient times) did not have Semitic blood (Silver 2005, 55). The Russian-Jewish-American anthropologist Maurice Fishberg (1872-1934) wrote that “the Jews
in Russia are not Semites at all [...] and actually belong to an entirely different race” (Fishberg 1905, 9).

Nevertheless, Ruppin’s new approach to the Semitism of the Jews, as he explained it, was based on the researches of one of his teachers, Felix von Luschan, who argued that the Jews were actually a combination of races. In Luschan’s view, the assertion that linguistic unity indicated racial origin and affinity was mistaken. One could argue plausibly, as did many over the course of the nineteenth century, for a common Indo-Germanic family of languages; it was foolish to move from there, as so many had, to the assertion that all of the “Indo-Germanic nations” were united anthropologically (Luschan 1892, 94-96; 97-100; see: Hart 2000, 175). This theory, which eventually led Luschan to claim that it was impossible to define the Jews as a race (and hence to reject Zionism), functioned in Ruppin’s theory as the basis for the differentiation and hierarchization of the Jewish racial types. Luschan’s theory was presented in Ruppin’s writings as a liberating breakthrough, as he writes in his Soziologie:


Luschan has shown that the one people generally accepted as the purest expression of the Semitic racial type, namely the Bedouins of the Arabian Desert, are distinguished...
by small straight noses, thin lips and soft curly or wavy hair, while the characteristic Jewish nose is due rather to a Hittite strain in the Jewish racial stock. It was known at the time that the Hittites had occupied a vast empire in Anterior Asia, and that their language was related to the Indo-Germanic languages. Luschan showed, too, that not only the Hittites but also the Amorites, (considered at the time to be Aryans), constituted an important component of the Jewish race (Hertz 1978, 133).

Luschan’s views concerning the polygenetic nature of the Jewish race led Ruppin to argue in his Juden der Gegenwart that the Jewish race was composed of a combination of two groups, a Semitic group which included the Assyrians, Babylonians and Arabs, and a Hittite one which included also the Amorites (Amoriter). In later periods, Ruppin continued to produce categories and definitions according to these same principles. More than two decades later, in the Soziologie der Juden, after adding the new definitions of Eugen Fischer and Hans Günther (Ruppin 1931b, I, 7), to Luschan’s views, he finally defined the racial composition (Rassekomponenten) of the ancient Hebrews as a combination of three elements (Volkselemente): Aramäer (Nordsyrien), Beduinien (arabisch-siniatische Steppe) and Philister (Südeuropa) (Ruppin 1930, I, 17).

Ruppin’s writings are fuelled by a constant urge to differentiate the [Ashkenazi] Jews from the Semites and especially from the Bedouin race – the original (Ur) Semites according to Luschan – which Ruppin, like most racial thinkers, perceived as inferior (as will be shown later). Whatever the composition of the Jews, according to Ruppin there was no racial connection between them and the yellow and black races (Ruppin 1930, I, 17). The three color components of the Jewish skin were in different shades of white, from light (hellen) white (Aramär), tanned (gebräunten) (Philister) and light brown (hellbraun) (Beduins) (Ruppin 1930, I, 20).

Another change in Ruppin’s vocabulary over the years had to do with his definition of the non-Ashkenazi Jews. In the The Jews of Today, he uses the term “Arabian Jews,” which designated the Jews from the Arab lands, while in the Sociology of the Jews, in

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144 Following Jakobs, Ruppin identified between the “Kanaaniter” and the “Amoriter,” see: (Ruppin 1930, 15).

145 European racial anxiety was as often focused on Africa (the ‘black peril’) and Asia (the ‘yellow peril’) as on the European Jews (see: Hutton 2005, 8). Ruppin takes the Jews out of this inferior group.
a much thicker description, he defined them more specifically. Here, the Bedouin branch (following Fischer and Günther) is redefined and named “oriental” (orientalische). The “Oriental” is actually a sub-race (Zweigrasse) of the Mediterranean Race (one of the three branches (Äste) of the white race). The Mediterranean Race then is composed of two groups: occidental (“westische”) (Ruppin 1930, I, 19) and oriental (named by Günther “ostische”) and it is under this latter heading that he lists the Bedouin.

Ruppin’s flexible racial reasoning enabled him to establish a fundamental racial differentiation between two main groups of Jews, and he quoted Ferdinand Wagenseil (1887-1967) to back up his assertion:

“Von dem dreifachen Urtyp in Palästina haben sich die aschkenasischen Juden nach der vorderasiatisch-mongolid-alpin-nordischen, die sefardischen Juden nach der orientalisch (=beduinisch)-mediterranen Seite hin entwickelt, wodurch die beiden jüdischen Reihen körperlich verschieden voneinander geworden sind” (Ruppin 1930, I, 28).

Ruppin’s persistence in trying to produce a link between the Sephardim and the Bedouins was parallel to his persistence in trying to find similarities between the Ashkenazi Jews and the Hittites, who belonged, in the anthropological and linguistic discourse, to the Indo-Germanic family (Doron 1977, 218). He wanted to find proof and establish a connection between the Ashkenazi Jew, whom he saw as the true Urjude (original Jew, i.e. the dominant or positive type in the Jewish race), and the European Indo-Germanic races, and to emphasize the weak connection of this type of Jew to the Semitic race.

Ruppin’s differentiation between the Ashkenazim and the Orientals/Sephardim/Bedouins, i.e. the Semites, also had an historical aspect. According to Ruppin, one of the significant racial changes within the composition of the Jewish original types took place in the period of the destruction of the Second

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146 He tries to prove for example that “one of the elements which are imbued in the Jewish race is the south European (Greeks, southern Italians) (Bein 1968, II, 40).

147 who can be defined more accurately as the groups which obtained dominant Semitic element in their racial composition.
Temple. As discussed above, Ruppin argued that when the Jews came to Europe they already had an excessive “mercantile instinct” which was not dominant in their original state as an agricultural Volk. The explanation Ruppin gives for this is that:

“Nur erfuhr durch die inzwischen erfolgte Aufnahme der zu dem Beduinentypus gehörigen Edomiter das beduinische Element eine gewisse Verstärkung” (Ruppin 1930, I, 22).

Following Gobineau, Chamberlain explained that the fall of ancient Rome was due to the physical and moral degeneracy of the Roman people, occasioned by incongruous racial mixtures, “like a cataract the alien blood poured down into the nearly depopulated city of Rome, and soon the Romans had ceased to exist” (in: Hertz 1970, 137). As in many other cases, Ruppin transferred their ideas into his Zionist weltanschauung, and argued that the “entrance of the Jews into history” took place because of a combination of the two groups, the Semitic (Sephardic etc.) and the Indo-European (Ashkenazi) (Ruppin 1913a, 214). Nevertheless, the link between the Semitic group and the Jews and certainly the Indo-European (Ashkenazi) group was only in terms of culture and language. Insofar as the anthropologists, following the linguists, assumed that it was language that defined race, the Jews were considered Semites. However, in “reality” as Ruppin put it (ibid.), the Jews were closer “anthropologically” (i.e. in terms of their biology) to the second group, which belonged to the population of Asia Minor and the Persians – the origin of the European races – from whom they received their physical qualities.

This theory enabled Ruppin to continue with his differentiation patterns – on the one hand, to take the Jews out of the Semitic race and on the other hand to accept the claims of the turn of the century race theories concerning the inferiority of the Semitic race. It was not the Jews who were greedy, it was the Semites, who were, in his analysis, a degenerate component that did not have any significant affinity to most of the Jews, who were actually non-Semites:

“Die Aschkenasim bilden heute eine so erdrückende Mehrheit unter den Juden, daß sie vielfach überhaupt für ‘die Juden’ schlechthin gehalten werden” (Ruppin 1930, I, 78).
This fantasy of the existence of an ancient Jewish-Aryan group achieved growing resonance in the Germany of the time when Ruppin was developing his theory. The racialization of European culture and the increase in anti-Semitism raised a paradoxical problem in the narrative of Christianity and its relation to the Jews: If Jesus was a Jew; did not the conversion of Europe to Christianity represent a form of Semitization? Gradually, the racial discourse provided an answer which located an alternative racial origin for Jesus in the lost Aryans, a warrior race that swept down from the mountains of Asia to conquer Europe (Fasken 1934, 32, 52; Hutton 2005, 88, 104). This “Aryanization of the Jew” enabled Chamberlain, Haeckel and many others to accept the desirable qualities of the Judeo-Christian tradition while eliminating from them the Semitic elements of the “actual Jews” of Europe. Thus they claimed that David, the prophets and, above all, Jesus and his disciples were actually the descendants of the German-Amorite group, and thus non-Semites (Joans 1981, 112). In the same spirit, the Maccabees were perceived as non-Semites because, heroism being an Aryan quality and not a Jewish one, it clearly could not appear within the Semitic race; thus the Maccabees obviously had Nordic blood and were the descendants of Scythians or other indo-Germanic tribes (Tal 1985, 223). Ruppin, perhaps unconsciously, adopted this kind of explanation. As noted above, for Chamberlain most Jews were Semites while, according to Ruppin, most of them were not Semites, particularly those he designated as “pure Jews.” In that case, the Germanic tribes who ruled over the Semitic Jews were the forefathers of the “pure Jews” he was seeking. In that way it was possible to apply the “Aryanization of the Jew” to a group that would be the basis for the renewed Jewish Volk.

As noted in the previous chapter, Ruppin’s first acquaintance with the ideas concerning the inferiority of the Jews compared to the Indo-Germanics, led him to write in his diary that “it would be horrible for me if I had to believe in this notion” (Bein 1968, 198). His theories grow to be comprehensible when we read in them a means of escaping from that horror.
3.6.2 The Change in the Concept of the *Urjude*

In the theories and cultural repertoire of the 18th and the 19th century German Jewish *maskilim*, and in the discourse of the so called *Wissenschaft des Judentums*, the Sephardic Jew was seen as the *Urjude* (original Jew). This model of perception connected the Sephardim to the “Golden Age” in Spain and, through that, to the ancient Hebrews. The Sephardic Jew was considered the most authentic and original Jew, and represented the aesthetic Jew as well. The Sephardic Jew, in the German-acculturated Jewish memory, was not only a symbol of the ancient and glorious Jewish past, but also a model for the renewal of the Jews in the future (Efron 1993, 77). This image of the Sephardic Jew resulted mainly from the German Jews’ need for a positive example in their own quest for cultural identity as a model for successful Jewish-Gentile interaction. This image reflected also their repertoire’s principle of differentiation, i.e. their need to differentiate themselves from the concrete threat to their cultural identity posed by the Eastern European Jews, the *Ostjuden*. The Sephardic Jew marked the “good other,” and was thus linked to all the attributes required of a “good Jew,” as opposed to those related to the “bad Jew” from East Europe.

This differentiation began during the Enlightenment, the era which marked the rise of the “good Jew,” entering the cultural discourse of the 19th century and assuming its new racial scientific vocabulary. A great deal of scientific and social literature attempted to differentiate between the two “sub-races” of Jews, the Eastern Ashkenazi and the Western Sephardic Jew, a distinction that was accepted by many Jewish and non-Jewish researchers (Krüger 1998, 381). Even Chamberlain praises the Sephardic Jews because they refrained from mixing and observed more strictly than the Ashkenazi Jews the “sacredness of the blood,” though both, according to Chamberlain, originally came from one and the same combination of clashing racial elements. In the supplement to the third edition of *Die Grundlagen*, Chamberlain went even further, actually presuming the noble Spanish Jews to be Goths(!) (Hertz 1970, 170-171) – in his terminology an outstanding compliment.
The changes in the cultural identity market that took place at the turn of the century and, especially, the rise of Zionism, raised doubts concerning the ideal that the Sephardic Jew represented and stressed its problematical dimensions. Max Nordau was one of the first to attack this model and to point out its dangerous faults:

“Sie kennen zwar die jüdische Geschichte nicht, aber sie haben doch einmal etwas läuten hören, daß es [...] in Spanien unter Ferdinand und Isabella jüdische Millionäre gab, die in Palästen wohnten, Hof- und Staatsämter bekleideten, den Adel des Landes mit Trüffelgastmählern bewirteten, und daß dann plötzlich, ohne Warnung, ein furchtbarer Tag anbrach, der diese lächelnden Millionäre in verstümmelte Leichen und die glücklicheren unter ihnen in landfahrende Bettler verwandelte, deren Nachkommen in den Judengassen Polens und Rumäniens verhungern und verkommen” (Nordau 1909, 298).

As already noted, Nordau’s ideas were always further developed in Ruppin’s theories, assuming in them a social-Darwinist-scientific dressing based on statistics. Ruppin’s role in this regard was the scientification of Zionist interests, ideology and mythology, a pattern which is also demonstrated in his theory concerning the *Urjude*.

As already mentioned, Ruppin stressed the importance of the purity of the race. The basis for the regeneration of the Jews, he argued, could not be a “mosaic,” and had to be established exclusively from the Ashkenazi East European gene pool. In order to give this concept a proper scientific, i.e. objective, reference, Ruppin had to prove that the true *Urjuden* were actually the East Europeans Ashkenazim rather than the Sephardim, as previously assumed. It is important to remember in this regard the significance of the concept *Ur* in the racial thinking of the end of the 19th century. As part of the invented national tradition, racial purity was praised, whereas the East European Jews were claimed to have a racial mixture that was “near-eastern, oriental, east-Baltic, eastern, deepest Asian, Nordic, Hamitic, and Negroid” (vorderasiatisch-orientalisch-ostbaltisch-östisch-innerasiatisch-nordisch-hamitisch-negerisch”) (Günther 1930, 191; Krüger 1998, 382). As will be described in the following, Ruppin’s attempt to establish the East European Ashkenazim as the *Urjuden* was paralleled by the marginalization and differentiation of what he defined as the Semitic Jews.
3.7 The Differentiation of the Oriental and Sephardic Jews

3.7.1 The Difference in the Language and the Racial Affinity

One of the attributes that defined the Ashkenazim, according to Ruppin, was the Yiddish language. The Ashkenazim were not only those who spoke Yiddish but also those whose parents and grandparents spoke that language although they themselves spoke German, English, French etc. (Ruppin 1931b, I, 59). The fact that they had spoken Yiddish for generations demonstrated, according to Ruppin, their distance from the Semitic languages.

As already mentioned, Ruppin claimed that the affinity, in ancient times, of the Indo-Germanic-Jews (the forefathers of some of the Ashkenazim) to the Semitic race was mainly linguistic and cultural and not biological. Since language and culture were the only channels of contact, and since this contact had been lost many generations ago, most of the Ashkenazi Jews did not have any racial affinity with the Semitic race. As opposed to the Ashkenazim, many of the Sephardic and Oriental Jews (whom he defined as one group) spoke Arabic and had a deep connection to the Arab-Bedouin-Semitic culture. The claim regarding the interdependence of language and biological structure was very common at the end of the century and it was important to Ruppin to distance the Ashkenazi from what he considered the inferior Semitic languages and culture:

“Semitic are the nations who speak in Semitic languages. In the last thousand years, only a minor part of the Jews have spoken in Semitic languages (Hebrew or Arabic). The major language the Ashkenazi Jew has been using since the Middle Ages is, in its vocabulary and grammar Indo-Germanic” (Ruppin 1933, 29).

148 Already in 1907 he connected between the Sephardic and the Orientals: “Sephardic Jews who have lived in the country for centuries, have become closely assimilated, in mores and in the general mode of life, to the local Arabs […] are poorly educated and of a not particularly high moral standing. The Jews of Morocco, Persia and the Yemen, who have come into Palestine of recent years, may be lumped together with this group.” (Ruppin 1908, 1)
3.7.2 The Intellectual Difference and the Environmental Factor

Ruppin argued that the Oriental and Sephardic Jews did not succeed in developing a selective system, which would cultivate the most intelligent among them:

“The Sephardic Jews lived in better economical and political conditions than the Ashkenazi Jews in Eastern Europe and their processes of adaptation and selection were not so sharp. Because of this and also because the Sephardim were not as eager to marry their daughters to learned scholars [talmidei chachamim] as their Ashkenazi brothers were, it happened that the Ashkenazi Jews in our time are better than Sephardic Jews in their abilities and their inclination to sciences. In the schools of Eretz Yisrael [Palestine], in which the children of Israel from all over the world study together, the superior ability of the children of the Ashkenazi Jews is a well-known fact” (Ruppin 1933, 29).

The environment in which the Sephardic Jews lived also made them inferior in matters of cognitive structure. Ruppin bases himself here on the research of Ottokar Nemecek, who, in 1915, assessed the pupils of one of the schools in Vienna and noted the special “liveliness” (Lebhaftigkeit) and “swiftness” (Raschheit) of the Ashkenazi pupils while the Sephardic pupils had: “ein mehr gemessenes, von orientalischer Ruhe getragenes Wesen aufwiesen” (very measured pace, influenced by Oriental calmness) (Ruppin 1930, I, 59-60). Ruppin admits that there are no reliable data on that matter, but he takes the liberty of basing his theory on his “own experience” (auf Grund meiner Erfahrungen), and claiming that the Ashkenazi “grasp of arithmetic” (Gewandtheit im Rechnen), aptitude for abstraction (Fähigkeit zur Abstraktion) and way of thinking (Gedankenablauf) are faster than those of other Jewish types” (Ruppin 1930, I, 60). The only good quality that the “Oriental (Bedouin)” type has is his “sense of reality” (Wirklichkeitssinn) and “sharp observation” (scharfe Beobachtung), while the Occidental South European (okzidentaler, südeuropäischer) type “excels in the arts, especially music, and also in mathematics (perception of space), (räumliche) and a talent for chess” (Ruppin 1930, I, 60).
The Ashkenazi, according to Ruppin, is a kind of “poet and mathematician,” an attribute which corresponds to the ideal German enlightened model combined with the Darwinist concept of “liveliness” the primal “life force” (Lebenskraft) described above. The Sephardic-Oriental, on the other hand, is deficient in his intelligence, in his artistic talents and mathematical abilities and, most important; he lacks the vitality of the Lebenskraft. The two qualities that might seem positive: “a sense of reality” and “sharp observation,” if taken in the context of Ruppin’s vocabulary, imply traits belonging to the materialistic nature of the Semites.

3.7.3 The Biological Difference: Ruppin, Hygiene and Race

By restoring order, which is the goal of cleaning, we reorganize our immediate surroundings and define the world as we want to have it. Cleaning has thus both a practical side and the symbolic function of satisfying our need for a fixed point in existence.

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One of the most important themes that interested Ruppin both as a researcher and as a culture planner revolved around hygiene. Setting sanitary standards and promoting hygiene programs was understood by Ruppin to be one of the most important means for creating the Modern Hebrews. The preoccupation with hygiene was part of the bio-medical weltanschauung of many eugenicists in the twentieth century, who used hygiene as a medium to promote their biological fantasies. Since his early observations of the Eastern European Jews in 1903, Ruppin had paid special attention to the hygienic conditions of the different communities and had been disturbed by their low level (Bein 1968, I, 225). Ruppin related the dirt and filth to the religious sphere, especially to the Hasidic mentality of the Shtetel. In his first period in Palestine, he was amazed at the sub-standard hygienic practices of the Second Aliya immigrants, and was the first to initiate sanitary regulations; building the first toilets in Kinneret (until then the settlers had answered the call of nature out of doors) and introducing a municipal law making it obligatory for every house in Tel Aviv to have a toilet (Bein 1968, II, 56).

149 (Frykman 1987, 123).
Although Ruppin knew that the sanitary conditions and hygienic attitudes and practices of the East European Jews in the Pale of Settlement were no better than those of the Oriental and Sephardic Jews, he still found in his conclusion that the biological difference between them was hygiene-related:

“We can find the reasons for the decline of the Sephardic Jews in the last two hundred years in the bad sanitary conditions of the countries in which the most decisive part of the Sephardic Jews are living, conditions which have not changed much since those of the Middle Ages. The changes in hygiene that caused the rapid increase of the Ashkenazi Jews in Europe, are taking place there today only in a very limited way. A severe level of mortality and frequent plagues are consuming the population” (Ruppin 1931b, I, 61).

Ruppin asserted that the Jews from the Islamic countries were in a process of biological degeneration, but since he recognized the fact that the sanitary conditions of the East European Jews had been quite the same as those of the Sephardic Jews for the last two hundred years, he developed an explanation that indicated an important biological difference. In 1927, after visiting the Jewish community of Berdichev, he described in his diary the horrible sanitary conditions of the Shtetl: “of sewerage there is nothing to talk about […] a terrible stink came up from the houses.” He then goes on to describe a conversation with a local physician on matters of hygiene. Both of them were amazed by the fact that although the sanitary conditions were poor in the extreme, the mortality rate was relatively very low. The physician’s conclusion was that “it seems that the Jews have developed a phenomenal adaptability for these hard sanitary conditions” (Bein 1968, II, 140). The Berdichev physician’s conclusion would seem to reflect the common explanation of 19th century medical theories:

“By the end of the nineteenth century, every theory about predisposition to illness had been racialized. A race’s physical characteristics as markers of this predisposition dominated discussion. The ‘national idiosyncrasy’ of the Jews and their ‘powerful struggle for life’ (Lebensfähigkeit) came to be the buzzwords for the rationale to their immunity” (Gilman 1996, 214).
However, this scientific assumption could not, according to Ruppin, apply to the Sephardic Jews, since all the scientific facts revealed that they were declining rapidly. Ruppin concluded that the Sephardim had probably not developed this “phenomenal adaptability” which might have prevented their degeneration. Based on these kinds of sources and reasoning, Ruppin concluded that the inherent aptitude for racial selection, which governs the process of evolution, was deficient in the Sephardim.

3.7.4 Conclusion: Semitic-Sephardic-Oriental Degeneration and Indo-Germanic-Ashkenazi Regeneration

As noted above, Ruppin interpreted Judaism as a constant struggle for the preservation of its racial purity, and even put the prophet’s prophecies into this biological context:


But what are the “sour grapes” that the fathers ate, according to Ruppin’s bio-medical interpretation of the prophet Ezekiel? Why are the children’s teeth set on edge? The answer to this question is formulated in Ruppin’s writings and practices in cumbersome and sometimes indirect ways but we can conclude that for Ruppin, the reason for the deterioration of the “original Jewish” (Urjude) Volk was the increase of the Semitic element in the Jewish Volkskörper, especially the one he defined as the Bedouin (Beduinentypus) or “Oriental type”; the original Jews actually belonged to non-Semitic Indo-Germanic tribes, which began at some point to mingle with the Semitic tribes, and thus distorted the principle of racial preservation. The Semitic element, which gradually gained dominance, detached the Jews from nature, from their native soil and from their productive agricultural way of life and thus developed in them – even prior to the first exile – their uncontrollable mercantile instinct (see e.g.: Ruppin 1930, I, 22).

The most explicit connection he made between Semitism and materialism can be found in his views on the Arabs, whom he described, already in the 1904 version of
Juden der Gegenwart (before he came to Palestine), as essentially racially different from the Jews, and as the ultimate representatives of the Semitic Bedouin type:

“so sind auch Juden und Araber trotz ihrer Sprachverwandtschaft der Rasse nach stark verschieden” (Ruppin 1904, 272).

In his article for the American-Zionist journal *Maccabaeae: The Relation of the Jews to the Arabs* (1919) he characterized the Arabs thus:

“Now it is true that the Arab actually has a strongly materialistic conception of life. [...] it is also true that in the daily life of the Fellahs [peasants] the question of making money plays a principal role and that, when two Fellahs converse, they are almost never heard to speak of anything except the Beshlik [Ottoman coin]” (Ruppin 1919, 109).

This description of Semitic materialism reflects Ruppin’s projective identification: the same qualities that threatened him in German culture – Jewish materialism and greed – are projected onto the Semitic element, which includes, in addition to the Arabs, the Oriental and Sephardic Jews.  

Ruppin’s plan aspired, then, to weed out or reduce the Semitic elements within the Jewish race and to restore its desirable racial balance. If this were to be done, then the first mission of the Zionist movement was to locate the group of “original Jews,” those who had a direct biological link to the ancient Hebrews. How were they to be assembled? As noted above, the Völkisch perception according to which he operated asserted a biological connection between the Volk and the soil, which enabled the Volk to express itself in a healthy and authentic way. The biological transformation of the Jew had to take place in contact with his original land (Ruppin 1911, 283). Nevertheless, even before bringing the Jews back to their soil in order to decide on their adaptability to it, Ruppin took an important decision: If the Semitic element was dysgenic, it meant that the main group of “pure race” Jews (the group that Ruppin saw

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150 In the *Jews of Today* he refers to the “Oriental Jews” also as “Arab Jews”.

151 The source for this idea was probably Chamberlain, who claimed that the most important thing for Germany was to get rid of the Semitic elements, which held up the process of purification of the Indo-Germanic race that would eventually produce a superior Aryan race (Tal 198, 230).
as the basis for the regeneration of the Jewish Volk), had to come from among the East European Jews, for among them it would be easier to locate non-Semitic “elements.” According to Ruppin, the Oriental and Sephardic Jews were not suitable for that purpose since they carried Semitic dysgenic elements. Not only did they not present signs for eugenic regeneration, which could be found in at least some of the East European Jews, but there was clear evidence that they were in a process of biological degeneration, and did not actually represent the Jewish race in the modern period.152 His only empirical evidence for this was that the Oriental and Sephardic Jews were evidently declining in number compared to the Ashkenazim. According to the statistical data he gathered, at the beginning of the twentieth century 92% of Jews were Ashkenazim and only 8% were Sephardim and Orientals (as opposed to the pre-modern era in which the Ashkenazim and Sephardim were more or less equal in number) (Ruppin 1930, 83; 1931, 63).

152 “Die Aschkenasim bilden heute eine so erdrückende Mehrheit unter den Juden, daß sie vielfach überhaupt für ‘die Juden’ schlechthin gehalten werden” (Ruppin 1930 I, 78).
The demographical curve of the Ashkenazi and Sepharadic-Oriental Jews (between 70 to 1930). (Ruppin 1931, 63).

All Jews
Ashkenazi Jews
Sepharadic-Oriental Jews

The radical decrease in the number of Sephardim is explained by Ruppin as being the result of certain deficiencies in their biological structure. As the most Semitic component of the Jewish race, they came to represent, in his analysis, a degenerate strain in the Jewish Volk. According to Ruppin, not only had the (Ashkenazi) Jews preserved their racial characteristics, they had also succeeded in improving them through a long process of selection which promoted the fittest among them: rich Jews married their daughters to the most brilliant students, thus ensuring the mental development of the race. The Sephardic-Oriental (Mizrahi) Jews, Ruppin concluded, were lacking this urge for self-selection, a fact that certainly damaged their “vital force” (Ruppin 1913a, 217). Another factor which differentiated the Oriental Jews, according to Ruppin’s assertion, was that most of them were actually Arabs and Moslems who had converted over the generations.
As described above, in all his writings Ruppin explicitly stressed the superiority of the Ashkenazi Jews over the Sephardic-Oriental Jews in intelligence, creativity, mathematical ability, agility, imagination and hygiene (Ruppin 1931b, 59-60), morality, and, above all, in their “life force” or in their Lebenszähigkeit the “powerful struggle for life” – this bio-mystic force – which enables the Volk and the individual to survive in the struggle for existence (Daseinskampf). He claimed that this force, which immunized the Ashkenazi Jews, did not exist in the Sephardic-Oriental Jews. Such distinctions and speculations led Ruppin to conclude that the Semitic element in the Jewish Volk was declining, and that the superior Jewish elements were related to the Indo-Germanic family rather than to that of the Semites (Ruppin 1913a, 214; 1933, 29).

Ruppin’s theory, which defined Judaism in terms of race and saw the Ashkenazim as its Ur (original) and vital element in the modern era, enabled him to distance the Jews from the Semitic race and hence to accept European race theories concerning the inferiority of that race. It was not the Jews who were avaricious, it was the Semites. For him, the healthy original Jews, who were responsible for the good qualities of Jewish culture, belonged to the Ashkenazi Indo-Germanic race. Though some Ashkenazi Jews preserved some Semitic elements (responsible for example for their uncontrollable greed), “modern race research” proved that the Semitic element in the Jewish Volk was slowly diminishing. In the same manner, the Ashkenazi Zionist national revival demonstrated how the natural eugenic process of Mother Nature herself gradually weeded out the racial and cultural Semitic elements. This explanation preserved Ruppin’s model of self-differentiation. He could accept the premise of his reference group and legitimize his belonging to it but he had, at the same time, to project the qualities of the ‘bad Jews’ onto the ‘other Jews’ – the Semites with their “orientalische” and “ostische” Keimplasma, and to free himself in that way from the threat they posed to his cultural identity and biological fantasy.

As will be described in the specific case of the Yemenite Jews, Ruppin’s racial theory concerning the Sephardic-Oriental Jews was the pretext and rationale for establishing

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153 See e.g. his description of the Jews of Saida (the ancient Sidon) who are “poorly educated and of a not particularly high moral standing. The Jews of Morocco, Persia and the Yemen, who have come into Palestine of recent years, may be lumped together with this group” (Ruppin 1908, 1).
their position in the new Jewish Volk as *dysgenic* factors, and, as such, marking them out as an immanent threat to the regeneration of the “new [Ashkenazi] Jew.”

3.8 Ruppin’s Method of “Science”

*How much I want to devote myself to scientific work on the questions of heredity and race!* Is it possible that I will die without succeeding in creating something of value in the field of science?  
Ruppin

3.8.1 The Theory of *Instinctual Objectivity*

The pseudoscientific nature of racial theories such as those of Ruppin and Chamberlain seems obvious today and in order to make sense of them we must remember that they are based on a certain conception of science that believed that the non-rationalized or unmeasured intuition, instinct or feeling of the researcher could be a source of scientific validity. Theories of this kind can be defined as theories of *intuitive objectivity* or, in the specific case of Ruppin and Chamberlain, as the theory of *instinctual objectivity*.

Chamberlain developed a new outlook on science, and concluded that observations should be based on the experiences of daily life and on instinct and that these should be the indicators of race in each particular case:

“by the mere virtue of our qualities as living beings there dwells in us an infinitely rich and sure capacity for hitting upon the right thing in case of need, even without erudition” (Hertz, 1970, 167).

According to Chamberlain, the human brain contains certain “*plis de pensée*” (folds of thought) proper to every race that determine the thinking of the individual. Thus Chamberlain did not base his racial diagnosis on physical characteristics; he boldly rejected the whole question of method and referred to

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154 (Bein 1968, III, 27).
the *instinct of the breeder*, which, he maintained, recognized race without being able to define it (Hertz, 1970, 168). Race is a tangible fact and, because of that, it exists. Human beings feel race from their own existence, from the power of the tribal and racial partnership of the blood (Blutgemeinschaft), by intuitive grasp of organic relationships (Hutton 2005, 176).

Ruppin was clearly operating according to this paradigm. To cite one example already referred to above, he admitted that not been enough research had been carried out in order to establish the assertion concerning the inferiority of the Sephardic-Oriental Jews and that it was impossible to “draw general conclusions”, but then he turned to his “instinctual objectivity” and claimed: “nevertheless, I allow myself to say this [the inferiority of the Sephardic-Oriental] on the grounds of my experience” (Ruppin 1931b, 42).

The theories of “instinctual objectivity” were developed during the 1920s by the declaredly anti-Semitic “race psychologist” Ludwig Ferdinand Clauß (1892-1974), who put in the center of his theory the unmediated gaze and bodily and facial movements. For Clauß, race was to be studied in the expressivity of the human body by means of an act of intuition or insight on the part of the investigator, who had to train his “scientific gaze” (Hutton 2005, 183-188). Methodological assumptions of this kind were shared by Ruppin as well as by Hans Günther, who was praised for his ability to determine a person’s racial identity from a quick glance (Hutton 2005, 35). Ruppin quoted Günther and Clauß, as well as others who developed these theories, claiming that the best way to discover a person’s race was through his special facial expression (Ausdrucksprägung) (Ruppin 1930, I, 52-53).

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155 In another place he writes that the superiority of Ashkenazi children over Sephardic children is a “known fact” (Ruppin 1940, 22).

156 Clauß’s method involved the marginalizing of physicalist or biological theories of race in favor of what he termed the “mimetic method” (mimische Methode) (Hutton 2005, 57). He was a very popular speaker and sold many books (ibid, 183). On Clauß’s theory in relation to the National Socialists, see: (Neumann 2002, 186-187).
In his diaries there are many entries which demonstrate the way he used such methods. Of one of his meetings with the Zionist-National poet Haim Nahman Bialik he wrote:

“On the train I met Bialik […] From some aspects he is very naïve, becoming enthusiastic very easily and yet, as I have heard, he is a good businessman. From the racial point of view, he is a Jewish-Slavic mixture, and that explain perhaps that he is at one and the same time both poet and merchant” (Bein 1968, III, 87, [10 August 1924]).

During most of his career Ruppin viewed people as if their exterior reflected their interior, as he wrote for example: “it is odd how many Jews stayed poor in this dirty ghetto [in Rome]; they are probably ‘poor in spirit’”. It is necessary to understand Ruppin’s idiosyncratic use of the word ‘spirit’ here as a synonym for “sperm.”

Bridging the gap between the inner and outer self, and uniting his ‘sperm’ and ‘spirit’ was one of the fantastic desires of the monistic-eugenic weltanschauung which, as already noted, was similar to fundamental messianic perceptions. The theory of “instinctual objectivity” rests on the same logical foundations and sources in human nature as the revelations of false messiahs.

3.8.2 Ruppin’s Empiricism

Besides this theory of “instinctual objectivity” whose practical expressions in Palestine will be discussed later, it is important to note that from the twenties onward Ruppin upgraded his theories and methods in accordance with the new trends in German racial sciences and anthropology. These methods aimed to discover a causal or valid scientific connection between the spirit and the body by finding a clear

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157. When he met a young kindergarten teacher from Salzburg (1926) who wanted to “make Aliya” [immigrate] to “the land of Israel” and had some difficulties, he wrote “I felt sorry for this lovely maiden, since her like may help the improvement of the race in the land” Ruppin helped her to come to Palestine “and today she is my sister-in-law Yehudit Hachohen in Binyamina”(ibid. [4 September 1926], 124).
158. This double meaning existed also in the Elizabethan period and was frequently used by Shakespeare.
relationship between mental qualities and physical characteristics, as he explained even in his last book *The Jews Struggle for their Existence*:

“Anthropology, with its racial classifications, would be of no particular interest if there were not in all the classifications an assumption that the physical differences in mankind are accompanied by differences in mentality” (Ruppin 1940a, 20; Ruppin 1940b 23).

Influenced by these empiricist trends and constantly driven to keep up with state-of-the-art biological anthropology, Ruppin engaged in consistent, intensive research with the aim of finding the racial composition of the Jews and their physical and mental differences. From the start of the twenties, one of his most important tools was his camera. At the end of his *Soziologie der Juden*, he presents dozens of pictures; selected from the hundreds he took, in an attempt to map the Jewish racial types. He photographed every face that seemed to him typical (“typisch erscheinendes Gesicht”) (Krolik 1985, 379), also taking pictures of patients in Hadassah hospital (Bein 1968, 116).

Ruppin used the accepted methods for measuring the size of the skull (craniology) and other anthropometrical examinations, such as comparing the shape of the skull and the skin, hair, eyes, and body posture and structure of different types of Jews. His high position in the Zionist colony in Palestine gave him the opportunity to satisfy his great scientific appetite, and to receive whatever data he needed. He received the compliant assistance of the medical and educational administration for all kinds of experiments such as photographing schoolchildren in order to determine their geographical origins by a comparison of their facial features (Bein 1968, 105).

His ambition for scientific innovations led him to invent a new parameter for racial characteristics: fingerprints. By comparing fingerprints, he hoped to find an inductive method for discovering the Jewish racial code. In 1921, he asked the *Berlin Police Department for Criminal Identification* to send him 10,000 fingerprints, Jewish and non-Jewish (Doron 1977, 246). “I ask myself”, he wrote in his diary:
“if it is possible to find differences between different Jewish groups, and if it is possible to indicate differences like that, as long as they exist, as proof of racial difference. I gave Hannah [his wife] a book about fingerprints in order to classify the fingerprints which I hope to receive in great quantity from Hadassah hospital” (Bein 1968, II, 109).

The establishment of the Hebrew University in 1925 – in the purchase of whose land he also had a major role – opened for Ruppin new scientific opportunities. In 1926, he established the first department for Jewish sociology, in the first Zionist university, and thus found in the Land of Israel/Palestine a new field for research: the sociology and statistics of the Jews. His approach was very different from that of the Jewish researchers at the Hebrew University. While the latter were preoccupied with “high” and ancient Jewish texts, Ruppin studied the actual sociology of the Jews from a bioanthropological perspective. In 1928, he lectured at the Hebrew university on “the race history of the Jews,” lectures that became, at the end of the 1920s, the basis for the two volumes (1000 pages, tens statistical tables, graphs and pictures) of his already mentioned central work Soziologie der Juden (1930).

Though Ruppin upgraded his theories and methods in accordance with the new trends in German racial science and eugenics, the “instinctual objectivity of the breeder” was a cornerstone in his weltanschauung and actions. In a document entitled “races,” (Rassen) in which he tried to define his use of the concept of race, he quoted the philosopher Hans Vaihinger (1853-1933) who explained the relationship between scientific representation and reality in the following way:

“Wir operieren mit Atomen, obwohl wir wissen, dass unser Atombegriff falsch ist – nur wir operieren mit ihm glücklich und erfolgreich.”

The concept of the atom, representing the material world and race, representing human beings was not problematic in his “transcendental materialist” weltanschauung, in which, as noted, the purely physico-chemical and the organic and human, ultimately sprang equally from one primal “life force.”

159 The reference in the document entitled “Rassen” is: “Vaihinger Die Phil. des Als Ob Leipzig 1920 S XII” (CZA, A 107/346).
The concept of race with which Ruppin “operated” all his life was essential to his culture planning activities. One brief example of the consequences of Ruppin’s perception of Judaism in terms of European racial theories can be seen in the case of the Ethiopian Jews. Ruppin’s explanation for the racial components of the Jews is involved and not at all clear, but as described above, one thing was very clear to him: there was no racial connection between the Jews and the Yellow and Black races. (Ruppin 1930, I., 23). In 1934, following the request of Dr. Yaakov Feitlovich (1881-1955) to bring the Ethiopian Jews to the Land of Israel, Ruppin claimed that the Ethiopians were:

“Niggers, who came to Judaism by force of the sword in the sixth century B.C. They have no blood connection to the Jews. […] [Therefore] their number in Palestine should not be increased.”

From Ruppin’s point of view, the fact that the Ethiopian Jews had been recognized as Jews by several Rabbis at least since the 16th century was not at all important because he perceived the Jews as belonging to the white Indo-Germanic races.

In 1942, about a month before he died, Ruppin wrote that “the shape of the nose” can give us an indication of racial affinity, and he sketched a series of Jewish types. He attached to each type a few names, (Herzl, Aharonsohn and Usishkin were “Assyrich – Bucharischer Typus,” Warburg and Leiberman were “Sefardisch-Süddeutscher Typus”, etc.). As an example for the “Aschkenasisch-Negroider” type he writes Feitlovich. It is quite possible that the reason he ascribed “blackness” to the Polish Jew Feitlovich was the interest Feitlovich took in the Ethiopians. Feitlovich’s interest in the Ethiopian Jews was religious and national; to perform a

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160 Protocol of the Zionist executive meeting [14 Nov. 1934], N. 20210, Ben Gurion Archive (I thank Ari Barell for sharing this document with me). On that meeting see also: (Halamish 2006, 311).
163 This classification seems to reflect Ruppin’s tendency to connect intuitively between personal characteristics or inclinations and racial categories.
mitzvah – a good deed – and help Jews in distress. For him, Judaism was a religion and not a racial category. Nevertheless, Ruppin’s opinion was accepted. Feitlovich’s initiative failed, and the Ethiopian Jews were recognized as Jews by the State of Israel only in 1979. The conflict between Ruppin and Feitlovich must be understood in the context of the opposition between the Jews and the Hebrews presented in the introduction and attests to the fact that the decisive cultural force of the Hebrews and not that of the Jews was the more crucial in creating the ethnic construction of pre-Israeli society.

From his youth until his final days, Ruppin dealt obsessively with race. For him, as well as for many other believers in “transcendental materialism,” the question of race was in constant battle with religious belief and the concept of God:

“[…] Then there came to my mind the idea that, indeed, the theologians were lucky because we have not yet found the zoologist who can create that astounding thing (that nevertheless has a probable chance of success): the fertilization of a female chimpanzee with human male sperm. Why, the bastard of a human being and a chimpanzee may be used as a crushing refutation of the belief that there is a deep gap between the human being, who ‘owns a soul’, and the animal, that ‘lacks a soul.’ It will be also be an incisive refutation of the claim of those who dismiss the affinity between the human being and the monkey” (Bein 1968, III[1 October 1925], 106).
f. Rote

1/ Assyrisch - Buchmischer Typus
   Michael
   Herzl
   Lottmeyer
   Urmischkin

2/ Mittelalterlicher Prototyp

3/ Hillichirch - hannörscher Typus

4/ Perrich - hannörscher Typus

5/ Hebräisch - Typus
   Rubbin

6/ Sephardischer Typus

7/ Sephardisch - süddeutscher Typus, Liebmann

8/ lakkasisch - Slavischer Typus, Limplinka
   Neumann, Feilner
Jüd. Rasse   29/XI 42

Die Nasenform ist ein Wegweiser zur Bestimmung der Typen-Zugehörigkeit

1) Assyrich – bucharischer Typus
   Bucharer
   Herzl
   Morrinsohn
   Ussischkin

2) Hittitischer Prototypus

3) Hittitisch-Aramäischer Typus

4) Persisch-Aramäischer Typus

5) Beduinen-Typus

6) Sefardischer Typus

7) Sefardisch-Süddeutscher Typus
   Anduron [Teduson?]
   Warburg
   Liebermann

8) Aschkenasisch  - Slavischer
   - Mongolischer
   - Negroider
   Feitlovit[s]ch
3.8.3 Ruppin’s Academic Field

Ruppin’s methodological standards, his models and his notions are derived from and addressed to the German eugenic discourse and literary field. One of the most influential works, which he quotes many times in the Soziologie der Juden, was the book considered by many the “bible” of Eugenics, the Grundriß der menschlichen Erblichkeitslehren und Rassenhygiene (Outline of Human Genetics and Racial Hygiene). This two-volume work had three authors – Dr. Erwin Baur, Dr. Eugen Fischer, and Dr. Fritz Lenz – and was thus commonly known as Baur-Fischer-Lenz.164

In 1919, the racial hygienist Eugen Fischer began to practice sterilization after having established theories about the general problem of “bastardization,” referring to the “Rehoboth bastards” in German South West Africa before the war. In that same year, Fischer performed eleven sterilizations in his own surgery for “eugenic indications.” Together with Fritz Lenz, Privatdozent at the Institute for Hygiene at Munich University, and Erwin Baur, professor of genetics at the Agricultural Faculty in Berlin, Fischer, in the meantime head of the Anatomic Institute at Freiburg, was, in the following years, working on the first textbook on racial hygiene. In 1921, the Munich publisher Julius Friedrich Lehman issued the Grundriß, which had a very successful reception and was internationally recognized, immediately after its appearance, as a standard textbook and soon even used in universities abroad. Their researches during the twenties expressed the transformation of Social Darwinism from a theoretical discipline to a more practical or applied discipline, which was nearer to the function and practice of a medical doctor or a botanist and less to that of the theoretical anthropologist, who observed and measured.

In the second volume by Dr. Lenz, the first Professor of racial hygiene in Germany (the chair was established in 1923 at Munich University), entitled Human Selection and Racial Hygiene (Eugenics), he wrote:

“A real restoration of the racial health cannot be set in motion without comprehensive measures and the organization of social-racial hygiene; but

164 On their careers and theories, see: (Friedlander 1995).
these are mostly introduced only when the racial hygienic idea has become the common knowledge of the population or at least of its mental leaders” (in: Eckart 2000, 1).

It is important to recognize that the eugenicists understood that implementing eugenics required a new code of morals, and that it had to be carried out indirectly, at least in the first stage. The indirect indoctrination of the new eugenic moral must, according to Lenz:

“[…] first develop a feeling for the senselessness of a civilization which allows the race to decay, […]. The introduction of racial hygiene education in the secondary schools [high-schools] and universities could effectively counter this illiteracy; unfortunately, this will only be possible when the importance of racial hygiene has become known in the right places. As long as this is not the case, the most important practical duty of racial hygiene is the private promulgation of racial hygienic ideas. As soon as racial hygienic conviction has become a living ideology, then the racial hygienic organization of life, even public life, will happen by itself […]. Anyone who loves his race cannot wish it to fall into decadence. He must realize that the industriousness of the race is the first and unrelenting condition for the thriving of the race. Even the fight for the freedom and self-assertion of the race must, in the final instance, serve the race” (in: Schreiber 2000).

The resemblance of Lenz’s views to those of Ruppin in his 1903 Moderne Weltanschauung is striking, and can explain Ruppin’s enthusiasm for the Grundriß. In the foreword to their work, Baur-Fischer-Lenz forewarned (in the same way that Ruppin did in his 1904 Die Juden der Gegenwart) against the “corruption” and “degeneration” that threatened the German Volk. According to Fischer, the reasons for this were the negative selection processes which could cause a rapid deterioration of the German Volk’s racial composition. All attempts to tackle the “disease of the body of the Volk” by such social political means as legislation were, in most cases, unsuccessful. This led Fisher to conclude that, in order to solve the problem of degeneration, Rassenhygiene must be applied. Fisher recommends a selectionist plan
of “active racial hygiene” based on a particular kind of selection: “ausmerzen” (weeding out or exterminating), i.e., sterilization, abortions and a ban on intermarriage.

A eugenic movement was already in existence at that time, so that the ideas of Baur-Fischer-Lenz were quite familiar and perfectly acceptable to all the political groups of the Weimar Republic, from the left to the extreme right. It must be remembered that the wide acceptance of Baur-Fischer-Lenz followed directly upon the shocking experience of the thousands of dead and wounded young soldiers in World War I, the decrease in the birth rate as well as the fear of degeneration through the increase in toxic substances detrimental to the germ cells, (“Keimgifte”; such as alcohol, tuberculosis, syphilis) resulting from war and economic crisis. World War I can therefore be seen as a turning point in the development of scientific racism in Germany. The death of so many of the best young men was interpreted as negative selection and a danger for Germany, particularly because those who survived were by definition – or claimed to have been – unfit for war (Krüger 1998, 378).

In a significant way, Baur-Fischer-Lenz’s reception in German culture was similar to Ruppin’s a few years earlier in the Zionist movement. The main reason for that was that, in both cases, the writers had the ability to formulate the fears of their reference groups in “objective” scientific language, which could be flexible in backing up political trends and the demands of public opinion. Many historians, who were probably not aware of the history of anthropology and eugenics and who all too readily believed accounts of the supposedly ad hoc character of the Nuremberg laws, did not realize that these were merely the implementation of more than twenty years of discussion. Far from inventing them, the Nazis (or rather Hitler himself) had only translated race-hygiene and racially based anthropological postulates into the party program (Weingart 1998, 402).

The Grundriß creators were one of the most prolific sources of the pretext, through a process of legitimization by scientification, for institutionalized human inequality, and became a necessary part of the practices that were applied, during the twentieth century, to entire groups of human beings who did not fit into their bio-utopian culture space.
It is important to note, as Hart has pointed out, that the majority of scientific sources
used by Baur-Fischer-Lenz in their *Grundriß* “were in fact produced by Jews. […] and are to be found particularly in articles in the *Zeitschrift für Demographie und Statistik der Juden*” (Hart 2000, 219), which Ruppin had established and edited.\(^1\) It is not clear to what extent and in what ways the Jewish scientists who wrote for the *Zeitschrift* contributed to the racial sciences in Germany. What is sure is that most of them, and certainly Ruppin, shared a similar *Weltanschauung* and had the same model of “biological utopia” as Friedlander calls it or “medico-biological vision” according to Aschheim (Aschheim 1996, 79).

Throughout most of his career, Ruppin was in close relations with the academic field of German race scientists, who operated during the thirties with Nazi support and provided them with scientific legitimization and ideas. This group was not only among the first scientists to join the Nazi party, they were also involved in shaping the general lines of its policy to exclude the handicapped, Gypsies and Jews. Until the final solution stage of the Nazi policy, which began sometime at the end of the thirties, Ruppin was able to understand them perfectly, and to agree that their attitude towards the Jews was only natural.\(^2\)

\(^1\) On the use of Ruppin and other Jewish researchers by Nazi scholarship see: (Steinweis 2006, 19-22).
\(^2\) Ruppin’s relationship with the Nazi scientist Hans Günter and an assessment of his weltanschauung with regard to the Nazis, will be discussed at the end of this work.
3.9 The End of Theory

At the end of the 19th century, there was not a major thinker in any movement (from liberalism and socialism to Zionism and nationalism) who did not use at least Darwinian or biological arguments and often eugenic ones. In this regard, Ruppin is typical and not an anomaly. Indeed, Ruppin was following many other Jewish and Zionist racial scientists, including Elias Auerbach, Aron Sandler, Felix Theilhaber, Ignaz Zollschan, S.A. Weissenberg, Redcliffe N. Salman and Joseph Jacobs, who wrote the foreword to the English version of Ruppin’s *The Jews of Today*, and whom Efron calls the first “racial Jewish scientist” (Efron 1994, 58). All of them were motivated by a perceived need to end Jewish intermarriage and preserve Jewish racial purity. Most of them believed that only by creating a Jewish homeland and by reducing the assimilatory influences of the Diaspora, could Jews preserve their unique racial heritage (Gilman 1993, 109; Efron 1994, 136, 155). Race was at the essence of Zionist cultural identity. Since Zionism lacked many of the attributes associated with nationhood – common territory, language conduct and customs – race was an Archimedean point for constituting a nation (Hart 1995, 166; Falk 2006).

The Jewish racial scientists and thinkers became the subject of intensive and vibrant research in the second part of the 1990s. Efron’s *The Defenders of Race*, Mitchel Hart’s *Social Science and the Politics of Modern Jewish Identity* and many others described their theories and cultural identity and included Ruppin among them. Nevertheless, what makes Ruppin’s case so different from that of the other social scientists is that he was able, like only few other eugenicists (e.g. Galton), to undertake a practical implementation of his ideas, as will be discussed in chapter five. Indeed, as Penslar notes, there were other attempts at social engineering of the Jews, and at linking Jewish economic and physical health with planned colonization. This frame of work was shared by a variety of Jewish international relief agencies that experimented, from the 1870s until the 1930s, with social engineering in South America, Eastern Europe, and the Middle East (Penslar 2001, 223). Nevertheless, the Palestinian-Zionist project was the only one of these experiments to succeed in radically transforming modern Jewish identity and, in particular, the Jewish body. The successes of Zionism cannot be overestimated: from one of the many political and
cultural options for identity in the culture space of the turn of the century it became, at the end of the twentieth century, a cultural synonym for Judaism.

In 1932, Ruppin wrote in his diary that the work on his theory concerning the sociology of the Jews was concluded. He wondered what his next scientific study would be. He thought about writing a book on “The Meaning of Illusion in World History” but dismissed this idea because it would probably have “a stamp of dilettantism” (Bein 1968, III, 215).

Ruppin could take another scientific direction. Since the twenties, and even earlier, there were other streams in sociology that challenged the racial anthropology paradigm. Max Weber, Franz Boaz, Émile Durkheim and many others exposed the scientific weakness’ of the Rassenkunde methods, and more importantly, generated a new recognition concerning the meaning of race, arguing that hereditary physical characteristics did not have a meaningful function in so-called “ethnic” relations or in social life in general.

However, Ruppin could not take this path for several reasons, the most important one being that his theories were bound up with his practical work and his service of the new Jewish Volk. Ruppin could never see his research outside the particular context of his practical work: “a work that is only practical or only scientific – does not give me satisfaction; I need both of them at the same time” (Bein 1968, 215). It is not surprising, then, that a few lines after he wrote that his theoretical work was finished (1932) he came to the conclusion that the Zionist movement had reached its final theoretical development: “it is impossible to create new, essential things and to pave new paths, but only to develop and broaden what already exists” (Bein 1968, III, 215). Realizing that he could not write anything important on subjects other than Zionism, Ruppin concluded this reflective entry with a most pregnant declaration: “the ideology of Zionism is a part of the sociology of the Jews, which I wrote” (Bein 1968, 215).

The following section will explore the meaning of this claim of Ruppin’s by trying to define the relationship between his models of perception (including his theories) and his practical work in the Land of Israel/Palestine between the years 1908-1943.
4. From Theory to Practice: The German Nexus

4.1 From Muscular Judaism to the Maccabean Type

More and more am I convinced that our idea is winning, and will soon ensure its place in the Jewish people...the time has come when the spirit of the Maccabeans will penetrate all layers of Judaism and solve the Jewish problem.

C. Weizmann\(^{167}\)

My main ambition was to invigorate the light of enthusiasm and to be the Shamash\(^{168}\) that is in charge of the eternal-candle [ner hatamid].

Ruppin\(^{169}\)

Before going into Ruppin’s nomination, his relationship with German Zionists and his activities in Palestine, it is my intention to describe his particular role in the history of concepts, or better, in the history of the perception models of the Zionist movement, and his connection with those who preceded him.

As mentioned in the introduction, Ruppin did not regard Herzl’s theories as viable, though he recognized their symbolic value to the movement. Ruppin’s criticism of other Zionists was no less harsh. Nossig, Wolfson, Ussishkin, Weizmann, Ben-Gurion and many others were criticised in his diaries for their lack of understanding of the essence of Zionism (e.g. Herzl), and he portrayed them as naive (Achad Ha'am), weak (Weizmann) arrogant and ignorant (Wolfson and Ussishkin), fanatical and irrational.

\(^{167}\) Weizmann to Gatzova, in: (Negev 2004, 14).

\(^{168}\) The Shamash is the servant candle that kindles the other lights of the Chanukah lamp (chanukiya or Menorah) and should stand out from the rest (i.e. be. higher or lower). This image was attached to Ruppin by Bein and many others. See for example: HaShamashim: Ruppin and Eschkol by Rosenman Avraham (Rosenman 1992).

\(^{169}\) The last sentence of his speech at the 14th Zionist Congress, 1925, in: (Bein 1968, III, 381).
(Ben Gurion) – the only unequivocal exception to this critical attitude was Max Nordau.

Ruppin saw Nordau as his mentor; perhaps the only Jew and certainly the only Zionist who could claim this title. In an early stage of his life, after reading Nordau’s *The Conventional Lies of our Civilisation*, he wrote in his diary that he would like to be someone like Nordau, a “dramatist, world improver, and social reformer.”

As already described, we can find similarities and links between the perceptions of Nordau and Ruppin in a number of cases (e.g., the importance of statistics and the rejection of the model of the Sephardic Jew as the *Urjude*). It is also possible that Ruppin’s views on religion, shaped by a Darwinist interpretation of Nietzsche, were also influenced by Nordau, especially when Ruppin integrated his general theory of world history into the Jewish one. For Nordau, as well as for Ruppin, religion was but a primitive “epiphomenon” and pathology, an unscientific self-delusion used to mask men’s fear of death and their consequent unfortunate need to subordinate themselves to their sense of powerlessness by means of “parasitism” (Stanislawski 2001, 20, 33).

However, Nordau’s most important influence on Ruppin, and indeed on the Zionist movement as a whole, lay in his introduction, at the second Zionist Congress (1898), of the powerful image of *Muskeljudentum* (*muscular Judaism* or *muscular Jewry*). This highly charged popular image expressed the fact that, at the end of the 19th century, the position of the Jew in Europe was defined increasingly in terms of the emerging paradigm and weltanschauung of social Darwinism, which consequently became a central source of inspiration for the Zionist desire to change the body of the Jew. Herzl expressed it clearly:

> “The character of the Jew may benefit from anti-Semitism. Education can be achieved only through shock treatment. Darwin’s theory of imitation [Darwinsche Mimikry] will be validated. The Jews will adapt. They are like

\[^{170}\text{Ruppin, Tagebuch, [1 Dec. 1894], CZA. in: (Penslar 1991, 83).}\]
seals that have been thrown back into the water by an accident of nature…if they return to dry land and manage to stay there for a few generations, their fins will change back into legs.” (Bein 1974, 173).

This urge of Herzl’s, and of many other Jews and Zionists, to transform the Jewish body was the background to Nordau’s call for Muskeljudentum, and it is quite clear that Ruppin was influenced by this image, for he mentioned it a few times in his diaries while commenting on new immigrants to Palestine; for example, when he wrote about Berman of Kinneret, he described him as an example of “a perfect Muskeljude” (Bein 1968, I, 75).

However, this description appeared only in the first stage of Ruppin’s writings in Palestine. From the twenties, after he adopted the language of the Bauer-Fischer-Lenz Grundriß, his theory became more and more specific, and instead of the general Muskeljude he used a more scientific (and also Jewish) term, defining the new ideal Jews as being “the Maccabean type” (Ruppin 1940b, 287).

Like other eugenicists, Ruppin saw historical development as a natural biological process, believing that the eugenicist could only navigate the already natural selection. Applying this principle to Jewish history, Ruppin believed that the Jews had begun to regenerate themselves from the time of their early encounters with modernity, with the most positive and important outcome of this interaction being the change in the Jewish body. Thus, unlike Nordau and his call for a future Muskeljudentum, Ruppin believed that the muscular development of the Jew was a natural process that had already begun. In this context, he saw the beginning of the Jewish engagement with sport at the end of the 19th century as proof of his hypothesis regarding the natural evolution of both body and mentality. The establishment of the sports’ association Bar-Kochba in Berlin (1898), and similar associations in central Europe was perceived by Ruppin as a positive turning point in Jewish history although “the most important one was the establishment of the Maccabeans that had

171 For a comprehensive criticism of Nordau’s Muskeljudentum theory and cultural history see: (Presner 2007).
begun, from the beginning of the 20th century, to educate Jewish youth from all countries towards sports” (Ruppin 1940b, 221).

4.1.1 The transfer of European models to the Modern Hebrew Repertoire: the Case of the Maccabeans

The Maccabeans are known in Jewish history as the family that fought against the Greek empire between the years 166-129 B.C. The most common theory for the meaning of the word Maccabeans is that it derives from the Hebrew word for hammer, because they were said to strike hammer blows against their enemies. Jews refer to the Maccabeans, but the family is more commonly known as the Hasmoneans. In 164 B.C., the Maccabeans recaptured Jerusalem and the Temple was purified, an event that gave birth to the festival of Chanukah.

The Jewish traditional narrative, starting from Raban Jochanan Ben Zakai and the “sages of Yavne” (Heb. chachmei yavne), defined itself by editing out the Hasmoneans from the Jewish canon. The books of Maccabeans and Hasmoneans became part of the “external literature” i.e., they were not written in the “spirit of sacredness” or “the holy spirit” (Heb. beruach hakodesh). Chazal, the Jewish sages who created the Mishna and the Talmud, opposed the tendency of the Maccabeans and the Hasmoneans to make excessive and injudicious use of their power while leading the Jews. They rejected the Hasmoneans to such an extent that these dynasties, as well as the festival of Chanukah, are hardly mentioned in the Talmud.

For the haftara (the reading from the prophets) for the Sabbath of Chanukah, Chazal chose the chapter from the prophet Zechariah, whose main teaching is “Not by might nor by power but by my spirit, saith the Lord of Hosts” (Zechariah 4, 6). Even the holiday’s traditional songs clearly express the exclusion of the Maccabeans. In the song “mi yemalel gvoorot ysrael” one of the lines in the Hebrew version “hen bkol dor yakum hagibor goel ha am” (in each generation there will arise a hero, savior of the people) becomes, in the common English translation, “in every age, a hero or a sage came to our aid,” the “sage” dimming the power of the “hero.” This addition, in the Anglo-Jewish Diaspora version, reflects the message that post-destruction

172 A paraphrase of psalm 26, 2.
rabbinical Judaism wanted to convey: that the warriors who fought with their swords passed the light on to the sages who fought with the Torah – from sword to word. Chanukah was presented in this tradition not as a military adventure (as in the Christian-European and Zionist cultures) but as a spiritual one; from the miracle of a small army that defeated a great empire to a spiritual miracle represented by the one jug of oil that burned for eight nights through the power of God.

The Maccabeans were dismissed from the Jewish canon, but at some point in history they became the heroes of another canon. During the Crusades, the church leaders presented the Maccabeans, who were willing to fight and die for their beliefs, as ideal models for the crusaders. Since then they have often been represented in European art and culture as exemplary models of the knight and the warrior; even the American military academy West Point has a statue of Yehuda the Maccabean (Judas Maccabeus), as a memorial to his military genius (Salkin 1999, 62-63).

The return of the Maccabeans to a dominant role in the Jewish repertoire parallels their entry into the modern era and in particular into the nationalist strains of the 19th century. The analogy between the Zionists and the Maccabeans of the Hasmonean House appeared already in the early period of Zionism. The traditional Jewish interpretation of the name Maccabean (Heb. makabi) presented it as the acronym of the verse: “Who can be compared to you among the gods, Adonai” (mi kamocha BaElim Adonai) (Exodus, 15, 11), but a Zionist functionary replaced this with the acronym of “who can be compared to you among the nations, Israel” (me kamocha baumot, Yisrael) (Simon 1950, 99); here the nation replaces God.

In the Zionist American journal *Maccabaeans* there appeared, as far back as 1902, a picture of Jewish settlers on horseback captioned “the new Maccabaeans” (Maccabaean, Dec. 1902, 300). Two decades later, when Jabotinsky tried to promote his ideas for a Jewish military force, he used this powerful image:

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173 This is the original spelling. It seems to be influenced by the German spelling *Maccabaeus.*
“like the Maccabeans in their time, the people of the Legion will be remembered in the history of the Hebrew people. We will prove to the entire world that in our veins the blood of our ancient heroes still flows.”

Shmuel Almog quotes one of the first references to the Maccabeans in Zionist history and shows its link to German nationalism. A Zionist pamphlet, distributed in German universities at the beginning of the 20th century, stated that the Jews were a separate Volk because of their “origin, history, thinking and feeling” and ended with the call: “Jew — you may not be a slave. You had the Maccabeans!” Almog added that this is probably a paraphrase of one of the German nationalist slogans: “Der Gott, der Eisen wachsen liess, der wollte keine Knechte.” This Zionist pamphlet uses the memory of the Maccabeans – instead of the iron in the German poem – to represent liberation from slavery, defined here as both suppression and humiliation.

Since its early beginnings, the Zionist movement took the Maccabeans to be the ideal Jewish warriors who fought for their independence as opposed to the feeble Jews of the Galut. After the Kishinev Pogrom (1905) many Zionists, among them Franz Oppenhiemer, stressed the contrast between those who surrendered to mass slaughter without resistance, thus “poisoning our sorrow with contempt” and those who fought and died, whom he described as the “true heirs of the Maccabeans” (Lowe 1965, 139).

Oppenheimer’s model of representation can be found reflected frequently in the German Zionist repertoire. In Both Herzl’s Das Neu Ghetto and Nordau’s Dr. Kohn the central scene (the so called “heart of the play”) revolved around a duel between a manly German (the minister of cavalry in Herzl’s play and the officer in Nordau’s) and a young, proud Jew; in both cases the Jew lost the duel but gained his honor, with Dr. Kohn feeling that he had to fight the duel or else all Jews would be called cowards (Mosse 1991, 169).

175 The song was written by Ernst Moritz Arndt, in: (Almog 1982, 18).
176 On Oppenhiemer’s admiration for the Maccabeans see: (Mosse 1985, 76). After Oppenhiemer visited Palestine in 1910, he spoke with admiration of a new race of Jewish masters, and praised the workers for their forceful stand towards the Arabs (Almog 2002, 75).
The model of the Maccabeans, as presented above, became an integral part of the modern Hebrew repertoire and served as a symbol for an active and assertive Jew who “stands up for himself” with “manly honor,” and who refuses to surrender to any kind of enslavement or humiliation even at the risk of death.

The transference of the Christian-European model of the Maccabeans to Modern Hebrew culture, demonstrates the way in which Jewish symbols and terms changed their meaning through Zionism. This process was not necessarily cognizant; as noted, most Zionists did not claim that they were changing Judaism but rather that they were reviving it. Nevertheless, this revival must be seen, at least partly, as the adoption, from the Christian-European and nationalistic repertoires, of legitimate and positive ‘Jewish’ images.

The choice of the Maccabeans as the ideal model in Jewish history was prevalent among all the Zionists who dealt with the production of the Zionist repertoire. Martin Buber even tried to change the Jewish holiday calendar and suggested the movement adopt a national holiday, possibly the Sabbath of the week of the Chanukah festival, to instil unity and national pride into the Jews and to link the victory of the Maccabeans to the new Jewish national movement for all future generations of Jews (Berkowitz 1993, 83).

In the very well known Zionist Chanukah song Let’s Raise (Hava Narima, with words by Levin Kipnis, set to the music of Händel’s oratorio, Judas Maccabaeus) there is no mention of the miraculous aspect of Hanukah: “Maccabeans are we/ our flag flies for all to see/ the Greeks we battled, verily/ and now we enjoy our victory” (Heb. macabeem anachnu/ diglenu ram, nachon, ba-yevanim nilchamnu – velanu hanitzachon). And the song ends with the description of a clearly Greco-Roman custom: “flower by flower/ we’ll bind a big wreath, for the head of the victor – the heroic Maccabi.” (Heb. perach el perach/ zer gadol nishzor, lerosh ha-menazech – macabee gibor). Another song which denied the miracle and replaced it with a blood bond with the land was We Carry Torches (Heb. anu noseeim lapidim): “no miracle happened to us, no jug of oil did we find/ we mined the rock until we bled, and there

177 Heb. omed al shel or [slang:] lo yotze fraier.
was light” (Heb. nes lo kara lanu, pach shemen lo matzanu/ basela chazavnu ad dam, vayehi or). This song demonstrates how the *Blut und Boden* trope appeared in the emerging Modern Hebrew culture. The ideal Zionist as a “new Maccabean” was prevalent in the Zionist literature, especially in the educational Zionist programs developed in Palestine,¹⁷⁸ Judah the Maccabean appearing as a model for imitation in numerous children’s stories and songs such as *The Small Maccabean*:

Do you know who I am?
I am Yehuda Ha-Macabee!
The cloth is white
The ribbon is blue –
Even gymnastics
I can do.¹⁷⁹

The link between the Maccabees of the past to the Zionists – the “new Maccabees” – was perceived in the Modern Hebrew culture as a premise proving the “natural” superior qualities of Jewish blood – and symbolizing the “blood connection” and bio-historical continuity between the new and old Maccabees. In the literary text of Avraham Solomon, the flower known in Eretz Yisrael as “Blood of the Maccabees” (that is its official name)¹⁸⁰ is presented as a sign of collective memory and a symbol of immortality. In his legend *The Blood of the Maccabees*, the land refused to cover the spilt blood of Eliezer the Maccabean, by claming that:

“The blood is valuable and we can’t wipe it away. This blood should remain for eternity, so that people will know how great a hero was the Maccabean who died for his land and his nation” (Solomon 1943, 6-7).

On God’s command, the angel *Tzimchiel* (Eng. goddess of plants) turned the drops of blood into red flowers “that will remind the children of Israel of the heroic and victorious wars that their fathers fought over the Land of Israel […] they are the flowers of immortality, of the Maccabean immortals as well” (ibid).

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¹⁷⁸ On the use of the Maccabees in Zionist education see: (Maschiach 2000, 146, 181).
¹⁷⁹ *Hamacabi Hakatan* (Kipnis, 1947, 64). in: (Maschiach 2000, 184).
¹⁸⁰ Known in English as the Red Everlasting and in Latin as: *Helichrysum sanguineum*.
In the Zionist narrative, especially as it developed in the Land of Israel/Palestine, the Maccabees marked the *Völkisch* link between blood and land, as well as the connection to the glorious historical past. This mythology was prevalent not only in children’s literature and education but in other institutions for initiation and formation of cultural identity, such as the youth movements and, later, the *Palmach* (Smash Troops; the special underground strike force). Yitzhak Sadeh, the chief commander of the *Palmach*, created an analogy between the warrior and the flower *Blood of the Maccabeans*:

“[…] and the same liquid […] flows in our arteries as well: In that feature they are like us. And if a drop of our blood falls on the homeland, a little flower will grow there, a small red flower that will be called by their name.”

Ruppin’s variation on the Zionist Maccabean trope, the “Maccabean type” demonstrated his particular function in the history of Zionism. It demonstrates the way he charged the national and *Völkisch* concepts of Zionism with a concrete biological meaning, and gave them, through scientification, rational and legitimate explanations. Zionist ideology was for Ruppin – like, previously, religion – a vehicle for eugenic codes and practices. When Ruppin wrote, at the beginning of the 1940s, about the modern Hebrews who were born in the Land of Israel (the so-called Sabars), he referred to them as a new sub-race, “the Maccabean type,” which had emerged, in his opinion, as a result of his culture planning activities: “Most of the young generation in the Land display a new type of Jew, a kind of Maccabean type from the past” (Ruppin 1940b, 287).

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181 (Sadeh 1945, 155-158). Sadeh’s story and images are prevalent in Israeli education system until today. See for example the *Institute for Holidays*, an internet site that provides stories and other texts for teachers in kindergartens and schools [www.chagim.org.il/d.html#1].

182 As we shall see, Ruppin believed that his eugenic culture plan was working, see e.g. what he wrote at the end of the 1920s: “If today the level of the diligence of the agriculture workers is greater than 10 or 15 years ago we must first of all give the credit for that to the work of selection among the groups [kvutzot]. From the thousands that passed through the groups, a large part was discarded, maybe most of them. Those who stayed were those who passed the test of fire” (Ruppin 1928, 42).
4.2 Ruppin and the German Zionists

4.2.1 “Spiritual,” “Political” and “Practical”:
Stages of Nation Building

Herzl’s kind of Zionism, called “political” or “diplomatic Zionism,” which became dominant at the end of the 1890s, was much more successful than the Love of Zion (Hibbat Zion) kind of Zionism, known as “spiritual Zionism,” that was dominant during the 1880s and culminated in the works of Achad Ha’am, who proclaimed that Palestine was important not as a political but as a “spiritual center” of Judaism and as a refuge “not for Jews but for Judaism” (Dubnow 1970, 159). In Herzl’s days, Zionism became more energetic and powerful and, as Dubnow puts it, “fully confident that it holds the future destiny in its hands, and that the Jewish national idea can be realized only through the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine…” The elliptical three dots with which Dubnow ends this sentence, written in 1898, with all that they imply of skepticism and ridicule, reflect how far-fetched the idea of “political” and certainly “practical” Zionism seemed to most people in intellectual Jewish circles at the turn of the century.

In terms of the stages of nation building as formulated by Hobsbawm, the transition of Zionism from “spiritual” to “political/diplomatic” and then to “practical,” can be described more or less as its development from the first phase of nationalism, mainly cultural, literary and folkloristic with very mild political or national implications, to the second phase of nation building, in which a small group of agents starts to promote the “national idea” and begins to establish the political systems and bodies for implementing it. The third phase arrives when these systems and their national ideas gain the support of the masses (or at least a substantial part of the masses) which the small group of agents claims to represent.

What follows deals with the history and perceptions of the German Zionist group that led to the implementation of a culture plan for establishing a Zionist social field in Palestine and can thus be described as the group responsible for the transition from

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183 Achad Ha’am (Asher Ginzberg, 1856-1927) was the leading theorist of “spiritual Zionism.”
185 On the three stages of nation building see: (Hobsbawm 2006, 36).
the first and second phases of nation building, as defined by Hobsbawm, to the third phase.

4.2.2 The German Zionists Perception of their Role in Zionism

*I am a German-speaking Jew from Hungary and can never be anything but a German. At present I am not recognized as a German. But that will come once we are over there.*

T. Herzl \(^{186}\)

*We can neither regress nor do we want to.*

F. Oppenheimer \(^{187}\)

The German Zionist Organization (Zionistischer Vereinigung für Deutschland) was more or less the equivalent of the World Zionist Organization; both were located in and operated from Vienna, Berlin, Cologne and Frankfurt. Their perceptions, visions and plans emerged from within German culture and were worded in its language. The main newspaper of the movement, *Die Welt*, was published in German, the language of the Congress was German and Zionist writers from Paris to Budapest wrote in German and appealed to a public which formed its perceptions through German culture.

German culture also had a central impact upon the identity formation of the Jews from Eastern Europe for it was, ever since the beginning of the enlightenment, their “window to the west.” As Shavit noted, German culture was the principle model of modernization for East European Jews, who even adopted the German criticism of France. \(^{188}\) In the last quarter of the 19th century, many Russian-Jewish students enrolled in the German-speaking universities of central Europe, among them many

\(^{186}\) Theodor Herzl, in: (Boyarin 1997, 278).
\(^{188}\) The cultural idiom “French culture” (Heb. Tarbut Tzarfat) referred to foreign culture that is only accepted by the aristocracy and the upper classes as opposed to the authenticity of the popular spirit (Heb. ruach amamit) of the national culture. French culture symbolized, in East European Jewish discourse, moral decadence, radical secularity and lawlessness (see: Shavit 1991).
who later became leading figures in the Zionist movement, such as Chaim Weizmann, Leo Motzkin, Yaakov Klachkin, Shmariyahu Levin, Nachman Syrkin and many others. Berlin was also the literary centre of the national revival literature, and many of the national literary agents spent significant time there – David Frishman, Shaul Tchernichovski, Micha Berdichevski, Shai Agnon and many others.

The German Zionists had a very important function in and crucial influence on the Zionist movement – although they comprised only 3% of German Jewry and 5% of the members of the WZO (Lavski 2006, 67). Most of the German Zionists (like most Western Zionists) did not plan to leave Germany and considered themselves mainly economic and cultural supporters and administrative leaders of the East European Jews. The German Zionists in general aspired to gain the support of German Jewry by showing the connection between Zionism and the secular, scientific, and humanistic tradition of emancipated German Jewish culture. Many of these Zionists, as we shall see, specialized in the social sciences and in methods of colonization, and this was one of the main reasons for their being invited by Herzl to join the movement (Berkowitz 2000).

189 Most of the Eastern European students tended to study science while the German Zionists studied law or national economy (Bergman 1971, 166).
4.2.3 Ruppin’s Nomination

Ruppin formally joined the Zionist Movement in 1905, after attending the 7th Zionist Congress that took place that year in Basel. His first official function was as a member of the sub-committee for economics. In 1906 he became a member of the legal department of the Vaad Hapoel HaTzioni, in its early stages of operation in Berlin (Weizmann 1988, 47). At the Zionist Congress of 1907 in Hague, the German-Jewish professor of botany Otto Warburg (1859-1938), a veteran scientific advisor in the German colonial service, and a leading figure in German and World Zionism recommended (on the advice of his secretary Yaakov Tahon) nominating Ruppin to make a pilot study of the possibilities for colonization in Palestine. A few months later Ruppin was officially appointed by the president of the WZO, David Wolfson (1856-1914), who was extremely impressed by Ruppin when they met in Cologne and came to the conclusion that “for all our work in Eretz Israel we need representation in the land, and at its head a director” (Eliav 1977, 128).

After eleven weeks of extensive work in Palestine, Ruppin presented the five-man Restricted Executive Committee (REC) with a detailed account and a concrete operative plan. His recommendations were that the settlements in Judea and Galilee should be developed into a nucleus with a Jewish majority and that the greater part of the land be acquired by Jews. His report included detailed proposals regarding land purchase and the industrial and cultural development of the Jewish colony in Palestine.

Ruppin’s first memorandum on Zionist work in Palestine, written in November and delivered in December 1907, is a remarkably comprehensive document, including suggestions for the expansion of Jewish commerce and industry in Palestine, the building of railways and highways, and the construction of resort hotels in attractive locations (Ruppin 1937, 9-18). At the meeting of the REC few weeks later (24 Nov.1907), the committee decided to establish a Palestine Office (PO) that would

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190 In the years 1905-1911 Warburg was a senior member of the secretariat of the WZO and in its Restricted Executive Committee (REC).
function as the official representation of the Zionist movement in Palestine. Ruppin was appointed director (and Tahon his deputy),\textsuperscript{191} of this new PO, which he established, cautiously and discreetly, in a two-room apartment in Jaffa (1908).

In accordance with Ruppin’s ideas, Warburg suggested the establishment of the \textit{Palestine Land Development Company} (PLDC), which the board of the \textit{Jewish National Fund} (JNF)\textsuperscript{192} approved. Ruppin was entrusted with the task of developing the plan and examining its legal aspects. At the end of January 1908, Warburg announced the establishment of the PLDC, and the public was called upon to purchase its shares. Ruppin’s plan made it clear that the company would not itself deal in settlement, but would create “ways and possibilities by which Jewish workers will attain by themselves the level of independent farmers” (Eliav 1977, 136). It was also decided, in a very general way, to establish a training farm that would be directed by experts and managed by a group of qualified farmers. This kind of farm, they believed, had a good chance of becoming profitable. It would also be a springboard for the independent settlement of agricultural workers, who would spend a few years there as hired hands, gaining experience and learning advanced agricultural methods, and then be given their own plot of land, to be paid for in instalments.

Ruppin’s nomination as the PO director became a turning point in his life and career. From this point on, he devoted all his energy to the planning and creation of the new Jewish Volk in the Land of Israel/Palestine and he spent most of his time promoting his plan, which had been confirmed in a general way by the REC. He saw this turning point as “the mark of destiny […] suddenly, without any effort, everyone gave me their unlimited trust, and I am perceived as a man who is suitable for every task” (Bein 1968, II, 42).

Within a short time he reached a new position that was the meeting point between the first generation of Zionism, and the new circle that developed in opposition to Herzl’s leadership and approach. Ruppin was now “the right man in the right place” as the

\textsuperscript{191} Ruppin’s salary was 12,000 Francs and Tahon’s 5,000 (Eliav 1977, 133).

\textsuperscript{192} Jewish National Fund, founded in 1901 at the Fifth Zionist Congress in Basel. Its purpose was to purchase and develop land in Palestine for Jewish settlement.
heading of the chapter on him in Israel’s *Open University* text book puts it. His knowledge and skills, as well as his cultural identity, reflected the new trend in the Zionist movement, soon to be known as “practical Zionism,” which demanded more action and fewer “groveling” diplomatic efforts and “futile” ideological phrases. The young Ruppin seemed to provide the necessary dynamic element that the previous leadership had lacked.

4.2.4 The Transformation from Political/Diplomatic Zionism to Practical Zionism

Ruppin’s appearance in the Zionist arena marked the beginning of a new direction and impetus towards a period described in the common Zionist narrative as the changeover from “diplomatic” to “practical” Zionism, and that was followed by the transfer of the Zionist centres and institutions of Europe to Palestine. However, this was not merely a technical or personal matter but marked a new recognition and distinct perception of overall culture planning. The idea of the Jewish state in the practical-Zionist version was described now as not only morally just but also as practically viable, and there was a new emphasis on the notion that Zionism had to be scientifically based on professional planning and economics. Zionism was not a romantic or Utopian illusion but a viable and practical culture plan. This group of practical-Zionists leaders and functionaries were oriented towards the use of science, especially the social sciences, and were knowledgeable and experienced in methods of colonization and colonialism (Penslar 1987, 1991; Berkowitz 2000). Their practical and professional attitudes were connected, too, to the Zionists’ goal of convincing other nations that they were the most advanced and modern Jewish group and thus the best candidates for representing all the Jews of the world.

The move from “diplomatic” to “practical” Zionism coincided with a change in the German Zionist leadership. The group of Herzl-Wolffsohn was replaced with a new group led by Warburg, who, as will be described later, had the motivation and knowledge for carrying out a large scale colonialist enterprise. After Herzl’s premature death in 1904, his “orphaned” circle and its leader
Wolffsohn (Herzl’s successor as the head of the movement), still conceived of the “Jewish problem” as a political question, to be solved only through the diplomatic negotiations and political arrangements that must precede any practical activity or individual enterprise for colonization. The rise of Warburg’s group, and consequently of Ruppin, was a result of the growing criticism directed at Wolffsohn’s leadership, together with the pressure on him to act – to do more and to talk less. “Wolffsohn was a good man and a good Jew, with common sense” Ruppin wrote in his diary, “but he lacked education and loved honor. He was able to sit for long hours and talk about petty things and, because all my life I was anxious for my time, he frequently led me to despair” (Bein 1968, II, 9). However, Wolffsohn did not see Ruppin’s diary, and Ruppin was able to gain his confidence, respect and even admiration. His ability to mediate between the contesting leaders Wolffsohn and Warburg, and gain their confidence and trust reflected Ruppin’s extraordinary diplomatic talent and skills. He seems to have operated smoothly, in the spirit of Woody Allen’s advice to a young director: “tell everyone they have great ideas, but always do what you think is right.” Although Ruppin had good connections, and appeared to agree with both of the rival leaders, Wolffsohn and Warburg, his weltanschauung concerning Zionism was very different from theirs and within a very short time he became more knowledgeable and powerful than either of the leaders who had nominated him.
4.3 The German Zionists and their Relation to Palestinian-Zionism

Since many detailed studies have been written (Eylony 1981; Gilman 1986; Ascheim 1986), on the conflicts and differences between West European and East European Jews since the beginning of the enlightenment, I will only refer here to how these conflicts and differences expressed themselves within Zionism.

4.3.1 West European and East European Zionists

In a letter to Herzl, the young Zionist activist Adolf Friedman described the internal situation in the Berlin Zionist Association in 1898:

“The relationship here is very complicated, first of all from the social aspect. In the beginning, the movement here was in the hands of young Russians, who indeed had great enthusiasm and the very best will, but totally lacked any understanding of our conditions. Most of them were socialists, had an unbridgeable lack of faith in the veteran, property-owning Jewish Germans […], they lacked manners (considered here of great importance) […]. [they] didn’t understand at all, that our belief in Zionism [mit unserem Bekenntnis zum Zionismus] brought us into a sharp conflict with our social circle, that we had to overcome the resistance of our families, and that we were also jeopardizing ourselves both socially and materially, while the other side [the East European Zionists] had nothing to lose, rather only to gain” (Eylony 1981, 122-123).

Friedman’s description was intended to legitimatize the actual separation that existed between the two Zionist groups: “we can step together but in our separate ways [German and East European Zionists] and strike as a united force” (ibid, 123).

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193 Gilman explored this relationship since its first beginnings in the enlightenment until the turn of the century and Ascheim described their tensions in later periods until the 1930s.
As the above illustrates, the differences between the East and West European Jews existed in the Zionist movement from its earliest stages, and many of the tensions and conflicts within the movement, e.g. between Herzl and Achad Ha’am or Ussishkin, can only be analyzed in this context. Indeed, the Uganda crisis marked an important peak in the relationship between the two groups, exposing as it did the deep cultural and political gap between them and making it imperative to re-evaluate and resolve their partnership one way or another.

As mentioned above, the first generation of West European Zionists saw Zionism as a solution devised in particular for the East European Jews. In his *Altmueland*, for example, Herzl refers to the Viennese Jews’ amused reaction to the idea of a Jewish state and their flippant offer to become its ambassadors in Vienna or Berlin. Like most Western Jews at the time, the German Zionists saw Zionism as a philanthropic organization for aiding the poor and persecuted Jews of Eastern Europe, and saw no conflict between their loyalty to Germany and their support of Zionism. Until 1914, no more than 30 German Zionists arrived in Palestine and between 1920-1933, their number was no more than 2,000 and most of these were, in all probability, East European Jews with German citizenship (Reinharz 1978, 107). The first generation of German Zionists did not consider immigration to Palestine an important part of their Zionist identity, and believed that Zionism was an enterprise designed exclusively for the backward East European Jews who had no opportunity of living among the western nations (Loquer 1970, 109). Only in the second generation of Kurt Blumenfeld (1884-1963) and Robert Weltsch (1891-1982), did the demand to visit to Palestine as a central part of the German Zionists’ identity begin to be heard and become an ideal or even a “must.” However, the German Zionists’ visits to Palestine were, in most cases, in the context of “national tourism” or a “national pilgrimage,” so that their knowledge of or contact with the actual situation in Palestine was generally superficial, sentimental, abstract or spiritual. The letters received by the ZVfD during the 1920s from compatriots in Palestine made it clear that the Zionists in Germany had no idea what Palestinian-Zionism actually achieved,

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194 The president of the ZVfD from 1924 until 1933.
195 A Zionist leader and the most influential editor of the *Jüdische Rundschau*.
196 Blumenfeld for example, traveled in Palestine mostly with Ruppin, who was for him – and for many others – a kind of private tourist guide.
despite the fact that many of them had visited the country and read the Zionist press (Stone 1997, 182).

As opposed to the East European Zionists, who resented the Russian and Polish authorities, the German Zionists felt a strong connection to the German culture and state. They saw themselves as belonging to the German bourgeois-liberal culture, and their loyalty to the Kaiser was almost total. This relationship is reflected in the fact that one of the first forests that the Zionists planted in Palestine, on lands of the JNF, was in honor of the German royal couple. Bodenheimer, the chairman of the JNF, announced the decision to the Kaiser’s Chief of Protocol: “to name the Grove of Kaiser Wilhelm The Grove of the Kaiserin Augusta Victoria in perpetual commemoration of the Silver Anniversary of their Majesties.”

Germany, wrote Franz Oppenheimer (1864-1943) is the “land of my aspirations, the land in which my forefathers are buried, the land of my struggle and love…and when I return home from a foreign country, I return home…to Germany” (in: Reinharz 1978, 98-99). Oppenheimer declared of himself that he was “fully assimilated” and “confessionally neutral” (konfessionell neutral) (Lowe 1965, 139). This attitude – with very few different nuances – was prevalent until the rise of Hitler, and even after. The Jüdische Rundschau declared in 1925 that: “the German Zionist who stays in Germany is bound to his fatherland in a thousand ways, not only thorough the formal duties of a citizen, but also through spiritual ties.”

Nevertheless, this deep relationship of belonging and commitment to German culture did not make the German Zionists indifferent to the national form of the new Zionist culture they aspired to establish. Their philanthropic position was always connected to a demand for the transformation or upgrading of East European Jewry’s cultural

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198 Oppenhiemer was a German sociologist and political economist. As a worldwide expert on colonization he became Herzl’s advisor and formulated the first program for Zionist colonization, which he presented at the 6th Zionist Congress (Basel/1903). Merchavia (the first cooperative settlement, 1910) was based from the outset on Oppenhiemer’s cooperative schemes.
identity. Nordau, who explained the Herzlian line even better than Herzl himself, formulated the different roles of western and eastern European Zionists:

“They [the Jews from the East] are a primitive crowd. We [German Zionists] are organizing them. They utter their complaints in a stammering language that is not comprehensible to a cultured man. We lend them the language of culture. […] They are obsessed with an enthusiasm that almost borders on madness. We moderate them” (Nordau 1948, 79).

Oppenheimer, who considered East European Jewish culture as inferior and “medieval,” (Pierson 1970, 140), formulated the model for the relationship between the West and East European Zionists in the following decisive way: “Zionism” he wrote in the Oestereichische Rundschau “is a process in which we [German Zionists] are the directors and the Jews from the East are the actors” (Oppenheimer, 1909, 6) [My italics. E.B.]. A year later, in 1910, in his article Stammesbewusstsein und Volksbewusstsein (ethnic consciousness and national consciousness) he elaborated his differentiation in the following way:

“We are, collectively, [either] Germans by culture [Kulturdeutsche] or French by culture and so on…because we have the fortune to belong to cultured communities [Kulturgemeinschaften] that stand in the forefront of nations…We cannot be Jewish by culture [Kulturjuden] because Jewish culture, as it has been preserved from the Middle Ages in the ghettos of East Europe, stands infinitely lower than the modern culture which our [Western] nations bear. We cannot regress nor do we want to. But it would be impossible for the Eastern Jews to be Russian or Rumanian…they must be Jews by culture…for mediaeval Jewish culture stands exactly as far above East European barbarism as it stands below the culture of Western Europe” (in: Poppel 1977, 58).

As we shall see later, Oppenheimer’s differentiations, which reflected the cultural position of most of the German Zionists of his circle, will be among the perceptions
that Ruppin will change, regarding both the relationship between German culture and the Jews and between the German and East European Zionists.

**4.3.2 German Zionists, Cultural Identity and Nationalism**

The belief in the existence of a “national character” has been present since the beginning of modern nationhood (Mosse 1993, 122). The anti-Semitic literature opposed to Jewish emancipation represented the Jew as lacking in respectability, truthfulness, and manly beauty (ibid, 123), the very opposite of the national ideals reflected in the stereotype of national character. The support of many German Jews for Zionism can be described as a reaction to the changes in the dominant repertoire of German culture at the turn of the century, i.e. as part of their efforts to legitimize their cultural identity, which was being gradually cast into doubt.

This imagined “national essence” was a product of almost 100 years of a generative linguistic and symbolic repertoire which included songs, pictures, myths, slogans and ceremonies, i.e., models of perception and practice. It seems that many German Zionists supported Zionism in order to acquire this magical “national essence,” and in that way to reduce their anxiety about their growing differentiation within the German culture. It is quite clear that many German Zionists believed that the aim of Zionist activity was to improve the image of the Jews in the world and make western Jews – who had no intention of leaving Europe – “proud” of their “working brothers” in Palestine (Oppenheimer 1924, 219); their Zionism, in fact, was meant to reinforce their German cultural identity. As Albanis notes, in the German social space at the turn of the century, there was immense pressure on Jews to identify themselves as such, a demand which brought them into confrontation with their dual identity. Such pressure did not always take the form of a requirement to assimilate but was, on the contrary, often directed particularly against assimilated Jews, precisely because their assimilation was regarded as subverting German culture. To be a “true German” was to identify yourself as a Jew if you were one. In fact it appears that public admission of one’s Jewish heritage diminished the danger of being accused of having a “disintegrating” effect on German culture (Albanis 2002, 31).
From the beginning of the century, this process of reshaping their German identity involved changing from negative to positive the image that Völkisch and race theories attached to the Jews. Their aim was to raise the symbolic status of the Jews by demonstrating the “vitality” of the Jewish nation and race. The success – or even the chance of future success – of the Zionist enterprise in Palestine served the German Zionists as proof that they were, or could be, a legitimate Volk.

The idea of the Jews as a nation or race strengthened German-Jewish identity, which had been undermined following the rise of nationalism and the weakening of the liberals, supporters of the emancipation. The moment the German identity defined itself according to the Völkisch interpretation of cultural identity, with categories such as [German] Geist, Volk, Seele, Blut and Rasse, Jews who wanted to feel “like Germans,” who longed to belong to the Germans, had to reinvent themselves as a different race or nation or as a different tribe (Stamm) which, while having a different tribe consciousness (Stammesbewusstsein), was nevertheless still connected to the rest of the German tribes. In this regard we can understand the attraction of German Jews to Zionism as unconscious obedience to the demands of the German repertoire – what Bourdieu terms anticipated censorship (Bourdieu 1993a, 77). The attraction to Zionism of Herzl, Nordau, Oppenheimer, Ruppin and Blumenfeld was paralleled by their rejection and mocking of those Jews who tried to conceal their “true identity,” stigmatized by Ruppin as “imitierte Germanen.”

Their Zionist cultural identity did not replace their German identity but reinforced it by reification of the model with which the dominant group defined itself – the model of national and racial identity. For Zionists like Oppenheimer and Warburg (president of the WZO), nationalism and racial thinking coexisted with Jewish national consciousness while their loyalty to the Kaiserreich almost always took precedence. As noted above, though the terminology of the German Zionists was different from that of most German Jews, it was still devoted to the synthesis between Deutchtum and Judentum until a very late period. This perception – as will be described in detailed later on – was different in its essence from that of Ruppin, who thought that there was an unbridgeable difference.

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200 In: (Doron 1977, 142). In the same way, Oppenheimer’s relation to Zionism was related to his strong denunciation of those Jews who tried to conceal their origin (Lowe 1965, 139).

201 Until the Balfour declaration (i.e., until Zionism was accepted to some extent by the West) all the organizations and elite groups in western states resented Zionism, and saw it as a utopian or even chauvinist idea which contradicted the universal (religious or liberal) ideas they believed in.
between the two Volks, and that the illusion of synthesis was futile, unhealthy and even dangerous.

4.3.3 German Zionists and the German-Jewish liberal tradition

the Central European Zionists referred again and again to men like Johann Gottlieb Fichte, instrumental in forming a German national consciousness, as an inspiration – and even the important weekly, Die Welt, founded by Theodore Herzl himself in order to publicize the ideals of the Zionist movement, compared Fichte’s ‘ethical nationalism’ to that of the prominent cultural Zionist, Achad Ha’am: a people must first gain a firm moral and ethical posture before it can aspire to become a nation.

G. Mosse

Most German Jews belonged to the middle class, with no poor and almost no peasants or workers. The integration of the Jews into the bourgeoisie was almost perfect, and even young Jewish socialists, who rejected ‘bourgeois capitalism,’ retained the core of this cultural emancipation. Their belief in the primacy of culture subordinated policies to lofty principles (Mosse 1985, 73). As Mosse showed in his extensive work on the German-Jewish cultural identity, the nationalists and Zionists (as well as the socialists and communists) never departed from three main models which, according to Mosse constituted their cultural identity: liberalism, bildung and respectability (or moral sense) (Sittlichkeit). Both bildung and respectability served to define the middle class as being above the lower classes and against the aristocracy. It is simple to understand this if we remember that the tolerant society of Germany and the Jews’ success were a result of the liberal repertoire, without which they would have still been on the fringes of culture. Jews were emancipated into bildung and Sittlichkeit, words that were much used by the German-Jewish press, in the sermons of rabbis, and also in German-Jewish literature, encouraging Jews to acquire these entrance tickets into German society (Mosse, 1991, 132-134). It is not surprising, therefore, that the vast majority of German-Jews remained faithful, until the 1930s, to the liberal parties that were becoming an ever more insignificant political force, for they owed this loyalty to the liberal thought and politics that had helped them attain full membership

(Mosse 1997, 160).
in the bourgeoisie. The expectation that the hopes placed in emancipation would be fulfilled was closely identified with belief in liberal ideals, and these in turn were an integral part of the German Jewish identity (Mosse 1991, 150). For assimilated German Jews, the trinity of liberalism, Bildung and respectability provided the common ground upon which all Germans could meet. They constituted the borders of the German-Jewish cultural repertoire and, in the words of Mosse, accompanied them “to the end, blinding them, as many other Germans, to the menace of National Socialism” (Mosse 1991, 144). Though the Centralverein deutscher Staatsbürger jüdischen Glaubens (the largest association of German Jews), waged a courageous fight against Völkisch nationalism, it seemed inconceivable that someone like Hitler, apparently without Bildung or proper comportment, could occupy Otto von Bismarck’s chair in the Reich’s chancellery (ibid).

The cultural repertoire of most German Jews emerged from liberal ideals and many early Zionists attempted to humanize their nationalism, regarding the nation as a stepping stone to a shared humanity. German Zionists such as Martin Buber, Robert Weltsch, or Georg Landauer saw in Jewish nationalism a necessary ingredient for the endless cultivation of the rationality of their own personalities: such nationalism was not a purpose in and of itself, but instead, a necessary step towards the union of all mankind (Mosse 1991, 149). German Jewish nationalists’ and indeed most Zionists’ commitment to Germany pointed back to a time when patriotism had been paired with a concern for all humanity, and where nationalism was seen as a step in the free development of the individual. Here, liberal thought attempted to humanize nationalism. Weltsch, for example, saw in nationalism a phase of personal development that would, in the end, benefit all mankind. In the same spirit, the Chief Rabbi of the Jewish reform congregation preached at a patriotic ceremony before the First World War that he who serves the fatherland serves all mankind, because this

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203 This was also the case in the mainstream religious trends. Leo Baeck – one of the German Jewish spiritual leaders – expressed in The Essence of Judaism (Das Wesen des Judentums) (1906), the exact opposite of Ruppin’s weltanschauung in his Die Gegenwart articles, and emphasized the autonomy of each individual; respect for his freedom, as over and against the state is designated here as a religious duty (Mosse 1991, 148). During the Weimar Republic, Baeck’s book The Essence of Judaism was given by the Jewish community of Berlin to every Jewish high school student who passed his Abitur (school leaving examination).
service will help develop his individual personality and thus enable him to benefit all communities (Mosse 1991, 153).

The young Hans Kohn, an important early theoretician of German Zionism, referred to their type of nationalism as the “nationalism of inwardness.” An inner spiritual reality would be created through membership of a real community based upon shared experience. Martin Buber and his Zionist friends considered this the true “Hebrew Humanism” (Mendes-Flohr 1991, 189). According to Mosse, Buber saw in the Volk only a “stepping stone toward a common humanity. Thus, despite his point of departure, Buber’s point of arrival was similar to that advocated in Lessing’s Nathan the Wise. For all his advocacy of a national mystique, Buber had absorbed much of the older Bildung and Enlightenment” (Mosse 1985, 36).

From Herzl to Buber, German Zionism considered the civic religion of nationalism not a call to battle but an educational process for the individual Jew who must recapture his dignity as a human being (Mosse 1991, 125). Oppenheimer denounced any extreme forms of Jewish nationalism as “the photographic negative of anti-Semitism” and a danger to the true aspirations of Zionism, which he interpreted as the wish to build up Palestine as a “Levantine Switzerland” (Lowe 1965, 139), and Blumenfeld was “the typical representative of what he named ‘post-assimilation Zionism,’ Zionism that did not stem directly from Jewish tradition but sought to return to Jewishness out of assimilation” (Goldman 1970, 95).

In spite of the Völkisch vocabulary that sometimes crept into their language, the German Zionists did attempt, as already mentioned, to humanize nationalism and it was this attempt to humanize nationalism and Zionism that is one of the most important legacies of German Jewry. It was supported also by East European figures such as Achad Ha’am and Aharon David Gordon who, in their turn, inspired Hans Kohn and Hugo Bergman, who used the title “The Human People” as the title of one of their books (Mosse 1985, 77).

204 The leader of the second generation of German Zionists, Kurt Blumenfeld, (born in 1884 in Insterburg, East Prussia) (Kaplan 2002, 30) maintained that the nationally conscious Jew should maintain a certain distance between himself and German culture, yet he himself appealed to the authorities of the German classical period to reinforce his Zionist conviction (Mosse 1985, 76).
The presentation of German Zionism in the common historiography as belonging politically to “center-left” or to “universal humanism” as Mosse and Lavsky write, (Lavsky 2006, 67-68) is not appropriate in the case of Ruppin, and reflects the difference between Ruppin and the mainstream German Zionists. As mentioned above, Ruppin had, already at a very early stage, taken a skeptical view of liberalism and humanism and this developed gradually, as will be described later, into a complete rejection of these world views. Thus, we must see Ruppin as one of the first to divert from the liberal German-Jewish tradition, and to subordinate considerations of liberal democratic justice and morality to the central goal of founding a sovereign and exclusively Jewish state in Palestine based on the perception of Judaism as a biological race. For him, old fashioned liberalism became more and more irrelevant in a world which he gradually perceived according to the monistic Darwinist weltanschauung.

The German Zionists operating in the field until the 1930s, such as Blumenfeld, Weltsch and Kohn, perceived Zionism in a very different way from Ruppin and most of the Palestinian Zionists. Nevertheless, they only clashed really significantly in the mid-thirties, on the subject of the “Arab question,” as will be discussed later. The fact that Ruppin and other Palestinian Zionists managed to keep on good terms with the German Zionists and avoid the deep abyss separating their different perceptions of Zionism, was, in general, due to the German Zionists’ need for Zionist identity in order to secure their position in Germany, and Palestinian-Zionism’s need for the political and economic support of the German Zionists. It would seem that their version of Zionism humanized the public image of the movement in Germany and made the British authorities believe that the Zionists were tolerant and had peaceful intentions. German Zionism, in Blumenfeld’s period, helped to represent Zionism as a humanistic movement, a philanthropic enterprise symbolizing liberalism and democracy and a disseminator of western culture. Nachum Goldman’s note concerning the role of Blumenfeld is typical of most German Zionists “he [Blumenfeld] managed to give Zionism a basis of common humanity, link it with every great cultural movement of our time and give it a tremendous openness to the world” (Goldman 1970, 95). Nevertheless, this public relations function was
combined with an important economic one. Goldman describes in his autobiography the crucial importance of Blumenfeld, who was responsible for bringing into the movement both Oskar Wassermann, one of Germany’s leading bankers and Albert Einstein, whose symbolic role was extremely important for Zionism’s public image. Blumenfeld was also a close friend of Paul Warburg, an economist and important figure in the American Jewish community (Bein 1968, II, 138), who had played an important role in the 1920s understanding between the Zionists and non-Zionists in America, which led to an immense expansion of the economic cooperation between Palestinian-Zionism and the non-Zionist Jews of America.

### 4.3.4 The Model of Transformative Philanthropy

According to Marion Kaplan, the charitable activities and institutions of the German Jews were a function of their acceptance of the mitzvah of zdaka (precept of charity) “they acknowledged responsibility – religious and social – for a far-reaching community of Jews” (Kaplan 2002, 13). For some individuals, Jewish associations fulfilled a religious precept, for others associational life provided them with the community they no longer sought from the synagogue alone. Such activity became their principal mode of Jewish identification. According to Kaplan, this behavior was similar to the Christians who manifested their (non church-going) allegiance to Christianity by participating in a wide range of charitable organizations. It was also a way of retaining interest in Jewish matters and gaining the “joy of belonging through feelings of solidarity” (ibid).

As mentioned, to a large extent it was these particular feelings and patterns of belonging that shaped the way the Zionist agents formulated their approach to German-Jewry. By 1913, it was admitted in the Zionist Jewish Chronicle that even “the so-called ‘assimilates’ could subscribe to present-day Zionism. They could find it quite in accordance with their principles to help build schools and universities in Palestine.”

Thus the German Jews in general were connected to Zionism not through its ideology but because it presented itself as a kind of a philanthropic

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205 *Jewish Chronicle*, [Sep. 12, 1913], 29. in: (Berkowitz 1993, 186).
enterprise for the aid of the East European Jews, and integrated itself into the zdaka network of German Jewish culture and tradition.

This recognition, which evolved in the Zionist bureaucratic field shortly after Ruppin’s appearance, was an attempt to use East European Jewry as a way to help Western Jews solve their identity crisis in the era of nationalism, and to stimulate the feelings of fellowship and solidarity that Jewish religious culture alone no longer provided. Philanthropy as a means of assuring one’s identity was used by the Zionists in a very sophisticated and organized manner. Thus, following Berkowitz’s study of Western Zionism, the JNF image was built on Jewish tradition, and on the mitzvah of zdaka. Buying trees for planting in the Land of Israel, for example, made a tremendous impression on Western Jewry and was used by the Zionists to acquire money for Zionism by indirect means, that played on Kaplan’s “joy of belonging through feelings of solidarity.” For western Jews, Zionist culture was a reservoir of secular faith and confidence in Jewish free will, which they could call upon when their material conditions and the attitude of non-Jews towards the Judefrage changed beyond recognition (Berkowitz, 1993, 187, 190).

As already mentioned, the Jewish cultural network of philanthropic institutions is as old as Judaism. Nevertheless, the model of German-Jewish philanthropy that we are considering here is connected to that of the Enlightenment and consequently to that of the Jewish-Enlightenment which followed it. Indeed, one cannot conceive of modern Jewish philanthropy outside the history of European philanthropy. As Penslar wrote:

“There was a dramatic shift in attitudes towards poverty and the poor in Europe at the beginning in the sixteenth century. Due to both a real increase in the number of poor and the rise of a more activist way of thinking about poverty and its treatment, municipalities throughout Western Europe attempted, from the middle of the 1500s, to centralize and rationalize the distribution of alms” (Penslar 1998, 199).
At the end of the secular nineteenth century, the act of philanthropy seemed, for many, the only way of gaining an identity. Louis Maretzki (1887-1897), the president of the German B’nai B’rith organization, believed that only social work, salutary both for the empathy its practice instilled into the agent and for its healing effects on the social body, could revive the Jewish spirit (ibid., 208); in this regard German Zionists were no different from Maretzki, as most of them were connected with philanthropic organizations.206

I will not elaborate here on the shift from zdaka (derived from zedek = Justice) to philanthropy,207 however, one of the most important implications of this transformation was concerned with the very essence of the act of giving (Heb. netina). From the earliest stages of social contact between Jewish groups in the modern period, Jewish philanthropy followed the principle of what I call transformative philanthropy, which differed in many significant ways from the traditional model of zdaka. While traditionally zdaka was given unconditionally, (as our sages emphasized many times) transformative philanthropy conditioned or stipulated its support on a cultural identity change (or at least attempt at change) on the part of the recipient of the charity.

Transformative philanthropy comes about also as a result of the established community’s need to control its “outsiders” – the poor immigrant Jews who belonged to a different economic class and often to a different ethnic group. In the case of the German Jews, it was the mass immigration of Ostjuden who threatened to endanger the intricate and unstable relations of the German Jews with their non-Jewish neighbors. This fear started with the first waves of so-called Betteljuden (beggar Jews), who began to arrive, from the beginning of the 18th century, in Vienna and Berlin.208 This wave of vagrants raised fears lest they commit crimes against gentiles and thereby bring the wrath of the authorities down upon the entire Jewish community.

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206 On the connection of Bodenheimer, Oppenheimer and Warburg to the German Jewish philanthropic organization APA, see: (Penslar 2001, 211).
207 On that topic see: (Penslar 1998).
208 The Betteljuden were a product of many social forces that emerged during the chaos and violence of the Thirty Years War in central Europe and, later, after the Chmielnitski massacres and the Russo-Polish-Cossack wars that ravaged the Jewish communities of the Ukraine.
(Penslar 1998, 200; Kaplan 2000). Fear of this kind was the main reason for the evolvement of the model of *transformative philanthropy* in modern Jewish history.

An early and small scale case of transformative philanthropy was described by Yosef Kaplan in his research into the Sephardic community of 17th century Amsterdam. The aim of the established Jewish-Sephardic community of Amsterdam with regard to the poor Polish and German Jewish immigrants was to educate them and they conditioned financial support on their cultural progress. They not only taught them to work and be productive but also led them to *bom judeismo*. The premise was that the Polish and German Jews had been corrupted by the persecution and tribulations they suffered. Kaplan points out that the Jews of Amsterdam were not concerned in this way about their own Spanish and Portuguese poor, whom they considered to be immune to moral corruption by virtue of their belonging to the *Nação* (Kaplan 2000, 102).

Modern Jewish philanthropy, as demonstrated above, functioned, to a greater or lesser extent, according to the model of transformative philanthropy. The westernized groups supported those Jews who wanted or agreed to change their ways, and join in the process of modernization and westernization. It must be stressed that the German Jews and, in particular, the German Zionists, operated to a large extent according to this model of transformative philanthropy. Actually, as will be demonstrated in the following, the German Jews’ support of Zionism in its early phases can be seen as a large scale enterprise of transformative philanthropy. For many of them, Zionism (of one kind or another) came to be the final answer to the *Judefrage*, and this model of perception began, around 1906-1907, to take on a practical form which, as discussed above, laid the stress on science and social engineering. The leading German Zionists saw themselves as philanthropists not only in terms of finance, but also in terms of *informational* and *statist* capital, i.e., they wanted also to shape the Zionist repertoire and habitus.
4.4 German Zionists and Colonialism

As described above, the German Zionists stressed their German-ness and their loyalty to Germany, although the Germany of their imagination was a liberal vehicle for their emancipation and acculturation into the western-modern humanist culture. Nevertheless, at that time, this cultural position was not necessarily divorced from engaging in colonialism.

4.4.1 Otto Warburg as a German Patriot Zionist and Colonialist

The German Zionist cultural identity, which later generations saw as ambivalent and contradictory, was conceived by the first generation of Zionists as a coherent cultural position. For them, being a Zionist and being a German were not contradictory; on the contrary, they felt that Zionism itself could reinforce their identity as Germans. The most typical example of this kind of weltanschauung and cultural position was Otto Warburg, (1859-1938) the third president of the WZO, who tried to combine two aims in his Zionist work: transformative philanthropy on behalf of the East European Jews and patriotic activities for the German republic. Warburg’s role in the rise of Ruppin was crucial, for it was he who nominated Ruppin and supported him wholeheartedly.

Warburg’s patriotism, as well as that of many other German Zionists, was related to and expressed through colonialism; he perceived Zionism as an opportunity to serve German economic interests in the Middle East, as well as to reaffirm his loyalty to the German nation. The attraction of German Zionists to German colonialism lay in the fact that colonialism provided them with a perfect opportunity to exhibit their questioned loyalty. Daniel Boyarin wrote that the group of Zionists who imagined themselves colonialists inclined to that persona “because such a representation was pivotal to the entire project of becoming ‘white men’” (Boyarin 1997, 302). Colonization was seen as a sign of belonging to western and modern culture; Treitschke’s disciples, like the historian Dietrich Schäfer (1845-1929), saw colonization as the highest goal of the German Volk.209

209 On Dietrich Schäfer see: (Deutscher 1918).
Otto Warburg was the son of one of the richest and most respected families of merchants and bankers in Hamburg. The capital he inherited from his father together with his wife was estimated as two million marks. It is doubtful whether there was anyone else in the Zionist movement who could rival his fortune (Eliav 1977, 57). As already mentioned with regard to Ruppin’s cultural identity (and that of other leading figures in German Zionism), Warburg had had no Jewish education in his childhood and had also experienced anti-Semitic rejection. Penslar wrote that Warburg’s “injured pride at not having received a professorship at the University of Berlin” was one of the main reasons for his decision to turn to activity in Jewish colonization (Penslar 1990, 148).

Warburg’s first contact with Zionism was thorough his wife, Hanna Cohen, who was the daughter of the Hamburg merchant Gustav Gabriel Cohen (1830-1906), one of the Love of Zion (Hibbat Tziyon) activists in Germany, who had a personal connection with Herzl. As early as 1891 Cohen had written a book entitled: Die Judenfrage und die Zukunft (the Jewish question and the future), which was published in Hamburg for private circulation. Cohen, who spent many years first in South Africa and then in England, had reached the conclusion that anti-Semitism was there to stay and that the only solution would be through the establishment of a Jewish state in Ottoman Palestine. Warburg was one of the few German Jews to receive a copy of the book, which he discussed with Cohen and that later opened the way for his first meeting, in 1898, with Herzl. Herzl was interested at that time in holding professional and scientific consultations concerning his plans to establish Jewish colonies (Tahon 1948, 14). He turned to Warburg in 1898 because, apart from being wealthy and well connected, Professor Warburg was also a professional botanist with great experience in the service of German colonialism (ibid., 17); his prominence in German academic circles could have great importance for the scientific appeal Herzl aspired to attach to the image of Zionism.

Warburg’s academic career began in 1883 when he became a doctor of botany at Strasburg University. After a few years of studying plants in tropical countries and traveling to the Far East, he succeeded in producing work that paved the way for his becoming a professor of botany at Berlin University, and he became one of the
outstanding botanists of his time and an expert in the flora of tropical regions. At the same time, he became involved in both teaching, at the Oriental Seminar of Berlin University, and in founding the Institute for Kolonialwirtschaft, which brought him into direct contact with Germany’s colonial ambitions (Warburg 2005, 2). The academic milieu of that period was interconnected with the political forces that encouraged German colonization in Africa, Asia and in the Pacific Ocean, and, in 1896, Warburg became one of the founders of the German Committee for Colonial Economy (Das Deutsche Kolonialwirtschaftscommission) (DDK) which functioned as a private body giving economic advice to the German foreign office, which was responsible for the German colonies (Tahon 1948, 16; Henderson 1962, 39; Smith 1978, 128-129). The DDK became, after a short time, part of the German Colonial Society, the central body of German colonialism that functioned as its technical arm (Smith 1978, 40). In 1901 Warburg was co-opted to the Prussian Colonization Committee. He also headed dozens of German companies for plantation and settlement in the areas of German colonial expansion around the world, in which he took charge of soil amelioration, crop selection and mobilization of hired labor. Herzl wanted to use Warburg’s experience and connections in the Zionist movement and to introduce colonialist models of technocracy into Zionism. Warburg agreed, though stating from the very start that he would agree to become actively involved only in “practical” issues concerning Zionism and not in its ideological-philosophical deliberations.

Similarly to Ruppin in his Zionist activities, Warburg’s work in the field of German colonialism was also always connected with his academic research. In Warburg’s case, this was mainly through his work as the editor of the periodical Der Troppenpflanzer (The Tropical Planter), devoted to colonial agriculture in tropical areas, which he founded in 1897 and edited for twenty five years (Tahon 1948, 16). In the years 1899 and 1900 Warburg advised Herzl on plants and the agricultural potential of Palestine region by region, information that helped Herzl to complete his book Altneuland. In 1900 Warburg made a trip to Anatolia, the Levant, and Palestine. His viewpoint at that time is clear from the initiatives he took after the trip, supporting (and financing from his own pocket) Jewish settlement attempts in Anatolia and
Contrary to Ruppin’s perception of the necessary connection between the *Volk* and its original soil, Warburg did not see Palestine as the only option for settling the Jews – it is true that he opposed the El-Arish and Uganda plans, but this was based mainly on technical grounds (Penslar 1987, 80-81). He tried to check other options for Jewish agricultural colonization also in Mesopotamia, which he saw as a “perfect territory” for that kind of settlement (ibid, 91).

During the 1890s, Warburg was deeply involved with German colonial activities and it is impossible to understand his conception of Zionism outside this context. His involvement in German colonialism preceded, and actually paved the way for, his work in the Zionist movement and he continued to work on German colonial projects at the same time as he fulfilled his central roles in the WZO. In 1905, the *German-Asiatic Society*, of which Warburg was a member, decided to explore the possibility of extending the German market to the Near East. The prerequisite for this expansion, they declared, was the development of a modern transport network and the settlement of non-Muslim inhabitants in the Near Eastern countries. Warburg was enthusiastically in favor of this program, since it provided a way of fulfilling his fantasy of a transformative philanthropic solution to the *Judefrage*, combined with a significant contribution to the German economy and colonialism. This twofold ambition underlies Warburg’s colonization plans for developing transportation in Palestine, particularly its ports and railroads. In the spirit of *Altneuland* – which he inspired to a large extent – he had visions of Palestine as a central intercontinental transportation crossroad. The main plan he promoted was creating a “railway company” which would receive a concession and sectors of state land from the Turkish state through a long-term lease of at least 99 years. The company would settle Jews in colonies in wide areas on both sides of the railway line. Warburg wrote and distributed a pamphlet in which he suggested to the eastern European Jews that they settle along the Baghdad railroad, which would soon extend from the Anatolia Mountains as far as the Persian Gulf. The Baghdad railroad company, he wrote, would give the Jews free land, a Jewish charity association would help them build

210 An idea he received from another German Zionist: David Trietsch (1870-1935); an adherent of the German *Garden City* movement, as well as a self-taught expert on colonialism (Penslar 1990, 151).

211 Flier published by the *German-Asiatic Society*, [year only] (1905), CZA, A12/90. According to Ovendale, Germany secured the concession for building the Berlin-Istanbul-Baghdad Railway already in 1903 (Ovendale 1992, 7).
their homes and the settlers would raise cotton for the German market (Penslar 1987, 93).

It must be emphasized that Warburg’s ambitions reflected an idea which had already surfaced in Herzl’s time, and that was central to the conception of early Zionist culture planning. To mention one example, in 1898 Max Bodenheimer (director of the JNF), had no hesitation when he worded the intentions and form of the first Zionist bank, calling it *The Jewish Colonial Trust*:

“The bank should be undertaken along the lines of the German colonial societies, which work towards the expansion of German colonial societies, which work toward the expansion of German colonial territories, in which they obtain concessions, privileges, title and sovereignty over overseas lands, lay in plantations and build railroads…the Anatolian Railroad, which was promoted by the Deutsche Bank, may be referred to as an example.”[^212]

Although Warburg received no support for his plan, either from the WZO or from the non-Zionists investors, he continued to promote it until 1920 (his last year as the president of the WZO). Warburg’s plans in their original form, and especially his hope of creating a flow of capital to the new colonies in Palestine, had no success (Penslar 1990, 154). World War I seems to mark the beginning of his waning authority. Following the war, the center of Zionist activities shifted to London where the new president of the movement, Chaim Weizmann (1874-1952), lived. For Warburg this was a difficult time; his scientific and colonialist work had been interrupted by the war and, with the end of German colonialism, his many interests in this sphere also came to an end. His journal, *Der Tropenpflanzer*, folded after 24 years of publication, he lost many of his companies in Germany’s African colonies, which ceased to exist, and he also lost most of his fortune in the post-World War inflation. He seems to have been on the wrong side, so to speak; if Germany had won the war Warburg could have played the same role as Weizmann in Zionist foreign politics.

[^212]: Stenographisches Protokoll der Verhandlungen des zweiten Zionisten-Kongresses (Vienna 1900), 140-141; in: (Penslar 1990, 14).
At the beginning of the 1920s, Warburg was involved in the establishment of the Hebrew University. In 1922 he was called upon to found its Agricultural Experimental Station in Tel Aviv and in 1925 its department of botany. Warburg’s active involvement in the Hebrew University enabled him to renew his scientific work in his sphere of specialization and to pursue his active participation in practical Zionism, at one and the same time. According to Gabriel Warburg (his grandchild), had Warburg’s wife Anna been in better health, he would probably have come to live in Palestine on a permanent basis, a wish he stated on more than one occasion. In 1936, he left for Berlin where he died in 1938. He was buried, with his wife Anna and his daughter Gertrud, in Degania, the burial place also of Ruppin (Warburg 2005, 9).

4.4.1.1 The Interaction between Ruppin and Warburg

It seems that, in the first stage of their encounter, Warburg was the ideal director for Ruppin in the same way as Ruppin was, for Warburg, the ideal field worker and executive. Later on, the balance of power changed dramatically, a change whose seeds were discernible even in the first years of Ruppin’s work in Palestine. Warburg, the professional colonialist and man of practical vision and Ruppin, the young social Darwinist and Weichensteller who was anxious to implement his theory, were perfectly matched to initiate and implement a culture plan.

As a scientist and colonization expert, Warburg realized that a careful plan had to be prepared and carried out based on detailed agricultural information, and that farms had to be found for tests and experimentation and for the acclimatization of the plants and population. His involvement as entrepreneur, investor, researcher and technical advisor was useful for the German and Zionist plans that stressed research and scientific development. The technical and scientific teams in the German colonies were considered by the experts as technically excellent and were “the envy of foreign colonial services” (Smith 1978, 135), as were the experimental stations they established. Warburg frequently wrote about these stations, praising those European governments that supported them, and he called on governments or private institutions to construct microbiological institutes for disease control, and training farms (Penslar 1990, 148). The fact that Warburg thought about training farms as far back as 1899
will prove important in the following chapter, which will try to clarify Ruppin’s implementation of this idea ten years later in the modern-Hebrew social field.\textsuperscript{213}

Warburg, like Ruppin, understood the necessity of investing in experiments and taking chances during the planning process, an attitude that was not accepted by Wolffsohn or Yakubus Kahn (1872-1944),\textsuperscript{214} both of whom promoted a conservative line and operated according to Herzl’s idea of “well ordered” colonization with a vision of gradual, stable and safe economic development. Indeed, in Herzl’s Der Judenstaat, the Jewish company that would carry out the colonization process was a conservative Erwebswesen business enterprise (Penslar 2001, 242). Warburg’s technocratic approach and his millionaire-dreamer personality were the entire opposite of the cautious commercialists of Herzl’s circle, and he believed that, whenever possible, private capital should be encouraged to purchase and settle the land. For Warburg, the nationalization of the land was only a secondary aim and could be justified only when it benefitted the general public or in places where private capital refused to take the risk. He inspired and was inspired by Ruppin’s approach at the time:

“\textit{We don’t have time for JNF box politics. Our work is urgent. [...] we must inherit the land as soon as possible. [...] what we can do now with a hundred thousand [money, E.B.] we will not be able to do later with millions. [...] It must also be the matter of each individual. We are at a great beginning and we must pave the way for those who will come after us}” ([Ruppin] Bein 1968, II, 219).

The conflict between Herzl’s circle and the new approach posed by Warburg-Ruppin, created constant tension and many struggles, which led both Warburg and Ruppin to threaten constantly to resign and even to do so, for short periods (Eliav, 1977, 59).

The core of their contention revolved mostly around the control of the National Bank (later: Anglo- Palestine Bank, now: Bank Leumi) whose directors regarded Warburg and other practical Zionists as “money wasters” who should not be entrusted with the

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item[213] Warburg expressed the training farm idea also in 1902 and in 1904 the Expanded Executive Committee proposed the establishment of a training farm for the sons of Jewish colonists. See: (Penslar 1990, 148, 152).
\item[214] A successful banker from a leading family from Frankfurt since the 17th century (Eliav 1977, 58).
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
management of finances. Although Warburg was the head of the movement, the bank remained a stronghold of Wolffsohn and the Köln Executive, which continued to criticize Warburg throughout his presidency. In the first stages of the PO, Warburg even had to pay the salaries of Ruppin and Tahon out of his own pocket because the Zionist executive in Vienna continued to refuse his requests for funds. Nevertheless, as will be described later, these tensions were always resolved, especially as the political power of practical and Palestinian-Zionism increased.

Warburg was one of the most popular figures in the movement, and was respected by all because of his knowledge, contacts and wealth. He was the last to join the founding circle of the JNF but his influence on its functioning was decisive. Since, of the group of founders, it was he who had the most complete professional background in the field of colonization, the Fifth Zionist Congress chose him, in 1903, to chair the Palestine Commission, whose main task was to guide the WZO’s settlement project and administer the holdings of the JNF until it had an official board. Warburg was elected to the REC in 1905 and in 1907 he became a member of the JNF directorate. In 1911, he was elected president of the Zionist Organization in place of Wolffsohn – a position he held until 1920.215

As the leader of “practical Zionism,” which was supported by most of the East European Zionists, it was only natural for Warburg to lead the movement in its new “practical” phase. Since his first days in the movement, he promoted the so called “work of the present” (Gegenwartsarbeit), which would lead eventually, in 1903, to organized and centralized colonization in Palestine and to the appointment of Ruppin as head of the PO. Although Warburg was willing to accept Ruppin’s plans, it must be noted that his economic weltanschauung in general was purely capitalistic and colonialist.216 His interest in Palestine as an economic field had already begun in 1901 when, together David Traitsch, and Alfred Nosig (1870-1935), he established The Committee for the Economic Exploration of Palestine. A year later Traitsch and Nosig established a periodical by the name Palästina which, two years later, changed its name to Altneuland. Warburg, like many other Zionists such as Zelig Soskin (1872-

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216 See e.g., his connections with Aaron Aaronshon (1876-1919) and The Palestine Trading Company, which they established together in 1904. Warburg to Levontine, [15 Jan. 1904], CZA, Z1/553.
and Nosig, published many articles in *Palästina* and *Altneuland*, dedicated to researching Jewish settlement in Palestine and comparing it to other colonial enterprises. Nosig wrote there, for example, that:

“Germany is a land from which we can learn much. If the Germans spread out so energetically today […] [and] their commercial and industrial undertakings meet with success in all lands and climes, so do the Germans owe this to the fact that they sent out their economists, their professors as pioneers. As in war, so too in the economic struggle, the Germans win because of their teachers.”

In 1903, Warburg and Soskin received formal permission and funding from the WZO to begin planning the colonization of Palestine. Soskin (in the name of the German delegation as a whole) submitted a resolution stating that the Zionist organization would establish a commission to explore Palestine and neighbouring lands, and set up stations for agricultural experimentation, disease research, and real estate information. Soskin wrote in his proposal: “We need only refer to how the Aryan people colonize. I refer to the Germans in the African colonies, etc.” The resolution passed, along with a budget request for 15,000 francs per year. Warburg, Soskin and Franz Oppenheimer were nominated to serve on the commission, known officially as the *Commission for the Exploration of Palestine* (CEP). As the commission set up shop, using Warburg’s Berlin home as its office, it soon became clear that Oppenheimer’s role in its activities was limited to the promotion of his cooperative scheme (which will be discussed later). The day-to-day work of the commission and virtually all of its projects were directed by Warburg and Soskin, while Oppenheimer signed letters and approved projects when called upon to do so (Penslar 1987, 290).

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217 Soskin was a Doctor of Agronomy (from Berlin University) and, during the second part of the 1890s, he visited Africa and South America and studied the colonial practices of the great powers. Like Warburg he was involved in German colonial activities both as an expert and as a partner.

218 (Palaestina, I, 1902, 107). Those teachers, as Penslar points out, were not scientist but technocrats, and Nosig called them: *Agrarpolitiker* (Penslar 1990, 151).


220 Ibid., 271-2, 328.
As already mentioned, this group of investors and colonialists (at that time the name had mainly “respectable” connotations) operated in a professional manner, trying to improve the economic conditions of the Yishuv in Palestine and of the East European Jewish immigrants. Most, if not all, of them, believed that the institutions of the Zionist movement existed in order to develop Palestine through private capital (Katz 1984, 361-363; Penslar 1987, 290). They had no elaborate ideology concerning the social and political structure other than the general Herzlian scheme and vague visions.

It must be noted that, while Warburg was of great importance in his support of Ruppin and his culture planning activities, he was always detached from the concrete social field of Palestine. His grand plan for a “railway company” for example, which took no account of cultural and national factors, seemed quite fantastic to many of his fellow Zionists, and gave him the reputation of a “a man of fantasies” (Heb: ish dimyonot), whose plans must be re-examined “with seven eyes” (Eliav 1977, 58). He seems to have perceived of Jewish settlement in the same vague way as Herzl. When he was asked, for example, about the growing secularization of the “new Yishuv” and its explicitly anti-religious ways, citing the Hebrew Gymnasia as a case in point, he declared impassively that the Zionist organization “will not do a thing that might offend the religious emotions of the Jews of the Land of Israel” (Eliav 1977, 203). As far as I could ascertain, Warburg seems to have been completely unaware of the Hebrew Gymnasia’s national-secular educational program as well as of other complexities of the Modern Hebrew social field. The statement quoted above, like many other comments of his, reflects his total ignorance of conditions in Palestine, a position that he always seemed to prefer.

**4.4.2 Franz Oppenheimer and the transfer of the Die Siedlungsgenossenschaft (the cooperative settlement)**

The pattern of transferring models of perception and practice from German culture to the emerging Modern Hebrew culture and social field, already described with reference to Ruppin, Warburg and others, is reflected, as well, in the history of Franz Oppenheimer’s (1864-1943) several positions within the German and Zionist cultures.
Oppenheimer developed his economic and social ideas out of his desire to suggest practical solutions to universal social problems and, in particular, German ones, as is apparent from the title of his first book *Freiland in Deutschland*, published in 1895, which contained the core of his later doctrine: to conquer capitalist exploitation and instability through cooperative settlement. A year later he wrote another book – *Die Siedlungsgenossenschaft* (the cooperative settlement) – subtitled “an attempt to reject Communism in a positive way through a solution to the cooperative and agrarian question” (Almog 1996, 445). He seems to have arrived at the combining of his socio-economic ideas with Zionism in 1901 (more or less the same year that Ruppin became a Zionist) when he published an article, *Jewish settlement in the Service of the Eastern Jews* (Preuss 1954, 60). At the end of that year and during 1902, Oppenheimer published a series of articles in *Die Welt* entitled *Jewish Settlements*, in which he developed his vision for a cooperative agricultural settlement which he compared to the cooperative experiment at Rahaline in Ireland.\(^\text{221}\)

Oppenheimer’s system was based on three principles:

1. Self-help (as opposed to the *chaluka* model of [unconditional] philanthropy)
2. Agriculture on an economic basis
3. Cooperative villages.

Oppenheimer’s ideas had great success when they were presented at the 6\(^{th}\) Zionist congress (Basel, 1903), and they were finally unanimously accepted at the 9\(^{th}\) Zionist congress (Hamburg, 1909) (Paz·Yeshayahu 1991, 237). Much like Warburg, Oppenheimer was involved in German colonial projects at the same time as he was involved in the colonial projects in Palestine. In 1906, he established a cooperative settlement in Wenigenlupnitz, near Eisenach in Saxony, in which Warburg and even Wolffsohn were investors (Penslar 1987, 294).\(^\text{222}\)

\(^{221}\) Ibid. Herzl used this comparison in *Altneuland*. See: *Altneuland*, electronic version: [www.zionism-israel.com/an/altneuland77.html].

\(^{222}\) It is important to note that some of the staff members who worked in Oppenheimer’s project in Wenigenlupnitz later took an important part in the colonization efforts in Palestine, e.g., Yaakov and Sara Tahon (1881-1920) who later became important agents of the PO. Sara Tahon worked in Palestine as an organizer of the women’s work force. One of her main projects was to establish workshops for embroidery, a skill which she had learned from the German farmers in Wenigenlupnitz (Tahon 2003, 19, 29).
Oppenheimer’s ideas had an important influence on the first generation of the Zionist movement (especially upon Herzl), but, as will appear later, the structure of the typical settlements of the New Yishuv, such as the kvutza (collective group) and the Kibbutz, as well as their social and economical development, emerged directly from the interaction between Ruppin and the young immigrants of the Second Aliyah, while Oppenheimer’s approach and methods, i.e., his models, were rejected.
4.4.3 Ruppin and German Colonialism

As already described, the attitude of Warburg and Oppenheimer, like that of many other German Zionists at the time, was shaped essentially by the conflicting demands of the German and Modern Hebrew cultural fields, which they tried to resolve by creating a common denominator between them. For them, Zionist activity did not mean leaving German culture but was rather a means for serving it and for creating, through it, a legitimatization for their cultural identity as German Jews. One can argue that for a certain period Ruppin shared their aspiration to serve German colonialism, and it took him quite a while to resolve this dilemma. World War I was a clear turning point. Until the defeat of the Germans in the war, Ruppin, like Herzl, Nosig, Oppenheimer and Warburg, had believed Germany to be Zionism’s most natural patron. The defeat of Germany in the war and the British occupation of Palestine in 1917 changed the position of the Zionist movement and Ruppin, as always, was quick to recognize the fact.

Zionism’s political move from Germany to Great Britain can be seen reflected in the publication history of Ruppin’s book *Syrian als Wirtschaftsgebiet* (Syria as an economic field) – that he began writing at the beginning of the war and published in 1917. This work expressed Ruppin’s aspiration to serve German colonialist interests in the Middle-East, and to use it, as well, as a pretext for future cooperation. In his diary, he writes with satisfaction about the compliments the book received from Colonel Friedrich Freiherr Kress von Kressenstein (1870-1948), head of the German forces in Palestine, who wrote of it that it was “the first book to present Syria as an economic field.” Shortly after this, as a result of the war, there arose an urgent need for the book to be translated into English. Because of this urgency, the English version was shortened and published under a more concrete title: *Syria: an Economic Survey* (1918). It was well received by the British colonialists and also given good reviews in the professional literature as the first study on the economic potential of Syria. Finally, the military heads of the Allies in Egypt considered the book of such vital importance that they had copies made of the single volume they obtained

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223 Until after World War I, the term “Syria” encompassed all of Palestine, which was commonly referred to as “southern Syria.”
This event marks the end of Ruppin’s close contact and cooperation with the German Embassy in Istanbul, a connection which is far beyond the scope of this research. Nevertheless it must be clear that his relationship with the German administration, especially with Colonel Kress von Kressenstein, was often of help to him in moderating the hostility of the Ottoman authorities and of Jamal Pasha (Bein 1968, II, 231-259). It was only the fact that he held German citizenship and that his secretary Tahon was Austrian (both countries allies of Turkey), that prevented Jamal Pasha from closing down the PO and arresting or exiling them both (Malkin 2006, 95-96). However, Ruppin’s connections with the German embassy in Istanbul were not based on his rights as a German citizen. Their support was much more comprehensive, probably because they saw the Zionists as partners. The German embassy in Istanbul provided Ruppin with valuable information and even let him use the embassy’s secret code (Bein 1968, II, 272). Jamal Pasha seems to have been afraid to deal with Ruppin because of his good connections with the German ambassador whose trust and support he gained to the point where the German embassy enabled him, during World War I, to send money and supplies to his three brothers in the German army, and even to bring one of them back from the front and then return him to his regiment after a few weeks furlough with 10,000 cigarettes (which were extremely expensive during the war) (Bein 1968, II, 278).

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224 A detailed description of Ruppin’s relationship with the German Embassy in Istanbul and the way he used them to avoid Jamal Pasha’s demands can be found in: (Palestine during the war 1921).

225 (Palestine during the war, 1921, 26).
4.5 Germany and Pre-World War I Palestinian-Zionism

The historical material presented in part above demonstrates clearly that the relationship of the Zionist movement with Germany and its colonial agents was more significant than is frequently posited in the common Zionist narrative and memory. This relationship was important not only in terms of the history of the Zionist cultural identity in Palestine, but also for the political and economic development of the Jewish settlements, for in the first stages, as Friedman notes:

“Had it not been for their [the German Zionists’] skilful diplomacy and persistent efforts in rallying the support of the American, but primarily of the German, government, the Yishuv would not have survived the war” (Friedman 1977, viiii).

During its first decade, Zionism attracted the attention of important figures in German culture. The first whose writings appeared in *Die Welt* was Pastor Friedrich Naumann. Naumann understood that Zionism opposed assimilation and that it was meant primarily for the *Ostjuden* whose misery demanded a solution and whose emotional connection to Zion was strong. He noted that the German cultural orientation of European Jewry (including the preservation of the Germanic language, Yiddish, by five million Jews) promised an alliance with the Templars, the Christian German colonists of Palestine. He believed that the Zionists would be helpful to German colonial interests, and was certain that decreasing Europe’s Jewish population would ease the “Jewish Question” (Levenson 2002, 195, 199). Such ideas influenced the shapers of German foreign policy and, in particular, the Political Department of High Command, to conclude that Zionism was the most important international organization of the Jews of Eastern Europe. They considered the leaders of Zionism “reliable persons,” as most of them were Germans or had a “German mentality.” In one of their assessments in 1914, they expressed the ideas that the Zionists could supply their intelligence department with useful information on the

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226 Carl Freidrich Naumann (1839-1922) an Orientalist at the University of Basel (Levenson 2002, 199).
countries where they lived and also that they might possibly be used as mediators with Russia on economic matters. There was even a discussion about employing Zionists as spies: “The Zionists might be used, though under a different cover, behind the Russian Army, as carriers of revolutionary movements, to spread demoralization, and organize sabotage” (in: Friedman 1977, 201).

However, it seems that the most significant advantage of the Zionists, from the German point of view, was their alleged ability to help Germany improve its extremely low image (the lowest of any nation) with the American public. The German estimate of the Jewish influence in the American media was not without basis. The big dailies, the *New York Times* and *New York World*, were owned or distributed by Jews, most of them Germans or Austrians with whom Ruppin had connections. Ruppin himself defined part of his role as to “thwart as much as possible, with the aid of the German embassy which aspired to buy the heart of world Jewry, the decrees that Jamal Pasha inflicted upon the Jews of Palestine” (Bein 1968, II, 272) (my emphasis E.B.).

Fostering good public relations in America seems have been the main reason for the help given by the German consul in Turkey and the German officers in the Turkish administration to the Zionist colony in general and to Ruppin in particular, enabling him to move about freely and relieving him of the constraints of the Turkish authorities. The connection between the Zionists and Germany was fully recognized by the other colonial powers; the French foreign office, for example, saw Zionism in the first decades of the twentieth century as an “agent of German policy” in the Middle East and tried again and again to foil Zionist efforts to achieve recognition and support from the Ottoman government (Avineri 1998, 258).

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227 Historical information for further investigation: In July 1914, the German Kaiser prepares for war and subversion against Britain in the Middle East. He assures the ruler of Afghanistan of his desire for the Muslim nations to be independent, and of the continuation of the common interests of Germany and the Muslims after the war; General Liman von Sanders, the Inspector General of the Ottoman army and a German, is commanded to stay on in Constantinople to promote unrest against Britain; a team is formed under Max von Oppenheim to arrange subversion in Muslim countries. He works in close alliance with German Zionists (Ovendale 1992, 7).
5. Practice

5.1 The Transfer to Palestine

In 1911, Wolffson was dismissed from the presidency of the WZO by a broad coalition of Zionist leaders who aspired to intensify the activity of the Zionist movement in Palestine, and opened the era of “practical Zionism.” The offices of the WZO relocated from Köln, Wolffson’s place of residence, to Warburg’s Berlin. Warburg was nominated head of the new REC, which, as described, had a major interest in Zionist colonization. He became responsible for everything connected with colonization plans, while the rest of the REC members dealt with cultural, educational and other current matters (Reinharz 1985, 345).

5.1.1 Centralization; Accumulation of Statist Capital

Ruppin’s plan, presented in part above, formulated solutions to the crisis of colonization in Palestine that will be described in the following. Backed by Warburg’s complete support and understanding, Ruppin managed to centralize the bureaucratic field, and establish new channels for cooperation between the contesting groups, entrepreneurs and followers of the scattered Zionist institutions.

The most important of the various Zionist institutions at that time was the JNF\(^1\), which had begun, since Ruppin’s appearance, to finance other activities in addition to land purchases, its initial function (Katz 2001, 3). Ruppin’s influence on JNF policies was crucial, and Bodenheimer (director of the JNF) consulted with him frequently on every detail. However, even when he wished to, Bodenheimer could do very little, since control of the JNF was gradually passing from Europe to Palestine. WZO head Warburg supported Ruppin and the REC stood behind Warburg (Penslar 1987, 221). It should be noted that Ruppin’s authority and responsibilities were very specifically spelled out in his contract, in a manner that reflected how valuable and dependable he seemed at that time to the Zionist leadership. One of the conditions Ruppin inserted into his contract with the WZO was that he would be allowed “carte blanche” in applying to the actual conditions in Palestine the general policies laid down by the

\(^{1}\) Jewish National Fund, founded in 1901 at the Fifth Zionist Congress in Basel. Its purpose was to buy and develop land in Palestine for Jewish settlement.
Zionist executive. which he himself had formulated (Bein 1972, 88). As we shall see in the following, Ruppin interpreted this condition very flexibly.

This opening position, as well as his successful interactions with many other parties in the movement, made Ruppin: “The authority […] in all matters concerning the Yishuv and settlement in Erez Yisrael […] [his authority] was accepted almost without any objection” (Shilo 1988, 116). “Actually” Ruppin wrote in his memoirs of that period:

“I was totally independent because I received absolute backing from the REC to manage all Zionist matters (except for the bank) on my own understanding, and the REC didn’t intervene in my affairs” (Bein 1968, II, 44).

In order to fully appreciate Ruppin’s power, we must recognize that, since his appearance on the scene, all the economic and cultural activities of the tiny Zionist colony depended, one way or another, on the PO and therefore on Ruppin. The fact that I so frequently equate him with the PO is not only because at that time the PO was very small and Ruppin’s conduct highly authoritative, but also because this identification was the accepted thing; most of the letters sent to the PO until the 1920s were addressed to Ruppin personally and for people considering coming to Palestine he and not the PO was the address.

The centralizing effect of Ruppin and the PO created a new field of interaction between the network of institutions and agents that operated in its frame of control. From the start he worked to implement his vision and plan of creating a modern Hebrew social field, in a model of a state. In his account of 1907 he described the function of the PO thus:


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2 E.g., Ruppin’s statist capital enabled him to influence the press not to publicize land purchases (Shilo 1988, 66).
This text reflects Ruppin’s ambition to create an administrative and cultural autonomy in the country that would be independent of the authorities (first Ottoman and later British Mandate) on the one hand and the Arab population on the other. It must be mentioned that, as a result of the political and economical conditions in Palestine, the new administrative field could be formed almost without needing to consider the Jewish social structure which preceded it (Lisak 1981, 16).

Ruppin’s new approach was different in its essence from the prior colonization plans of the First Aliyah and the Baron Edmond de Rothschild administration. For all its relative sophistication and reliance on colonial technology, Rothschild’s colonization activity remained not entrepreneurial or political, but philanthropic – in an idiosyncratic combination of the zdaka and transformative models. Rothschild saw himself as a private individual doing good for the Jewish people and not as a capitalist developer. Nor did he conceive of himself as a political figure seeking to create an autonomous, self-sufficient entity that could become a Jewish homeland, which was the way Ruppin thought from the very start of his operations.

Rothschild and the Paris-based Jewish Colonization Association (JCA), which assumed control over the Rothschild colonies in 1900, opposed the agenda of Practical-Zionism to the degree that they were anti-political, that is they refused to conceive of Jewish settlement in Palestine as an assertion of political sovereignty, something to be directed by a proto-governmental agency. They were opposed to any hasty activity that might endanger their position as a “Jewish plantocracy” largely dependent on the exploitation of Arab labor in small colonial-capitalist plantations (Penslar 1990, 145).

In the fragment of his account quoted above (CZA, Z 2/631) one can see that Ruppin’s main aim in the early stage of his operation was to accumulate statist capital, i.e. to centralize all the various early developments in the Yishuv, and organize them within the economic and cultural umbrella of the PO. Within a very short time after his arrival in Palestine, the PO became the representative of the following companies and organizations: the Jewish National Fund (JNF), the Palestine Land Development Company (PLDC), the Donations for Olive Trees
Association (DOTA), Bezalel (art school and workshop), The Industrial Syndicate, The Palestine Company for Real Estate Properties, The Settlement Company El Ltd., the Neta’im Planting Society, a Fund for the Kishenev Orphans, a Fund for Aid to Russian Jews, the Department for the Land of Israel, the Women’s Organization for Cultural Work in the Land of Israel, the Syndicate for Chemical Research, Achuza (a company for establishing plantations), Geulah (land purchasing company) and the Company for Developing Culture in the Land of Israel (Eliav 1977, 236; Paz-Yeshayahu 1991, 49).

The centralization of these institutions gave Ruppin crucial economic and political power and enabled him to dictate his plans and instill a repertoire from above; a practice which naturally involved rejecting or “drying up” many of the social options promoted from below. It is quite clear that Ruppin gave no help at all to many of the groups and organizations that had emerged in the social field prior to his appearance but encouraged entrepreneurs to act according to his culture plans. This policy was demonstrated in the actions he took against the teachers’ organization and various economic enterprises that were in their early stages, as well as in his attitude towards what he saw as the “old” and degenerate communities of Palestine (Arabs and Jews) who lived in the land before the Practical Zionist era.

From 1911 onward, with the expansion of the activities of the PLDC, Ruppin began to make efforts in order to formally unite this company with Geulah and the Neta’im Association in order to bring about an appreciable expansion of the settlement enterprise in Palestine. Ruppin did everything he could to make the different land purchasing bodies operate together and in 1913 he stated that “the companies [PLDC, Geulah and the Neta’im Association] were operating in unison and with mutual consent…”³ This move of centralizing the land purchasing companies was typical of the centralization pattern sketched above and was of significant importance for Palestinian Zionism’s ability to organize its expansion more efficiently than ever before.

³ (CZA L18/103/2, Ruppin to the management of the PLDC in Berlin, [8.4.1913], in (Katz 1994, 134). on the way he managed it, see: (ibid., 130-137). On Ruppin’s attempts to unite all the companies under his control see : (ibid., 132-136). On the cooperation between Ruppin and Eisenberg as the representative of Neta’im (planters association) see: (ibid., 190).
Ruppin’s central position and centralistic conduct was noticed by keen observers and critics. The following report from 1921 of the Palestinian branch of the Zionist Organization of America criticized the activities of the PLDC, and questioned Ruppin’s “multiform” roles, accusing him of a conflict of interests:

“According to correspondence, Dr. Ruppin has been acting either for the [World] Zionist Organization or for the Palestine Land Development Company or for the Jewish National fund or for all three at one and the same time.”

Ruppin managed to deflect the frequent accusations that he was creating a personal monopoly by claiming that the PLDC activities, as well as his own, were directed toward preventing speculation in the market that would lead to an inflation of land prices (Glass 2002, 141). His success in stabilizing the market by centralizing and monitoring the purchasing of land led eventually to the creation of a bureaucratic system that made the JNF the most important land purchasing agency in Palestine (Halpern & Reinharz 2000, 239). His evident success was enough to reconcile his critics and diminish the power of his opponents. In the first years of Ruppin’s activity, the donations to the Zionist movement increased dramatically. In the years 1908-1913 (the first 4 years of Ruppin’s directorship of the PO) the properties of the JNF almost tripled. The PO’s success was also a result of the conditions created after World War I. Following the economic crisis caused by the war, almost one third of the old Jewish community and First Aliyah Jewish population emigrated from Palestine (it is estimated that the Jewish population after the war was 57,000). During the war years the economy of the towns was hurt because of the lost markets and the increased burden of taxes. The Jews of Jerusalem and Safed suffered from hunger and diseases and many of them emigrated in order to survive. The new settlements and institutions

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4 Ruppin to Zionist Organization of America, New York, [28, Feb. 1921], CZA L18/44/11, in: (Glass 2002, 141).
5 It is beyond the scope of this work to understand the economic reasons for his successes. Nevertheless, it seems that Ruppin’s mercantile experience made him realize that he could take advantage of the crises resulting from the cholera plague and from the Greco-Turkish War that led to a shortage of money, and to a significant reduction in land prices.
6 On the ways that Ruppin centralized the institutions for the PLDC and the money sources see also: (Penslar 1987, 219-220).
7 “The assets increased from RM 1,348, 000 to RM 3,224, 000” (Bericht des Action Comites der Zionistischen Organization an den XI. Zionisten-Congress, Vienna, 1913, 57).
controlled by the PO were organized in relatively efficient ways, which was an important reason for their new, dominant position in the Yishuv. Perhaps the most important advantage the new, Second Aliyah settlements and institutions had was that the PO controlled the main channels for transferring the donations from the Diaspora communities (Halpern & Reinharz 2000, 205).

5.1.2 The Speed Dimension

An important difference between Ruppin’s PO policy and the prior systems at work in the Yishuv, was speed and a sense of urgency. While the dominant groups of the First Aliyah believed in a stable and gradual development, Ruppin’s culture planning activities systematically inserted a dimension of speed into the social field of Palestine which, within a short time, changed the conditions there.

This expressed itself not only in the increase in land purchasing and in settlement and economic activities, but also in a new consciousness of the need to hurry. The First Aliyah’s small, young society (less than 20 years old), secured their “Jewish plantocracy” as Penslar puts it (Penslar 1990, 145), with the ideals of Ahad Ha’am and Chovevei Zion; the very name of their journal Ha Shiloah, symbolized the dangers of building a Jewish society or state in haste.

Ruppin’s new sense of urgency meant that “creating [demographic and land] facts” was infinitely more important than the quality of the process, thus, for example, building Tel Aviv as fast as possible was more important by far than building it properly. Ruppin recognized very well that the founders of Tel Aviv (including himself) had no experience of building an urban neighborhood, nor did they have the necessary means. To note one example, Ruppin realized, as early as 1910, that the streets of Tel Aviv were much too narrow for a proper city. His attempts to correct this failed in most cases because the buyers of the plots would not or could not finance wide streets; they did not want to “waste” their land on public space (Bein

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8 To note one example, the marketing cooperative HaMashbir was able to distribute goods at reasonable and controlled prices (Halpern & Reinharz 2000, 205).

9 (Yisheyah 8:6): “Forasmuch as this people hath refused the waters of Shiloah that go slowly […].”
1968 II, 145). Thus they built cheaply, with low standards and no proper planning, just ad hoc planning in most cases (see: Shavit & Biger 2001, 20-21).

Ruppin’s part in the establishment of Tel Aviv demonstrates his dominant position in the social field and reveals some of the guidelines of his culture planning. In his recommendation to the JNF in support of the founding of Tel Aviv he explained that a Jewish urban settlement would create a market for the agriculture produce of the Jewish agriculture sector, and would also divert the flow of capital from the Arabs of Jaffa (who profited from the rent of apartments), into Jewish hands (in: Shavit & Biger 2001, 66). Ruppin explained the attraction of Tel Aviv for immigrants and Jewish capital as being a place where immigrants can live in a “healthy European atmosphere” (in: Shavit & Biger 2001, 24) as opposed to Arab Jaffa. This same policy of separating the Arabs (economically and culturally) from the Jewish cultural space lay behind his decision to build the Hebrew Gymnasia in the Jewish neighborhood of Tel Aviv, even though it was far from the homes of most of the pupils and many of their parents opposed Ruppin’s choice of location (ibid., 76).

Tel Aviv, in the establishment of which Ruppin played a crucial role, is perhaps the most distinct expression of the PO’s sense of urgency. In 1924 Ruppin wrote in his diary:

“One evening I traveled…on the outskirts [chutzot] of Tel Aviv and I remembered the Tel Aviv of ten years ago. What a difference! In every place they build I remember how I stamped in the deep sand, eight or nine years ago: I was the only person in the area; today in the same place there are long roads, with electricity and enormous commotion […]” (in: Shavit & Biger 2001, 100).

A few days later he continued to express his amazement at the rapid development of Tel Aviv; from a population of 200 in 1908, to 2,000 in 1914 and 30,000 in 1924 – an over fifteen-fold increase within ten years (ibid.).

It must be emphasized that all this was not only a result of the vast amount of development and the flow of immigrants and investors but stemmed also from clear attempts to increase the pace and use it for gaining political, symbolic and material
capital. The PO proclaimed its projects in Palestine to be successful both economically and socially far sooner than could be based on fact (Berkowitz 1996, 146). It is clear that the PO, and practical Zionist propaganda in general, were focused on producing, as fast as possible, a national façade and body images as well as a pantheon of ideal types and heroes (Frenkel 1996, 422-453): “[…] hasty we are to make history,” wrote Yosef Haim Brenner already in 1912 “how we rush to sanctify things which can be sanctified only over the breathing space of generations […]”

One of the premises of Norbert Elias concerning the nature of the habitus was that it takes “centuries” for the “fortunes of a nation” to “become sedimented into the habitus of its individual members” (Elias 1996, 19). In the case of the Modern Hebrews, this process of “sedimentation” was created in less than few decades. Speed and haste were one of the social field’s immanent needs. In his 11th Zionist Congress lecture, which was the climax of the congress, Ruppin stressed the importance of speed:

“Our work is urgent. […] we must inherit the land as soon as possible. […] It must be also the matter of each individual. We are at a great beginning and we must pave the way for those who will come after us” (Bein 1968, II, 219).

This understanding that the Modern Hebrews had to act fast before it was too late was the first seed in this “sedimentation” or, in other words, one of the fundamental models of perception disseminated through the Modern Hebrew repertoire among its followers, whose cultural identity was formed in approximately the same way as Tel Aviv was built.

Within several years after Ruppin’s appearance, a host of projects, investments and plans enabled the PLDC to gain appreciation among growing circles. Menachem Mendel Ussishkin (1863-1941) and Yechiel Chelenov (1863-1918), the leaders of Russian Zionism, who were suspicious at the beginning of the Warburg-Ruppin plans, (Frenkel 1996, 445).

11 The leading figure in Russian Zionism since 1904. In 1906 he became the leader of the central political body of the Russian Zionists, the “Odessa Committee,” whose full name was “the society for support of the sons of Israel, land workers and artisans in Syria and the Holy Land.”
became vital supporters of the new culture plan, which created the condition for comprehensive national colonization (Penslar 1987, 216).

As the head of the PO, Ruppin was responsible for all the projects of Zionist settlement and, although he did not formally have control of the finances, he quite frequently used the money of the JNF and other sources before receiving their approval and this systematic, administrative “misconduct” increased constantly, parallel to the growth of his power. But what seemed like misconduct to conservative circles in Germany was, for Ruppin, a necessity if he was to operate in the economic and cultural conditions of Palestine. Ruppin’s entry into the field introduced an immanent condition of urgency that became of far greater importance than “conventional accounting” or attempts to create a “well-ordered society” and his dynamic culture planning replaced the gradual, cautious way of advancing that had characterized his predecessors and opponents in the Zionist leadership.

5.1.3 The Anonymity of the Culture Planner and Planning

In the first stage of his operations, Ruppin tried to work as much as possible anonymously. He requested that there be no public mention of his name or that of the Palestine Office, which would be known only as the Palestinian branch of the WZO. In addition, he demanded that official publications refer to him only as “our representative in Jaffa.” He also expressed his deep fear that the speeches and discussions at the forthcoming Zionist Congress (Vienna, 1913), might disclose information harmful to his planning: “the orator in the congress”, he emphasized in a letter to the congress members:

“is not standing and preaching in a shtetel in Russia, but in an assembly, all of whose reports to the public will be read with great attention by hostile Arab authorities and envoys. [thus] It is the duty of every speaker to watch every word he utters, and it is better that questions concerning the Land of Israel not be negotiated in the assembly but only within the [closed forum of the] committee” (Eliav 1977, 216).
Ruppin’s recommendation had an enormous impact on the participants in the Congress, and most of the discussions did indeed take place in the restricted and closed framework of the committee (ibid.).

By instilling this model of perception, Ruppin, the WZO and the PO accumulated informational capital which, inevitably, it was necessary to conceal from their adversaries – in this case the local Arabs, who would have to be uprooted and the land speculators, Jews and Arabs alike, whom Ruppin regarded as the main enemies of his culture plan.

By convincing the dominant Zionist political groups and delegates represented in the World Zionist Congress of the need to conceal information and plans and to cover up the practice of Zionism, Ruppin’s appearance on the scene marked the end of the naïve, visionary, ideological, literary, spiritual, diplomatic first phase of Zionism, and introduced into the field an immanent, coordinated gap between the Zionist declarative dimension and its operative dimension.

As noted, one of the reasons for Ruppin’s strategy of concealment was that, if his purchasing plans were exposed to the public at an early stage, it would increase the opportunities for private Jewish and Arab speculators, as well as political factors, to manipulate the market to raise land prices.\(^\text{12}\)

Ruppin’s efforts to purchase land as rapidly as possible were extremely complicated in the complex bureaucracy and political tensions of the fading Ottoman Empire that ruled Palestine. His successful handling of this mission was due to his high skills as a professional lawyer and an experienced businessman.\(^\text{13}\) His activities paved the way for many others and made the purchasing of the land accessible as never before. Nevertheless, his success was also due to the ‘fluid’ Ottoman bureaucracy that enabled him to give investors new perceptions and also to create new business options in the field. To note one example, one of Ruppin’s first actions was to write a

\(^{12}\) The fear of publicising land purchasing is a subject that appears frequently in the correspondence between Ruppin, Tahon and the PLDC (Doukhana-Landau 1979, 38).

\(^{13}\) As already mentioned, from 1902 until 1907 – the year he came to Palestine for the first time – Ruppin practiced law as a Referendar (junior barrister), Assessor and then (German) State Prosecutor (Bertisch 1980, 2).
brochure with the title: *Der Bodenerwerb in Palästina* – without the author’s name – which explained the best, safest and fastest ways to purchase land in Palestine (Doukhan-Landau 1979, 14; Ruppin, 1968, I, 96-97). This move was typical of Ruppin’s practical mode of operation, i.e. exerting influence on the social and cultural field from an *anonymous* position.

Another important reason for Ruppin’s strategy of concealment was that an open discussion of the “Arab question” might expose Zionist aspirations with regard to the land and might stir up the Arab peasants. As noted above, Ruppin warned the delegates to the 1913 Zionist Congress not to expose the true facts concerning the settlements in order to mislead the Arabs. However, Ruppin was not only concealing his true plans but also making deliberately false declarations. Shilo writes that:

“although in his speeches at the congress [Ruppin] declared that ‘we are buying, in particular, land that is not good for the cultivation of field crops,’ he was planning, at the same time, the purchase of tens of thousands of dunams in the Jezreel Valley, which were designated mainly for the cultivation of field crops. Ruppin also suggested, in confidential letters, buying land in Lebanon in order to transfer there the Arab peasants, when it would prove necessary, (in explicit contradiction to his declarations in the congress).”

5.1.4 National Ownership and the model of Inner Colonialism

The most important point in Ruppin’s proposal to the REC – the blueprint of his culture plan – appeared in its final section, which was devoted to land purchase. Ruppin called there for the establishment of an “agrarian fund” empowered “to buy land and make it possible for Jews without means to acquire it via an amortization of the purchase price over many years.” This proposal was radically different from the previous policy of the REC in one important respect: its principle beneficiaries were to be poor laborers, not the well-to-do landowners that many in the Zionist leadership would have preferred.

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14 (Shilo 1997). In the Eleventh Zionist Congress opened in Vienna on September 2, 1913, both Weizmann and Ruppin insisted on cooperation with the Arabs and on achieving a “modus vivendi” in which the Jews and the Arabs could develop their cultures side by side (Reinharz 1985, 385).

15 (CZA, Z2/639). A duplicate may be found in (A107/663).
“By this means, Jewish agricultural laborers in Palestine, who now have no chance for independence and leave Palestine for that reason, will be tied to the land, and new elements will be attracted there to become agricultural laborers, in order to be settled by the agrarian fund, after a probationary period of several years, first as tenants and then as owners” (ibid.).

Ruppin’s crucial suggestion enabled the agricultural workers to become settlers and potential land owners. As opposed to the prevailing capitalist colonization perception – from Lilienblum to Warburg – which needed rich colonialists or the budgets of a “mother state,” Ruppin recognized that, practically, the colonialists that the Zionist organization could attract in masses were poor, young East European Jews. He was the first person to promote and elaborate a culture plan that utilized this fact. The idea of national ownership does not appear in any of the first drafts of the settlement plans (Shafir 1989, 155). Many leaders in the movement – both East and West European Zionists (Shilony 1998, 107) – were radically opposed to his suggestion. Lilienblum, one of the main leaders of Russian Zionism, wrote, in 1908, that Ruppin’s idea:

“smells of socialism: [it means] that the redeemed land [haaretz hanigelet] will not belong to individuals but rather to the people as a whole. We need nationalization of the people but not that the land will be their nationality.”

The PLDC, which Ruppin established, helped the JNF (of which Ruppin was the official representative in Palestine) and the private sector to purchase the land and settle it. As several historians have already made clear, Ruppin’s plan was based on, or at least inspired by, the work of the Prussian Colonization Commission (PCC) in his native Posen.17 The PCC was founded in 1886 and was part of Bismarck’s colonization policy for the eastern provinces. The tasks of the PCC, which was backed by the Prussian Finance Ministry, was to acquire land suitable for settlement; and manage the area until its sale or lease to German settlers; to prepare the soil and drainage; to divide it into farming units and settle German immigrants on the land and to assist in the construction of public buildings in the colonies (Shilony 1998, 31).

17 the conceptual link between the PLDC and the PCC was posited for the first time by Shalom Reichman, professor of Geography at the Hebrew University, see: (Reichman 1984, 57-70).
Another point of similarity between the PO and PLDC and the PCC is the fact that the villages that the PCC established were generally in clusters which too, were located close to one another and, in the Eastern part of the region, an effort was also made to situate the German areas of colonization in such a way as to prevent, as far as possible, any territorial contiguity between the ‘islands’ in which the Poles constituted more than 75% of the population (Shilony 1998, 31-32).

In his first memorandum to the JNF (June, 1907), Ruppin mentioned casually that he saw the work of the JNF as “similar to that of the colonization commission in Posen and West Prussia. The national fund will buy land when it is offered at a good price by non-Jews, and will then sell it to Jews either as a whole or in parcels” (in: Penslar 1991, 94). Ruppin made a similar reference to the colonization commission in the prospectuses of the PLDC, and in numerous letters and published articles thereafter (ibid.).

The use of the model of German colonialism in East Prussia was customary in the German Zionist discourse, which praised the German colonialist practices (Penslar 1991, 80-102). As already mentioned with regard to Ruppin’s cultural identity, the interest of Prussia in the Eastern provinces was not only economic but also cultural: to impose German culture on the Poles and eradicate the Polish nationalists. The PCC bought estates from Polish and German landowners, parceled them into family farms, and sold them to Germans, on condition that they not employ Polish labor. The commission has come under harsh criticism, both in its day and in our own, for being a racist institution that set out to expropriate historically Polish lands in the name of Germandom. Critics also accuse the commission of serving as a Rettungsbank (safety net) for Junkers, for it purchased the estates of financially-troubled Junkers at inflated prices (Penslar 1987, 152).

As will be seen in the following, the PLDC and the PO operated in ways very similar to those of the PCC. Shilony, following Reichman, Hasson, Penslar and Shafir, summarized the well-documented historical research and demonstrated that the PCC

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18 When a professional advisor of the PLDC said that the company should not go in the way of the Prussian committee for settlement, Ruppin wrote “...I don’t understand the difference, it is self-evident that PLDC was not meant to do business but to advance the national aims.” in: (Doukhan-Landau 1979, 145)
model was used, in both perception and practice, in the work of the PO (Shilony, 1998, 34). It is arguable, as Penslar wrote, that Ruppin’s transfer of the Prussian model to Palestine was “instrumental” and not “substantive” (Penslar 1987, 154). However, it seems that in this case, as in many others, it is hard to differentiate between the instrumental and the substantial. Though it is clear that the PCC model of “inner colonialism” was indeed a source of inspiration for Ruppin and the PO, it was different at least in one respect, which actually demonstrates how “substantive” the repertoire of the PCC was for Ruppin. As already mentioned, the PCC tried to Germanize the Polish population, but this policy was not implemented with regard to most of the native Arabs of Palestine.\(^{19}\) Ruppin declared explicitly that such an attempt would fail, as it had failed when the Germans attempted to Germanize the Poles. Ruppin not only worked with the PCC model, he even learned from its failures and adapted it to the Palestinian reality. Ruppin understood the power of nationalism and he recognized that the Arabs were in the process of nationalization, so that attempting to “Hebraize” them would not succeed even if necessary or desirable.

5.1.5 Relations between Ruppin and Ussishkin

When Warburg tried to convince the Russian Zionists of the advantages of Ruppin’s plan, he wrote to Ussishkin, in 1908, and emphasized that it was not a new method or a new experiment but rather a “Prussian colonization method” that had been used for the last ten years by the PCC.\(^{20}\) After a short while, Ussishkin was convinced and became one of the enthusiastic supporters of Ruppin’s plan. Besides the presence of the PCC model in the Zionist discourse, Warburg and Ussishkin’s correspondence illustrates how minute and secondary was the influence of the Russian Zionists and, in particular, that of their leader Ussishkin, in determining the PO’s overall policy. Ten years later, following Ussishkin’s resignation from the Zionist board, Ruppin described him as follows:

“In an objective aspect,\(^{21}\) there is no damage in Ussishkin’s resignation. He will be missed by us only as an orator on the holidays of Israel. In his function

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\(^{19}\) Although one can argue that this kind of policy was implemented – with harsh symbolic and material violence – by the Israeli government from 1948 (until the 1980s), towards the so called “Arab Israelis.” See: (Cohen 2006).

\(^{20}\) Warburg to Ussishkin, [17 Dec. 1908], (CZA L2/21/1), in: (Penslar 1987, 156).

\(^{21}\) It is typical of Ruppin to perceive of himself as “objective.”
as the head of the education department – he didn’t do anything; his views on economics are backward. [nevertheless] he has one virtue that you can’t find in any other leader: a confident sense of the state of mind of the East European Jewish masses” (Bein 1968, III, 71 [23 August, 1923]).

As the above quotation suggests, and as the following will reinforce, the role of the Russian Zionists in general and of Ussishkin in particular, in culture planning activities was limited to mediating between Ruppin’s PO and the “East European Jewish masses,” who arrived in Palestine in the period of the Second Aliyah (1903-1914), especially the youth inspired by the workers’ socialist movement.

The rise of the Zionist workers’ movement was extremely crucial for the survival of the Zionist movement as a whole. Most of the Zionist leaders at the beginning of the twentieth century belonged to the bourgeoisie and had, in most cases, conservative economic and social world views. The Zionist leadership before Ruppin – both German and Russian – was opposed in general to socialist ideologies and usually denounced in contemptuous terms the younger generation’s attraction to the revolutionary movements in Russia. Only in the first years of the twentieth century did this attitude change, when the Zionist leadership began to recognize the political consequences of lack of sympathy with the socialist trends among Russian-Jewish youth. In 1904 it became clear that the Jewish Russian intelligentsia and proletarians alike resented the Zionist movement and were joining the revolutionary movements, the Bund in particular. As a result of this ideological and organizational crisis, the tiny Zionist workers’ movement began to disintegrate. The Jewish youth, as well as the intelligentsia (i.e., those who had more or less assimilated Russian culture), were attracted to the immediate solutions posed by the socialist revolutionary ideas. Defeating the despotic rule of the Czar seemed a promising and sweeping way of ending the discrimination against and oppression of the Jews. This recognition led to the flow of the youth and the intelligentsia to the revolutionary movements, and the

22 In Ussishkin’s vocabulary, the revolutionary movements were equal to anti-Semitism. Whatever their ideologies, the link between the Jews and the revolution was made by the Russians authorities and this was the reason for their support of Zionism. The Russian government saw an overlap between the objectives of Zionism and its own aspirations, such as keeping down the number of Jews. It also saw the movement as a mechanism that could potentially absorb groups of revolutionary Jews.

23 This phenomenon is correlated to the observation of the German Jewish historian Yaakov Turi that the assimilation of the Jews into the German culture was faster among the upper and lower classes, while the middle class retained their traditional norms for a longer period (Turi 1961, 67-73).
Jewish press began to support local activities and ceased supporting Zionism (Magen 1994, 123). Even in the Yiddish social “street,” a kind of “pre-Bundist” group emerged and organized workers’ “assistance funds” (Yid.: zesharganische kamitan) and socialist activities. In his memoirs, Berl Katzenelson described this change as: “new visions which threatened to swallow up Zionism” (in: Magen 1994, 34). As can be understood from Katzenelson’s description, in order to survive politically, the Russian-Zionist leadership – consisting mainly of Tzionei Tzion members such as Ussishkin, Chelenov and Shmariyahu Levin – was under pressure, during the period 1904-1906, to promote a policy of financial support for the workers’ associations (mainly Poalei Tzion), and also to adopt a more tolerant attitude towards growing attempts to combine Zionism and socialism even though, personally, most of them disliked this direction.

With regard to these relationships, it is important to note that, in general, Ruppin succeeded in reconciling the interests of Western Zionism and the East European bourgeoisie leadership, and the demands of the youth to give Zionism a “socialist character.”

As will be described in detail in the following, since Ruppin’s appearance in the Palestinian Zionist arena, the young East European immigrants of the Second Aliyah shifted their initial support from Ussishkin and Chelenov to that of Ruppin and Warburg. This was not only because Ruppin and Warburg controlled most of the movement’s resources, but also because they offered the immigrants of the Second Aliyah a new repertoire, accompanied by a concrete culture plan that would give them informational, statist and material capital. Ussishkin, on the other hand, while supporting the ideology of “practical Zionism,” was still working within the framework of a populist, general ideological and utopist scheme as imported from the turbulent Russian culture of his day and was unable to adapt it realistically to the Palestinian social field. His main political activity in his attempt to gain leadership of the movement was to create an autonomous leadership in the Yishuv that would counterbalance the WZO. 24 The peak of this aspiration was the distribution of his

24 In 1903, Ussishkin organized a list of 2,000 Jews living in the cities and villages of Palestine and gathered an elected assembly. This body collapsed mainly because of the Uganda crisis in 1904 (Halpern & Reinhartz 2000, 221).
famous pamphlet *Our Program* (1904), which called on young Russian Jews to come to Palestine. Ussishkin’s pamphlet is considered one of the main reasons for the arrival of the first waves of the Second Aliyah but, as we shall see, there were many other possible reasons that, in retrospect, seem far more important than his short, rather pompous pamphlet. In any case, what must be emphasized is that when the young immigrants arrived in Palestine, Ussishkin and his group did not have either the necessary culture plan or sufficient material, statist or informational capital to organize them successfully and it did not take the new immigrants long to realize the paucity of the investments of Ussishkin and the *Odessa Committee Organization*. (Goldstein 1999, 224). It was only Ruppin’s culture planning that enabled these scattered youngsters to become organized and to develop a “socio-semiotic-cohesiveness,” as well as to become, within a very short time, the dominant group of the *New Yishuv*.

5.1.6 The Main Points of Ruppin’s Plan

In the opening of his above-mentioned memorandum of December 1907, Ruppin declared that the idea of Jewish autonomy in Palestine – the practical meaning of the *Basel Program* – could become possible only under the following conditions:

1. The creation of a Jewish majority in Palestine;
2. The purchase of most of the land;
3. The unwavering ambition to achieve Jewish autonomy.

Before going into a more detailed description of Ruppin’s plans, one can already see, from a glance at his main points, the scale of the operation he had in mind. At the time when Ruppin enumerated his aspirations, the number of Jews in Palestine was no more than 10% percent of the whole population (around 80,000 out of 700,000), and the Jews owned only 1.5% of the land (400 square km out of 29,000). The actual implication of Ruppin’s plan was that, in order to achieve a position of what he defined as “decisive worth” (Heb. erech machriaa) the Zionist movement had to buy 15,000 square km of land and settle over 600,000 Jews on it (Eliav 1977, 128).
Another point stressed by Ruppin seemed to be aimed at reducing the Jewish “mercantile instinct” and “parasitical abnormality”:

“We must liquidate the Chalukkah [Heb.: distribution, dividing] system,\[25\] which still provides most of the Jews with the largest part of their income, and replace it with work […] While the Arabs make immense sums of money out of vegetable farming, the Jewish colonies have hardly begun to do anything in this field” [Ruppin 1907].

5.1.7 Land Purchasing

*The size of the skies above the head of a nation is like the size of the land beneath its feet.*

Ruppin\[26\]

Following the PCC model, Ruppin suggested that the new Jewish society should concentrate in specific areas that would enable safe expansion and achieve a Jewish majority enclave of population and land:

“Since this is not possible in the short run, it is necessary to limit the ambition or obtain autonomy only on a small part of the land in Judea and around the Galilee, because in these areas the Jewish community is denser and the interlocked Jewish land is greater” (Ruppin, in: Eliav 1977, 128).

Purchasing the land was the most essential and urgent task in the first stage of Ruppin’s plan of operations. As already mentioned, Ruppin wanted to act “urgently”; to “inherit the land as soon as possible” (Bein 1968, II, 219). Trying to act with the required speed, Ruppin created complicated and imaginative contracts which were often based on loans and future capital. The PO invested considerable time in producing numerous publications presenting the favorable opportunities of the land,

\[25\] The foundations that distributed the contributions from the Jewish Diaspora communities to that of Palestine and operated usually according to the zdaka model. Ruppin also refers here to the philanthropic system of the Baron which was a hybrid of the zdaka and the transformative models.

\[26\] In the report Ruppin gave to the 11th Zionist Congress (1913), he debated with a student of Ahad Ha’am’s, claiming that a misunderstanding of their mentor led him to deny the colonization acts in Palestine. He claimed that their interest was to create a “cultural-spiritual center,” while forgetting what Bialik said, that: “the size of the sky above the head of the nation is the same as the size of the land beneath its feet” (Ruppin 1914b, 5-6).
as well as brochures on agricultural projects which were sent to potential investors around the world, promising future infrastructure that would raise its value (Doukhan-Landau 1979, 158-161, 166, 208).

5.1.7.1 The System of Groups as a Tool for Expansion

Before entering into the social and bureaucratic organization of the system of training farms and groups that Ruppin established, it is important to note their connection with Ruppin’s land purchasing policy. One of the many reasons for Ruppin’s hurried functioning was the Ottoman law stating that land that was not cultivated or populated within three years of the date of purchase could be settled and even claimed by others. Ruppin had justified suspicions that the Arab peasants would exploit this law and invade the purchased lands (in some cases Arab peasants planted trees or grazed their herds in an attempt to establish their right to the land).

Since 1908, the PO as well as the JCA, had been operating according to Ruppin’s culture plan, and were settling unskilled immigrants both on training farms and with groups of agricultural settlers already working on the newly acquired lands in order to protect their rights in accordance with the Ottoman law. There the immigrants were rapidly trained by experts to become skilled farmers who could then constitute new groups for settling the land.27

The first models of such groups were termed “conquest groups” (Heb. kvutzat kibush), and their origins can be traced back to the First Aliyah period. Now, however, with the increasing amount of land under PO administration leading to an increased need for such groups they became the norm, evolving into a system of groups organized specifically to meet the PO’s planning.

27 According to Eliav, on the brink of the First World War there were 47 Jewish agricultural settlements, 25 of them established after 1900 and 14 of them under the care of the PO. The 47 settlements had a population of 12,000, 14% of the entire Jewish population (as opposed to 5000 in 1900). Between 1900-1914, the land of the Jewish settlements was more than doubled: from 200,000 dunam in 1900 to 420,000 in 1914 and half of those lands were suitable for agricultural cultivation (Eliav 1977, 237).
The description given in 1922 by Akiva Ettinger (1872-1945), Ruppin’s right hand in the PO, of the function of one such “conquest group” near the Arab village Noris (later Nurit) gives us a good idea of their purpose:

“They settled near a wellspring but it was a dangerous place, in terms of both health and security. There are a lot of Bedouins in the area who had to leave the land and they are not satisfied. The land is good and there is water for its irrigation. After consulting with the engineer Triedel we decided that the settlers must stay near the spring in order to conquer it” (in: Kushner 1962, 226).

The conquest groups were also used to reinforce existing settlements; one such case was the First Aliyah settlement of Be’er Tuvia (established in 1887) which, in 1911, was on the verge of collapse. Ruppin saw that changes were needed in the culture and economy of the town and in 1912 he settled a group there. This group (members of Hapoel Hatzair) stayed for 12 years and made an important impact on the town’s population and agricultural organization. It dissolved in 1924, after an internal crisis. (Kushner 1962, 266).

The fate of this group was no exception. Organized by the PO to solve a problem in the field, for a while these groups worked, but when a crisis emerged – whether economic or social – and the PO no longer had any interest in preserving them, they dissolved. The conquest groups served Palestinian Zionism throughout the whole period of expansion over the land of Palestine, and was one of the models for the permanent groups to be described further on.

It should be noted that this system of farms and groups established by the PO, was part of its expansion aims and strategies. The system, based mainly on the deployment of young male workers, was a fast and easy way to implement the WZO’s

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28 Akiva Ettinger (1872-1945). Studied agronomy at the University of Bonn. His first work was in JAC as a manager of Jewish settlement in various lands, particularly Russia and South America. In 1918 he began to work in the field of agriculture in Palestine as the director of the land department of the JNF and later as the manager of the department for settlement of the Jewish Agency.
colonization program, as Ruppin himself explained to the Zionist General Council (HaVaad HaPoel Hagadol): 29

“The PLDC farm Kinneret demonstrated, for the first time, how it can be possible for Jews to purchase new land and cultivate it. Perhaps one will not yet see the management method as the best solution. However, one thing is clear: for the time being, it is needed for purchasing new land and handing it over to settlers; indeed, with the establishment of the farm in Kinneret, the stagnation of settlement that existed before has ended.” 30

As already mentioned, it is easy to see the influence of the PCC model of colonization on the structure of the group system which Ruppin established. The PCC used to send groups of capable workers to areas that demanded extensive preparation and improvement before the arrival of the permanent settlers. These groups organized themselves on an ad-hoc basis. Wages were paid to each worker individually, but in most instances they set up and operated a cooperative kitchen and dining hall. When their work was concluded, they would leave the area and permanent settlers could move in. At this point the group tended to break up, with each member going his own way.

Ruppin’s system of training farms and groups were clearly inspired by this model although, as we shall see, his actual plans were additionally influenced by many other models from German culture, as well as by the particular conditions, needs and aspirations of the Second Aliyah immigrants.

29 Havaad HaPoel Hazioni, the legislative institution of the WZO between congresses. Established in 1897, it comprised two bodies: the “General Council” (Havaad HaPoel Hagadol), (which consisted of about 25 members and met at least once a year to discuss all aspects of the movement) and the “restricted council” or “committee” (Havaad HaPoel Hametzumtzam), (which consisted of 5 members) which was considered the “Zionist board” or “management” (HaHanhala Hatzionit).
30 Ruppin to the General Council of the WZO, Berlin, 1914.
5.1.8. The Borders of the Modern Hebrew Social Space

[...] there is not a single nation of the white race that is racially pure [...] Only a part of any nation will correspond to the description of a particular racial group given by the anthropologists, and may thus be regarded as of pure race. Ruppin, 1940

To bring order is to bring division...the limit produces difference and the different things [...] this magical act presupposes and produces collective belief, that is, ignorance of its own arbitrariness. It constitutes the separated things as separated, and by an absolute distinction.

P. Bourdieu, *The Logic of Practice*

In his memorandum of 1907, Ruppin repeated, in a general way, the analysis he had presented in *The Jews of Today*. He described the groups existing at the time in the social field of Palestine and analyzed their position with regard to the new social field he planned to establish. As mentioned in the weltanschauung chapter, Ruppin aspired to create a new biological type for the new Jewish society in Palestine, and, as the new source or “gene pool” for this new Jewish *Volkskörper*, he chose the East European Jews (Ruppin also made divisions within that group, as will be described later).

The two groups that Ruppin saw as unsuitable and even antagonistic to his plans were, on the one hand, the Orthodox Ashkenazi Jews and, on the other, the Sephardic and Oriental Jews whom, as he put it, he “lumped together” and defined disparagingly as “Oriental or Eastern Jews” [Heb. yehudey hamizrach].

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31 (Ruppin 1940, 18). The title of the chapter in which this text appears is: *Race; the conception of race; racial purity.*
32 (Bourdieu, 1990).
In his lecture *The Land of Israel in the Year 1907*, which he delivered to *The Jewish Settlement Association* in Vienna in 1908, Ruppin divided the Jewish population of Palestine into what he defined as four “distinct strata” (Ruppin 1908, 1):

“The first is made up of those Sephardic Jews who have lived in the country for centuries, have become closely assimilated, in mores and in their general mode of life, to the local Arabs and who, side by side with Ladino, speak Arabic too. A good picture of the life of these Jews is furnished by the town of Saida (the ancient Sidon) where 2,000 Jews – all of them Sephardic – may be found. They receive no *Chalukkah*, earn a difficult and pitiful living as small merchants and artisans, are poorly educated and of a not particularly high moral standing. The Jews of Morocco, Persia and the Yemen, who have come into Palestine in recent years, may be lumped together with this group” (ibid).

This group, according to Ruppin, though “poorly educated” and lacking a “particularly high moral standing,” had one advantage: “They receive no *Chalukkah*”; an important sign of their productivity. In these early definitions we can detect Ruppin’s constant urge to verify his theoretical writings concerning the Semites through his observations in the Middle Eastern and Palestinian social field. As described at length, the ‘Orientals’ were always marked by him as unintelligent, non-modern, bestial and immoral. Their only good quality and path for regeneration lay in their ability to be useful as an unskilled workforce.

The second group, as defined by Ruppin, was the Ashkenazi ultra-orthodox, (Heb. Charedim) who consisted mostly of an unproductive and aged population that was almost entirely dependent on the *Chalukkah*. The attitude of Ruppin to orthodox Jewry has already been described, and, as in other cases, his observations in Palestine corroborated his theory for he believed that, at least in Palestine, this group was in gradual decline.33

Ruppin’s hostility to these two groups intensified during the 1920s and he saw them as a constant threat to the new social field he was creating. In a letter to Jakobson in 33

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33 As with many other models, this perception became part of the labor movement leadership’s.
1922 he described these two groups – the Orthodox and the Sephardic – as the “hidden opponents” of the New Yishuv, which he characterized in this letter as the “organized ethnic group” [Heb. eda meurgenet] (Bein 1968, III, 32).

The third group defined by Ruppin was that of the so-called First Aliyah, which suffered, according to his analysis, from several weaknesses caused by their economic structure being heavily based on the generosity of Baron de Rothschild. The Baron’s unconditional philanthropy led to an ever-weakening connection between them and the land, since it was not developed through their efforts and work but fell into their hands “as a present” (Ruppin 1908/1998, 209). It is important to emphasize that this specific criticism will shape his attitude to the young immigrants of the Second Aliyah.

According to Ruppin, this indifference to the land was the reason for the First Aliyah’s declining “enthusiasm,” – equated in Ruppin’s vocabulary with the “vital force” that his monistic weltanschauung regarded as the most important “element” or “energy” and the necessary quality for becoming a part of the New Yishuv’s Volkskörper. The failure of the First Aliyah is made evident by the fact that their children, the next generation, emigrated permanently from the country, leaving their places for Arab workers (Ruppin 1908/1998, 210).34

Having dismissed these three groups out of hand, Ruppin did however find a fourth, group that he considered a positive asset. This was composed of young immigrants from Eastern Europe who, according to his analysis, were in the first stage of constructive organization. This was the group that Ruppin felt included the best candidates for the mission at hand, which was to constitute the foundation of the healthy Volkskörper but “naturally,” they could succeed only if treated and molded

34 Needless to say, Ruppin’s assessments and differentiations as sketched above were a result of his weltanschauung and efforts to promote his culture plan rather than of the Palestinian “reality.” E.g., in his accounts, Ruppin ignored the fact that the upper class of the Sephardic community cooperated from the first stages with the “Ashkenazi modernists” and constituted an important link with the Ottoman rulers (Halpern & Reinhart 2000, 198-200). On many of the Second Aliyah working sites, the Sephardic and Oriental Jews – both natives and immigrants – had an important role in the labor and guard forces, and, as we shall see later, those of them who aspired to a greater involvement in creating the modern Hebrew space were usually rejected. The same goes for Ruppin’s assessment of the First Aliyah’s contribution as well as for his premise that there is an essential contradiction between modernity and religion.
according to the scientific conceptions of modern social sciences and eugenics. According to Ruppin, this group could become a new “species” or “type” of Jew that would not suffer from the problems of the other groups, those that had to be held back, limited, marginalized or even rejected from the new social space and certainly from its dominant groups.

To Ruppin, reducing the dominance of the first three groups was a mission of no less importance than that of furthering the fourth group and was connected with his attempts to “inherit the land” as rapidly as possible; the same urgency that he exhibited in occupying the land had its parallel in his haste to occupy the social space by creating a new species of Jew, i.e., the Modern Hebrew, to be selected from the pool of young East European immigrants:

“We must see most of the Eastern Europeans as desirable Olim [immigrants]. [...] because by transferring people considered morally inferior from one land to another we are not enhancing their value, and what is more, these morally inferior people are in most cases, ruining good social institutions” (Ruppin 1919e, 373).

Nevertheless, the fact that the “desirable” immigrants were East Europeans, i.e., Ashkenazi, did not on its own qualify them. More than anyone else in the Zionist movement, Ruppin emphasized in his writings and implemented in his practice, the importance of selecting what he defined as Menschmaterial:

“We devoted ourselves extensively to the question of the economic, legal and social structure of the Jewish society which we were erecting in Palestine but in this we proceeded very much like a physicist who makes his calculation on motion without taking into account the pressure of the atmosphere. We assumed that all we needed to do was find a good social structure, proclaim it by fiat, and presto, it would be there. We seemed to forget that even the best of social structures become flesh and blood realities only by virtue of the individuals who fit into them and that if the individuals who make up the society do not, in their education, occupation and character, belong to that structure, they will either alter its form or else reduce it to an empty shell” (Ruppin 1919d, 373).
This text reflects how Ruppin took the Zionist enterprise from its ideological phase into a phase of culture planning based on eugenic perceptions and, in particular, on the practice of selection. The Jews now became “human material,” a perception which legitimized and enabled the PO to increase its intervention in molding that “material.”
The years to come will pass judgment on my work in Palestine. I can only say that I have always considered it my principal object to keep alive in those with whom I have worked the enthusiasm which they brought with them to Palestine. I have tried to guard the flame of this enthusiasm and work by its light. 

Ruppin

In the Jews of the East [Europe], he [Ruppin] saw the starting point for the continuation of the line; in the most enthusiastic among them, the ancient genealogy.

A.Tz’ioni

As in Ruppin’s vocabulary in general, the meaning of the concept “enthusiasm” or “enthusiast,” (derived, in Hebrew, from the word for flame=lehava) in the above quotations is pregnant with eugenic meaning. As already mentioned, the concept of the “vital force” was linked to the concept of “energy” and to Ruppin’s monistic Weltanschauung. According his bio-Völkisch perception, the appropriate match between the racial type and the particular type of soil that suited it was a necessary condition for the vitality and creativity of a given type. According to this logic, Ruppin figured that the immigrants who were more “enthusiastic” for the land, who were more connected to it and interacted well with its soil, were more likely to belong to the “ancient genealogy,” as Tz’ioni put it, or to the “Continuität des Keimplasmas” (the continuation of the germ plasma) as Ruppin described it (Ruppin 1903c, 197); i.e. they were more likely to be related biologically to the ancient, “Ur” (original) or “pure race Jews.” In other words, since Ruppin’s bio-historical proposition was that

35 The most positive characteristic of the “desirable element” was what Ruppin had defined already in his Darwinismus und Sozialwissenschaft as “the vital force”. This concept – elaborated by Alfred Ploetz (1860-1940), is connected with the concept of Vitalrasse which means a stock with a good intersection of genetic lines of transmission (Erblinien). Vitalism saw life as driven by a harmonious final stage. It meant that cells and organisms had an innate drive towards a whole or harmonious form (Hutton 2005, 17, 27). On the particular vitalism of Ruppin, see also: (Penslar 1987; Bein 1968, 1, 22).

36 (Ruppin 1936a, 152).

37 (Tzioni 1943, 4).

38 The particular quality that Ruppin sought in the young immigrants was what hardly any writer, from Renan to Ruppin, fails to mention, that is “indomitable ambition as an outstanding feature of the Jews, and added to their other qualities enumerated above it naturally makes them formidable exponents of the will to power, and ruthless competitors in any contest for influence and ascendancy.” The Jews, and the Jews in England, (Cobbet 1938) chapter IV, Character of the Jews (no page number).
the ancient Hebrews lived primarily an agricultural life, the immigrants who adapted to agricultural work with “enthusiasm” would probably be those who were linked to them biologically.

It is worth emphasizing that Ruppin used the concept of “enthusiasm” with great frequency and that when giving the reasons for or against any proposed settlement, he repeatedly used the phrase “in any place where there is enthusiasm, it is possible to overcome every difficulty” (in:Shilo 1986, 52).39

Weisman’s germ plasma theory, which Ruppin had absorbed, suggested that racial features were not permanently erased and could reappear, thus supporting Ruppin’s view that the Jews could once more become a “vital race” (Vitalrasse).40 This theory was also closely connected to selection theories, since the particular biological structure of a given type is discernable only through a process of selection. Thus, the first stage of Ruppin’s eugenic plan was built on a selection process to be achieved by bringing about a rapid encounter or clash between the candidates and the land through agricultural work on training farms or subsidized working programs on existing plantations and settlements, and by then creating independent groups from among those newly trained candidates who would settle the land and create communities of Modern Hebrews. This system would enhance and improve the “natural selection” and make it possible to discover those “elements” that were suitable for agricultural work.

39 For a detailed description of a case in which Ruppin used the concept of “enthusiasm” in a crucial and explicit way see (Shilo 1986, 41-52).
40 The concept of Vitalrasse means a stock that has a good intersection of genetic lines of transmission (Erblinien). Vitalism saw life as driven by a harmonious final stage, meaning that cells and organisms had an innate urge towards wholeness or harmonious form (Hutton 2005, 17, 27).
In his article *Die Auslese des Menschenmaterials für Palaestina* (The Selection of the Human Material) Ruppin tackled this issue bluntly:

“Here I will touch upon a question which is also important: whether there is a possibility of effecting an influence in the direction of purifying the Jewish race. Since we want to develop in Eretz Yisrael specifically what is Jewish, it will obviously be desirable that only the racially pure come to the land” (Ruppin 1919e, 72).

Nevertheless, since the race sciences had not yet defined who, exactly, was a pure Jewish type, Ruppin believed that the process had to be based on the “selection of the fittest”:

“Actually, we can’t have a direct influence on the choice of the Olim [immigrants] according to their more or less closeness to the Jewish racial type. Nevertheless we must assume in advance that the Olim will be, in most cases, more racially Jewish than the [west] European Jews, because certainly those attracted to the Jewish society in Eretz Yisrael will be precisely those people whose Jewish side, in body and mind, is more prominent and, because of that, they are the most rejected by their non-Jewish environment in Europe” (Ruppin 1919e, 72).

This opinion of Ruppin’s, it must be stressed, was a crucial part of his idea for solving the “Jewish problem” all over the world. In 1923, to note one example, he presented a report to the REC which predicted that the Land of Israel would become a “place of refuge” (Heb. mekom miklat) for all those who have:

“a deep Jewish sentiment. This sentiment is so strong, that the Jews cannot develop in gentile surroundings. Thanks to this process, the Land of Israel is sucking out from all lands those Jews who have a strong inclination for Judaism, and, consequently, those Jews with scant national consciousness remain in the Diaspora. As a result, the opposition between the non-Jews and the Jews in the
Diaspora is weakening, and this might solve the Jewish problem in the Diaspora.”

As in other cases here, too, Ruppin formulated his solutions to the “Jewish problem” within the monistic weltanschauung and eugenic framework that frequently rationalized the rifts in his cultural identity. In this respect, the concept that Palestine was attracting the “purest Jews” in a “natural” way can be understood as a compensation for the shame and pain of his personal rejection, through “scientific” rationalization. As he saw it, rejection by the Europeans was an indication of one’s Jewish racial “purity” which, according to his theory, was actually Indo-German. This is a typical example of Ruppin’s pattern of stereotyping and transvaluation, which constantly legitimized anti-Semitism as a “natural” phenomenon.

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41 Ruppin in his report to the REC in 1923, in: (Fridlander 1989, 207).
5.2.2 The Training Farm at Kinneret and the Rise of the First Collective Group (kevutza)

I told myself: in the beginning was the action, and the name of that action was: Kinneret. I decided to use the means of the PLDC and to establish a farm on the land of the JNF.

Ruppin

He [Ruppin] always asked us to remember that these agricultural settlements were the hope of the Volk and its first foundations in the land [of Israel].

S. Dayan

The stages by which Ruppin implemented his culture plan were flexible both in formation and in their ability to take into consideration new or changing factors and trends. Generally speaking, one can see Ruppin’s dialectic between theory and practice as dynamic and by no means rigid – his culture plan a jazz improvisation rather than a symphonic score. Ruppin described his method as that of “trial and error,” a definition which enabled him to legitimize his “errors,” i.e., the unsuccessful projects and the financial irregularities that often accompanied them.

Ruppin’s first successful project; the corner stone of his enterprise - the one which the common narrative also considers the breakthrough and turning point in the emergence of the Palestinian Zionist labour movement – was the training farm at Kinneret; the place where, in his will, Ruppin asked to be buried.

Ruppin’s motto (quoted at the opening of this section), which he expressed originally in his first public appearance at the 11\textsuperscript{th} Zionist Congress in Vienna and which appeared many times in various versions in his diaries, articles and books, summarizes the main elements of his agenda: Young immigrants, agriculture training, the idea of being active, and the resources of the WZO.

\textsuperscript{42} (Ruppin 1913c, 15).
\textsuperscript{43} (Dayan 1935, 86).
In 1908, the first year of Ruppin’s long career in Palestine, he established Kinneret as an agricultural farm whose main aim was to train young immigrants who aspired to work the land. The independent financial management of the farm reflected the way Ruppin used WZO funds and how he exploited his powerful position. “We don’t have time for the politics of the JNF box” (Bein 1968, II, 219), he wrote in his memoirs, legitimizing his adventurous economic administration, which was not, in fact, a temporary means of crisis management, as he would have it, but rather a systematic policy.  

Ruppin’s independent management marks the beginning of the shift of Zionism’s main field of power to Palestine. From this point onward, Palestinian Zionism, as the most practical branch of the movement, would gradually begin to influence the WZO’s policies and position, as well as to operate independently – overtly or covertly – and, in particular, according to the practical model of “creating facts on the ground.” In fact, the first big land purchase by the JNF (10,000 dunams in the Jezreel Valley) was made by Ruppin in clear opposition to the instructions he received from Bodenheimer (the JNF’s director) (Shilo 1992, 2). According to Shilo, Ruppin also planned large scale purchases with the non-Zionist company JCA, thus sending an important message to the Cologne based JNF – that the PO was not dependent solely on their funds (Shilo 1992, 2).

Ruppin’s establishment of the training farm at Kinneret, took place under similar strained circumstances. Several important figures in the WZO cast doubts on the value and necessity of the Kinneret project, and feared that it would be another extravagant failure. Bodenheimer and Khan emphasized the heavy losses of the colony in repeated critical letters. Kahn, the professional and prudent banker, insisted constantly that an economy that did not carry itself was a failing

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44 To note one example, Ruppin opposed, at least initially, the establishment of the Hebrew University. He believed that a university was not as important as the agricultural training farms and settlements and feared that the money spent on it would be on account of his projects (Reinharz 1985, 380), and though the decision was accepted by the Congress and favored by most of the movement’s leaders, Ruppin delayed the purchasing of the land as long as possible: “I must say” wrote Weizmann, “that I am absolutely not pleased with the way Ruppin managed the university matter. It is obvious that he opposes it, indeed, that is his full right. What I oppose is that he is not loyal” (Weizmann 1988, vol. 6, 420).

45 “Creating facts on the ground” (Heb. likboa uvdot bashetach) is a Modern Hebrew idiom which reflects a model in the repertoire; from the early settlements to the “illegal settlements” of the 2000s.
economy, and in his speech at the Congress he stated that: “the JNF should have
brought in incomes – and there are none” (Shilo 1988, 199).

This climate in the WZO was one of the main reasons that Ruppin kept the
Kinneret project secret – both in order to secure its success and to minimize the
criticism in case of failure (Sternhell 2001, 33). Already in October 1909,
Ruppin’s secretary, Tahon, wrote to Warburg and discussed him with the
economic problems of the PLDC and the likely probability that the Kinneret farm
would find itself with a deficit (Shilo 1988, 121). When news of the farm was
published, Ruppin and Warburg tried to find ways of presenting the deficit as
smaller than it really was. In order to gain time, they explained the losses with all
their frequently used excuses: the land was not fertile, the workers were not
qualified, the Arab neighbors were problematic and hostile and the current losses
were only natural for a long term investment.⁴⁶

Warburg and Ruppin promised that profits would soon be seen, although they
knew very well that they were simply trying to gain time. Only in 1912 did
Ruppin admit publicly that Kinneret, being first and foremost a training farm, was
not supposed to yield any profits (Ruppin 1912, 70 and not until 1913, after the
beginning of Kinneret’s symbolic success, did he state his case unequivocally:

“How can one imagine that work which aspires mainly to change the
character of the Jews and to make urbans into rurals, will take place
according to demands of profit. In the same way we could demand that our
schools be profitable” (Ruppin 1913b, 49-50).

For Ruppin, Kinneret served as the “social laboratory” for his culture plan. His
inaccurate and delayed financial reports gained him time that enabled him to
examine the relationship between his weltanschauung and culture plan and the
particular state of mind and needs of the young immigrants of the Second Aliyah.

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⁴⁶ Warburg to Ruppin, [7 and 9 Feb. 1910], CZA, KKL/100/A.
In its first years, then, Kinneret was an experimental space for crystallizing a viable model of a Collective Group of young workers that would be able to fulfill the PO’s double aim of keeping control of its lands and selecting good “human material.”

For the ambitious social scientist who perceived himself as the “geistigen Führer des Zionismus,” as he was later described by the German eugenicist Fritz Lenz in the Archiv für Rassen und Gesellschaftsbiologie, (Lenz 1932, 436), the training farms and groups were a “laboratory experiment directed at the future” (in: Shilo 1988, 203), and “an exceptional school for the detection (Identifizierung) and selection (Aussonderung) of the unfit (Ungeeigenten)” (Ruppin 1924; Korolik 1985, 135). This would be done through natural selection in the context of the agriculture training farms and collective groups that Ruppin saw as having supreme importance for Jewish colonization (Ruppin 1924, 522). However, before delving into the evolvement of the Collective Groups and their structure, it is important to investigate the background of the young immigrants who populated the PO’s training farms and groups, i.e., the consumers of its repertoire.
5.2.3 “Making Aliyah with ‘a big noise’ and leaving it secretly:”
the Cultural Identity of the young Second Aliyah immigrants

A Russian government committee reported in the 1880s that 90% of Jews living in the Pale of Settlement constituted “a proletariat living from hand to mouth in poverty and under the most trying and unhygienic conditions” (in: Alroy 2004, 44); 20%-30% were recipients of charity. Living conditions in the Pale were extremely hard. In most cases homes were also used as work places. The houses were very small, overcrowded and suffocating. Many of the reasons for this state of poverty, the policies of the authorities among them, are outside the scope of this work. There is one major one, however, that is relevant to our field of interest and that is the fierce opposition of the Jewish culture of the Pale to any form of modernization (Kosak 2000, 18-19).

The extreme economic crisis of the Jews in the Pale was paralleled by a cultural crisis which led them to undergo a fundamental transformation. Hundreds of thousands migrated from the small towns and villages to the industrial centers and over 2 million emigrated overseas at the turn of the century (Goldstein1986, 546). Nevertheless, during the years 1882 to 1914, out of the millions who emigrated from the Pale, only a tiny fraction came to Palestine. This is not surprising if we consider that only a minority of Russian Jews (about 60,000) associated themselves with Zionism at the turn of the century and that, of these, no more than 8,000 can be defined as activists at various levels (Goldstein1986, 547). Moreover, many, if not most, of those activists seem not to have come to Palestine at all but were rather social agents who functioned as organizers, sending others there (Cnaani 1976, 22).

The number of immigrants who arived in Palestine during the Second Aliyah (1903-1914) is estimated by historians as between 20,000 to 35,000. These immigrants possessed no capital of their own with which to set themselves up as farmers and thus found themselves competing with an abundant supply of cheaper Arab labor, which was naturally preferred even by Jewish employers, especially the citrus plantation owners and those engaged in viniculture. The new immigrants

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47 A common idiom in the period of the Second Aliyah. See, e.g.: (Chazan 2005, 12)
could not subsist on the wages paid to Arabs, and were, in addition, unaccustomed to heavy physical labor, resentful of their employers’ efforts to discipline and control them, and prone to vociferating loudly about class struggle and socialist revolution, all traits that did not endear them to prospective Jewish employers. They thus found themselves with few prospects either for settlement on land acquired by the Zionist movement or for employment on land owned by private Jewish farmers. In this bleak situation, exacerbated by disease and Arab hostility, most of them – the estimation is 90% – left Palestine within a short period (half of them after few months, the rest within three years), either returning to Europe or (more often) moving on to a wealthier and more attractive “promised land” – the United States (Lockman 1994, 218).

Of those who stayed for a longer period (thought to be approximately 10,000), only a small number belonged even temporarily to the agricultural sector – and many of them, too, left after a short while. At the end of the Second Aliyah period only about 5% of those who had immigrated between the years 1903-1914 were left in the agricultural sector – the breeding ground of the so-called “pioneers”, i.e., around 1500-2000 people (including only a very small minority of women) with an average age of 17-22. 48

The members of the Second Aliyah agricultural sector, who mostly arrived with nothing, were given a variety of derogatory nicknames by those of the First Aliyah – the barefooters (Heb. yachfan) because they were poor, “schmendrics” (Yid. lacking personality) because they seem to have no coherent plan, and “hooligans” (Rus.-Heb. chuliganim) because they were seen as aggressive and quarrelsome. These epithets reflected the antagonism they raised in the First Aliyah people, partly because the latter did not consider Palestine a suitable destination for poor Jews and feared that the immigrants might destabilize the tiny Zionist colonies, but also

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48 On the Second Aliyah emigration from Palestine, see: (Kaniel 1994). Kaniel admits that the lack of figures makes it very hard to estimate the real scale of migration in and out of Palestine. This is true for all Second Aliyah statistics. On Second Aliyah statistics and demography, see: (Sluzki 1973; Cnaani 1976; Gorni 1996, 381-387; 14-15; Halpern & Reinharz 2000, 187; Alroey 2004, 38-54).

49 Another reason given for that nickname is that some of them had Tolstoiyan ideas concerning “simplicity” while for others it marked better physical contact with the soil. Yisrael Gilaadi, one of the well-known characters in that period, refused to wear shoes and walked barefoot on principle. His legs were covered with scratches and bruises but he said that “our legs must get used to the soil of the land” (Elon 1971, 114-115).
because of their socialist and anti-religious beliefs and behavior (Magen 1994, 33, 88, 126). The First Aliyah people\(^{50}\) saw the young Second Aliyah workers as an “enemy camp,” while the new immigrant saw the First Aliyah people as lacking in ideals and, in some cases, even as “anti-Semitic Jews” (Elboim-Dror 1996, 113).

The following paragraphs will describe some of the features of the Second Aliyah immigrants – especially those of the agricultural sector – with particular focus on the social conditions that shaped their cultural identity.

5.2.3.1 Religious Ministrants
(Heb. klee kodesh = “Holy Instruments”)

According to the data of Cnaani and others, almost 70% of the immigrants who joined the agriculture sector knew Hebrew when they came to Palestine. Almost 60% of them had had a traditional education in the Heder or Yeshiva or at home. A little over 20% had had a few years of high school (though most of them did not graduate), and very few had academic or other higher forms of education. Most of them came from the lower-middle class – sons of peddlers, grocers or teachers – and from religious or semi-religious families “and what they had in common was the traditional education they had received at home or in the heder, in their childhood and youth” (Cnaani 1976, 21).

A high percentage of the young immigrants were the sons of what were known in Hebrew as “holy instruments” (Heb. klee kodesh), i.e., minor religious ministrants such as Bible and Hebrew instructors (Heb. melamdim) ritual slaughterers, rabbinical assistants (Heb. dayanim), circumcisers (Heb. mohelim) etc. This fact is of importance for an understanding of their cultural position since this particular class was the focus of attacks in the revolutionary propaganda of the workers’ parties in Russia (Frenkel 1989, 454-455; Almog 1994, 287-288). Thus their “ideological rebellion” was connected with their rebellion against their fathers (Gorni 1996, 386). One of the workers in Rechovot, (who was still religious),

\(^{50}\) To the 26,000 Jews who lived in the four holy cities of Palestine from 1882 until 1902 were added about 5,000 immigrants. More than half of them left Palestine within a short time. A few hundreds of them created an important change in the Jewish settlement of Palestine mainly by establishing the first four towns (see: Kaniel 1994, 115-138).
described the never-ending ideological discussions and disputes and emphasized what united them:

“[…] In one thing all of them concurred – in their hatred of religion and tradition. Religion is opium. Every traditional, religious person is a swindler, a cleric, a jésuit, a hater of the workers, a bloodsucker etc.” (in: Cnaani 1976, 47).

In this, the young second Aliya immigrants were no different from many other young Jews at that time. The overwhelming majority of the East European immigrants’ children had “deserted” Judaism. A New York survey in this period found that young Jews were more likely than Protestants or Catholics to become atheists or agnostics. They did not convert but were indifferent or hostile to traditional religion (Frank 1997, 735). The behavior of the young immigrants of the Second Aliyah was no different, but instead of the secular repertoire adopted in New York, in Palestine they adopted the national-Zionist one which, as we shall see, was a fusion of secularism and messianism.

The Second Aliyah youngsters came from what Berl Katzenelson described as “the Jewish petit bourgeoisie, or, if you prefer, the Jewish poverty. It is hard to find in the Second Aliyah someone from the ‘haute bourgeoisie.’” At the same time, says Katzenelson “the proletarians and sons of proletarians were very rare, simply because the sons of the proletariat did not receive a Jewish or other education that would persuade them, consciously, to come to Palestine (Katzenelson, 1943, 23-27). Katzenelson’s description corresponds in part to the phenomenon mentioned above, that the Jewish proletariat as well as its intelligentsia (i.e. those who were more or less assimilated into Russian culture) were attracted to revolutionary socialist ideas. In terms of cultural capital, this meant that those who knew Hebrew to some degree belonged to the least assimilated groups of Jews. Thus, the Second Aliyah immigrants came not only from the lower middle class, but also from the most problematic group within this class. The symbolic capital they had acquired, i.e., Hebrew and knowledge of traditional community service, left them in limbo; the symbolic and material capital of their fathers was not sufficient either for proper assimilation or for the continuation of their tradition. In this respect, the
“consciousness” of which Katzenelson speaks did not necessarily result from a new, modern secular, socialist or even well thought-out Zionist recognition or ideology but rather from a particular kind of youthful rebellion against the older generation of their marginalized fathers and the dead-end path they had inherited from them. This particular cultural position – quite similar to that of Ruppin himself – can explain the inclination and readiness of the Second Aliyah youth to take the path of hypercorrection\(^{51}\) suggested to them by the PO.

### 5.2.3.2 Level of Education

Generally speaking the level of education of these young people was “amazingly low,” most of them having no education beyond elementary school (Elon 1971, 116). This was partly due to the Russian educational system but also because “formal education” in general was in opposition to the Tolstoyan Narodnic ideals of many of them. As will be shown in a sub-chapter on their views regarding education, the PO’s repertoire supported these tendencies. The repertoire of the collective groups was against any form of “careerism” and opposed to any sign of “over-intellectualism”; Avraham Herzfeld explained: “our university was the swamps” (in: Weiz 2003, 21). When, in 1912, Ben-Gurion and Ben-Zvi went to study law at Istanbul University, many of the workers expressed resentment (Elon 1971, 116). Neither of them managed to conclude their studies. Moshe Sharret, one of the rare exceptions, received his degree from the London School of Economics despite the denunciations of many leaders of the workers who feared that he might become “a model for others” (Weiz 2003, 21).

\(^{51}\) Hypercorrection in this sociological sense, results from: “the disparity between knowledge and recognition, between aspirations and the means of satisfying them – a disparity that generates tension and pretension [...]. This pretension, a recognition of distinction which is revealed in the very effort to deny it by appropriating it, introduces a permanent pressure into the field” (Bourdieu 1994, 62).
5.2.3.3 Organization and Mobility

The young Second Aliyah immigrants did not, for the most part, come in organized groups. They arrived individually, generally in a rebellious state of mind and deeply influenced by the Russian revolutionary ethos, although with no clearly formed class theory. Lack of discipline, individualism and anarchism were their norm. One of their slogans, worded by their most admired and mythologized writer Y. H. Brenner, was “great is the loner, great is the roamer” (Heb. gadol haboded gadol hanoded), and they did indeed roam a lot – from one place to another in Palestine and also to Russia, for many of those who stayed in Palestine permanently used to take long vacations abroad that were often described as “national missions.”

This movement between Palestine and Russia was one sign of the indecision and confusion that many of the young immigrants felt while in the process of choosing between Palestinian Zionism and the Russian revolutionary movements and since travelling between Palestine and Russia was relatively cheap many of them could afford it without parental help.

A survey made by Zeev Smilansky in 1912 revealed that most of the workers who came from Russia and worked in Judea stayed in one place for less than a year. Only 15% of them worked in the same place for more than three years (Frenkel 1989, 457). The twenty year old David Green (Ben-Gurion), for example, lived and worked, within a period of three years, in Segera, Jerusalem, Zichron Yaakov, the Kinneret farm and even Russia. This was typical of most of the young immigrants, a very remarkable fact if we consider how bad transportation was at that time. (Frenkel 1976, 59).

The ambiguous and double-bind relationship we have already seen between the German Zionists and German culture was paralleled by a similar relationship between the young “pioneers” and Russian culture. In their intensive search for a legitimate place “under the sun,” during the twenties and thirties many of the “pioneers” went

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\[52\] The constant wandering from place to place was one of the major complaints of the First Aliyah employers against the Second Aliyah workers (Drori 1998, 71).

\[53\] Most of the so-called “pioneers”, at least until the end of the First World War, came from Russia.
back and forth several times from Russia to Palestine, a pattern that expressed the conflict many of them felt between the Zionist and Russian (Marxist, Bundist, Communist, religious etc.) options.

This constant movement and indecisiveness destabilized any attempt to establish efficient institutions for self-help in the towns or cities. Their organizations were small and divided. The workers did indeed build kitchens, cafeterias, libraries, laundries, and small shops to ease their lives, but only very rarely did these initiatives last more than a few months and quite frequently they collapsed, leaving unpaid debts (Frenkel 1989, 457). “we are not very successful in organizing our lives” wrote Katzenelson to his brother “[...] we eat badly and suffer from lack of cleanliness, and from that there results sloppiness and negligence and the diseases that come upon us frequently [...] we are always in a certain state of bustle for something…and live ‘by the hour’” (in: ibid).

**5.2.3.4 Ideology as the Reason for Immigration**

Cnaani writes that the young immigrants of the Second Aliyah did not come to Zionism through “the anemic Hibat Zion and not from political Zionism” whose activity was only in its first phase; what generated their attraction to it was their Jewish tradition:

“it is doubtful if you will find among them one son of the leaders of Hibat Zion or Zionism, or of one of the important go-getters or of a famous Maskil, a Hebrew author or thinker. Linguistic and cultural assimilation (and quite frequently mixed marriages and even conversions) threatened them in the same way as it did the non-Zionists. They were ‘Hovevim’ and enthusiastic Zionists when they went out, in their public appearances, in their articles, but were Russian or Polish speakers in their homes, and sent their sons from a young age to schools that taught in the language of the state” (Cnaani 1976, 22).

According to Alroey, most of the immigrants who arrived did not do so out of ideology but rather for economic reasons that prevented them from immigrating to
America, their preferred destination (Alroey 2004). Alroey’s assessment substantiated that of Cnaani, who also said that those who immigrated to Palestine did not take this step for ideological reasons, a fact that might explain why most of them – the common estimation is 90% – left again within a short period; half of them after few months, the rest within three years. This huge exodus of the newly arrived immigrants can be explained as resulting from the gap between their expectations and the conditions in Palestine. Many immigrants, who had more or less middle class expectations and needs such as for a stable family life, could not find proper jobs and prospects, while the minority of youngsters who held various rebellious, “idealistic” positions saw their revolutionary socialist or Tolstoyan beliefs shattered on the rocks of Palestine’s reality.

5.2.3.5 Ideological Confusion

Their common denominator was the rejection of what exists and the aiming for ‘something’ different.
Z. Zahor

Achad Ha’am wrote in his sober report from Palestine that the young immigrants of the Second Aliyah had enthusiasm but no coherent views. Shapiro notes that the immigrants with political consciousness were divided among so many different political views that it was impossible to find an ideology that suited everyone (Shapiro 1975, 20). The unattainable ideological agreement between the various workers’ parties was one of the reasons for their being extremely flexible in their ideology, and tending to emphasize the organization and the personal commitment of the members rather than their ideological beliefs. The Hapoel Hatzair party could not decide in its first years whether to define itself as a professional union or as an ideological party. During the years of the Second Aliyah its leadership was unable to

54 (Zahor 1998, 217).
55 Achad Ha’am, All in All (Heb. sach hakol), in: (Karpi & Shapira1978, 16).
56 Hapoel Hatzair was an intellectual socialist party which saw in A.D. Gordon its teacher. The party was formed in Palestine in October 1905 and though it was basically socialist it refused to go into ideological discussions for it believed that, due to the fact that the country was only just beginning to be created, there was no possibility of deciding on definite rules and ideology (Hattis 1970, 73). Hapoel Hatzair rejected both Marxism and class struggle and instead, influenced by Tolstoyan principles, expounded a commitment to physical labor, self-sacrifice, and settlement on the land as the means by which Zion would be “redeemed” for the Jewish people (Lockman 1994, 217).
formulate an ideological platform although they made many attempts to do so (Halpern & Reinharz 2000, 188). Even the allegedly socialist Poalei Tzion party, after they detached themselves from their Ukrainian branch, could not formulate a clear ideological line, while Achdut Ha’avoda’s party platform included many general and arbitrary sentences. Although the writers perceived themselves as socialists, the word socialism did not appear at all. Instead, the platform mentioned the loyalty of the organization to “social-Zionism” and its aspiration to create a workers’ community. This vague description could have fit many liberal circles connected with the Zionist movement (see: Shapiro 1975 30) and aiming to avoid any kind of ideological obstacle for potential donors (a point I will discuss later).

It would appear to have been almost impossible for the Second Aliyah workers to develop a coherent view even if they had really wanted to. Their unclear ideology was representative of the amorphous political space in Russia in the first decade of the twentieth century. Even the ideas of Nachman Syrkin (1868-1924) and Ber Borochov (1881-1917), who were the first to make a synthesis between Zionism and Marxism, were unknown to most of the young immigrants at the time (Syrkin was translated into Yiddish only in 1926), and were not inserted into the narrative of the labor movement until later periods. The immigrants did not come, for the most part, after a long process of studying and debating ideology – something they could not have done even had they wanted to for lack of ideological propaganda material (Magen 1994, 47, 55). Nevertheless, even if some of them had been knowledgeable about the Zionist socialism of Syrkin and Borochov, these theories were not at all coherent, and had no realistic relation to the particular conditions of Palestine. Borochov – who never visited Palestine – concluded his programmatic central article Our Platform (1906) with the determined conviction that the Jewish immigrants would manage to gain control over the “means of production” in Palestine, and that the local population would adapt within a short time to the new Jewish society. In 1909, at the beginning of the cooperation between the WZO and the workers via the PO, Borochov predicted that such cooperation would lead the labor movement to collaborate with and serve the Jewish bourgeoisie which, for him, was the WZO (Gorny 2006, 27).

57 Heb. United Work. The Zionist Socialist party which was established in 1919 as a merger of Poali Tzion and the unaffiliated workers. Its first leaders were Ben-Gurion and Katznelson. In 1930 it merged with Hapoel Hatzair and formed Mapai.

5.2.3.6 Messianic Marxism; Zionism as a Völkisch religion

The attraction of the young Jews from the Pale – and especially those of the Second Aliyah – to Marxist and socialist ideas stemmed from the illusion that these theories would lead to a sweeping abolition of ethnic and class barriers. The vague socialist identity they assumed enabled them, in a relatively short time, to extricate themselves from the depressing and stifling conditions of the Pale’s culture space and erase their Jewishness from their bodies and minds and even their memories.

The theoretical superficiality of the young immigrants of the Second Aliyah indicates that, in most cases, they related to Marx more as a prophet or a culture hero than a social theoretician. Landshot notes that, like many Jews in the Pale who called Marx the “Zadik [saintly person] from the Jewish street”, most of the Second Aliyah immigrants, too, saw Marx as a messianic figure (Landshot 2000, 39). Their urge to emigrate was imbued with quasi-mystic symbolism, through the evocation of biblical narratives of flight from oppression and the coming of the Messiah (Kosak 2000, 37).

The fact that most of the immigrants came with no prior studying and debating on ideological matters was the reason for the abrupt nature of their transformation. As Frenkel puts it, the Russian Jews moved “directly from a pre-liberal state of development, from a medieval community, to projects for national revival, from a religious to a social and secular messianism” (Frenkel 1981, 2). Frenkel’s analysis echoes Dubnow’s assessment that:

“Political Zionism is merely a renewed form of messianism that was transmitted from the enthusiastic minds of the religious kabbalists to the minds of the political communal leaders. In it, the ecstasy bound up in the great idea of rebirth blurs the lines between reality and fantasy. Here too, we find the continuing effects of secularization. In the same way as the Jewish national idea in its completeness now divests itself of its religious form and takes on a secular form, so messianism passes over from the religious to the political sphere” (Dubnow 1970, 157).
Almog notes, in this regard, that even the political organization of the Second Aliyah preserved patterns of behavior from the Jewish traditional sphere rather than the modern political world. He points out the parallels he found between the Hasidic rabbinical courts and the “courts” of the Second Aliyah, describing HaKibutz Hameuchad members as the Hasidim of Tabenkin, Hashomer HaTzair’s of Yaari and Chazan and Mapai’s of Berl Katznelson (Almog 2002, 101).  

Almog’s description reaffirms the assertion that the workers’ parties’ cohesiveness was based on personal commitment rather than ideological beliefs.

Dubnow, Cnaani, Frenkel and many others, emphasized that the transformation from a religious life to the secular context of Zionism had no clear ideological formulation and thus, within a short time, the religious models were absorbed into the new modern-Hebrew repertoire and gained within it a new meaning; religiosity and religious feelings were not secularized but rather nationalized (or better still “Volkisized”) with the collective ideals of the nation and the party becoming sanctified.

This particular model of transformation from the religious to the national can explain the fact that the young Second Aliyah arrivals adopted a puristic form of behavior. They opposed any kind of “materialism” or “decadence.” Although wine was quite accessible (and in many cases free because of the many vineyards), they tended not to drink and their sexual behavior, too, was generally puritan. Elon noted that their diaries were similar to those of monastic monks (Elon 1971, 114). As in the case of A.D. Gordon, to be discussed later, they were under the influence of the ascetic tradition of the Narodniks.  

Baratz writes that when they were in Um Ja'uni (the Arab name of what became Degania), one of the members suggested that they vow not to marry within the next five years. Paucity was nurtured by rituals of sublimation. Their food was simple and basic: olives, vegetables and soup. Their

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59 Almog writes concerning the Third Aliyah that Hasidic stories and folklore were the material “from which they formed the new culture” (Almog 2002, 67).
60 Narodniks was the name for Russian revolutionaries of the 1860s and 1870s. Their movement was known as Narodnichество or Narodism. The term itself derives from the Russian expression Хождение в народ (“Going to the people”).
61 This vow was annulled by the same member who suggested it – Shmuel Dayan, whose son Moshe Dayan was the second child of the first collective group (Baratz 1948, 61).
clothes were plain, those of simple “proletarians” according to the model of the
Narodniks who were, like the Tolstoyans, imbued with deep religiosity.

According to Almog, Katzenlson tried to convert the institutional religion into
spiritualism in a way that presented pioneering as a kind of alternative ritual (Almog
2002, 298). Yosef Kloisner who visited Palestine before World War I, wrote in his
memoirs: “the work was for them a kind of holiness, and they devoted themselves to
it in purity and with awe, just as the Jew was devoted in the past to the Torah and
prayer” (Kloisner 1913, 209). According to Zvi Shatz, they wanted to achieve “a
religious attitude to life and nature […] and a new family on the basis of a new
religion” (The Book of the Kvuza, 11).

From the very beginning Zionist propaganda created a clear link between the model
of the mitzvah and the practice of Zionism, a link we have already seen with regard to
philanthropy. Ussishkin, in his Our Program, presented a demand that the “salvation
of the land must be our mission this time” (in: Almog 2002, 67). This conversion of
religious terms and symbols into the new context of Zionism was typical of the
Zionist transference from the collapsing repertoires of the Pale to that of Palestinian
Zionism. The conversion of the Second Aliyah was not from the religious and Jewish
traditional way of life into secular modernity but rather into the völkisch
weltanschauung which merged religiosity with the cult that connected the Volk with
its original soil. Tzvi Shatz explained in 1915 that:

“the [Jewish] family is ruined and religion is dying. But the eternal values of
life will stand; they are changing only in their form – because the need in the
familial environment is deep and organic, and the religious relation to life and
nature […] is our true messiah that will save us from the secularity [Heb.
chulin] of life. Indeed, the working nation in its land will establish a new
family on the base of new religia [in the original] […] and I believe in a
religious, human movement, of the kind of the Essenes in their time […] we
will be saved only by a deep messianic movement.”

Shatz Zvi, On the Group, from a conversation at the Galilee workers convention, 1915, in: (The
Book of the Group, 11, 13).
As already mentioned, the main quality that differentiated the young immigrants Ruppin took under his wing as protégés or “sons,” was, in his opinion, their “vital force.” This had a bio-racial meaning. Ruppin perceived that this “energy” of the “young element [from East Europe]” whose “national enthusiasm…is a counterpart of religious enthusiasm” (Ruppin 1926, 143) could be transformed and utilized in his culture planning. His Zionist bildung was based on transforming the “young element’s religious enthusiasm” into the worship of nature and the body, and inviting them to experience a higher pitch of feeling and spiritual intensity, an emotional release which would enable them to return to ordinary life inwardly satisfied and refreshed.

It must be noted that Ruppin was aware of the specific model of transformation I described above and believed that “the transference of the Messianic idea of Judaism from the religious to the social field,” is one of the attributes of the “Jewish social sense,” (Bein 1968, III, 244) which ever tries “to find better forms of societal life. This aspiration has within it religious fervor and, like a supporting pillar, it secures all of life in Eretz Yisrael. If these attempts succeed, they may possibly be of value for other countries too. Such a gift to world culture from the Jews of Eretz Yisrael would be some kind of compensation for all that the Jews have received from the culture of other lands” (ibid.).

Like the “Stumm system” directors, Ruppin recognized the importance of Vaihinger’s “As If philosophy” (als ob Philosophy) in human culture, and he encouraged the workers to develop a national repertoire and social ideologies, so long as these views and practices abided by the lines of the PO’s eugenic and culture planning. The young workers of the Second and Third Aliyot were assessed after a highly selective scrutiny administered by a bureaucracy of experts, doctors and clerks, especially formed to select and create a new dominant group, a core group of loyal workers. Nevertheless, the culture planning which determined conditions in the field was totally different from the way most of the immigrants perceived their actions and experiences. As in the “Stumm system,” the workers’ “productive will” was associated with moral qualities and attributes, but also with “holy service” for the regeneration of the Jewish

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63 Since he read Schopenhauer’s *The World as Will and Representation* in his university days, Ruppin was curious about the function of illusion in culture (Bein 1968, I, 139). In 1932, he thought of writing a book with the title “The Meaning of Illusion in World History” but dismissed this idea because he believed it would probably have “the stamp of dilettantism” (Bein 1968, III, 215).
people, i.e., the everyday work itself was part of the fulfillment of their general role, and created a deep internal connection between the fulfilling of everyday work and the main meaning of cooperative life (Landshot 2000, 53). According to Kanari, the cohesiveness of the groups existed only when the “pioneers” believed, with “religious devotion,” in cooperation. When the act of cooperation lost its religious aspect, the belief in its righteousness began to erode. From that moment, the Kibbutz became similar to any temporary, secular commune (Kanari 2001, 397).

The young pioneers conceived the transformation of their identity within a national messianic world view, as reflected aptly in Zvi Shatz’s description, in his diary, of his experience as a soldier sitting near the banks of the Jordan River:

“How wonderful and awkward our history is! . . . always miracles . . . when I suddenly ask myself: . . . who and what has brought me here, standing on the border, on the top of the mountain! Who has converted my Russian language into the language of the Bible and trained my hand for battle and for labor? . . . Only a tremendous revolution . . . might work such a thing, the messianic movement.”64

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64 Shatz Zvi, (Heb.) *Ai-Gval ha-Demema*, Tel Aviv, 1929, 150. In: (Luz 1987, 92).
5.2.3.7 Conclusion: the Cultural Identity of the Second Aliyah Youngsters

The typical immigrants of the Second Aliyah agriculture sector were young males raised in small or medium-sized towns or cities (with a high Jewish ethnic density), who belonged to the lower middle class and came mostly from religious homes with varying levels of piety and religious observance. They were given a traditional Jewish education (Cnaani 1976, 24-25) and most of them had no significant education of any other sort (Gorni 1996, 381). Most documents, memoirs and researches paint a picture of immature youngsters in a confused, sometimes hysterical, process of adopting a new identity with which they hoped to erase their past, especially their Jewish-rabbinical-clerical past, and transform it into a blend of socialist, revolutionary, popular ideas and messianic longings – a state of mind that was based on vague sentiments rather than clear consciousness (Landshot 74; Halp & Rein 2000, 184). And in this state of mind they were trying to function in a new environment that added culture shock to their initial confusion (Alroey 2004, 107-112).

5.2.3.7.1 The Two Phases of the Second Aliyah

As already noted in the introduction, in the period following its establishment, the PO devised a plan aimed at introducing a new repertoire that differed not only from the repertoire of the First Aliyah (1882-1902), but also from that developed by the first wave of the Second Aliyah and, later, also by the Third Aliyah (1919-1923). It is my contention that the Second and Third Aliyot must be divided into two periods and that in the first phase (1903-1908) there existed beliefs and perceptions that were fundamentally different from those developed in the second phase, after the appearance of the PO (1908-1925). I maintain that the history of the Modern Hebrew repertoire is not compatible with the division made in the historical research, which perceived the Second Aliyah as one indivisible period, and differentiated it from the Third Aliyah (1919-1923). Examination of the pre-Israel repertoire reveals that not only were the two periods of the Second Aliyah different with regard to the repertoire of the dominant group, they were different also – as a result of massive negative immigration (about 90%) – in the identity of their population. In other words, most of

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65 Which may differ in terms of ideology but were quite similar in terms of their repertoire.
the immigrants from the first phase of the Second Aliyah had already left Palestine by its second phase and by the Third Aliyah. This negative immigration, like the positive immigration after World War I, was handled to a large extent by the culture planning of the PO.

Thus, we can divide the Second Aliyah into two phases or periods. The first is sometimes referred to as the *Utopist* phase but, as described above, in terms of the history of the repertoire, it is more appropriate to designate it the *confused* and *disorganized* phase, not only because those who generated this wave of immigration had insufficient means to organize it, but also because the confused cultural identity of the young immigrants led them to develop anti-organizational models of perception; the first phase norms, as noted, were lack of discipline, individualism and even anarchism. The beginning of the second phase of the Second Aliyah is marked by the appearance of the PO, which had the means to organize it and to instill a new repertoire emphasizing collective organization and unity in perception and practice.

5.2.3.7.1.1 The First Phase of the Second Aliyah (1903-1908)

*We were afraid of that monster “a life of air” [chayey avir].*
B. Katzenelson

The main aspiration of the young workers’ leaders, especially those who came in the first wave of 1903-1905 under the influence of the propaganda of Ussishkin and Vitkin, which called for a cadre of young men from the Diaspora to enlist in a quasi-military national service, was to devote themselves to Zionist work and the development of the *Yishuv* that would be the basis for the revival of the Jewish nation. This aspiration was supposed to be achieved by turning the Jews to agricultural and manual labor, and by having them replace the Arab workers in the First Aliyah colonies. The expression used, defined by Shapira as their “battle cry,”

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66 (Katzenelson 1935, 165).
was “the conquest of labor” (Heb. kibush haavoda). However, in practice, this required depriving the Arab workers of their jobs and also the cooperation and consent of the employers in the First Aliyah colonies. According to this scheme – later to be accepted as “utopist” – the worker was supposed to work in hard conditions for low pay and the employer was supposed to earn a little less as well and to sacrifice his profits for the “national effort.” Nevertheless, after a very short period, when the young Jewish workers realized that the salary of an Arab worker was not enough for even their basic needs, let alone their future ambitions, they began to organize and, in the name of social and national justice, to demand a higher salary than that of the Arabs. They began to present differentiating models in their discourse, according to which the Arabs (as well as the oriental Jews) were “natural workers who were satisfied with little” while they were “idealistic workers,” with awareness (Heb. baaley hakara) who served a lofty ideal.

The workers’ leaders argued that their Jewish employers had to recognize that these workers were promoting the general national interest, and that therefore they had to raise their salaries and include them democratically in the management of the new society (i.e. the new colonies/agricultural settlements). However, most of the employers in the colonies considered the workers’ socialist concepts dangerous, and regarded their radical nationalism as a threat to their society. Aharon Aharonson (1876-1919), one of the dominant figures of the First Aliyah, claimed that employing local Arabs was not only an economic necessity but also a key to good relations with them. The First Aliyah people even included Arabs in their organization of guards, The Gideons (Heb. HaGidonim) established in 1913.

The clash between the young “utopist workers” and the First Aliyah employers created an impossible tension, and all attempts to bridge the gap came to a dead

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68 The sources of this call for “productive labor” can already be traced in the period of the Enlightenment in the writings of Mendelshon and his circle, as a liberating call which opposed over-concentration on business (Sluzki 1973, 42).
69 This criticism was very similar in its model to the criticism of the Jewish socialists of the Bund and so on, who frequently attacked the rich Russian-Jews who were not willing to help their poor brothers (Magen 1994, 78).
70 The employers in the towns preferred the Arab workers because the latter were cheap (almost by 50%) and considered to be obedient workers with a greater output.
end. The workers organised strikes but the strikes, as Frenkel notes, “was in most cases a self-defeating tactic because of the vast supply of Arab replacements” (Frenkel 1989, 458).

Their confused ideologies and their culture shock would seem to have led the youngsters of the first phase of the Second Aliyah to perceive the reality in Palestine through the general revolutionary world view that existed at the time in Russia. The agronomist Yitzhak Vilkinski (1880-1955), wrote in *Hapoel Hatzair* that the workers were suffering from the conceit of self-recognition” [hitganderut behakara atzmit] and Avshalom Feinberg, from the town of Zichron Yaakov, said in 1912:

“We don’t know anymore how to behave with the Hebrew workers! I have tried to treat them in a friendly way, but then the workers shouted: ‘we knew it, we knew it! With this rose-water sweetness you want to weaken our class consciousness …’ I tried to treat them as a landlord; but then they shouted even more: ‘a farmer in the land of Israel is not allowed to be a bourgeois! Both of us came here with the same idea. This landlord attitude toward us is an attitude of belittlement and humiliation that we will never tolerate!’” (in: Frenkel 1989, 459).

The inability of the workers to accept the economic situation and the conditions of the labor market led them to develop a rhetoric of “revolution for the sake of revolution.” Most of them seem not to have been capable anyway of real manual labor, let alone agricultural work, which many of them perceived in a romantic and abstract way. Mordechai Ben Hillel described a workers’ gathering in Jaffa:

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71 Vilkinski, who was appointed by Ruppin to direct the experimental farm in Beit Arif (near Lod), and the training farms of Ben-Shemen and Chulda, was the advisor for agriculture of the PO during the years 1909-1919 (Malkin 2007, 16).  
72 It is important to note in this regard that for many of them the experience of work was in itself something new; according to Gorni more than 60% of them had not worked before immigrating to Palestine (Gorni 1996).
“and our eyes looked for but couldn’t find, in the whole hall, true workers, workers that truly work. And it is quite clear: real workers…will not stay until the middle of the night to listen to chaotic and empty speeches when they have to go to work the next morning…youngsters who feed themselves with Marxist theory…like these…will not succeed in being material for building the land. We need…simple workers” (in: Frenkel 1989, 463).

The testimony of the worker is matched by that of the plantation owner. Aharon Eizenberg (1863-1931),[73] the general director of the planters’ association, wrote to Ussishkin in 1909 that in the twenty three years in which he had been in Palestine, the ten thousand Ashkenazi workers he met were no more than an “artificial labor force.” Most of them left after three years and “in no way will the condition of the Jewish community be suitable to the needs of the Hebrew worker” (in: Shafir 99-100).

In the last years of the first decade of the twentieth century, the workers were overwhelmed by growing confusion and depression. Their striving for democratization and proletarization had failed and the immense negative immigration lowered the morale of those who did stay to confront the hard material and mental conditions. Their culture shock included the disappointment of their rejection by the First Aliyah as well as their underestimation of the presence of the Arabs, which aggravated the constant conflict between their socialist universal ideals and the Zionist ideology of national revival. This dead end generated a new attitude towards idealism and utopianism. The “idealists” who had left were referred to by those who stayed as “absolute idealists” (Heb. idalistim gmurim). In Hebrew ‘gmurim’ also means “ended,” and indeed, the few “absolute idealists” who stayed on the land, and expressed their universalistic, usually Trotskyist views, were differentiated and even came to be regarded as “traitors” and a hostile internal element.[74]

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[73] The director of the Netaim Association; the largest capitalist enterprise of the period.
[74] See e.g. Ben Gurion’s speech at the agricultural convention (1931) “if the [Hebrew worker] loses his faith, if he stops fighting – then the will of the hostile farmer, the effendi oppressor, the communist traitor [will win],” in: (Karpi 1978, 130).
The labor movement leadership began to realize that the workers’ “over-idealism” was one of the main reasons for the negative immigration. In his opening speech at a gathering of Poalei Tzion party in 1910, one of the members (Avner) said:

“Most of the immigrants cannot live as workers. Their exaggerated idealism is their obstacle, it deceived them. Now he [the new immigrant] is exhausted. And those idealists cannot continue to live, even in the most comfortable conditions, as simple workers” (in: Meir 1983, 43-44).

Among those who stayed and started their way as salaried workers there was a great deal of social mobility, especially among the more educated immigrants and, after a very short time, they joined the clerical or educational system or turned to the liberal professions. “Who are most of the farmers in Eretz Yisrael?” we read in *Hapoel Hatzair* “if not yesterday’s idealists…who is the Eretz Yisraeli supervisor […] if not yesterday’s idealistic worker?” (in: Frenkel 1989, 453). This development came about because the farmers and plantation owners needed people to supervise the Arab workers in the orchards and on the construction sites and many of the young immigrants seized the opportunity and left their “ideals” behind. “Despair pervades the heart” wrote A.D. Gordon about this period and Ben Gurion remarked:


5.2.3.7.1.2 The Second Phase of the Second Aliyah (1908-1918)

Disappointment in idealistic and utopist solutions, as well as their leaders’ recognition that their goals could not be achieved by the masses from “below,” created a crisis that thinned the workers’ ranks, weakened their political power, and threatened the entire development of the labor movement. The tiny, divided worker class, composed mainly of young male immigrants, was in a constant tremble as their hope for mass proletarian immigration was revealed as wishful thinking. This crisis, i.e., the collapse of “absolute idealism” or the first utopist phase, was recognized by the labor movement at approximately the same time as the PO and Ruppin appeared in Palestine.
From the beginning of his work, Ruppin realized that the workers’ idea of the “conquest of labor” was not suitable for the economic and cultural conditions of Palestine. His analysis asserted that there was a vast difference between the “young element’s” standard of living and that of the Arab peasants:

“The falachs [Arab peasants] do not go to school and don’t want an ordered medical system. They don’t have demands for vacations and entertainment, for cosmetic or hygiene products [their diet is drab and includes bread, mush (from oats), cheese and olives. The Jewish worker, on the other hand, however much he reduces his demands, cannot give up the minimum comforts of western civilization” (Ruppin 1919a, 269).

Ruppin’s saw the roots of the Jewish workers’ problem in the perceptions and practices that had been dominant since the 1880s in First Aliyah society. From its early beginnings, this colonial society transferred European standards of life into the Asian environment. The transfer of a high level of life into a milieu with lower standards resulted in the creation of an “artificial economic enclave.” In the long run, Ruppin wrote, the Yishuv will not be able to maintain different levels of salary for Arabs and Jews. Thus it is inevitable that the power of economic competition will lead the Arab worker to penetrate and take control of the Jewish economic sector, and the Jews will be pushed (like in Europe) into non-productive, secondary positions (entrepreneurs, merchants, brokers etc.) (in: Bertisch 1980, 97). Since the struggle against the Arab wage level was hopeless, the only possible solution, according to Ruppin, would be to separate the Arab and Jewish economic systems. This analysis, together with his aforementioned views on the importance of the racial segregation of the Jewish community, led the PO to create an exclusive Modern Hebrew enclave within the economic cultural field of Palestine by developing an agricultural and industrial system, infrastructures, transportation and other services to be operated under the umbrella of the PO.

75 Ruppin used this argument also in his letter to Hope-Simpson, when he explained to him why “it is impossible for the pioneers to compete with the Arab peasant in the work market” (Ruppin to John Hope-Simpson ([7 Dec., 1930], in: Bein III, 194-195).
As already discussed, the appearance of the PO under the direction of Ruppin marks the shift of Zionism from its diplomatic to its practical period. In the history of the labor movement in Palestine, the appearance of Ruppin’s PO marks the switch from “utopist” and, more important, from *disorganized*, independent and even anarchical conduct, to a new perception of practical organization. His appearance thus marks the changeover from the first to the second phase of the Second Aliyah.

While there were some elements in the labor movement that aspired to emphasize the class struggle, these were neutralized by the activities of the PO. Ruppin’s PO favoured collaboration with Hapoel Hatzair party far more than with Poalei Tzion because of the latter’s tendency to stress socialist interests over national ones. Ruppin collaborated with Hapoel Hatzair mainly because, already from its first beginnings, it had had reservations about the Russian revolution, claiming that the energy invested in it might be at the expense of the energy directed to the national mission (Frenkel 1989, 431). Moreover, they accepted the mission of spreading the Hebrew language, including holding their meetings and managing their correspondence in Hebrew (Halpern & Reinhartz 2000, 201).

The changes that soon took place in the ideology of the Poalei Tzion party resulted quite clearly from the policies of the PO and the new repertoire it instilled. In 1910 Brenner wrote in *Hapoel Hatzair* (the party journal), in response to the idea that the function of Poalei Tzion was to disseminate socialist theory in the Middle East: “those who live here know the difficulties of our lives here…without preaching to Arabs, Turks, Armenians and Greeks…on social justice – won’t they only laugh at us?…Here we want finally to cease, being gypsies and teachers of others…and to cast off the “privilege” of being a ‘light unto the nations’” (Frenkel 1989, 432). Brenner, who a few years later (through his contacts with Agnon) became the translator of Ruppin’s *The Jews of Today* into Hebrew, reflects the change in the state of mind of the young immigrants, and its conversion from the idealist socialist repertoire.

The periodization of Zionist historiography tends to create a continuity between the periods prior to and following Ruppin’s appearance, and it defines the Second Aliya as one indivisible historical period that began in 1903 and ended in 1914. However, as described above, by the end of World War I. only 10% or even fewer of the
immigrants of that period were still in Palestine. This historical representation detracts from the crucial changes that the PO’s culture planning made in the field. As I have described above, most of the Second Aliya immigrants left Palestine but even those who stayed had no coherent culture plan before the PO’s appearance and, in many cases, their ideology and beliefs conflicted with those instilled by the PO.

5.2.4 The Impact of the Palestine Office on the Workers

As will be demonstrated in the following, Ruppin’s vision and intervention gradually changed the world view of the workers’ leaders and shaped it in accordance with the new repertoire he aspired to instill. The PO’s economic development and administrative expansion and the establishment of modern public and private institutions – from banks to schools – created new work opportunities that enabled the young immigrants to improve their conditions and status. Its policies also gave every Jew who could put together a minimal amount of money the chance to buy land in one of the settlements and become an independent farmer. “The young radical from among the Russian immigrants” wrote Frenkel, “who gained some experience […] found himself under constant pressure to climb one or two rungs in the socio-economic ladder” (Frenkel 1989, 453). In 1912 it was quite clear to Achad Ha’am, for example, that most of the immigrants “don’t want to be workers for more than a few years, and they dream of becoming independent farmers” (in: Karpi & Shapira 1978, 16). It became a known fact that as soon as a worker was able to obtain land, he almost always turned into a small farmer and hired Arab workers.  

76 Katzsenelson wrote in 1909:

“[…] and so, slowly slowly all the veterans and best workers become – supervisors, and don’t even feel what the nature of this kind of work is. […] it is reasonable that the only one who doesn’t want to be a supervisor is Gordon (no. there are many more.) yet Gordon is a Jew who maintains himself and his

76 See e.g. the case of the “first workers’ moshav” Ein Ganim (Halpern & Reinharz 2000, 247). Though the moshav regulations declared that they would not employ Arabs, they did employ them from the first stage of their establishment; e.g., the Arabs dug their well (Drori 1998, 71). This case demonstrates how crucial the Arab workforce was and how artificial was the demand of the Second Aliyah workers for “Hebrew Work” (Heb. Avoda Ivrit).
family on sixty copeks per day, and says that he doesn’t lack anything” (in: Frenkel 1989, 453).

The idealistic notions of the immigrants became more flexible vis a vis the socio-economic reality of Palestine, and many of the workers who stayed began to cooperate with the planters and employers in the First Aliyah settlements and in the towns. Nevertheless, the altered perceptions and practices of the minority of youngsters who stayed in the country did not occur initially as a result of the development of their ideological consciousness – which was confused and immature – but from the culture planning activities of the PO and the new models it supplied. The main sites for this process were the training farms and groups established by Ruppin from the very beginning.

5.2.4.1 “Contract Groups” and “Conquest Groups”

The first model of the PO’s groups was that of “contract groups” [Heb. kvutzot kablaniyot] which were established for one particular project without any other obligation or further connection with the PO. In such “contract groups,” the method of dividing the profits and the level of cooperation varied greatly. As Paz-Yeshayahu notes, at this stage, what characterized the groups was more the “responsibility” they received rather than the form of “cooperation” or “collectivity” (Kolatt 2006, 56).

The contract group had many functions but one of its most important ones was to serve as a “conquest group” (Heb. kvutzat kibosh); a temporary group whose role was to cultivate the lands of the JNF in order to preserve ownership rights and prepare them for future settlement (Paz-Yeshayahu 2006, 104). The “contract” type of group – including the “conquest group” – operated, in one way or another, throughout the whole period of the Yishuv. Their internal organization varied and was decided upon within an ad hoc framework. Only at the beginning of the twenties did the names kvutza and, later, kibbutz begin to designate the cooperative settlements as we know them today and as they are referred to by most scholars (Kolatt 2006, 56).

77 E.g. only at the end of 1922, more than 10 years after its establishment, did Degania’s members decide to operate on a fully communal basis (Paz-Yeshayahu 2006, 116).
5.2.4.2 The First Stage of Kinneret

In its first few years, the Kinneret farm functioned more or less as a “contract” and “conquest group” and was directed by a professional agronomist and representative of the PO. According to Ruppin’s diary, Moshe Berman was the only person he could find at the time to manage the farm; he was “the man on the spot” and impressed Ruppin because he seemed to him an authentic example of a “muscled Jew” (Bein 1968, I, 74).

The problem with Berman was that he managed the farm according to the Russian estate manager model with which he was acquainted – that of a master who expects blind obedience. He also kept a clear distance and social barrier between himself and the workers (Bein 1968, I, 74). “Master” (Heb. ha-adon) Berman lived apart from them in a spacious private house, while the workers had to make do with rickety huts. He did not take the workers seriously and addressed them rudely and condescendingly. He took part of the farm’s produce for himself and, what is more, and this was extremely important to the young workers, he employed Arabs without any reservations (Baratz 1948, 43).

In October 1909, and again in February 1911, the workers of Kinneret farm went on strike to protest Berman’s management. The strike of 1909 was followed by an enraged memo to Ruppin from the workers, demanding that he fire Berman on the spot. In the second strike, Ruppin went to the Galilee himself and, after a long discussion with the workers, fired Berman and three of the workers, and installed a manager (Yoel Golda) with more sensitivity to the demands of the workers. One of the new manager’s innovations, which reflected his new style of management, was to give prizes to the best workers (Shilo 1988, 133-135).

According to Katzenelson, Ruppin did not want him to participate in the negotiations because he had the “reputation of a very dangerous revolutionary and as one responsible for the strike.”78 Ruppin’s decision signaled his approach to the workers: he agreed to listen to their demands but rejected any kind of revolutionary acts which

might overstep the bounds of discipline and loyalty to the PO management and its representatives.

### 5.2.4.3 The Emergence of the First Collective Group (kevutza): Degania

In the course of their 1909 discussion, Ruppin and the workers agreed to establish a collective group in *Um Jaʿuni* (the Arab name of “Degania;” from the Hebrew word *dagan* = corn).\(^79\) This eventually became the first of these groups, and is still known as “the mother of all collective groups” (Heb. *em hakvutzot*).

In 1910, Ruppin, in the name of the PO, signed a contract with the workers for one year.\(^80\) This contract between the PO and the first group in Degania stated: “We, the undersigned workers, are obliged to work for the PLDC and to follow the instruction of its clerks” (Dayan 1935, 33). The contract noted explicitly that the inventory was the property of the PO (Frenkel 1976, 64). It also stated that, at the end of the year, the PO would be obliged to assess the financial situation and divide the profits (if any) between the PO and the members of the group.\(^81\) This model was later applied to others groups established by the PO (Frenkel 1976, 64). Immediately after Ruppin signed the contract with the workers, he wrote (9 Dec. 1909) enthusiastically to Köln:

> “In the last hour we have managed to fulfill the establishment of the settlement group in Kinneret. In *Um Jaʿuni* we have erected one shed, united six of the most industrious workers in the Galilee in one group and have given them the necessary capital and inventory” (in: Dayan 1935, 27).

In his discreet manner Ruppin asked the workers to keep the news secret. A few days later he wrote to the management of the PLDC in Berlin and explained to them that it was impossible to find workers with capital, and, since they could not give credit to

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\(^79\) The name was invented by Busel who sent a letter to Ruppin to get his approval.

\(^80\) For a detailed description of their agreement see: (Dayan 1935, 25-30; Landshot 2000, 44).

\(^81\) This however was only a façade to appease the WZO management. The Degania group, like the rest of the groups, worked at a loss and it is clear that without the constant and massive help of the PO they would not have survived.
workers without means, they had come to an agreement that the inventory would be considered PO property (Dayan 1935, 27).

Ruppin and the PO supervised the social and economic development of the groups “through a magnifying glass” as Tal puts it, and they were closely aware of the personal processes the workers underwent (Tal 1994, 4). The contract between Ruppin and the first group in Degania had stated: “We, the undersigned workers, are obliged to work for the PLDC and to follow the instruction of its clerks” (Dayan 1935, 33). The young workers – “the pioneers” – were actually employees of the PO (officially until the end of 1919, Frenkel 1976, 68), and Ruppin could fire them according to his own judgment, as indeed he did in a few cases. Until 1920, Degania had the status of a leased farm. The PO funded everyday activities, paid the salaries of the workers and provided professional advice on every aspect of administrative, social, architectural and economic planning (see e.g., Dayan 1935, 73).

Almost three months after the first group was established, Ruppin suggested, in his report to Köln, that Degania should grow to 20 members and that another group should be established on JNF or PLDC lands. And, in fact, in 1913, Ruppin did establish another group, in Gan Shmuel near Hadera, and then, in 1915, yet another in Hulda (Bein 1968, II, 90).

This model of a select group, which gains incentives and independence according to its success, was not implemented by Ruppin only in the agriculture sector, (although it should be noted that that was its main focus) but in many other fields too, as, for example, with the establishment of urban “contract groups” (Heb. kvutzot kablaniyot) or of “working contractors” (Heb. poalim kablanim) (Bein 1968, II, 284).

“yes, I [Ruppin] see great importance in giving credit for establishing groups of working contractors, who will, in the future, carry out certain jobs for fixed prices, especially in the field of construction” (Bein 1968, II, 284).

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82 A copy of the contract in the original German can be found in: (CZA, L2 364 84/5)
83 Ruppin to Zionist Central Office, [13 Feb. 1910], CZA Z2/634.
The model of the core social unit which Ruppin planned and produced became the prototype for the bureaucratic and personal interactions and organization of the Modern Hebrew social field. We can even trace this model in the establishment of the Workers’ Bank (Bank Hapoalim) founded in 1921 by the Histadrut and the WZO (a case that will be presented later).

The cooperative settlements, collective groups and kibbutzim that were established after, the first group, Degania, received Ruppin’s vigorous support although he did not participate in their embryonic stages as in the case of Degania. Ruppin also helped in shaping the first Workers’ Settlement (Heb. moshav ovdim)\(^{84}\) and the first Large Group, the cradle of the “Big Kibbutz” (Heb. Kibbutz Gadol),\(^{85}\) as well as other kinds of settlement structures (e.g. the achuzot).\(^{86}\) The model of the first group in Degania became the prototype for shaping the various new kinds of cooperative settlement, and it succeeded within a few years in becoming the symbol for a new period, as “a new form of life that is in contrast to what has been done in our settlements until then.”\(^{87}\)

5.2.4.4 The Collective Group System as a Transitional Space and Phase

For Ruppin, the training farms and groups were “an exceptional school for the identification (Identifizierung) and selection (Aussonderung) of the unfit (Ungeeigenten)” (Ruppin 1924; Korolik 1985, 135). Ruppin believed that the collective group was a temporary social structure that would change in the long run: “None of the new social formations can be certain of its existence for all future time. For a long time yet there must be changes and transitions from one system to another”

\(^{84}\) From the letter of Eliezer Yafe to Ruppin (1921), in which he describes the structure of the first “workers’ town” (Heb. moshav ovdim), we can learn that Yafe’s plans were devised and formulated to meet the approval of Ruppin, and that prior to the formulation of his plan he negotiated with Ruppin for a few years (CZA S15/20866).

\(^{85}\) Most of those who established Ein Charod and Nahalal came from Kineret as, too, did the women workers’ groups who were “created,” as Rachel Katzenelson put it, “in Kineret’s ‘backyard’” (Heb. hachatzer hakineratit), (Katzenelson 1946, 219).

\(^{86}\) Many of Ruppin’s initiatives were made with a purely business approach and, through his mediation, many Jewish investors bought parcels of land and financed the building of houses and the first cultivation of the land by the “conquest groups” in order to be able to settle there later themselves more comfortably. Jews from Saint Luis bought Poria, Jews from Chicago bought Sharona, Jews from Bialistock bought Uriya Village and a group of Russian Zionists bought the Migdal Farm (Tzur 1984, 28).

Ruppin estimated that each group (or other cooperative association established by the PO) might disintegrate within ten to fifteen years as a result of disagreement among its members, something that would lead to the division of the land into private units (Ruppin 1936a, 127). This was the reason for his suggestion that the kibbutzim be planned in such a way as to make possible their future conversion, at minimal expense, to a social form based on a lesser level of cooperation or to private farms. Ruppin consistently opposed the groups’ demand to establish permanent communal buildings such as dining rooms. The first permanent dining room in the kibbutzim was established, only after long negotiations with the PO, in 1929 (in Genigar), almost twenty years after the establishment of the first group (Tal 1994, 4-7).

Kinneret and the Degania group served for years as transition points. Hundreds of people passed through Degania in its first years and in Degania B., (Heb. Degania Bet) which was established near Degania, the entire population changed completely within a few years (Kanari 2001, 383-384; The Book of the Group 1925, 131). Actually, as Kanari pointed out, “the vast movement inside and outside [Degania], was the thing which made its existence possible […] and stabilized both its economic and its social situation” (ibid.).

With the success of the first group in Degania, the PO began to reproduced this model of settlement in other places too. On the outskirts of the towns, small groups of workers who had failed to find their place in the towns or new immigrants who had just arrived were encouraged to organize themselves under the auspices of the PO. If such a group included more than eight members, they were entitled to receive the PO’s help: a few tents, a small piece of land and minimal financial assistance to help them survive (Myers 1995, 134). Most of the workers who established this sort of

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88 This view that the group was only an impermanent solution was accepted by many of the workers' leaders. See e.g. Katzenelson’s lecture at his speech at the Third Conference of Judean Workers in 1913 (Frenkel 1976, 67).
89 As the number of members in the first Degania increased, they decided to divide the group and its lands into two groups and established Degania B. Later they established a third group, Degania C. (degania gimel), which later became Kibbutz Beit Zeraa (meaning in Hebrew: the house of seed/semen).
90 In addition to Kineret and Degania, the PO established, prior to 1913, also Merchavia, Gan Shmuel in Samaria and Ben Shemen and Chulda in Judea and by doing so paved the way for the form of settlement on national land with national capital funds (Malkin 2006, 187). Until 1924, the number of groups established according to this model was 32 (The Book of the Group, 154-155).
agricultural group came to Kinneret and Degania for training. Thus, Kinneret and Degania were an important center for Ruppin’s selection plans and for the dissemination of the PO’s repertoire. By the time the first waves of the Third Aliyah (1919-1923) arrived in Palestine after World War I, the form of the group in Degania already exemplified the way to achieve an organized and healthy society and to fulfill the highest national aspirations of “conquest of labor” and “conquest of land.” The Third Aliyah’s central organization, the Labor Battalion (Heb. Gedud HaAvoda) was similar in its organization to that of the “Stumm system” already discussed, and gave its members incentives for what was described by one of their leaders as rewards for:

“mutual criticism, studying [how to work] and [letting] the good and strong workers supervise the weak and sloppy…to influence each member to take care of organizing the internal life” (in: Margalit 2006, 138-139).

The number of members in the Labor Battalion did not exceed 665 at any given time, but almost 2,500 are estimated to have passed through it during the years of its existence (1920-1927), and many of them found their way to the groups and kibbutzim and became part of the generation that established Israel (Elon 1971, 140). As in the case of Kinneret and Degania, the Labor Battalion served as a selective and transitional space which trained a new type of productive worker as well as providing a constant supply of new agents for the reproduction of the PO’s repertoire.

During the Third Aliyah, the PO’s selective system was already working in an organized way. Ruppin’s experience in his first years made it clear to him that the process of selection had to begin already in Europe, and the ideas concerning selectivity spread in many Zionist youth movements and most explicitly in the Young Guard movement (Heb. Ha-Shomer Ha-Tzair) (Margalit 1970, 245; Halamish 2000, 185; Peled 2002, Nur 2004).

91 The Third Aliyah (1919-1923) brought to the Land of Israel about 35,000 Jews. Most of them were young and unmarried and saw themselves as pioneers. Most of them were very poor and planned to make a living as workers. Their main difference from the Second Aliyah was that they came organized.
The Third Aliyah immigrant Golda Meir described the relationship of her generation to the Second Aliyah in the following way:

“it seems to me that the main importance of the Third Aliyah lies in our acceptance (Heb. Kabalata) of this Torah that our friends from the Second Aliyah passed on to us (Heb. masru lanu). We accepted it wholeheartedly (Heb. believ shalem) and happily and kept its mitzvoth” (Meir 1972, 77).

Meir’s description of the relationship between the Second and Third Aliyot reflects the claims stated above. First of all, concerning the process of reproducing the repertoire, and secondly, regarding the attitude of the immigrants to this new repertoire, which was conceived by them as a new religious practice; Meir’s description alludes explicitly to Pirkei Avot (the Ethics of the Fathers) and to the traditional Jewish model for transmitting knowledge.

5.2.5. Ruppin’s Models for Organizing the Social Field

5.2.5.1. The Instilling of “Statist[ic] Consciousness”

Statistics were an important part of the “magnifying glass” used by the PO to monitor the groups. Every few months, the PO issued a standard form to each group, to be completed by one of the workers. The form was marked out into lines for “men,” “woman” and “children” and columns for race and gender: Ashkenazim, Sephardim, Yemenites, “Mountain people” (Heb. harariim). The categories in this standard form reflected the ethnic differentiations implemented by the PO in the field. In this case, statistics were more than a means of representing ethnicity; they were instrumental in its very construction. The standard statistical form was one of a variety of models of perception and practice which provided the “pioneers” with the justification to consider themselves a distinct and superior group. The young Second

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92 This mission was taken seriously by the office and its agents within the groups. See for example the worker Eliezer Yafe’s letter to Ruppin in which he apologizes for not sending the statistical forms on time (CZA, L2/751).
93 (CZA, L2/751). “Mountain people” designated the Caucasian and Kurdish Jews (see e.g. Eschkoli 220, 1937). In a statistic report from 1914 the Sephardim and the Kurds are put under the same heading, a step towards the unification of the new “Easterns” (mizrachim) (CZA, L2/751).
Aliyah immigrants quickly internalized this model of perception, and it became a tool for their internal process of selection. One statistical report to the PO from the Galilee in 1914 featured the following remark (written under “comments”):

“there are 197 workers in all the agricultural settlements of the Palestine Office, among them fifty-four who are superfluous and a burden on the settlement” (CZA, L2/75I).

In the case of the training farms and groups, Ruppin used statistics in order to accumulate statist and informational capital as well as to intervene in and monitor the development of those whom he perceived as candidates for the future leadership of the Modern Hebrew Volk. The statistical stream of data from the groups to the PO was important not only for the information it contained, but also for its impact on the workers’ perceptions; it instilled a sense of order while at the same time providing an important measuring tool for the productivity of the groups’ members.

The incorporation of statistics in the repertoire of the Second and Third Aliyot shaped its members’ models of perception and was an important factor in their exceptional ability to organize efficiently and speedily. It also accelerated the naturalization of the perception of “people as datum,” the inevitable result of Palestinian Zionism’s elevation of collectivity over the individual.

5.2.5.2. Selectivity

As already described at length, Ruppin’s weltanschauung was based on Völkisch nostalgia for ‘lost purity’ and offered scientific reassurance that “pure-race Jews” were not biologically doomed to destruction, although in his day such purity remained tantalizingly out of reach, with its traits scattered in diverse combinations throughout the Jewish Volk.

Ruppin’s methodology for organizing the Jewish Volkskörper in Palestine through selection was no different from that of the German eugenicists, who were obsessed with analyzing processes of social selection (soziale Auslese) and developing them
into practical models (see: Hutton 2005, 99). Since its initial stage, the PO was looking for high quality *Menschenmaterial* to serve as a base for the healthy *Volkskörper* (Ruppin 1919). At the same time, Ruppin and his PO did everything they could to prevent the penetration of negative or rather *dysgenic* “elements.” In his lecture to the 15th Zionist Congress (1927) he explained his policy in sober words:

> “Some believe that in Palestine a higher type of human being [höherer Menschentyp] will develop by itself. I don’t share this belief. What we sow today, we will reap in the future” (Krolik 1985, 181).

The 32 year old Ruppin, ambitious and determined, armed with a coherent *Weltanschauung* enabling him to oscillate between scientific knowledge, statistical data and, above all, the *intuitive objectivity* of a Jewish *Übermensch*, understood that the first stage in establishing a new social entity was a critical period that must be experimental and bold in order to create an exemplary society that would be a master model for following generations. It was meant to be a formative stage which demanded of its participants discipline of body and mind, and a strong sense of responsibility for the racial health of the collective.

Ruppin’s demand for “quality immigration” was repeated in many forums and emphasized that “in the selection of the human material […] lies the structure of the Jewish population of the Land of Israel in the future” (Ruppin 1919, 63). Historical researches show that Ruppin operated a program of selection both in Palestine and in Europe. According to the data of Alroey, between 1912-1914 the PO implemented Ruppin’s explicit selective policy and rejected about 80% of those who aspired to immigrate into Palestine (Alroey 2004, 173). The PO policy, as Tahon (Ruppin’s secretary) summarized it, was: “unfortunately, in most cases we are advising [the candidates for immigration] not to come.” The PO and, later, the *Jewish Agency*

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94 “the work at the *Palestine Office* occupied me from morning until late at night and I do not remember taking one single day off during my first three years of working there” (Ruppin, LBI dairies, 106).

95 Ruppin explicitly defined the first stage of his culture plan as different from the next stages: “after the first ten years, which are the most difficult years and they demand enormous organization-power [koach irgun] and self-sacrifice from the Jews, after that the development will be easier and faster” (Ruppin 1919f, 78).

96 He continued with this approach in the 1920s and 1930s as well (Karpi 2004, 14).

adopted a policy that championed the immigration only of those Zionist elements who were healthy in body and soul and capable of assisting in the building of a future state. At the same time those institutions prevented the immigration of others who did not meet Zionist criteria. It must be emphasized that during the 1920s, the limits that were determined by the British mandate, were coordinated, more or less, with the Palestinian Zionist leadership and, although the Zionist Organization (histadrut hatzionit) protested at the declarative level, in practice, the Zionist management was quite satisfied with these limitations (Dothan 1979, 15). Ruppin was consistent in his selective approach to Jewish immigration into Palestine and even during the 1930s supported the policy that Jewish refugees who needed help be diverted to other countries (Karpi 2004, 14; Halamish 2006, 429).

Ruppin’s immigration policy marks a radical change from the formerly prevailing perception of the WZO – from Herzl to Ussishkin and in the first phase of the Second Aliyah – which, ever since the 1880s, had been that Palestine should be a refuge for the East European Jewish masses without any regard to their particular racial quality or identity.

Ruppin’s immigration policy was strongly connected to his eugenic perceptions according to which the new Modern Hebrew space in Palestine should be a breeding ground for a new healthy Jewish type. This “higher type of human being” (höherer Menschentyp), which was eventually to become the dominant racial element in the old-new Jewish species, was termed later by Ruppin “the Maccabean type” (Ruppin 1940, 287).

Ruppin believed that his eugenic culture plan was meant for only part of those referred as ‘the Jews’ and that that was the only way to preserve the existence of the Jewish race and nation. Unlike Herzl, whose idea was that Palestine would be the refuge of all the persecuted and poverty stricken Jews of the Pale, Ruppin believed that the solution for these masses was immigration to the USA (Ruppin 1914a, 206).

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98 *Immigration Department of the Palestine Zionist Executive, Instructions for the Medical Examination of Immigrants, Compiled by the Health Council of the Palestine Zionist Executive, Jerusalem, 1926,* in: (Shvarts, Davidovitch Seidelman & Goldman 2005, 9).
5.2.5.3. The Sources of Ruppin’s Planning

Ruppin’s selective culture plan was based on the establishment of a network of training farms and agricultural settlements that would enable him to achieve the two main goals already mentioned: to control the lands that the PO supervised, and, through selection, to consolidate, the “good Menschenmaterial.”

I repeat here my contention that the establishment of the network of training farms and groups was not an ad-hoc solution emerging from “reality itself” as most history books would have it.99 Let us not forget that, already in his days at the university, inspired by his close friendship with one of the central leaders of the German youth movement, Gustav Wynecken,100 Ruppin had planned a “uniform school” (Einheitsschule), to educate Prussian youth to serve the fatherland.101 Ruppin’s plan combined agricultural and factory work, sports, gymnastics, military training and life in a community: “The school must become a self-contained organism that constitutes a state in miniature.”102 His plan was an explicit attempt to train a new type of man and woman (Lacqueur 1962, 54) and can be seen as an early sketch for his culture planning activities in the training farm he established in Kinneret and a harbinger of his group system. Indeed, 15 years before he met the twenty-year old legendary “pioneer” David Busel,103 he was already dreaming of and planning training systems that would create a “new man.”

The most important points in Ruppin’s early plans were similar to those of his later culture planning in Palestine: the transformation of the body through productivization and militarization and the absolute importance of the state and of the collective (as opposed to the “overvalued” individual).104

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99 See, e.g., Anita Shapira: “the actual state of affairs in Palestine [led to the creation of the first Group]” (Shapira 1982, 110).
100 Ruppin was one of the first readers of Wynecken’s plans (Lacqueur 1962, 54; Korolik 1985, 97)
101 Ruppin’s educational plans were directed at German culture and expressed his attempts to legitimize his belonging by proving his contribution to the German state and Volk.
102 Ruppin, Aphorism, [13 January 1899], (CZA, A107/217).
103 Busel is considered in the common narrative to be the “unshakeable leader” of Degania and one of the founders of the first group. His important relationship with Ruppin will be discussed further on.
5.2.5.3.1 The new German “Science of Work” (Arbeitwissenschaft) and the “Stumm system”

However, Ruppin’s operative plans regarding the young immigrants of the Second Aliyah were not only the continuation of the plans he had envisaged in his university days but were also connected to the new “science of work” (Arbeitwissenschaft) that had emerged in Germany in the 1890s and created new management models in the factories and new labor relations between owners and workers (Rabinbach 1982, 189-202).

This evolving repertoire presented new ways of molding the working class through a new system of connotative codes designed to give meaning to the workers’ lives. The new system of labor relations in Germany was often referred to as the “Stumm system,” since its most consistent and powerful advocate was the steel industrialist and conservative politician Karl Ferdinand von Stumm (1843-1925), and while he worked mainly in the Saar, the system was accepted by all the major factories in Germany. The “Stumm system” combined far-reaching and disciplinary work rules with an extensive array of social provisions in order to attract a loyal core of workers (Arbeiterstamm) who would curb independent labor organizations. The system was founded on a set of assumptions which identified the employer as the “provider” (or father-figure; Brotgeber), and the workers as dependants (or children) in the larger factory “family” (Arbeiterfamilie). As the director of his steel factory in the town of Neunkirchen, Stumm in fact regularly referred to himself as the head of a “family of workers” (Sweeny 1998, 36-37). In this context, “productive” work was sanctified and associated with moral qualities and attributes. The workers celebrated hard work and labor discipline for their moral aspects: work was considered a “means of improvement” and charged with values such as orderliness and moderation, which deterred the individual from engaging in ‘idle’ or dissolute pursuits. The company’s social welfare services were not simply part of the wage nexus; they were inspired by a wider ambition towards cultural refinement and aspired to achieve the moral and intellectual elevation of the workers’ estate. This involved inculcating the values of thrift and saving, sobriety and moderation, obedience and loyalty to the factory family.

via schemes for income savings, loan programs and housing co-operatives that offered the workers the financial means to purchase their own homes (Sweeny 1998, 40). The company officials often monitored the moral lives of their workforce, and kept a rigorous eye on the sexual and marital lives of the employees. Young workers could be sacked for illicit (i.e. non-marital) cohabitation, and at several firms workers who wished to marry were expected to seek approval for the marriage from their employer. However, the process of selection was conducted mostly by the workers themselves.106

Ruppin’s attitude to the workers as his sons, which gave him the image and nickname of “The Father” soon after his appearance, was very similar to the “Stumm system” repertoire. His overall approach to the Second Aliyah immigrants, his constant call to make them partners in the creation107 (merely nominal ones in the early stages), and his emphasis on charging their work with a significance that went beyond mere economic calculations, are distinctly modeled on the “Stumm system.” The way he managed the network of training farms and settlement groups, based on planning, monitoring and meticulous statistics, and his focus on the worker’s body and its productivity were also part of the “Stumm system” repertoire. Furthermore, the group system established by Ruppin was similar to that of the employers in the Saar who, in 1906, started to organize groups of “healthy and work-capable (arbeitsfähig) employees.”108

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106 E.g., workers were subjected to fines or dismissal for drinking and were expected to report on the drinking habits of their colleagues: those under forty who appeared to drink too much, and thus represented both a moral threat and a future financial burden on the company’s sickness fund, were immediately dismissed (Sweeny 1998, 40).
107 This attitude, which was part of the “Stumm System” repertoire, was shaped also by his critical assessment of the First Aliyah. In the following account regarding the Baron’s administration, one can detect the models of German Arbeitwissenschaft: “The third mistake was that the system of administration blocked the development of a spirit of independence among the colonists. An agricultural expert was appointed for every group of colonies; his instructions to the colonists were binding, but the risk was carried, formally and legally, by the colonists themselves. A situation like this is impossible in the long run. I can imagine two methods of agricultural colonization. A man may work under the direction of an administrator, but without taking responsibility. It is also possible for a settler to make his own decisions on his own responsibility. But it is hard for me to imagine a system under which the farmer must bear the responsibility while following the instructions of the administrator. It is for this reason that the Jewish colonist does not feel the same responsibility as the farmer who takes the risk for his own decisions. I will cite only one example of the disadvantages which result from this system of guardianship over the colonists. At one time a number of Jewish colonists, under instruction from Baron Rothschild, planted a certain type of grape. Later it was found that this type was not worthwhile. The consequence was that colonists were compelled to uproot the vines, and to ask the Baron to cover their losses. Which he did” (Ruppin 1908, 3).
108 Studien und soziale Aufgaben sowie deren Lösung (Völklingen, 1906), 13. In: (Sweeny
One of the first phases in the “Stumm System” model of culture planning was the installation of sanitary facilities (Rabinbach 1992, 35-38). The new forms of sanitation and hygiene were part of the eugenic repertoire and were associated with the sanitation, hygiene, purification etc. of the race and the *Volkskörper*. This kind of planning was carried out by Ruppin too, and one of his first symbolic and practical moves was to build toilets and to instill a perception of hygiene that was contrary in its essence to the “barefoot Tolstoyan beatnik style” that was part of the repertoire of the rebellious youth of the Second Aliyah.\(^\text{109}\)

From his first days in the PO Ruppin mediated between the capital owners – both private and national – and the workers. In a lecture he delivered to the planters in 1914 we can hear, in his conceptual vocabulary, how he transferred the “Stumm system” models into the field:

> “The strikes now are not such a burden as they used to be. The workers who arrive now are experienced in agricultural work [...] you can achieve understanding with them. In one of the gatherings, I expressed to the workers my opinion that the work in the settlements demanded that they adapt their behavior in order to attract Hebrew capital, and that it was necessary to establish an institution that would include both the employers and the workers in order to find a compromise in cases of conflict. I still hold this view now. And the employers should not fear such an institution.\(^\text{110}\) […] the radical views of the workers do not make me despair: in due time they will die out.”

(CZA L2/70, 1-2, 4).

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\(^{1998, 49}\) On the ideas of breeding colonies in the *Monist League* see: (Gasman 1971, 152).

\(^{109}\) Ruppin was also the one who initiated the law that every apartment in Tel Aviv (the first modern-Hebrew city) must have a toilet (Bein 1968, I, 225; II, 56).

\(^{110}\) The idea of such an institution, which was fully implemented during the 1920s with Ruppin’s dominant participation, shows how Ruppin was succeeding in implementing his culture planning.
Ruppin’s management model was very different from that of the Zionist leaders who preceded him, and his criticism reflects the shift he generated in labor relations in the Zionist colony:

“I resent Mr. Sheinkin, who says that by indulgence we spread demoralization among the workers. The truth is that by means of good treatment we strengthen their love of work and remove the feeling of despair that was beginning to be rooted in their hearts. Like a father with a son, we must teach the workers and accustom them to work. Patience is required. Baron [Rothschild] suffered from you as well” (ibid., 4) (my emphasis, E.B.).“

In the same lecture Ruppin presented the group to the plantation owners as a means of molding productive workers: “in Chulda [one of the training farms] I saw how the group rejected the lazy [workers]” he reported to them (ibid). Three years before, in an article in the major workers’ journal Hapoel Hatzair, Ruppin had put forward plans for the young immigrants, formulated according to the Stumm incentive system:

“The desirable age for immigration to the Land of Israel is 17; after that: 1-2 years as an apprentice on one of the training farms; 2 years as a worker with private farmers in the moshavot; 5 years as a worker within the associations [e.g. the groups] (or, if the worker wants to go on straight to the farmer class, at least 10 years). Thus the worker, if he is satisfied with limited independence (owning a home, a few dunams etc.) at the age of 25, and if he wants to be a farmer, he will, at around the age of 30, achieve his purpose and be able to maintain a family” (Ruppin 1911, 5-6).

Ruppin criticized the perceptions of the former leadership relentlessly. Shmuel Dayan writes in his memoirs that when Prof. Bodenheimer [the president of the JNF] visited the cabins in Degania and saw the “beds – which were no more than wooden planks on kerosene cans he said that it was possible to continue to use these ‘beds’ and not to buy new ones. The young Ruppin was very offended and told him in front of us: ‘I would suggest you sleep for one night in this bed, and after that we will talk…’” (Dayan 1968, 194).

On the way in which Ruppin was involved in the establishment of Chulda see: (Bein 1968, II, 90).
This text reveals how the social field in Palestine was organized from above by the culture planning of Ruppin’s PO¹¹³ and not through a form of organization which emerged from below as in the common Zionist narrative. As Meir noted, in their period of training (which continued sometimes for a few years) the workers’ salaries were composed of the payment from their employers plus an additional sum from the PO (a kind of subsidy which is still the norm today in the case of new immigrants). This additional sum was considered as covering the period of training. In addition to the economic aspect of incentives and promotion tracks, Ruppin’s planning was similar to the “Stumm system” also in its ability to offer the immigrants “meaning in their lives.” Thus, for example, when he introduced the young immigrants to the group he emphasized its advantages and promised that they would be able to achieve independence and “freedom”:

“This form [the group in Degania] raises the workers’ feeling of responsibility to a higher level, because they themselves are the owners of the farm and it is also the most suitable form for the mentality of the young freedom-loving Jews from Russia” (Ruppin 1911).

This formulation appealed to many of the young immigrants – it was totally different from the attitude of both the First Aliyah employers and the Zionist movement representatives – as Baratz writes:

“The main and crucial motive in going to Um Ja’uni [later Degania] was the ambition for independent work and self-responsibility, without control or authority from an external factor” (Baratz 1948, 46).

Ruppin’s empathetic approach and understanding of the workers’ state of mind, his ability to give them the feeling that their wishes were taken into consideration, that their views were considered thoughtfully and attentively, and that there was deep interest in making them full partners in the Zionist enterprise, all these were among

¹¹³ The identification of Ruppin with the Palestine Office was common at least until the end of World War I. Those who wished to immigrate to Palestine addressed their letters to Ruppin personally and not to the Palestine Office (see e.g., the many letters presented in: Alroey 2004).
the reasons for the enormous and rapid popularity that Ruppin gained among the young workers.

5.2.5.4 The Father-Son Relationship between Ruppin and the Second Aliyah Youngsters

Our question-outcry is: what to do? How to live? How to stop being parasites in all aspects? How to acquire conditions for creating decent ways of life? How to stop being sons of the ghetto?

Y. H. Brenner

His work in Kinneret and Degania gave Ruppin direct contact with the young immigrants and their leaders, and for many of them he became a mentor and patron, always at their side as they rose rapidly to become, within a decade, the leaders of the dominant group of the New Yishuv.

Although he had difficulty in communicating directly with most of them – partly because the workers did not understand his German and he did not understand their Yiddish or Hebrew – he approached them with a sympathetic ear, trying to understand their “mind, desires and views” (Bein 1968, I, 59). Although Ruppin writes in his memoirs that he had a problem with their “emotionalist tendencies, habit of getting into long arguments, lack of persistence, lack of accuracy and punctuality at work” (Bein 1968, I, 59) – typical Ostjuden stereotypes – this did not deter him or prevent him from observing “their sincere enthusiasm for agriculture as the foundation for the Jewish national home,” for him, the “most valuable asset” they had, “which must be preserved at all costs” (ibid). What was important for him was not rationality, lack of cordiality, persistence, accuracy and punctuality but “enthusiasm for agriculture,” which for Ruppin, as already discussed, had the important eugenic quality of “vitality.”

In Kinneret and the other training farms, Ruppin created a network of relationships with the workers, especially those he marked out as potential leaders or dominant

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114 (Brenner 1978, 53).
individuals in the social bonding of the groups. Ruppin devoted considerable time to these particular youngsters, sitting with them for long hours of private and collective talks, taking them on nature trips and tours of the country\textsuperscript{115} and arranging social events which enabled him to influence the formation of their cultural identity and weltanschauung – all this as part of their Modern Hebrew bildung.

Ruppin’s main influence, as we will see, was not through texts or speeches but rather through activating the workers with specific missions which put them in positions of responsibility and authority. Berl Katznelson’s amazing rise within ten years from a rejected, striking worker on the Kinneret farm to bank head, is just one example of the crucial role Ruppin played in advancing the careers of these young leaders.

Katznelson was just one of the many young workers who saw Ruppin as a mentor and benefited from his ability to connect them with powerful, influential people and institutions in the Zionist field. The young workers were his sons and he was their surrogate father and this observation must be understood against the background of the situation noted by Gorni, according to which, for the immigrants of the Second Aliyah, close friendships tended to become a substitute for their families (Gorni 1996, 381). Elboim-Dror observes that the terms father and son are used as a code to denote not only the tensions and differences in the priorities of the various generational units but, over and beyond that, also the different cultures and the shift of emphasis from the country as the Holy Land of the fathers to the country of the sons, who wish to develop in it a new culture, different from that of the fathers (Elboim-Dror 1996, 125.)

The father-son relationship can be detected in many of Ruppin’s relationships with the workers. A typical example of his way of assisting the development of the young immigrants can be seen in the case of the writer S.Y Agnon, who was Ruppin’s Hebrew teacher.

\textsuperscript{115} In 1911, Ruppin wrote one of the first travel guides to the Land of Israel (CZA L2/79/1).
As Dan Laor writes, Ruppin was:

“determined that that important writer must spend at least a few years in a big European city; for this purpose, Berlin seemed to him an ideal place. Ruppin assisted Agnon financially when he took him on his journey to Berlin in October 1912, and even suggested he stay in his sister’s apartment” (Laor 2001).

Ruppin treated all his “favorite sons” with this same attentive care, generosity and love. His ability to understand what Agnon needed in order to improve his talent was a reflection of his analysis in *The Jews of Today*, in which he emphasized the importance of a supportive milieu which nurtures the artists.\(^{116}\)

As far as I could discover, the first person to refer to Ruppin as “the father” in the literature was Shmuel Dayan (Dayan 1935, 27), in a chapter with the title “the father of the group,” which deals with the emergence of the first group. This image was used later by many other writers, who also presented Ruppin as a father figure in their memoirs. Avraham Herzfeld (1891-1973),\(^{117}\) for example, described Ruppin as the “architect of the settlement” who “adopted” the workers and said that he did what he did “with modesty and in secrecy” (in: Kushner 1962, 326). Unlike other Zionist leaders who condescended to the workers and made light of their ideas, Ruppin was “the only one” who could listen to a new idea (Kushner 1962, 334). Katzenelson, one of Ruppin’s most favored protégés and a key figure in the formation of the labor movement, described Ruppin’s indirect and discreet initiation methods: “his way was to stay beside the doer to enable him to find his intention and initiative [...] the contact with him was refining, his being with us broadened

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\(^{116}\) This attitude was also demonstrated in his relationship with the poet Elza Lasker Schüller. See e.g. her letter to Ruppin [6 Jan. 1935] and a postcard without a date written in German in which she refers to Ruppin with the Hebrew word “Adon” (Heb. Master or Sir) and thanks him for enabling her to stay in Jerusalem. Both of the items are in: (CZA, A107/88).

\(^{117}\) One of founders and active members of Achdut HaAvoda Party, 1919-1930 and from 1930 a member of Mapai. One of founders of the Histadrut, among the leaders of the Agricultural Association and a central figure in establishment of new settlements for forty years. MK of Mapai from 1949 until 1961.
our understanding,” Katzenelson called him (in Talmudic Aramaic) “chad bedara” (Aram. one in a generation) and wrote that:

“Ruppin’s life is a testimony to the superiority of the Zionist idea and to the purity of the Zionist act [emphasis in the original].”

Almost all the main political leaders and bureaucratic agents of the Second Aliyah wrote about Ruppin in their autobiographies and memoirs with the same veneration, and described him as the main figure that shaped their generation and their personalities. Yitzhak Tabenkin (1887-1971) remarked that: “Dr. Ruppin symbolizes an entire period in Zionism: more correctly, he created a period” (Tabenkin 1969, 334). Zalman Shazar (Shneur Zalman Rubashov) (1889-1974), Israel’s third president wrote:

“The main turning point in the history of Zionism was neither the resolutions that were adopted nor the large sums of money that were allocated but…Ruppin’s arrival on the Zionist scene. Ruppin’s Aliyah to the Land of Israel was a milestone in the history of Zionist settlement” (Shazar 1973, 104).

Levi Eshkol (1895-1969), a former Israeli Prime Minister, emphasized that “Ruppin was probably the most formative influence on Jewish settlement in the decade before the outbreak of World War I” (in: Prittie 1969, 31). Yosef Sprinzak (1885-1959), the first Speaker of Israel’s Knesset, referred to Ruppin as “a Rabbi and instructor” who knew how to “utilize the energies of the Jewish youth who arrived from Russia to build a Yishuv in Eretz Israel” (Sprinzak, 1943, 3) and in his eulogy delivered on Ruppin’s fresh grave, he declared explicitly “all of us are Ruppin’s sons” (ibid.).

To the young East Europeans who came from the collapsing Pale of Settlement, Ruppin offered new hopes and prospects. Though his approach to them was

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118 This kind of admiration is not only found in the workers’ circles. Nachum Goldman, to note one example, wrote: “I saw a lot of Dr. Ruppin, the greatest pioneer in the history of Jewish colonization, whose achievements cannot be overestimated. Of all the Zionist leaders I have known, he was the most unbiased and the one who identified most completely with the work he had undertaken” (Goldman 1970, 40).
combined from the outset with a concrete promise of prosperity, Ruppin’s main role was to provide them with the space in which to produce a cohesive cultural identity and also to bestow upon them symbolic fortune, placing them at the top of the new social ladder he erected. This attitude enabled him to gain their appreciation and admiration, which was the first step towards inculcating a new code of behavior and set of beliefs, that is to say, a new repertoire, a ‘tool kit,’ to channel and organize the chaotic energy of this “fading [father] shadows” generation, which abandoned both its Father in heaven and its galut fathers on earth.

In his autobiographical novella Whither? (Heb. Le’an?), the Jewish-Russian-revivalist-Hasidic writer M. Z. Fierberg (1874-1899) depicted what seems to be the attitude of the young Second Aliyah immigrants to their fathers:

“But when he inherits his flag from his father, he cannot also inherit his weapon; this weapon has already become rusty, and he needs a new weapon…”

Using this metaphor, Ruppin was the one who managed to supply them with a new weapon: a repertoire devised for their conversion to the secular, western, modern world of “normal” nations and identities; new Hebrews with the same old flag, armed with a new weapon: a powerful repertoire.

In 1936, at a meeting arranged for Ruppin’s 60th birthday, Ben Gurion said:

“Dr. Ruppin was among the few who planned the rebuilding of Palestine as well as directing it and he has been able to see the fruits of his labor. He came to us as an outsider but he didn’t remain an outsider. He came as a scientist but he wasn’t content with just the cold experiments of the laboratory….he came as a scientist with an open heart. He was never content with visions but has also seen the real situation. Ruppin, coming to us from the outside, brought us the humanistic element. He understood how to introduce it to us.”

In the canonical *Book of the Second Aliyah*, Ruppin appears frequently as a father figure and a savior, who supports his “sons” the “workers” unreservedly. Ruppin was in his thirties, and he presented himself as someone who had renounced a brilliant career in Germany for the sake of the Zionist idea. For them he was the man of the West with German manners, a doctor, a scientist who abhorred idealistic and abstract words and appreciated, as well as rewarded, practical and “enthusiastic” actions.

Levi Eshkol described the entrance of Ruppin into the Zionist arena in Palestine:

“He, the man of the West, the man of science and numbers who holds meticulously and strictly to the order and punctuality that construct according to a plan and formula, met with the *Second Aliyah* people with their unclear ambitions and dreams and desires, met with them and was conquered by them. He was conquered by them and also conquered them […] he succeeded in opening the hearts of the pioneers of Israel when they came to plant themselves in the soil of the homeland [Moledet], removing obstacles and mishaps, listening to their desires as the emissary of an exiled nation and helping to divert them to productive (and creative) channels” (Eshkol 1969, 313-314).

As Eshkol writes, and as already described, the young immigrants had “unclear ambitions and dreams and desires.” Their confused ideas and behaviour, expressed themselves in their pursuit of the “conquest of work,” something that was recognized within a few years as futile. The tiny minority that stayed at the end of the Second Aliyah was actually the youngest (17-22), poorest, least intellectual and least ideologically dogmatic or committed, i.e. the most pragmatic. From Ruppin’s point of view, those “elements” were desirable mainly because they could be molded more easily, but also because he understood, from experience, that this particular group was the only one that could adapt to the conditions of Palestine.
Akiva Ettinger, (1872-1945) Ruppin’s right hand in the PO, wrote:

“Both of us, Ruppin and I, learned, from the reality after the war, that those who owned property were not attached to agriculture. After a short while it became clear that people without means who have been trained in agriculture, who aspire with all their heart to take root in the soil of the motherland, are preferable to those who have money but don’t want to work themselves. I didn’t expect that within a few years we would find candidates for settlement only in one circle – the workers’ circle. They were penniless, but they had a strong and fervent will to ‘bring forth bread from land’ [...]” (Ettinger 1945, 81).

In the years after Ruppin’s appearance appreciation increased, in Hapoel Hatzair for the Berlin school of German Zionism, in direct relation to the decrease in its appreciation for the Russian “Chovevei Zion.” This shift reached its peak in 1913, the year of the 11th Zionist Congress (Vienna), at which Warburg was described by the workers as the definitive leader of the Zionist movement, abandoning their initial support of Ussishkin as the natural candidate for this role. “The working method of Warburg-Ruppin,” wrote Yaakov Rabinowitz “is, in its essence, despite its disadvantages, an iron-pillar of modern land settlement and Hebrew work on the land” (in: Frenkel 1989, 491). Ruppin’s speech, in his usual style of scientification of the Zionist interests, was full of details, dry facts, numbers and statistics. It was published in full length not only in Hapoel Hatzair but also in Ha-Achdut, the newspaper of the Poalei Tzion (Zionist workers’ party), an unprecedented sign of the workers’ recognition of the Berlin Zionist leaders and of Ruppin as their representative in Palestine.

Rabinowitz wrote that Ruppin practically accepted the ideas of the Hapoel Hatzair party: “from our own he gave us. Not for nothing do Ruppin’s opponents say: his speech is a programmatic speech of Hapoel Hatzair. It is true” (Frenkel 1989, 492).

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120 Akiva Ettinger (1872-1945). An agronomist. His first work was in JAC as a manager of Jewish settlement in various lands, particularly Russia and South America. In 1918 he began to work in the field of agriculture in Palestine as the director of the land department of the JNF and later as the manager of the department for settlement in the Jewish Agency.
this speech Ruppin presented his solutions to what he described as “the workers’ question” and defined the special symbolic status of the workers:

“First of all, it is clear that these young people don’t want and don’t need to remain all their lives salaried employees earning a small sum which is enough only for their subsistence. It is necessary for them to have the possibility of advancing financially and of being able to build themselves houses” (Ruppin 1913c).

For this reason, Ruppin suggested giving each worker:

“a dunam of land, vegetables and poultry. He will have one cow or a pair of sheep, and he will make his main living as a wage-earning laborer in the moshavot. Maybe once he gains experience, especially in gardening, it will be possible for him to turn gradually into a permanent agricultural worker, whose small private farm will be his main livelihood, and whose work as a wage earner will take second place” (ibid.).

As in his article of two years earlier, The Question of the Land Workers in the Land of Israel (Ruppin 1911), here, too, Ruppin’s speech offered the workers a plan which took their future into consideration and let them see a new prospect on the horizon.

5.2.5.5 The Workers’ Leaders as a “Work Tribe” (Arbeiterstamm)

Clearly similar to the “work tribe” (Arbeiterstamm), – the Stumm system’s core workers’ group – was the group of young immigrants who related loyally to Ruppin as a father figure and whom he aspired to cultivate as the “pure racial” group.

This project of Ruppin’s was financed in no small measure by the American Jewish community, which earmarked a large proportion of its 1912 donation to the PO specifically for this purpose. According to it, the PO made a full list of unemployed workers and was responsible for supplying them with work.121 It also supplemented

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121 A detailed list of the employers and the employees can be found in the CZA, in: (Goren 2005, 290).
the salaries the workers received from their employers and it was this system of compensation that enabled the PO to organize the workers under its umbrella.

This loyal group played a crucial role in inculcating the young immigrants with Ruppin’s repertoire, organizing them according to the aims of the PO (e.g., by mobilizing them for “national missions” rather than the “utopian” ones of radical socialism), and guiding them in the important changeover from their initial unrealistic concept of “conquest of labor” to that of an organized bureaucratic field.

This “work tribe” was actually the milieu from which the ruling labor movement leadership emerged. Almost all the names that Ruppin mentions in his diary as being close to him, can be found on the internet site of the Knesset (the Israeli parliament), where they appear as members of Knesset, ministers, prime ministers and presidents of the State, e.g.: Yosef Sprinzak (MK), Berl Katznelson, David Remez (minister), Y. Ben-Zvi (president), Zvi Yehuda (MK), Yosef Baratz (MK.), Shmuel Dayan (MK.), Avraham Herzfeld (MK.), Shlomo Lavi (MK), Aharon Zisling (MK), (Bein 1968 II, 58-59). Most of them began their careers as agricultural workers on the training farms and settlements that were under Ruppin’s supervision (Bein 1968 II, 58-59).

5.2.5.5.1 The Origins of the Concept of the Collective Group

As many historians have noted, the whole idea of cooperative work and independent collective communes was derived from a number of sources. It can be found in many of the workers’ memoires, as well as in early Zionist ideologies, where it could have been adopted from any of the numerous ideologies and theories prevalent in Europe at that time. Nevertheless, the decision to establish the first group did not come from the workers’ circles but rather from the clear initiative of Ruppin and every stage in its development was in the context of his culture plan (Shafir 1982, 177; Penslar 1987, 164; Landshot 2000, 44). Penslar claims that the plan to establish the group was already suggested by Ruppin in July 1909 when he proposed (after a meeting with Natan Gross, Bodenheimer’s secretary) that the PO initiate the establishment of a group in Um Ja’uni (later Degania) composed of the most capable workers from the

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122 On the idea of cooperation in the history of Zionism see: (Slutsky 2006, 43-55).
Kinneret farm.¹²³ However, the workers refused the offer and, in September, decided to wait another year before establishing a cooperative.¹²⁴ As Tanchum Tanfilov (1888-1968), one of the members of the first group, wrote: “it is clear to me that I did not do it out of desire to become a ‘perfecter of the world’ [metaken olam] or because I was socialist” (in: Frenkel 1976, 44). Tanfilov’s testimony makes it clear that the ideology of the workers’ parties was not a factor in the decision to join the group. Actually, the two opposing workers’ parties saw in the very idea of the ‘collective’ group a departure from their principles. In 1907, when Yosef Vitkin called for the establishment of an independent settlement of workers, Yosef Aharonovich, the main ideologue of *Hapoel Hatzair*, admonished him perceiving it as a betrayal of the workers’ main aim, which was to establish a Jewish working class and as succumbing to the same corruption that his generation attached to the First Aliyah immigrants, who based their economy and world view on philanthropic aid in order to eventually become landowners. When some of the members of Poalei Tzion joined in the establishment of Oppenheimer’s cooperative settlement, Ber Borochov opposed this idea absolutely and, with his skilful Marxist dialectic, proved the idea’s “utopist absurdity” (Halpern & Reinharz 2000, 191). Borochov’s rejection of the idea makes it clear that critical Marxism had no significant impact on the emergence of the groups or on the Kibbutz movement. Not only were nationalism and lack of solidarity with the Arab workers incompatible with even the loosest interpretation of Marxism, the idea of a closed, highly selective group was also impossible according to any form of Marxist thinking (Landshot 2000, 79).

The cooperation of the young workers’ leaders with the PO, denounced by Borochov as representing the “bourgeois” WZO, was a clear shift from their previous rebellious and immature state of mind, which had held stubbornly to the idea that the Zionist labor movement should not seek the assistance of official Zionism.¹²⁵ A few years before Ruppin’s arrival, the same Poalei Tzion leaders who now collaborated with him declared, in what is known as “the Ramla Platform” (1906), that they aspired to establish a Hebrew state in the Land of Israel on socialist foundations, and that this

¹²³ Gross to Kaplansky, [26 Jul. 1909], CZA, A137/121.
¹²⁴ Thon to PLDC, [12 Sep. 1909], L1/96.
¹²⁵ In this regard we must remember that the identity of the young immigrants was built on their opposition to the image of the Jew as parasite and that was why they opposed any economic system that was reminiscent of the *Chaluka* system of the ultra-orthodox or the philanthropy of Rothschild.
aim would be achieved by means of the class struggle (Ben-Zvi 1967, 86-87). Ben Gurion’s initial position in 1907 was also against cooperative settlements and he preferred the development of an urban proletariat – an idea which belonged to the socialist revolutionary ethos of Russia (Zachor 1998, 229; Gorny 2006, 25).

As in many other cases, here too Ruppin’s culture planning changed this model of perception from its essence and it was the PO’s polices that influenced Poalei Tzion to move to the agricultural settlements in opposition to the explicit call of the leadership of the World Poalei Tzion party in 1907, to remain in the urban areas of Palestine.

It did not take long for the workers’ leaders to realize that the network of training farms and groups established by the PO was the main site of political activity and the only available opportunity for acquiring resources and power. This ideological conversion, demonstrated so strikingly in the case of the “Ramla Platform” and the Poalei Tzion party’s defiance of its central branch in Russia, was a direct result of the PO’s actions which, since 1908, had consistently subordinated the workers’ ideology to its culture plan (see: Shapiro 1975, 18-19).

The first organized and official request by a workers’ party for assistance was submitted a year after Ruppin began his activities. In 1909, Yitzhak Ben-Zvi (1884-1963) (one of Ruppin’s many protégés and, a leader of the Palestinian Poalei Tzion), began to make piecemeal requests for housing, agricultural training and land. In the same year, at The Sixth Convention of the Poalei Tzion, Ben-Zvi advocated such ideas as the importance of being involved in colonization in spite of its seemingly bourgeois flavor. He also pushed through a resolution that the party must act “in organizing groups of workers for settlement on a cooperative basis” (in: Gorni 2006, 29). It was this declaration concerning the change in the nature of the party that marked their separation from the Russian factions and influences. In 1911, Ben-Zvi raised the issue of the danger presented by cooperative settlement to socialist ideas, and declared that: “cooperative settlement bears a unique kind of social and national novelty” (ibid., 30).

126 Nachum Tversky and Yosef Aharonowiz of Hapoel Hatzair made similar claims in 1911 (Ben-Zvi 1966, 170; Kolat 1964, 125-130; Penslar 1987, 204).
In 1913 Ben-Zvi already wrote in a language that echoed Ruppin’s culture plan:

“The role that is given everywhere to the ruling classes – the expansion of the state and the strengthening of the economy through colonies [is important] in our case vis a vis the working masses themselves, who need to achieve by their work what others do with their property and the power of their weapons and army; in other words, for the agriculture worker, behind the social question, there stands a settlement question. This settlement mission is the unique feature of the working class in the Land of Israel” (in: Gorny 2006, 32-33).

In 1918 Ben-Zvi goes on to explain that: “I don’t believe that we can prevent capitalism in the Land of Israel totally. We need to restrain it, in such a way that it will be less harmful, nationally and socially” (ibid., 37).

After 1911, the spokesmen of the workers’ parties, as well as the politically independent unions of the Jewish agricultural workers, stitched together their specific requests into a vague program of “non-capitalistic constructivism,” which had very “flexible” guidelines and ideological coherence and enabled the workers’ leaders to establish a channel to the national capital (Mintz 1983, 50). According to this program – described as “social” and or “socialist” according to the addressee – Zionist agricultural colonization would be directed and funded largely by public institutions. Private land-purchases would be either forbidden or strictly curtailed; the Yishuv would be built on nationally-owned land, granted to settlers on a hereditary lease. It would be the duty of the JNF to build a network of cooperatives, training farms, and experimental stations throughout the land. Only Jewish labor would be permitted on JNF property. Finally, the institutions for national settlement would be subject to the democratic control of the settlers themselves. In other words, the labor movement would play a dominant role in allocating the resources that the Zionist Organization would provide (Penslar 1987, 205). The “non-capitalistic constructivism” program would support collective forms of agriculture that did not link salary to productivity.

\[127\] The socialism was concealed by the use of the general term “social” and even Achdut HaAvoda defined itself as a “Zionist-Social Association” (Sharet 1961, 35). The word “social” could appeal to the young immigrants who conceived of themselves as socialists and also be accepted by those who opposed socialism (especially the Jewish American donors and investors).
Clearly, such an environment could not foster a system of salaried workers in which Arabs would have the natural advantage (Shapira 1977, 27-29).

This agenda of the dominant labor parties was actually identical to Ruppin’s culture plan guidelines, most of which, chronologically speaking, were formulated by Ruppin before their presentation by the workers’ parties. Most of the perceptions and principles of the “non-capitalistic constructivism” program were developed parallel to the cooperation between the workers’ leaders and Ruppin in the framework of the PO.

5.2.5.5.2 The Symbolic Capital of the Collective Groups

In addition to his constant assistance to the workers’ leaders and parties in shaping their ideological and operative plans, Ruppin also made enormous efforts to give them symbolic fortune by regularly stressing their crucial importance to the Zionist movement and also by neutralizing opposing forces, e.g. the Brandeis circle, which resented his support of the labor parties and described him as “addicted to the workers.” In one of his diary entries from 1924, Ruppin claims the credit for convincing Weizmann of the importance of the cooperative settlements in general and the collective groups in particular. According to Ruppin, Weizmann was opposed to this form of settlement, but after Ruppin took him on a tour in the Jezreel Valley, Weizmann changed his mind and became a supporter of the group system (see: Friedlander 1989, 229-228). What Weizmann, who at the time needed material for his fundraising activities, realized on that tour was that most of the groups and agricultural settlements, while not profitable in terms of material capital, were a veritable goldmine in terms of symbolic capital. Thus, of primary importance for Ruppin and many of his agents was not to make these settlements productive economically, but to enable them to produce images that could bolster Zionist propaganda and fundraising. Ruppin recognized that an image of well-organized settlements could yield more funds for the Zionist movement by appearing economically and socially “healthy” than by actually running profitable farms. Ettinger alluded to this sort of understanding in a letter he wrote to Ruppin, in which

128 To this we must add the recognition, prestige and authority that the British mandate gave to the PO, which was, at least in part, due to Ruppin’s diplomatic abilities and the respect in which he was held as a reliable person (Halpern & Reinhartz 2000, 205).
he referred to one of the Zionists’ projects as “most important propaganda material for purchasing more land in the Jezreel Valley.” As noted, the principle aim of the PO in its first decades was to buy up as much land as possible in the shortest possible time; the goal of turning a profit or even of breaking even was secondary at best.

Without Ruppin’s persistent support and provision of symbolic and economic capital, the labor movement would seem to have been unable to fulfill its aspirations. In the First Aliyah settlements, the workers’ leaders could do no more than organize futile strikes, which served only to increase the hostility of the planters/farmers, whereas through their cooperation with Ruppin, the workers’ leaders of the Second Aliyah gained political importance and power – this because the leaders of the WZO, under Ruppin’s vigorous influence, believed that they were the only group in the Yishuv capable of consummating the Zionist ideal. In the First Aliyah repertoire, the workers were considered “tramps,” “schmendrics,” “bums,” “philistines,” “nihilists” and “anarchists.” In the new repertoire which evolved after Ruppin’s arrival, the workers became “idealistic pioneers,” “genesis men,” “pavers of the way” and were considered the main asset of the Zionist movement.

Ruppin gave them a framework in which they could enjoy an unconscious Chaluka, and unconscious [transformative] philanthropy. Zalman David Levontine, one of Ruppin’s harsh opponents, whose perspective was typical of the classical conservative colonialism prevalent in the WZO, viewed Ruppin’s activities as

“Nothing but Chaluka, which corrupts many good people, a Chaluka that hides behind the name of ‘National Settlement’” (in: Shilo 1998, 199).

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129 Ettinger to Ruppin [27 Jan. 1924], CZA, S15/21580.
5.2.5.6. The Differentiation of the “Eastern Jews”; the ‘Orientals’

In a short passage entitled “the Eastern Jews” (Heb. yehudi hamizrach), i.e. the ‘Oriental Jews,’ which appears at the end of his article The Question of the Land Workers (1911), Ruppin explains that the plan he proposed for the workers from East Europe

“…needs changes for the Oriental Jews (Yemenite, Persian, North Syrian) whose standard of life\textsuperscript{130} is lower, because they are used to the climate of the Mediterranean and to the eastern way of life […] As opposed to the worker from East Europe, the Oriental Jew is satisfied with his salary as a worker” (Ruppin 1911, 6).

This early article which, as already noted, was actually a road to advancement for the young immigrants from East Europe, gives us an idea of how, in following Ruppin’s eugenic plan, Palestinian-Zionism differentiated between the East European immigrants and the ‘Orientals.’

According to Shiloni, from the very first stages of his planning, Ruppin introduced differentiating practices with regard to those whom he defined as ‘Orientals,’ for example, he hired ‘Orientals,’ (especially from Jerusalem) only for guard duties and simple jobs such as digging drainage channels or holes for tree-planting, while the East European workers were given more “dignified” work as carters, plowmen and planters (Shilony 1998, 129).

The clearest and most distinct example of the impact of Ruppin’s theory as to the bio-mental inferiority of the Oriental Jews can be seen in the way it was put into practice with the Yemenite Jews who arrived with the wave of immigration initiated and carried out by the PO in the years prior to World War I. This wave of immigration, designated in Zionist historiography as “Aliyat Yavneli,”\textsuperscript{131} was in its essence – at least from the point of view of the landowners and others who

\textsuperscript{130} The English idiom “standard of life” appears in the German and Hebrew versions.

\textsuperscript{131} Shemuel Yavneli was the PO’s envoy to Yemen.
supported it—a colonialist act for the “importation of cheap labor,” as Shafir puts it, and its full description is beyond the scope of this work.

Many historians have described the extreme suffering that these Yemenite Jews experienced upon their arrival, the economic exploitation, culture shock, humiliation and abuse which led eventually to their mental and physical collapse; the death rate of the Yemenites who arrived Palestine between the years 1912-1918 is estimated as between 30% to 40% (in some towns it reached almost 50%).

The main reason for bringing the Yemenite Jews to Palestine was the need of Ruppin and Aharon Eizenberg (1863-1931), the representative of the plantation owners, to find a solution to the problem of the labor market in the Zionist colony, i.e., the failure of the Ashkenazi workers to replace the Arab workers. However, even this economic operation was carried out within the framework of Ruppin’s eugenic planning. As we have seen, Ruppin did not believe that the Volkskörper could be constructed like a “mosaic” and he was unequivocally against mixing the white and black races. Like Haeckel, and like most eugenicists and colonialists, he believed that the black races were in a process of degeneration, and could not participate in the process of civilization, for such contact would only accelerate their extinction (Haeckel 1883, II, 325; 363). However, Ruppin did not need Haeckel to legitimize his attitude towards the Yemenites. There were several Jewish scholars who categorically regarded the Yemenites as blacks and interpreted their racial composition according to the prevailing theories concerning blacks. Ruppin clearly based his theory concerning the Yemenites on the works of the East European-Anglo-Jewish physician and biologist Redcliffe N. Salman (1874-1955), whom he quoted several times in his Sociology.

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132 E.g., in the town of Rehovot, out of 237 Yemenites, 101 died, among them 76 children (Shafir 1989, 106).
133 The director of the Netaim Association; the largest capitalist enterprise of the period.
134 Ruppin opposed any kind of “niggerization” of the white races. See (Bien 1968, III, 224)
135 Salman influenced Ruppin deeply and in the middle of the 1920s, when Ruppin planned the establishment of an institute for race research at the Hebrew University, he invited him to join the directorate, writing to him admiringly: “I have read everything you have written on the subject of the Jewish race” (CZA A107/349).
Salman’s theory developed out of the observations he had made in the course of his service as a medical officer in the British forces in Yemen during the World War I. In his memoirs, he wrote of the Yemenite Jews:

“For the most part, they are undersized and rather poor spirited natives. Racially, they are not Jews. They are black, long-headed, hybrid Arabs […] the real Jew is the European Ashkenazi, and I back him against all-comers […]” (Salman 1920, in: Falk 1998, 596).

According to Salman, the Ashkenazi Jews were on a higher level than the Sephardic Jews because of an unconscious eugenic process – a “natural selection” that cultivated the most talented Torah students. Ruppin had expressed similar ideas as far back as 1904 and still held such views even in the 1930s, as is evident from his Sociology (Ruppin 1930, I, 59). Ruppin excluded the Yemenites from the “original Jewish types” (Urjude). “It is possible” he wrote, “that most of the Yemenites come from converted Arab tribes […] they have Arab blood elements and their skin is dark” (Ruppin 1931b, 17; see also: Bein 1968, II, 27). According to Ruppin, the Yemenites did not belong to the original types of Jews: “they never arrived in Europe” he wrote “and had foreign blood in them, to a great extent, leading to the appearance of special types […] Most probably, the majority of these Jews come from Arab tribes who accepted the religion of Israel […],” or are Jews who “intermingled with gerim [Heb. converts to Judaism] from among the Arab tribes” (Ruppin 1931b, 17). Thus the Yemenites have “a certain amount [nofēch] of Arab blood, and their skin is very dark” (Ruppin 1931b, in: Shohat 1999, 30).

Like Salman before him, Ruppin believed that the Yemenites’ Semitic elements were dysgenic factors and that integrating them with the “pure race” Jews would endanger the New Hebrew genus he aspired to produce. However, while he rejected the completely black Jews (e.g., the Ethiopians) as non-Jewish, he did not reject the ‘Oriental’ Jews outright but rather differentiated them. The “dark” and “racially mixed” Yemenite Jews for example, could be useful only if differentiated and

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136 According to Falk, Salman’s theories served to prove to the British that the Jews from East Europe who sought to immigrate to England and Palestine were, from the point of view of racial health: “A eugenic rather than a dysgenic factor” (Falk 1998, 596).
segregated from the dominant and “purer” racial group. Although Ruppin warned against “en masse” immigration of the Oriental Jews on the grounds that it might “be bad from several points of view,” he regarded their immigration as positive under certain conditions: “In small numbers, however, they might be extremely useful” because of “their small needs and in particular, their ability to compete in wages with the Arab agricultural laborers. [...] the Oriental Jew, who can do the rough work at the same price as the Arab” (Ruppin 1913a, 294; my emphasis, E.B.).

Ruppin explained the failure of the Ashkenazi workers to compete with the Arab workers as due to their cultural superiority: “The East European Jew cannot possibly live on such wages. He can earn a living in Palestine only through work which makes demands on his intelligence and reliability. For purely manual labor, preference is naturally given to the Arab”, including the “Arab Jews” (as he designated the Oriental and Yemenite Jews) (Ruppin 1913a, 294) (my emphasis, E.B.).

As soon as the Yemenites replaced the Ashkenazi workers in the Moshavot, the Ashkenazi workers became available for the purpose Ruppin intended them, namely to set up groups and by their presence to ensure the PO’s control of the new lands he purchased. The Yemenites’ work as manual laborers and guards was certainly of crucial importance for the survival of the economy in the years prior to and during the World War I (Katz 1994, 319). According to a census of Galilee workers in agriculture taken in 1913, there were 164 male Ashkenazi workers and 79 male ‘Orientals’ (50 Sephardic and 29 Yemenites and, among the female workers, 31 Ashkenazi and 17 ‘Orientals’ (13 from Yemen and 4 Sephardic). Nevertheless, this ratio changed during harvests and whenever other seasonal or specific tasks required more workers. Even the groups, who were proud of their self-sufficiency, made massive use of the Yemenites and other ‘Oriental’ workers on a temporary basis. This phenomenon led some of the members of the groups to feel that they were behaving like “a privileged group which exploits less privileged groups to promote their selfish interests” (Openheimer 1973, 41). One of the women members

137 Hapoel Hatzair, 23, 1913, 3.
of Degania wrote resentfully: “we are drawn to hire paid workers and it is endless. […] The Sephardic woman is working for us as a servant” (The Book of the Group 1925, 6).

5.2.5.6.1 The differentiation of the ‘Orientals’ and the unification of the ‘Ashkenazim’

The appearance of the Yemenites in the cultural space and their social differentiation were formative factors in defining the borders of the dominant group. The ‘Oriental’ Jews, and the Yemenites in particular, formed a new Jewish group that the leaders of the Zionist movement marked a-priori as inferior and limited. By differentiating themselves from the ‘East’ they became more ‘Western’; as Bhabha writes:

“The other must be seen as the necessary negation of a primordial identity – cultural or psychic – that introduces the system of differentiation that enables the cultural to be signified as a linguistic, symbolic, historic reality” (Bhabha 1990, 195).

Parallel to the appearance of the Yemenites as a new marker of the ‘East,’ a new link came into being between the East European and West European Jews between whom, until then, there had always been a state of tension and hostility. “[…] if there was a time,” wrote the workers’ leader Yosef Aharonowitz after Ruppin’s speech at the 1913 Zionist congress, “when we in the Zionist organization were differentiating between the east [European] Zionists and the western Zionists, now it is impossible to make such a distinction; it is as if, in one day, the borders between East and West have dissolved.”

The unification of west and east European Jews under the category “Ashkenazim” took place simultaneously with the emergence of the category “Eastern or Oriental Jews” (Heb. yehudei hamizrach), which unified thousands of Jewish communities.

138 Yosef Aharonovich, *Hapoel Hatzair*, in: (Frenkel 1989, 491) Ruppin is considered in Labor movement history as “the man who built the bridge between the east and the west.” (Katzenelson 1968, 12).
from more than twenty nations. The main reasoning behind the differentiation of the new “Eastern/Oriental-Jew” from the Ashkenazi Jew was neither “culture differences,” as mainstream historiography would have it, nor classic colonialist-economic acts as in Shafir’s narrative, but rather Ruppin’s eugenic culture planning.

It must be emphasized that Ruppin’s perceptions and practices with regard to differentiation (and unification), were accepted by most of the agents in the field, proof that Ruppin was often, with his theories and practices, merely reinforcing and legitimizing the European immigrants’ biased and stereotypic view of the ‘Orientals.’ Their ambition to belong to the West made it necessary for them to deny the modern anti-Semitic perception of the Jews as “Oriental” or “Asiatic” strangers in Europe; indeed, the “modern Hebrew” identity in Palestine was perceived as a European identity.

During and after World War I, the workers’ press developed a discourse which marked the Yemenites and other ‘Orientals’ as “quantity” and the Ashkenazim as “quality,” an opinion which made acceptable the salary disparity and other forms of discrimination. The Yemenites were paid what was, to all intents and purposes, a starvation wage. Prices were high, as was the rent demanded of them for even substandard accommodations such as stables (Shafir 1989, 103-104). Medical care was almost out of reach, “they were the last in line” (Goren 2005, 210). The Ashkenazi workers did not include the Yemenites in their organizations or groups. They never went out on strike on the Yemenites’ behalf although, as we have seen, they were always ready and anxious to strike for anything concerning their national and social demands. Even in cases where the Yemenites tried to become part of national organizational frameworks they were rejected by the political parties and by the workers’ and guards’ organizations and kept at arms’ length from all the activities of the “cooperative” settlement.

139 The internal divisions in each group are also remarkable. The Yemenites for example came to Palestine and Israel from more than 1,200 different geo-cultural locations and the Moroccans from more than 500.
140 The average salary of an Arab worker was between 5-7 piasters, of a Yemenite 6.2-8 and of Ashkenazi workers 12.4 (Shafir 1989, 104).
141 In a meeting in 1915 of the finance committee of the PO, Ruppin opposed any medical help (in particular for the Yemenites). The only recorded reason he gave, which appears in the abbreviated protocol of that meeting, was that “it is against regulations” (CZA, L2/569).
Representatives of the Yemenites were present at the workers’ conference of 1914 but did not take an active part in it, asking in vain for the discussions to be held in Hebrew and not in Yiddish. The PO and the workers themselves did not consider the Yemenites part of the discussion about their own fate and did not even invite them to participate in meetings dealing with Yemenite issues (Shafir 1989, 142, 145). Among the hundreds of delegates to the Third Histadrut Conference, there was only one Yemenite delegate (and this was 13 years after their arrival in Palestine) (Goren 2005, 212). Although a few workers did write articles and letters to the editor on some aspects of the Yemenites’ plight, they did nothing more. Gradually, the whole social field was shaped by the dictates of the PO’s differentiation principle with its ‘objective’ discrimination of the Yemenites.

Ruppin’s culture planning was devised in such a way as to “purify” the Yemenites through a eugenic process of selection that would ensure the survival only of those who had the qualities for hard physical work. There can be no doubt that if what Ruppin wrote was what he really thought, he saw the Yemenites as low quality Menschenmaterial that, given proper eugenic treatment, could become a productive Jewish-Yemenite type able to serve the evolving new nation. As opposed to his warm, empathetic relations with the Ashkenazi workers, he kept his distance from the Yemenites, refusing to take any responsibility for their poor conditions. His attitude towards them was a clear case of “pathological stereotyping” (Gilman 1986, 18). In one of the few meetings he held directly with their representatives, Ruppin could do no more than preach repeatedly that they had to work hard and accept that that was what they “were created for” (Sharet 1961, 99).142

Ruppin’s Weltanschauung, in his conception and treatment of the Yemenites, was very similar, in fact, to that of the anthropologist Eugen Fischer, by whom he was greatly influenced, as has already been mentioned. Fischer conducted his research in South Africa in 1908, one year after the defeat of the black Herero and Hottentot tribes by the German colonial forces. In his study (which influenced all subsequent German legislation, including the Nuremberg racial laws) Fischer concluded:

142 For a description of that meeting see: Katznelson to Ben Gurion [2 June 1920], (Sharet 1961, 99)
“We still do not know a great deal about the mingling of the races [Rassenmischung]. But we certainly do know this: Without exception, every European nation [volk] that has accepted the blood of inferior races – and only romantics can deny that Negroes, Hottentots, and many others are inferior – has paid for its acceptance of inferior elements with spiritual and cultural degeneration” (in: Fridlander 1995, 11).

“Consequently” proposed Fischer “one should grant them [the black races] the amount of protection that any inferior race confronting us requires in order to survive, no more and no less, and only for so long as they are of use to us – otherwise free competition, that is, in my opinion, destruction” (in: ibid., 11-12).

5.2.5.7 The Collective Training Farms and Groups as a Selection System

_in Chulda [one of the training farms] I saw how the group rejected the lazy [workers]._ 
Ruppin^{143}

It is important to emphasize that Ruppin’s treatment of the Yemenites was an _extreme case_ of his policy towards the bulk of the immigrants, including Ashkenazi immigrants who did not fit his _Menschenmaterial_ standards. The term “human material” (Heb. chomer enoshi) was used by many agencies of Jewish social policy, which agreed that only the young, fit, and employable should make the trek from the old world to the new. The term _Menschenmaterial_ was pervasive and appeared early on, in the writings of both Herzl and Hirsch (Penslar 2001, 238-239). In the Palestinian-Zionist discourse this term was used frequently (at least until the 1950s) by immigration clerks and other agents who defined the immigrants in terms of good, mediocre or bad “human material.” As opposed to Germany, in which this

^{143}(Ruppin 1914c, 2)
During the PO’s first decade, Ruppin organized an administrative network to begin the process of selection already in Europe. These “natural” processes were intensified and complemented by an immigration policy that:

“raises to the maximum the percentage of desirable elements, with regard to profession, health and character, for the creation of the Jewish Yishuv in Eretz Yisrael and reduces to a minimum the percentage of undesirable ones” (Ruppin 1919e, 64).

The first stage of the selection was managed by physicians and clerks at the ports of departure and entry. This procedure aimed to prevent the arrival of all the “old,” “sick,” “diseased,” “morally less valuable,” “anarchists,” or those having “egoistic or anti-social inclinations,” who must be rejected because they are “utterly undesirable” (Ruppin 1919e, 64).

The system of selection was supposed to weed out the “bad elements” (the seekers of fast financial profits, for example) who would otherwise become a “sore” on the “healthy social foundation” and infect the new Yishuv with “non-productivity and beggary” (Ruppin 1919e, 64). If this were to be achieved, the selection could not be carried out in “a general way […] because the concepts healthy and strong are very meaningful” (Ruppin 1919e, 72). In this plan – which he formulated explicitly in his 1919 article Die Auslese des Menschen materials für Palaestina – one can detect Ruppin’s monistic, bio-purifying view on culture: mental, economic, moral and ideological inclinations are linked to biological qualities. The contrast between desirable and undesirable Jews or “elements,” is defined in terms of health and disease, and the healthy new Jew is the one who has “the most understanding and love of the ideal side of Eretz Israel as a land for Jewish settlement” (Ruppin 1919e, 64), i.e., the enthusiastic-vitalistic approach as defined above.

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144 A Google search (in 2008) showed 5,810 entries in the Israeli net (e.g., the regulations of an academic college, sports news, employment agencies, chat forums, the IDF, the police and many other fields).

145 Heb. version: sapachat: a biblical word for skin disease; a kind of psoriasis.
After the first stage of the selection process – that of the clerks and physicians in the ports of departure and entry – the second stage came into action when the new arrivals joined the training farms and the groups. Here the harder and more meaningful stage of the “natural selection” got under way. The main role in the selection process at this stage was played by the members of the groups themselves (in a very similar way to the Stumm system):

“We are imposing the role of expelling people with anti-social inclinations mainly on the kevutzot [collective groups] themselves” (Ruppin 1919e, 65).

The structure of the group – the atomic crystal of Ruppin’s social space – was based on its selective function: their close life in “[the kvutza] enables the members to know each other after a few years […], and to reject those members who are not qualified for work or for social life” (Ruppin 1919e, 65). The group’s structure, according to Ruppin’s culture plan, was designed so as to create the psycho-social pressure of the group on the individual. It was for this reason that he declared that an ideal group should number no more than 30-50 members, living in close familiarity, so as to enable the group to be involved in the life of the individual and test his behavior (ibid.).

The invasion of each other’s privacy was a typical part of the group’s development and one of the models for its internal selection processes. The demand for hyper self-criticism was projected on the other and shaped the group members’ emotional toughness and selective gaze. The daily life of the groups was laid down in a way that generated a high degree of friction among the members. This legitimization of criticism and selectivity was enhanced by a set of regulations or “principles” such as a common toilet and showers. The dwelling conditions did not allow the individual any private space, and frequently a group member had to move to a different bed, sometimes every night.\(^{146}\) Boiling water for tea in the private rooms was forbidden (to encourage gathering in the dining room) and sitting at the tables on benches (and not

\(^{146}\) This situation existed for a very long period. 25% of the members of the Kibbutzim in the thirties did not have permanent abodes and in certain places (like Magdil) almost 40% did not have their own rooms (Landshot 2000, 56).
chairs) was such a strict rule that a group that did not obey it was threatened with boycott. The perception that prevailed in the groups was that everything was the property of the collective, including the thoughts of the individual; one of the regulations asserted that “any privacy disturbs the common work.” The talks and conversations among the members were penetrating and intrusive. The so-called intimate “confessions” and the legitimacy to investigate and intervene in the mind of the individual – with the purpose of testing and selecting – did not necessarily create a feeling of solidarity but, in most of the cases rather increased the individual’s isolation. Golda Meir, who was accepted by the Merhavia group only after her third attempt, described this intrusion into personal space as the main reason for the departure of “thousands” (Meir 1972, 75; see also: Landshot 2000, 56-58; The Book of the Group 1925, 8-9).

As Meir emphasized, it is quite clear that in many cases the hard material conditions and physical sufferings were only secondary causes of many aspiring members leaving the groups. Those young men and women were under tremendous psychological pressure to prove their possession of the “required elements,” for belonging to the group; that they were “Alpha Males” (a frequent term in that period).

The tension that was created in this highly selective atmosphere can be noticed in all the group members’ activities. Aliza Yudlevski – a lifelong pioneer in the Jordan Valley – claimed that even the singing and dancing, regarded with sentimental nostalgia in memoires of the period, were not a sign of “joie de vivre” (Heb. simchat chaim), but rather an outlet for radical psychological tension:

“and that singing concealed all the doubts and fears that maybe there would be no tomorrow…sometimes the singing ended with a no less wired hora [typical pioneers’ dance] carried on to fainting point …it was not just a dance, rather a kind of wordless cry [Heb. tze’aka], a discharging of all that had accumulated in the heart. It was a period of cruelty for the human being. People lived in hard conditions and were expected to give everything they had with no consideration as to their individual capabilities” (in: Frenkel 1989, 486).
Yudlevski’s testimony is not at all typical, nor is that of Yosef Aharonovich, who was one of the few who criticized the idealization of the “pioneers.” In 1922 he described his feelings concerning the Second Aliyah:

“we are forcibly accepting the verdict of history to serve as fertilizer for some kind of vague future, that none of those alive today will live to see” (in: Chazan 2005, 74).

It would seem that the embryonic social field that Ruppin created derived from the Stumm system’s bio-medical weltanschauung, in which the productive space of the workers mirrored conditions in the animal world. It was merciless, unsympathetic, hard and cruel; it recognized only force and not opinions and it knew only the innate “aptitude” or lack of “aptitude” of the individual.  

5.2.5.8 Martyriology

It is a reasonable assumption that the excessively demanding conditions of the selective social field were a main factor in the high percentage of suicides among the Second and Third Aliyah immigrants. Their tendency for self-sacrifice seems to be what Durkheim described as “altruistic suicide” (Karsel 1972, 23). Alroey, who researched the suicides of that period, described the legitimization and glorification surrounding the suicide. In this connection he quotes one of the pioneers, Mordachai Kushnir, who, in 1920, wrote an article entitled Consuming the Mind to Death (Heb. Chilyon haNefesh laMavet):

“Someone in our small society who commits suicide …does not only lose himself; he is a sacrifice put to death by us all. He has found the courage to take upon himself a sentence that lingers in the heart of many who bear it within themselves without having the ability to carry it out” (Kushner 1964, 26; Alroey 1999, 233).

147 These ideas were promoted by the Saar industry management and were part of the Stumm system repertoire, see: (Tille Alexander, Die Berufsstandspolitik des Handel und Gewerbestandes, Berlin 1910, II, 173-174, in: Sweeny 1998, 57).
At the Vienna congress (1913), Ruppin emphasized that though the movement had poor resources “we are rich in people who are capable of sacrifice” (Bein 1968 II, 22), and in his lecture at the 15th Zionist congress in Basel, 1927 he said:

“the valley […] which is populated by Bedouins and hostile neighbors, we will not be able to conquer with middle class, settled men, but only with enthusiastic youth who are not deterred from endangering their minds and their health” (Ruppin, 1927, 142).

In his essay Self-sacrifice (Heb. Mesirut Nefesh), Dr. Joshua Tahon (1870-1936) the brother of Ruppin’s secretary, gave expression to this same theme: “National aspirations,” he wrote, “cannot be realized unless people are willing to sacrifice their lives. Without the seal of blood [chotam ha-dam] no national hope in history was ever fulfilled. Our hopes have already received the stamp of blood, warm blood, young blood” (in: Frenkel 1996, 429).

Ruppin and his literary agents such as Yaakov Tahon (1880-1950) and R’ Benyamin (J. R. Feldman) (1880-1958) who were his most senior secretaries, explicitly advanced the Zionist martyriology (Frenkel 1996, 424), that was crucial for the success of the PO’s selection planning. This martyriology which was a blend of models from the ethos of the heroic martyr in Christian culture, models from the national repertoire, which evolved in the wake of the French Revolution, praising those fallen in battle for fatherland and nation, and images and tropes from the Jewish tradition of commemoration and externalization, promoted the idea of death for the sake of the nation and the land. The inducement of Palestinian Zionism for the young male immigrant emphasized militarism, physical preparedness and sacrifice as Zionism’s highest values while selflessness and steadfast devotion are glorified as the litmus test of personal character.

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148 On the Zionist martyriology and cult of death, see also: (Zartal 2005).
149 In this context it is appropriate to mention that one of the mottos of the Second Aliyah was Yosef Trumpeldor’s supposedly last words: “It’s good to die for our country” which became an inspiration for generations of patriots in Israel.
“Blood, blood” wrote one of the pioneers in lyrical prose:

“its color is beautiful and the land immersed in it becomes dear to us, treasured. In the same way as the body needs blood, so does a whole nation need it, as well as the land.”

The idea of sacrificing one’s life was exalted as part of Ruppin’s culture planning, which was interwoven with the process of the religious transformation from traditional Judaism to nationalistic Zionism. In this way the martyriology was secularized as it tied individual uniqueness to the collective fate: the significance of individual deaths was expressed in terms of their contribution to the pioneering enterprise of the nation (Chazan 2006, 285-286). After the death of the eighteen years old pioneer Moshe Berski in 1913 at the hands of Arab robbers, his father sent a letter in which he promised that his second son, Shalom, would replace his dead brother. Berski was the first victim in Degania and though he had only been in Palestine for eight months he became an important symbol. His grave was the first in Degania’s graveyard and “made Degania a permanent settlement, rooting it in the soil of the motherland” (Dayan 1968, 378). Ruppin wrote that the father’s act proved that “the spirit of the Maccabeans was not yet lost in Israel” (Bein 1968, II, 89). This story was extremely important to Weizmann as “propaganda material” (Chazan 2006, 284) and led many American Jews to contribute money to Kinneret (Bein 1968, II, 89-90). Berski’s story was important also as an edifying model in the memory building and education of the youth, as well as of their parents; some of whom had only recently arrived in the country. For both the younger generation and their parents, the cemeteries and funeral ceremonies provided a concrete, physical dimension to the process of socialization, creating a collective memory that imparted models for comprehending their culture and identity.

150 Silman K. L., (Heb.) *From the Reflections of my Heart*, quoted in (Frenekel 1996, 429).
151 Moshe Dayan was named after Moshe Berski (Duyan 1968, 378).
152 From the period of the Third Aliyah on, the cemetery of Degania was considered a place where the pioneers could restore their spirits and rekindle their motivation, a site that gave direction to young newcomers (Chazan 2006, 296). On the cemetery of Kinneret and its relation to Israel’s “culture of mourning,” see: (Mann 2000, 74-75). Warburg and Ruppin are buried there.
However, beyond the powerful images this incident and the many that followed it provided for the Zionist fundraising system, the martyrriology of the Second Aliyah was enhanced by the demands of Ruppin’s eugenic planning. In the cultural space he produced, the young immigrants were subconsciously under pressure to prove their suitability to belong to the “desired elements.” For this, they had to demonstrate their “enthusiasm,” which was perceived by Ruppin as “vital power” or the “will for life.” This unique kind of energy found its expression particularly in the worker’s skill at hoeing. Acquiring the ability to work with the hoe (Heb. turia/maadeer) – the “tool” as they used to call it at that time – meant gaining the respect of their fellow workers as well as proving to themselves and to the native Arabs their questioned masculinity.\footnote{Many of the Second Aliyah people wrote in their memoirs how they “conquered the hoe” and how they competed with the Arab workers. Avrahamiyyahu Naftali remembers his work in Gedera in 1909 and that he “competed with two Arabs” in cutting grapes, “it was like a struggle until eventually the Arab worker asked me to stop the competition” (in: Tamir 1972, 12).}

The PO considered working with the hoe as the “test of fire” as Ruppin put it, (Ruppin 1928), as the ultimate test for determining one’s \textit{Menschenmaterial} quality.\footnote{It is interesting to note that working with the hoe became in the following decades an important practice for the formation of other groups of immigrants. Thus, e.g., we can find the following explanation, given by Arie Shil, one of the Zionists Agency emissaries to Iraq in the late forties: “work with the tool [the hoe] plants in the heart of the young man and woman confidence in their own power, it creates an important counter-balance to the Jewish-galut inferiority complex, which is so hard to uproot” (in: Meir 1996, 67).}

Nevertheless, this ability served not only as an indication of the \textit{productive level} of the worker but also of his \textit{biological affinity} with the ancient Hebrews. According to Ruppin’s weltanschauung, derived from the \textit{Völkisch} connection between the soil and the \textit{Volk}, the ability to work with the hoe (at least for a significant period) is proof of a person’s connection to the soil – his ability to fertilize it – a fact which affirms his racial affinity to the ancient Hebrews.\footnote{This idea is derived from the school of Haeckel, who wished to regenerate the Germans and make them new and brave males who will feel “at home” in the natural landscape of the fatherland (Gasman 1971, 7).}
A.D. Gordon, whose ideas, as will be described later, were totally different from those of Ruppin in most cardinal matters, was unequivocally opposed to the martyrriological policies of the PO:

“Not with blood do we buy our right to [as in: konim zchut] the land but rather with those who are living in it. This land belongs to the Arabs who dwell and work in it and it is ours as we dwell and work in it” (in: Halpern & Reinharz 2000, 182).

Gordon claimed that self-sacrifice was a heavy sin, almost worse than exploiting others and that it also had a parasitical aspect. No one can use others for his own goals and nor, therefore, should one sacrifice one’s own present for the “tomorrow” of oneself or others. He claimed unequivocally that the Zionists were recruiting the young settlers through appeal to their “urge for self-sacrifice” (ibid.).

5.2.5.9 Pruductivization

The repertoire which dominated the groups placed in its center an ideal type of productive man who was satisfied with minimal possessions, the diametrical opposite of the Jew as parasitical and greedy. As in the “Stumm system,” the main endeavor of the PO was to create an atmosphere in which the workers’ “productive will” would never cease. The attitude of the group to the individual was dependent almost exclusively on his reputation as a worker: “[…] the position of the individual in the group” wrote Landshot, “the gravity of his personality, the respect he receives, the extent to which his ideas and wishes are taken into consideration – are all a kind of prize which is given to the industrious worker” (Landshot 1944, 63). Nevertheless, the “prize” of the productive worker was not merely symbolic; he was recompensed materially as well. A productive worker increased his chances of promotion and future prosperity. The PO offered incentives to capable workers in the form of higher positions in the administrative field or gave them land on easy terms that enabled them to become independent farmers. One of the workers wrote about this phenomenon with naive bitterness:
“Had I seen two out of us twenty dedicating their work to public affairs I wouldn’t say a word. But when I saw that 12 members at once went to the Petach Tikva convention, I felt a need to stay at home.”

A significant number of group members had political and administrative ambitions (The Book of the Group 1925, 5), and after a period ranging from few months to a few years, rapidly achieved promotion in the institutions established and run by the PO. The PO used the group members as a reservoir of high quality *Menschenmaterial* and systematically appointed the prominent members of the groups to the many positions needed in the expanding administrative field (emissaries, instructors, officials, managers). Lisak finds that almost 50% of the political functionaries (Heb. askanim) came from the groups and the Kibbutzim. These were agents who had an important role in disseminating the repertoire of the PO. The elite groups in the social field in the 1930s and 1940s achieved their high positions at a very young age, 50% of them within 10 years of their arrival in Palestine and 40% in a fast track of 1-6 years which Lisak defined as the “leap-frog” mobility of the ‘founding fathers’” (Lisak 1981, 37, 42).

5.2.5.10 Reproducing the Repertoire According to Military Models

Ruppin’s methods of reproducing the repertoire were based from the very beginning of his work, as his early student plans demonstrate, on military models, not so much in terms of martial warfare but rather in the Prussian manner of transferring military models to civilian activities: “Our condition here” wrote Ruppin “is similar to that of an army […] when there is a trained, permanent army it is easy to add a great number of new men each year and to train them together with those already trained” (Ruppin 1919e, 375). This principle, of reproducing and spreading military style

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157 Lisak writes that 55% of the elite personnel in the period before the establishment of Israel arrived in the Second and Third Aliyot. He finds also that many of the elite members were relatively young (Lisak 1981, 36-37).
158 It is important to stress that, in his discreet way, Ruppin supported all the military organizations in the Yishuv. See e.g. the way he supported, financially and morally, the para-military group known as the “Jaffa Group” and its leader Eliahu Golomb, later to become one of the founders of the *Hagana* (the leading underground organization of the Yishuv; the cradle of the IDF), (Malkin 2007, 94-95).
models, is one of Ruppin’s most important contributions to Modern Hebrew culture and influenced many of his followers.\textsuperscript{159}

Ben Gurion’s ideal model for organization was one in which all authority would emanate hierarchically from a central body, determining each individual detail in orderly and disciplined fashion (Shapira 1989, 628). In this regard, as Shapira noted, the various forms of political organizations in the period of the Third Aliyah (1919-1923), with all their ideological differences and disputes, resulted from personal and group political struggles rather than from conceptual disputes concerning the model of organization. When Tabenkin for example, broke from \textit{Gedud ha-Avoda}, his rival organization, Ha-Kibbutz ha-Meuchad, accepted the idea of a centralized Kibbutz, led by a powerful leadership whose power to impose its will derived more from its own inherent authority than from formal procedural structures (Shapira 1989, 628).

It can be said that this model of military-like centralisation was necessary in many ways if the Zionist movement’s leadership was to achieve its goals. In the year that Ruppin devised the reproduction of his repertoire through military models (1919) the Jewish population in Palestine was estimated at 56,000. In May 1948, when the State of Israel was established, the number of Jews was 650,000. In thirty years half a million people had immigrated and multiplied the population 11 fold (Cohen 2002, 36). This unprecedentedly fast immigration created the dimension of speed already mentioned, which must be taken into account in any analysis of the field and the formation of its cultural identity. Handing on the models of cultural identity had to be carried out through rapid selection within rigid categories and led to direct and strong sanctions against those who deviated from the norms dictated by the dominant repertoire. In this regard, the intrinsic speediness and selectivity of the field the PO generated was inclined to use military models which were suited to carrying out the rapid internal selection, the segregations within and the external expansion.

\textsuperscript{159} The main working force of the Third Aliyah (1919-1923), called the \textit{Labor Battalion} (Heb. Gedud Ha-Avoda), was organized according to military models. Apart from its important historical role and many achievements, it was also responsible for establishing a settlement, “Ruppin Village”, in his name.


5.2.5.11 Healthy Cruelty

*Hebrew pioneering is cruel in its essence.*

Y.H. Brenner\(^{160}\)

*The root of our problem lies not in a lack of tolerance but in the fact that tolerance has rooted itself too deeply in many of us.*

A literary agent of the PO\(^{161}\)

The selective practices that the PO instilled in the social field were radically opposed to the declared ideology of the WZO which called, allegedly, for “free immigration” of “all” Jews, using the traditional messianic motives of *Kibbutz Galuyot* (the Ingathering of the Exiles) and “mutual responsibility” (Heb. arvut hadadit), which presented Zionism as the alternative and contrast to all the discriminatory societies of Europe, and as an open haven for all Jews (Margalit 1999). The declaratory approach of the Messianic *Kibbutz Galuyot* was of enormous importance for Palestinian Zionism’s public relations, in that it could create an emotional channel to connect Diaspora Jewry to Eretz Israel and also present Zionism to the world as a humanist movement. Although these ideas and images were disseminated by the marketing and fundraising agents of the Zionist movement, and were presented as the moral justification for its establishment and existence, in practice, Palestinian Zionism’s institutions ignored these declarations and put obstacles in the way of those Jews who were indeed in dire straits, but did not fit the criteria of what was required or preferred. As we already know, the PO acted almost from the beginning according to rigid criteria that eliminated most of the “Jewish people” from the lists of those entitled to certificates to enter Palestine.

\(^{160}\) In: (Tarshish 1989, 92).

\(^{161}\) In: (Frenkel 1996, 437).
Shapira points out the clear contradiction between the propaganda of Kibbutz Galuyot and the selection policy and explains it as the by-product of the gap in the Zionist movement between “dream and reality” (Shapira 1989, 18). It is my contention however that, in practice, this gap was bridged by means of the model of “healthy cruelty, one of the main models that Palestinian Zionism, and the PO in particular, imported from Völkisch German nationalism and social Darwinism.

“Healthy cruelty” was a necessary perception for agents in the eugenic field. It asserted that the “new man” must be cruel not because he wants to be cruel but because he must be cruel in order to survive. According to this weltanschauung, cruelty is a magnificent quality because it is ‘natural’ (as opposed to ‘unnatural’ liberal or religious mercifulness), and Man must find a way to release it in order to express his power (Bachrach 1995, 65). These beliefs were common in the eugenic movement, which promoted the idea that the selection process – which seemed to the “non-modern” as cruel – was actually natural and necessary for the existence and progress of the human race and Ruppin had already dealt with this concept in his early works Darwinismus und Sozialwissenschaft and Moderne Weltanschauung und Nietzsche’sche Philosophie. As in many other cases, Ruppin now transferred this concept to the repertoire of the new Zionist identity. According to him, “healthy cruelty” was essential for the building or rather bildung of Zionist identity while mercifulness became, in his weltanschauung, a symptom of the weakness and degeneration of the galut Jews. Thus, the “healthy cruelty” model in the specific Modern Hebrew culture was connected with the erasing or “burning” of the image of the galut Jew who was marked by his frightened and excessive mercy.\(^{163}\)

\(^{162}\) The idiom “burning the bridges” was common among the second Aliyah workers. (see e.g. the memories of Gluzman Ben Tzion, in: Tamir 1972, 63)

\(^{163}\) Anxiety, fear and panic (which were attributes of the Jews) could lead eventually to “paralysis of the will” and resulted from “lack of nervous energy” (see: Rabinbach 1992, 168).
The “healthy-cruelty” model became a necessary component of the new cultural identity, as represented in the character of the pioneer Gad in a play from 1918:

“Gad: Yes...I am cruel! ...I was cruel and I am cruel! [...] All the bridges behind me are destroyed! I feel relieved! The last part of my heart – has died within me! Yes, this is cruelty! I am not the only one! [...] and the path is flattened with beloved bodies! We are walking and stepping over the souls that loved, raised and nurtured us. We are stepping over our parents and going on our way...”

In his lecture on the sources of the Second Aliyah, Yitzhak Tabenkin, one of Ruppin’s ‘sons’ and the leader of *HaKibbutz HaMeuchad* asked: “how did this human material [of the Second Aliyah] become a conqueror and settler of the land – why didn’t the Diaspora [gola] educate the Jews as colonizers?” and he answered:

“the burning of the bridges to the world where we lived before, the destruction of former relations with the Diaspora [gola] and all its qualities, [...] our being desperate – all this set the background for the constructive ‘even so’ [af al pi chen]. It is the source of power! [...] the virtues that emerge from the burning of all the former values and from losing any other outlet ---from the burning of the former values the human being prepares to become a genesis man” [emphasis in the original].

In the same way as anti-intellectualism stood in opposition to the allegedly excess intellectualism of the Talmudic *pilpul* of the *galut* and male activism stood in opposition to feminine passivity, so cruelty stood in opposition to the allegedly timid and excessive mercifulness of the *galut* Jew. Almog describes how this was introduced into the Modern Hebrew repertoire through literature by extracting from the texts distributed by the PO to the Second Aliyah immigrants a model of perception that demanded of the young immigrant that he overcome his pity for his parents in the

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165 Tabenkin’s concept ‘even so’ (Heb. af al pi chen) recalls Ruppin’s Darwinist-Nietzschean idea regarding the demand that the *Übermensch* transcend his historical-mental-biological frame.  
166 Yitzhak Tabenkin, in: (Balevski 1935, 83)
galut and his remorse at having left them. As Almog notes, the texts he examined were actually propaganda written in simple language for readers who had only just begun to learn Hebrew (Almog 2002, 111).

Yosef Baratz, one of the members of Degania, remembers the pain of overcoming his longing for his parents:

“every evening I hide among the trees and cry – cry for the pains of my body, cry because of my fears that I will not hold out, cry with longing for my parents’ house…nevertheless I pretend that I am young and happy and ready to continue the work in spite of everything” (Baratz 1948, 20-21).

One of the pioneers who committed suicide by putting a bullet through his head left a note to his friend. His last words were:

“You have belief in your heart, mine is lost. Tell my parents. When I remember my parents…I am afraid” (in: Baratz 1948, 75).

The fight against pitying the galut father became a dominant model in the repertoire. The poem “Don’t Listen, my Son, to thy Father’s Instruction” by David Shimonovich (Shimoni) – a paraphrase of the biblical verse “hear, my son, the instruction of thy Father” (Proverbs 1:8) – openly encouraged a radical rebellion against the galut father and was obligatory reading in the youth movements, especially in HaShomer Hatzair (Almog 2002, 110).

On the wall of the PO branch in Colosova, Beni Marshak hung the slogan quoted above as a motto: “Hebrew pioneering is cruel in its essence” (Tarshish 1989, 92). The concept of “healthy cruelty” appeared frequently in the discourse of the immigration administrators of the PO and its branches in East Europe. In one of its memos, the PO management accused the immigration clerks of a tendency towards mercy that “overcame healthy national reasoning” (Margalit 1999, 248). According to Margalit that concept “became central to the perception of immigration and appeared

167 Later a “politruk” (political officer or propaganda officer) in the PALMACH.
in many versions” (ibid. 248-49). The instructions of the directors of the *Aliyah* department that implemented Ruppin’s plan was to give certificates only to “selected, pioneers, with awareness [baalei hakara]…*Aliyah* fanatics…heroes of the spirit,” and Y Sokor (Lufban), the editor of *Hapoel Hatzair* wrote at the beginning of 1927 that “the settlement’s quality of justice [midat hadin] and reason, will always need to overcome the quality of mercy [midat harachamim].”

The model of “healthy cruelty” is evident in Israeli culture even today, but during the formative decades of Modern Hebrew culture it was a dominant cultural obligation. To give one example, Netiva Ben-Yehuda recounts how she was shouted at by Shaul, a kibbutz member of her parents’ generation, after she expressed doubts and confusion concerning her role in a military incident where she had to kill Arabs:

“Fool! What will you all amount to? These are the thoughts of a weak, miserable people. Do you want a normal people here? Do we want to stop being miserable Diaspora Jews? Weaklings? So, among other things, we have to invent the Jewish hero…a strong person, free, liberated, who can take a gun in his hand and kill those who want to kill him before they do, do you hear? If you can’t be like this, then you are either a sissy or a damned Diaspora Jewess!” (in: Weiss 2002, 24-25)

### 5.2.5.11.1 The Selection of the Diseased

In his *Sociology of the Jews* (1930) Ruppin wrote that, contrary to the Europeans, “the Jews have never engaged in a ‘self-cleansing’ of their race, but have rather allowed every child, be it the most sickly, to grow up and marry and have children like himself.” He suggested that “in order to keep the purity of our race, such Jews must abstain from childbearing.” In accordance with this tenet of Ruppin’s, the PO, and later the Jewish Agency, adopted a policy that championed immigration of only those Zionist elements who were healthy in body and mind and capable of assisting in the building of a future state. At the same time, the Jewish Agency prevented the

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169 Netiva Ben-Yehuda (b. 1928; Tel Aviv) was a member of the Palmach and fought in the 1948 War. (Ruppin 1930), in: (Weiss 2002, 2).
immigration of others who did not meet the Zionist criteria (Shvarts, Davidovitch, Seidelman & Goldman 2005, 9).\footnote{For a detailed description of the Jewish Agency’s instructions see: Immigration Department of the Palestine Zionist Executive, Instructions for the Medical Examination of Immigrants, Compiled by the Health Council of the Palestine Zionist Executive, Jerusalem, 1926, in: (Shvarts, Davidovitch, Seidelman & Goldman 2005, 9).} In order to secure its own goals, the Palestine Zionist Executive instituted a medical certification process. Naturally, young, healthy applicants who could best enhance the effort to bolster Jewish presence in Israel received preferential treatment. However, the medical selection process did not end with the immigrants’ arrival. If a young immigrant was discovered to be ill, the Secretariat for Health Matters of the Jewish National Committee in Israel, (the body that provided self-governance among Jews in Mandate times) together with the Jewish Agency, undertook to return the individual to his country of origin. In this manner, the cost of treatment was saved and the immigration certificate could be passed on to an able-bodied young person. It is interesting to note that, at least according to our current historical knowledge, no open debate was found regarding the issue of medical selection by the Jewish Agency during the British Mandate (ibid., 9-10).

All immigrants who became ill or were injured irreversibly during their stay in Palestine were forced by the PO and, later, by the Jewish Agency, to return to their ports of origin and for this purpose the authorities even agreed to pay for the ticket and other necessary expenses. From the beginning of the 1920s, those who were forced to leave included the chronically sick, who had already been ill in their countries of origin, victims of work accidents who could no longer support themselves, and also large families whose provider had died or become crippled and who were left with no means of support. By this method, among others, the PO and the Jewish Agency fostered the healthy “elements” and weeded out the weak and the ill, in the spirit of Ruppin’s eugenic planning.
At the end of 1921, Yehoshua Gordon, the director of the Aliyah bureau in Tel Aviv, wrote a memo in which he described the distress of the sick who were sent back to Europe:

“In the last period, cases of sending Olim [immigrants] back has increased. Most of them are sent to Vienna, others to Romania and Poland. Most of them are sick people who can’t help themselves. The minority are sent to their parents. But even in those cases, it is possible to imagine the state of a pioneer who volunteered to come to this Land, sometimes against his parents’ will, and returns to his parents as a sick person, with nothing; Still, his condition is better than that of one who arrives in Vienna, a place which is foreign to him completely, where he doesn’t have friends or acquaintances, except for a letter of recommendation to our office.”

However, memos like the above were mere expressions of “mercifulness” and had no significant impact on the immigration policy. During the 1926 economic crisis, and the Fourth Aliyah (1924-1928), which threatened the fragile social structure of the Second and Third Aliyot from a number of aspects, the plan to send sick people back to Europe was accelerated, and the health committee of the PO undertook to deal with the chronic invalids and see to their deportation. The instructions for carrying out the plan were formulated in July 1927 and included a series of actions aimed at “exerting psychological pressure on the sick” in such a way that the offer to return them to their countries of origin would be an “offer they could not refuse” (in: Margalit 1999, 271). This “offer” was conveyed in different ways, beginning with an attempt to convince them in a pleasant talk and culminating in harsh threats of cutting off their income, as was recommended in the case of one epileptic. The sick were put in an impossible situation. The institutions treated them – according to the concept of “healthy cruelty” – as parasites living on the public, and the clerks “chronically”

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174 The Aliyah Office in Jaffa to the Zionist Management Aliyah Department [23 Jul. 1926], CZA S 30.2639, in: (ibid.)
ignored their petitions for help. Their letters were neglected, their allowances stopped arbitrarily and personal applications were treated with contempt (ibid.).

In addition to the effect of such procedures on the standard of health in the Yishuv’s population, the PO’s practices also had an impact on the perception of illness. Many pioneers in the groups tended to hide their illnesses because a sick person was immediately marked out as a burden. Like many other models that Ruppin instilled in the repertoire, the practices concerning sickness had a long-lasting effect on the members of the Kibbutzim, making them embarrassed to stay in bed for minor illnesses, or even unwilling to admit that they were ill at all (Evence 1975, 187).

Starting in the early groups, these models soon infiltrated the growing and expanding culture space and habitus of the whole Kibbutz movement, a habitus that can be generally defined as a “milieu of better people,” similar to Durkheim’s “society of saints,” which became, as noted, the main reservoir for the dominant group of the Modern Hebrew social field.

5.2.5.12 The Function of “Selectivity” in shaping the Dominant group

While it is clear that the PO’s selective immigration policy was implemented at different levels and with varying degrees of intervention, the strict and rigorous plan that Ruppin had in mind would seem to have become more lenient in practice towards the end of the 1920s, following the mass immigration of the Fourth Aliyah (1924-1928). The directors of the PO and its East European branches had, it is true, clear intentions of conducting a strict selection in the distribution of certificates but in practice, there were many cases in which it proved impossible to carry out this “cruel” intention and many immigrants arrived eventually who did not match the desired criteria. This resulted in part from the unprofessional staff of many of the PO branches but also from party interests, favoritism and even bribery.

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175 According to Chazan, the Group in Degania engaged in lengthy debates concerning Shmuel Dayan’s journey to Europe for medical treatment. According to Dayan, he had decided to cover the expenses himself. This anecdote reflects how the level of collectivity increased only gradually and shows that, at least until 1913 (the year of Dayan’s journey); mutual help in Degania did not include health-care (see: Chazan 2006, 294).

176 It is estimated that the Fourth Aliyah (1924-1928) brought 67,000 immigrants, half of them from Poland. The attitude of Ruppin to this Aliyah will be discussed further on.
The immigration into Palestine, which became massive in the second part of the 1920s, was described by the immigration clerks as “pandemonium” (Heb. andralamusya). Yehoshua Gordon said, at the committee of immigration bureau managers in 1926, that “we have to say that the Aliyah has got out of control.” His colleague Chaim Babli said that “instead of the management controlling the Aliyah, the Aliyah is controlling the management” (Margalit 1999, 271).

Since the end of the 1920s the function of the “selective immigration” seems to have been, as Halamish writes:

“a function of enlisting myth […] as an instrument for recruiting a selected vanguard. The leaders of the labor party [MAPAI] used the phrase ‘selective Aliyah’ in a ‘selective’ and controlled way. They were cautious in using it when turning to the wider public […] but, at the same time, they raised it in the inner circles of their party as a cohesive slogan to strengthen the pioneer camp […] they also used it in the inter-Zionist struggles over the certificates, wanting to protect excess privileges or achieve priority for the vanguard, which included their own people [Heb. anshei shломam]” (Halamish 2000, 198).

The perception of society as ‘selected’ or ‘elected,’ used since the end of 1920s, is a manifestation of the labor movement’s construction of its memory of the past, in which it developed the self-perception of a “working aristocracy,” unique people who were not born to be workers or farmers, but chose that way of life out of idealistic commitment, and after a rigorous selection process to determine their qualifications for it. The personal decision in favor of a working life was a kind of “entrance card” to the new aristocracy, which was sufficient to erase the stain of parasite that was attached to the Jews (Harshav 1988, 23, 26).

177 In this particular year (1926) 13,000 immigrants came to Palestine but more than half of them left the country within a year. See: The Jewish Agency Internet Site: http://www.jafi.org.il/education/100/concepts/Aliyahh3.html
At the end of the 1920s the dominant group, which had become more or less established, made the idea of selectivity a part of their symbolic capital. According to this narrative, the dominant group had had an initiation period which forged them and thus gave them the legitimacy to become the leaders and shapers of the new social field. The ‘selective Aliyah’ myth created a difference between the dominant group and those who ‘infiltrated’ the land without a proper selection process, and without any ‘idealistic’ enthusiasm only because they had no choice or, in the worse case, because they wanted to make selfish and ‘unproductive’ profits. This historical memory enabled the dominant group and their decedents to increase their symbolic capital and legitimize their privileged status over the newcomers. A striking example of how this historical memory was accepted by the Yishuv’s population and the symbolic capital translated into the field of political power, is the fact that the members of the agriculture sector, who were no more than 4% of the entire Jewish population, comprised more than 20% of the members of the first elected Knesset (the parliament of the State of Israel).178 This symbolic capital was translated also into material capital, and although 80% of the Fourth Aliyah immigrants settled in the cities, cooperative agriculture in its various forms received most of the national budget (Landshot 2000, 165; Sternhell 2001, 234).

178 It is possible that this achievement was connected to the fact that in MAPAI and other labor movement parties, it was accepted that the election of a Kibbutz or Moshav party member counted as two votes. This regulation was changed only at the end of the 1970s; a remnant of this privileged status is preserved until today – the Kibbutz or Moshav party members of the Labor [Avoda] Party still pay a reduced party membership fee.
5.2.6 Between Ideology and Bureaucracy: Gordon and Ruppin

The difference between the weltanschauung of Ruppin and that of Aharon David Gordon (1856-1922) can illustrate the gap between Zionist public relations and rhetoric – fields in which Gordon was a “star” – and the practical field dictated by the PO’s culture planning.

Gordon’s cultural identity was molded by his transformation from traditional religious life in Russia to the life of a fervent Zionist agricultural worker in Palestine. Until the age of forty eight he lived the obscure life of a bookkeeper on the estate of Baron Günzburg in Padolia, Russia. He left his wife and children (who joined him only later) and went to Palestine in 1904 to become an agricultural laborer and to preach his doctrine of “salvation through work” to a group of young admirers. Although some of his “spiritual” perceptions were similar to those of Achad Ha’am, he was different from him and from the First Aliyah Chovevi Tzion in laying stress on the redemption of the individual as the first step towards the redemption of the nation. Gordon argued that only if the individual Jew returned to Palestine and worked its soil would the Jews as a nation regain their historic claim over the land. He was in no doubt as to the Jews’ right to return to Palestine/Land of Israel and become an integral part of it once more, but neither did he doubt that the Arabs, too, were a part of it and he recognized their national rights:

“The Arabs have all the characteristics and possessions of a living nation, though not a free one. They dwell in the land, live in it, till its soil, speak their national tongue etc.” (Gordon 1952, 140).

Gordon is considered the “father of the religion of work”, for he perceived of the productivization of the Jew and the idea of the “conquest of labor” within the Hassidic frame of tikun (Heb. religious amendment or reform. Lit.: repair). In his 1911 article On Our Work he wrote:

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179 The only person the number of whose appearences in the canonical Book of the Second Aliyah is greater than Ruppin’s.
“When Israel is fulfilling the will of the Makom [Heb. lit. Place; a synonym for God] – their work is done by others. This is not a mere saying. This idea, knowingly or not, became for us a subconscious feeling and second nature […] from now on our main ideal must be work. We failed in work (I am not saying ‘sinned’ for it wasn’t our fault), and by work we shall heal […] if we only succeed in discovering the ideal of work, we can be healed of the disease that sticks to us, we can stitch up the tear made by being ripped from nature. […] we need not deceive ourselves, I must see with open eyes how defective we are in this regard, how foreign work became to our spirit, not only in the private sense, but also in the national” (Gordon 1911, 287-289).

Hassidic, Tolstoyan and even Buddhist ideas formed part of Gordon’s moralistic views. He opposed Marxism as being “based on hatred,” and because he thought it preached change for institutions but not for individuals (Hattis 1970, 27). His ideas were imbued with a mystical spirit which infused working the soil of Eretz Israel with a religious holiness.

The significance of Gordon’s historical persona and views in shaping the Second Aliyah cultural identity and ethos are presented in almost every Zionist history text but the source of his charisma lay less in his general and mystic ideology than in his being a model for imitation. His arrival in Palestine almost in his fifties represented for the young immigrants “the father who follows his sons.” His picturesque Tolstoyan long white beard appealed to the young workers and provided them with a “transitional figure” to whom they could refer in their confused conversion from religion to nationalistic Zionism. Gordon’s outward appearance and language were direct and simple, and his images and concepts were constructed in the manner of a Rabbi, a preacher and a loving father. His importance for the young immigrants reaffirms the assertion that they were not motivated by socialist world views and that their urge to regenerate or heal their bodies and minds was a far more decisive incentive than any kind of systematic socialist ideology (Landshot 2000, 39).

Both Ruppin and Gordon considered “productivization” and “work” as the means to heal the Jewish “disease,” but Gordon’s words were uttered from within a different
Gordon published his criticism of the group already in the early stages of its development. In 1916, in his article Our Account with Ourselves (Heb. cheshbonenu im atzmenu), Gordon furiously attacked the behavior of the group members. The cause of his attack was a transaction in which the members of the groups behaved, according to Gordon, in the manner of “the haggling daughter of parasitism,” which came to life in its “sheer ugliness.” Gordon was referring to the group’s intention of selling its wheat crop at the inflated market prices of the war period, while a group of worker leaders demanded they sell it to HaMashbir at a fair price (Ben-Avraham 1980, 240). Their behavior, according to Gordon, was a symptom of the deterioration of their general inner development, “a beginning of decay – if not more than just a beginning – in a place where I didn’t believe it possible” (in: Ben-Avraham 1980, 240). This incident was the background to his critical article. The conversation he had with the group members made him rethink the phenomenon of the “kevutza” in its entirety. His criticism of the structure of the group revolved in particular around the issues of selectivity and “healthy cruelty.” The development and establishment of the group’s economy had become its essence, he declared, and the human being was of no account. Instead of “creation” (Heb. yetzira), a value in itself according to Gordon, there came “action,” measured by economic achievement. The group had become, in his view, an impersonal unit that supported abstract ideals while ignoring life and in

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180 HaMashbir was founded in 1916 at Kineret to help the small Jewish community in the country during the World War I.
particular, the living human being. Furthermore “economic calculations and thinking in terms of social planning” had replaced the experience of allegiance, allegedly its social ideal, (Ben Avram 1980, 242). It is not hard to see that all the tendencies that Gordon considered negative, were precisely the models that Ruppin was instilling.\textsuperscript{181}

Gordon was no less horrified by the development of the groups’ selective structure as promoted by Ruppin:

“indeed, they work with energy, very hard, and with suffering and not without devotion, but their ideals remains ‘abstractions’ with no connection to the suffering of the human being” (in: Ben-Avraham 1980, 242).

And this, according to him, was the main reason for the rapid turnover in the groups:

“[When in the] groups love for others is no longer a force and the organic spirit slackens, many of the members leave. That is why it is not surprising that in one of the groups the members are changing every year” (ibid.).

The root of this development lies in the “mechanical [impersonal] contact which will never be able to connect minds in a lasting relationship.” Gordon’s views, written when he was already sixty years old, seem to reflect his inability to go beyond his mystical and utopist world view and to recognize the fact that it was actually Ruppin who was encouraging the “turnover” in the groups, and their “mechanical” relationships and uniform behavior. The extent of Gordon’s surprise and amazement reflected the deep change that had taken place since Ruppin’s cultural planning began to have an impact in the field. Gordon’s perceptions belonged to the first phase of the Second Aliyah. They were based on an “organic” (rather than “mechanical”) human interaction whose main principle was to oppose any kind of selectivity. He believed that one should be open to accept any human being and wrote that he was not “demanding for the group persons with some unique quality but rather […] [that] the

\textsuperscript{181} Gordon’s ideas concerning cooperation, although he didn’t formulate them systematically, were influenced by the spirit of Tolstoy’s mansion or the “cooperative communities” of Fourier’s school, which emphasized the freedom of the individual and unmediated relationships between the members of the groups.
group should accept all kinds of human beings from the market place [i.e., ‘simple people’] who, once in it, will become honest, important” (Gordon 1957, 453).

This view, which is similar to the traditional Jewish Hasidic one as well as to Tolstoy’s ideals of simplicity and of welcoming every one regardless of his class or physical condition, was indeed the opposite of Ruppin’s conceptions and practices. The selective nature of the group, which was so different from Gordon’s faith and ideology, was for Ruppin the main reason for the settlements’ success. In the middle of the twenties, 15 years after Ruppin began his culture planning, he wrote:

“If today the level of diligence of the agriculture workers is greater than 10 or 15 years ago, we must first of all give the credit for that to the work of selection among the kvutzot. From the thousands that passed through the kvutzot, a large number, maybe most of them, were rejected. Those who stayed were those who passed the test of fire” (Ruppin 1928, 45).

Comparing Gordon and Ruppin reveals the difference between “dream” and “reality,” as Shapira puts it, as well as between declaration and action. Ruppin’s impact on the forming of the Second Aliyah’s cultural identity was of far greater importance than Gordon’s, yet Zionist historiography, and especially its propaganda systems, chose Gordon to symbolize its values and ideals so that in common Zionist historiography the collective group, whose structure was the result of Ruppin’s social planning, is represented as a direct continuation of Gordon’s ideology. “Good old Gordon” with his hoe and his long white beard were much more appealing for the self-image of Palestinian Zionism than Ruppin’s charts, statistics and German mandarin spectacles. Gordon’s image and ideology played an important role in spreading the spiritual and moral dimensions of Zionism and had a crucial function as a recruiting myth both in Palestine and in Europe (where his ideology and image had a great influence, for example, on the German Zionists).¹⁸²

¹⁸² His writings and image were disseminated through Buber’s Der Jude. The person who initiated these publications was Zalman Shazar (Halpern & Reinharz 2000, 218).
5.2.7 Ruppin’s Model of Direction

The answers of Ruppin are lessons in settlement-wisdom. It is possible that the truths and rules he thought out are not written in any book, but they are taken from the book of life of Jewish settlement in the Land of Israel.

B. Katzenelson

In the chapter on German Zionism, I quoted Franz Oppenheimer’s theatrical metaphor designating the German Zionists the “directors” and the East European Jews the “actors” in the Zionist enterprise. I will now make use of this metaphor, presenting colonization in Palestine as a performance, to describe some of the unique characteristics of Ruppin’s mode of direction.

A year after the establishment of Degania, in 1910, the WZO established another cooperative project, the “cooperative of Merchavia,” near Afula. A comparison of the two reveals Ruppin’s unique pattern of colonization and the ways in which it differs from that of the WZO leadership, represented in this case by Franz Oppenheimer, Merchavia’s planner and director.

The major differences between Ruppin’s Degania and Oppenheimer’s Merchavia: are to be found in their methods of directing the groups and the aims of their planning. With regard to their methods of direction, while Ruppin was in close contact with the agents in the field, Oppenheimer directed them from afar, via a mediator (the agronomist Dick). The interaction between Oppenheimer and the members of Merchavia did not include continuous and unmediated feedback. Oppenheimer expected the settlers to follow his original plan as well as to acknowledge his absolute authority. Ruppin’s model of direction was, of course, the exact opposite and one of his main principles was to take the constant feedback from the “actors” into serious consideration.

183 In: (Bein 1968, I, 21).
Oppenheimer’s mode of directing demanded disciplined and obedient settlers who did not aspire to intervene in planning and direction or, even if they did, did not have that option. His “cooperative plan” evolved in the context of Central Europe and, while suited to the conditions of the German labor market, was inappropriate for the economic and climatic conditions of Palestine, and even less so for the cultural identity of the Second Aliyah settlers (Oppenheimer 1973, 45).

Oppenheimer’s attitude and planning stemmed from the conservative bourgeois opinions held by both West and East European first generation Zionists. He was a life-long liberal who viewed economics as a game of supply and demand. Like most of Herzl’s circle, he too believed in the concept that any collective form not based on differential wage payments lacked motivating power and that, in fact, the only force that would increase productivity was the workers’ self-interest (Preuss 1954, 64). As opposed to Oppenheimer and the WZO leadership in general, Ruppin believed that the workers could be motivated also by an idea greater than their individual interests, an idea that would give an exalted meaning to their lives and to their cooperative labor. To be sure, this understanding did not emerge from any form of ideology, whether socialist or liberal, but rather from his modern weltanschauung, which was totally different from Oppenheimer’s liberal, idealistic views.

As opposed to the typical model of the “Stumm system” and the empathy that Ruppin had with the workers, Oppenheimer tried to impose his models from above; he was indeed a liberal but a patronizing one. For example, when Merchavia’s settlers opposed the appointment of a new director, Oppenheimer’s reaction was authoritative and condescending. Although he noted that he was not insisting on the new appointment, he added that if the settlers refused “to accept the authority of an expert in management, I will declare in Our ‘Welt, ’ that I am indeed making the experiment, but am not taking any responsibility.”

Oppenheimer’s reaction reflects the profound difference between his approach and that of Ruppin. The latter would never have thought of threatening the members with publication in “Our Welt.” As in the “Stumm system” model, Ruppin’s approach was

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to give the “actors” the feeling that they were partners in the planning; that they were participating in the planning process even if this was merely a feeling. Unlike Oppenheimer, he listened to their views not only as a way of manipulating them, but also because he knew that it was they who were the actors in this performance and that his role was limited to teaching them how to express ‘their demands’ properly and efficiently. As opposed to Oppenheimer, he understood their suspicion of any patronizing agronomist or director who did not recognize their special “state of mind,” and he understood that the differential wage payments, which were a key element in Oppenheimer’s plan would “only make them jealous and bitter and destabilize the feeling of friendship on which the success of the farm is dependent” (Bein 1968, II, 85. my emphasis., E.B.).

This kind of understanding was absent from the direction of Oppenheimer’s “cooperative settlement.” The main problem in Merchavia stemmed from the labor relations between the agronomist Dik, Oppenheimer’s loyal “assistant director” and the members of the settlement. Dik’s attitude was domineering and rigid. Conflict was inevitable and reached to the point where:

“no one could imagine the possibility of cooperation between the members [of Merchavia] and Dik […] his devotion and addiction to the methods of Oppenheimer are immense…”

In addition to the bad labor relations, the workers also resisted the employment of Arab workers – one of the keystones of their ideology – a resistance perceived by both Oppenheimer and Dik as unrealistic and illogical for economic and professional reasons, as well as being contrary to their liberal, ideological perceptions. Oppenheimer saw real danger in the workers’ hostile attitude to the Arabs and he wrote that: “because of the excessive nationalism of the Russian terrorists [the workers] we will arrive very soon into a maze” (in: Frenkel 1989, 476). As stated in the chapter on the German Zionists, Oppenheimer considered modern nationalism a calamity and hoped that the Zionist dream could be realized in the spirit of

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185 According to Oppenheimer’s plan, each of the workers had to be fully responsible for the economic consequences of his decision to establish a family (Oppenheimer 1973, 46).
brotherhood and by agreement with the Arab neighbors. This attitude alienated him, in 1910, from the workers and then, in 1920, from the Zionist movement altogether (Bilski 1958, 66-70; Karsel 1972, 115-116).

Unlike most German Zionists, Ruppin supported the Second Aliyah settlers who gave priority to the national idea over socialist-universal ideas, and thus differentiated themselves from the Arabs. Ruppin knew, too, how to modify their early dogmatic and confused attitude to the Arabs into pragmatic practices that enabled them to utilize the Arab work force while at the same time preserving the powerful symbolic ideal of “Hebrew Work,” which played a central role in their unification.

Step by step, Ruppin made the workers recognize that their demand for “100% Hebrew labor” endangered the most important sector of private economy and thus threatened the Modern Hebrew economy as a whole. Ruppin recognized (already in his first memorandum from 1908) that the workers could not supply even a small part of the required working force. Kolatt shows that in 1914 the Jewish workers in the agricultural towns comprised only 10% of the working force (Kolatt 1996, 76). The main economic activity derived from private capitalist initiatives and was based heavily on cheap Arab labor and not on the new national settlements established by the PO.187

It is a reasonable assumption that Ruppin’s PO made no special effort to help the cooperative settlement of Merchavia (Ron 1973, 48). Merchavia’s success might, after all, have proved the feasibility of planning Palestine from Europe, thus weakening the power of Ruppin and the PO. The reaction of the JNF members in Germany to the contract signed by Ruppin with the workers in Degania reflected the difference between Ruppin’s “Stumm system” approach to dealing with the workers, and the position of the German based JNF executive: “as to Um Jauni [the Arab name of Degania],” they wrote to Ruppin:

187 On the dominant function of the private sector in the Second Aliyah period see: (Karlski 1997)
“we were amazed that the apportioning of wages in this group is determined according to a purely communist principal that does not take into consideration the quantity and quality of the labor of each worker.”

The directors of Oppenhiemer’s cooperative settlement in Merchavia (who were based in Germany), opposed point-blank the establishment of such a group as Degania and wrote to Ruppin:

“we regard with pessimism the development of such a group, which comprises a kind of communist experiment, which aspires to vanquish Oppenheimer’s experiment” (in: Frenkel 1996, 487).

The difference between Ruppin’s Degania and Openheimer’s Merchavia marked a crucial turning point in the collective memory of the labor movement. Yitzhak Ben-Zvi described Oppenheimer’s experiment as a “theoretical idea […] without any connection to the Jewish reality in general and the Eretz Yisraeli in particular” (in: Frenkel 1998, 50), and Ben-Gurion, wrote on the subject of Merchavia:

“and again the basic mistakes are made […] following the example of [the Baron’s ] bureaucracy, all the enormous experiences that cost our settlement so much energy and such great losses are not enough to put in the hearts of the new ‘colonizers’ the simple recognition that you can’t build the Yishuv only by commands from outside and completely ignore local public opinion. […] and the incident in Kinneret is proof. […] as is known to all in Berlin and Köln nobody cares about the voice that comes from the Land of Israel.”

Ben-Gurion, who was deeply influenced by Ruppin, and also assisted by him in the following decades, praised Ruppin’s mode of direction in Kinneret, which he saw as an example of good dialog between the WZO and the workers.

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189 Ben Gurion David, (Heb.) The Strike in Kineret Farm, the Labor Movement Archive, 104 IV, file 45.
190 Ben Gurion became, over the years, a close disciple of Ruppin and a lot of his ideas and concepts derived from Ruppin’s lexicon and weltanschauung.
By 1914, most of the special characteristics of Oppenheimer’s original plan had vanished from Merchavia, and it was taken over by a group that operated according to Ruppin’s model. In labor movement historiography, this development was interpreted as the victory of pragmatism over abstract sociological theory (Myers 1995, 36). The failure of Merchavia and the success of Degania marked the acceptance of Ruppin’s culture planning and repertoire as realistic substitutes for the detached WZO leadership and, in fact, the last years of the Second Aliyah, from 1911 to 1914, witnessed a sharp increase in the number of groups. Among the workers, the success of this model was formative and among the young Jews in the Pale the very idea of publicly owned land being cultivated by a group of workers aroused great expectations and enthusiasm.
5.2.7.1 The Dissemination of the Repertoire through the Workers’ Leaders

*His way was to escort the doer, to enable him to find his intentions and initiative.*
B. Katzenelson

*He knew how to connect his heart to the fervent minds of anonymous youngsters, [...] to help the anonymous to achieve positions of fame in the nation.*
Y. Shprinzak.\(^{191}\)

The process through which the workers transformed the “unclear ambitions and dreams and desires” of their first phase (Eschkol 1969, 313) into a new repertoire emerged, as I claimed earlier, to a large extent from the culture planning activities of Ruppin and the PO. Ruppin disseminated and instilled his repertoire mainly through the workers’ leaders. In order fully to understand this process, we must first recognize that Ruppin’s model for organizing them was not altogether conscious nor was it formulated or expressed coherently. Nevertheless, it was not completely unconscious either; the epistemological channel of his interaction with the workers was the limbo of dispositions which is located between the conscious and the unconscious, i.e. that of the habitus. According to Bourdieu

“*The habitus is a set of dispositions which incline agents to act and react in certain ways. The dispositions generate practices, perceptions and attitudes which are ‘regular’ without being consciously co-ordinated or governed by any ‘rule’* (Bourdieu 1993a, 12).

Ruppin’s way of shaping these dispositions within the small social field of the workers that emerged in the training farms and groups was through their leaders, whom he perceived and built up into a kind of Zionist *Übermenschen*. As already described, Ruppin perceived the *Übermensch* as of enormous importance for society,

\(^{191}\) In: (Shprinzak 1943, 3).
since he set an ideal model, whether mental, physical or biological, for imitation (Ruppin 1903b, 149).

Ruppin’s method of forming the dispositions of the workers was not by means of ideological or scientific discussions, but by first of all putting them through a process of Zionist bildung (e.g., agricultural training and medical and social selection) and then placing or situating them in positions that would lead them to behave eventually according to the repertoire he aspired to instill in their bodies and minds, a repertoire that eventually generated a new habitus.

This social relationship, between the culture planner or producer of the models (in this case Ruppin) and the reproducer of the models, i.e. the dominant agents of the repertoire (in this case the workers’ leaders), can be demonstrated in the interaction between Ruppin and all of his ‘sons’ – from the young pioneer Busel to the young writer Agnon and the young historian Bein.

As noted above, the difference between the producer and the reproducer is defined by the fact that the latter is not fully cognizant of the intentions of the former. The reproducer exhibits only limited understanding of the intentions underlying the culture plan he reproduces, and tends to espouse the repertoire’s models with perceptions and practices taken from the simpler popular and often demagogical ideological sphere. It is indeed the “recognition of non-recognition,” as Bourdieu puts it, which defines the reproducers and all the agents subordinate to them (Bourdieu 1993c, 209).

**5.2.7.1.1 Yosef Busel as a Reproducer of Ruppin’s models**

In the case of the first group, Degania, it is easy to show how Ruppin transferred his models of perceptions and actions, i.e., his repertoire, through Yosef Busel, (1891-1919), considered in the common narrative the “the symbol of the sublime essence of Degania and its unshakeable leader” (Paz-Yeshayahu 1991, 343). A description of this kind tends to relate to Busel as a producer and, by ignoring the important role of Ruppin’s culture planning, fails to realize that Busel was a mere reproducer whose “ideology” was shaped to a large extent by Ruppin’s culture planning.
Busel was born in 1891 to a “very religious family” in the shtetl of Lachovich, in Minsk (Tzur 1997, 68). He studied in a Yeshiva and his mother and family perceived him as a future Rabbi. At the age of 15 he left the Yeshiva and devoted himself to Zionist activity. He went to a training farm in the Jewish town of Cherson (south Russia) and at the age of 17 he came to Palestine. In 1908 he joined the Cherdera Commune,192 and after a short period of work in the Moshavot/Colonies of Petach-Tikva and Rehovot (in which he “overcame the hoe” (Heb. nitzeh et hamaader) as he put it193 – he became, in 1910, the leader of Degania (Paz-Yeshayahu 1991, 72).

Busel was the dominant figure among Degania’s members and his influence upon them was so crucial that when at some point he considered leaving, the other members feared it would mean the end of their group and settlement (Tzur 1997, 68). In the workers’ memoirs, Busel is described as a leader with “revolutionary perception” and, in addition, “every idea ripened in his mind much earlier than it did with the rest of us.”194 Zalman Shazar (Rubashov) (1889-1974) described Busel as the “originator of plans” (Heb. mecholel ha-tochniot) (Shazar 1973, 1, 108) and Tanchum Tanfilov (1888-1968) said that he had “mature thinking” (Frenkel 1976, 63).

Zionist historiography attached to Busel a long list of innovative ideas and crucial decisions, which allegedly originated in his unique revolutionary and creative mind. Busel is also considered to be the promoter of the idea of keeping the group small, and turning it into a permanent settlement (Paz-Yeshyahu 2006, 108).195 Katzenelson writes that the establishment of a permanent settlement group was a rebellion against the disorganized and failing workers’ organizations of the towns and it gave the workers a “stable mental balance, of staying put […] by stopping the wandering [of the immigrants] from place to place, and overcoming their roaming spirit, the Bedouin spirit” (in: Frenkel 1976, 59).196

192 The Cherdera Commune, known initially as The Rumenait Commune (from the name of the town Rumeni in Belorussia some of them came from), was established on a ship by a group of young immigrants on their way to Palastine in 1908.
193 Yosef Busel, Degania A. Internet site, [www.degania.org.il/bussel.htm].
194 Yossef Baratz, in: (Paz-Yeshayahu 1991, 72). A similar description that Busel “saw the future” and everything “before us” is repeated also in the memoires of Miryam Baratz, (Frenkel 1976, 63).
195 See also: Yosef Baratz, in: (Landshot 2000, 44)
196 Katzenelson’s description is typical. Shmuel Dayan, e.g., writes that it was Busel who was responsible for ending the wandering and encouraging settlement in one place. In: (Paz Yeshyahu 2006, 108).
Both of these aims – keeping the group small and putting an end to the constant movement – were explicit goals of Ruppin’s culture plan so that, while for Katznelson the “Bedouin spirit” was merely a casual expression, in Ruppin’s vocabulary it also had a definite biological meaning connected with his racial and eugenic theories.

Ruppin’s interest in changing the “wandering mentality” of the young immigrants is obvious. The “conquest groups” did not sufficiently meet the demands of the PO for these groups being organized on an ad hoc basis, their members lacked the long-term sense of responsibility and commitment required – for at least a few years – for the survival of a permanent cooperative settlement group. Ruppin’s culture plan aspired to move the workers from the towns, where they were in permanent conflict with the plantation owners, to the lands the PO was constantly acquiring, and use them there to establish settlements within the borders of the Jewish enclave he had created. His plans and aims were translated into practice by agents like Busel, who provided the necessary justifications in the ideological discourse of the confused young workers. In his lectures and talks, Busel provided them with “texts of legitimization,” i.e., models of perception and practice which can be traced back to the PO and Ruppin.

The first important example of this shows how Busel promoted the move from the concept of “conquest of labor” to that of “conquest of the land”; a move that was marked, as noted, by the advance from the first phase of the Second Aliyah to the second phase, in which Ruppin organized the workers into a more or less efficient Arbeiterstamm.197 Busel was also one of the first to adopt and spread Ruppin’s concepts among the workers: “all those who think about the community [al ha-klal] and about our national aspirations reach the understanding that it is necessary to replace the Arab worker with a Jewish one” he said at a workers’ assembly:198

> “but the element here in this hall is not qualified to take that role. The Ashkenazi can’t compete with the Arab and live in hard conditions under the farmer because he wants to be free and doesn’t want to be enslaved. This position will be taken by the eastern Jew [the oriental] who, after a year of

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197 *Arbeiterstamm*. Literally: workers’ tribe. This is a concept from the “Stumm system,” discussed above, referring to a loyal core of workers.

learning the work, will stay in the town and do all the lower grade jobs. [pchutot]. We need to turn our energy away from the towns, and not waste our strength in vain...if we came here to create something, we must qualify ourselves for that particular end. The Histadrut must educate and prepare workers who are qualified to conquer new lands” (ibid).

Busel’s speech carried Ruppin’s message and marked the end of the utopist first phase. It is striking to see how Busel accepts the mission from on high by referring to “all those that think about the community [al ha-klal]” as the supreme authority for the importance of his speech. Busel’s words, implicitly and unconsciously, also take it for granted that the “eastern Jew,” by his very nature, is willing to be enslaved, further evidence of how Ruppin’s ideas had crept into the discourse and shaped it.

Common historiography provides many examples that portray Busel as the producer of the repertoire. It claims, among other things that he was the initiator of the model of the “mixed farm” (Tzur 1997, 65), and of dividing Degania and establishing more groups on its land. He is also given credit for solving the problems of the children’s education and women’s agriculture training (Openheimer 1973, 41) and finally, though the list is longer, it is Busel who is credited with limiting the size of the groups and seeing to it that they not exceed 30 members (Paz Yeshyahu 2006, 111). These examples bear witness to the common Second Aliyah historiography’s misleading understanding and representation of the relationship between reproducers and producers. The ideal size of a group may well have been determined through some of Busel observations and reports, but the crucial and final decision – as always – was based on Ruppin’s culture planning and authority. In this particular case, the number of members had to be sufficient to create the necessary ‘intimacy’ between them and provide optimal conditions for intervention and internal selection.

In short, all the ideas that are attributed to Busel in the common narrative are ascribed to Ruppin in other historical sources and were, in any case, compatible with Ruppin’s interests and culture planning (see: e.g., Halpern & Reinhartz 2000, 235; 190). Even the naming of Degania, attributed in most historical texts to Busel, was not passed
without Ruppin’s approval. A close reading of the letter Busel wrote to Ruppin on that matter reveals that Ruppin was more involved than is generally acknowledged even in that decision.

The contact between Ruppin and Busel was extremely close; as between a father and son. It was Busel who was responsible for correspondence with the PO and he was also the treasurer (Heb. gizbar) and secretary of the group. “At nights” writes Yossef Baratz in his memoirs:

“All of us would gather in the chusha [a kind of native-Arab hut], that served as an office, in which our late friend Yossef Busel was living. We sat crowded together and talked about the affairs of the farm, and Yossef Busel would read to us the correspondence with the PO. The contact between us and the settlement institution – the PO – was regular and constant [Heb. kavuaa ve matmid]. On every matter, important or trivial, we consulted with the office and with its director Dr. Ruppin. A horse died – immediately we informed the office and received a letter of condolence; for a wedding or any other celebration – even more. […] Arthur Ruppin was a wonderful person. [He was] short, bald, a pair of glasses on his nose, and seemed to be a dry man who observed everything from a scientific point of view; but when you got to know him – you immediately realized that he was the exact opposite. Even the calculations and accounts he sent to the WZO, full of statistical numbers, were fuelled with a spirit of poetry for the soil. […] he used to visit us frequently and was very interested in our work and our friends. There was nothing in our lives that he didn’t regard as very important and which didn’t touch his heart, and he did as much as he could to help us” (Baratz 1948, 50-51).

Unfortunately, the complete correspondence between Busel and Ruppin is not available. However, in Busel’s correspondence with Ruppin and the PO from 1912 we

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199 The only other story I found ascribed the invention of the name to R. Binyamin, Ruppin’s secretary. Tzur writes that according to “another tradition” the name was given by R. Binyamin (Tzur 1997, 42). I believe that the story of the “other tradition” is closer to the truth.

200 See Busel letter to Ruppin concerning the name the members of Degania chose for their settlement, [www.jafi.org.il/education/ivrit/ZIONISIM120/chapter3.html].
can read of Busel’s opposition to the nomination of a clerk (CZA L2 364 84/4), and his request for money from the PO for equipment and the hiring of an engineer (CZA L2 364 84/8). From these letters we learn that the group had an account with the PO on which they could draw in case of need. From those of Busel’s letters to Ruppin that we have, we can see that their correspondence was intense and also that Busel was not always able to answer Ruppin’s many questions: “About many things it is very hard to write,” wrote Busel in one letter and from another we learn that Ruppin’s questions were repeated and detailed “this time, too, our answer will not be complete or comprehensive” (Busel to Ruppin, CZA, A107/731 50/257).

As the correspondence between Busel and Ruppin clearly shows, every activity of the group had to be accompanied by PO approval. Ruppin and his staff intervened in every stage of the planning and building of Degania. In 1910, to note one example, Ruppin decided to build permanent houses for Degania, because he believed that without proper housing the group would dissolve. Many in the group were afraid that the building of permanent houses would be the start of what they called “hitbargenut” (going over to a bourgeois or middle class way of life). However, in spite of their objections, Ruppin used his authority and continued preparations for the building, forcing the group members to accept his plan (Paz-Yeshayahu 2006, 105). Describing this affair in his memoirs, Dayan reveals another important fact. Since Ruppin had trouble in obtaining Jewish builders, most of the workmen who built the houses were Arabs. The group members protested and quarreled with Ruppin’s clerks and engineers but the PO continued the work without taking the protest seriously. 25 years after the event, Dayan summarized the nature of their dispute with Ruppin on this subject:

“During the time of the argument between us and the PO regarding the Arab workers – the builders continued the work. The argument ended at the same time as the work of building the houses was concluded” (Dayan 1935, 54).

In Zionist historiography in general, and in the popular “educational” narratives in particular, Busel and Ruppin are described as the creators of the group in a manner that blurs their specific functions as producer and reproducer. These historical accounts ignore the fact that, 15 years before the 32 year old Ruppin met the 20 year
old Busel (who only 5 years earlier had been a devoted Hassid), Ruppin had already been dreaming about and studying the management of social systems, training farms and groups of core workers in Germany’s most advanced academic institutions.

It is not my intention to detract from the importance and qualities of Busel – the young pioneer who would probably have become one of the more prominent of the workers’ leaders had he not drowned so tragically, in 1919, in the treacherous waters of the Sea of Galilee – but merely to point out that what common Zionist historiography calls Busel’s “innovative ideas” can be traced, in all essential issues, to Ruppin’s culture planning, which was implemented by his small team of experts and clerks who managed the training farms and groups. In the particular case of Degania, his partners were the architect Yitzhak Vilkinski (1880-1955) and the engineer Joseph Treidel (1876-1929), both of whom had had experience in the service of German colonialism and were appointed by Ruppin. Paz-Yeshayahu writes that Vilkinski worked according to the Prussian method of settlement, which became the leading one in the overall planning of Degania (Paz-Yeshayahu 1991, 113).

However, for Busel, as for all the young pioneers, Ruppin’s new repertoire was interpreted through the perceptions of the Gordon-Tolstoyan world view or other forms of messianic nationalism. One of the members of the group remembered that Busel used to say that “we should accept the group in the same way we accept matters of destiny.” Such a statement reflects Busel’s naïve and Hassidic perspective. Busel was unconsciously an agent of the “recognition of non-recognition” which normalized and legitimized the PO’s culture plan. His lofty ideological, utopist and mystic forms of expression were only a translation of Ruppin’s models into the confused identity field of the young group members.

As already noted, with his indirect mode of directing, Ruppin was able to give the workers the feeling that they were full partners in all the planning stages of Degania, even though their contribution was actually marginal. To give one example: the only reservation the workers had concerning Ruppin’s and Vilkinski’s architectural plan,

201 The member Hayuta from Degania A., (The Book of the Group, 27).
was a trivial one concerning the measurements of the stable; Ruppin changed the length of the stable on the spot, to their satisfaction.

It must be emphasized that, although I am dealing in particular with the young men of the Second Aliyah, the young women demonstrated the same pattern of transformation both politically and culturally. The case of Hanna Meisel (1883-1972), who arrived in Palestine in 1909 as a young agronomist, is a distinct example of such a transformation. Berg, who followed the changes in the Second Aliyah’s perception of gender, found that Meisel’s initial position supported a novel type of education that would take young women and girls out of the kitchen and put them on the land and at the same time encourage rather than reject, academic learning. In her initial ideological position, she denied that physical differences between men and women should exclude women from highly valued field labor (Berg 2001, 139). However, she changed her position after she met Ruppin, who saw in her an ideal reproducer of his culture plan and in 1911, appointed her the founder of the women’s training farm at Kinneret. Ruppin supported enthusiastically in her career and diverted “substantial material aid” to her projects and, in 1926, he appointed her the founder of the Agricultural School for Young Woman at Nahalal (Berg 2001, 140, 145, 147-148). As was the case with other people too, her meeting and work with Ruppin changed her views dramatically. In 1911 she espoused a new concept of women’s work based on what was “suitable” for women, and she began to emphasize traditional work for female farmers (Berg 2001, 140). This was exactly what Ruppin intended for women in his culture plan. Berg believes that the encounter of Meisel and Ruppin, “signals a broad transformation of Zionism’s gender after the Great War” (ibid., 145), and concludes his research on the gender differentiations in the formative period of Palestinian Zionism by stating that physical labor and productivisation and not gender were the prime criteria of women’s identity. It was not men but the culture of the Diaspora, that, was the enemy of Jewish renewal in general and of women’s liberation in particular (Berg 2001, 144, 146, 156).
5.2.7.1.2 The Dissemination of the Repertoire: The Case of Shmuel (Varshavski) (Eliezer Ben-Yosef) Yavneli

As noted above, Ruppin’s powerful position in the field enabled him, by means of his indirect direction, to situate a particular agent within a field of action, leading him to act in a certain way (while sometimes unaware of the implication of his actions) and thus to comply unconsciously with the framework of the PO. The case of Yavneli, the envoy of the PO to Yemen, provides us with a demonstration of the way Ruppin’s situating practices shaped the pioneers’ dispositions.

5.2.7.1.2.1 The Origins of the Initiative to Bring Over the Yemenite Jews

Ruppin had already written as far back as 1904 about the idea of bring the “Arab Jews” to Palestine, and in 1907 he specifically mentioned the Yemenites as a potential working force (Ruppin 1907, in: Ruppin 1936a, 11). Yet, in his diary, he writes:

“R’ Binyamin [Ruppin’s secretary], who was involved with the Yemenites, gave me the idea of sending a ‘messenger’ to Yemen to tell the Jews that in the agricultural towns in the Land of Israel they would be able to make a living as workers.” (Bein 1968, II, 103).

Ruppin, who wrote this a long time after the event, presented the initiative as that of his secretary, but in R’ Binyamin’s diaries, we find a totally different version (Droyan 1982, 118). Here, Binyamin presents the plan as Ruppin’s initiative, saying that only later was he asked to help in its implementation:

“[…] and in those days the suggestion evolved. People came and disappeared into the room [Ruppin’s office]. Closing, unusually, the door and whispering, also unusually. In secret, in secret, [Heb. razi-li, razi-li] something developed behind that door. But it was not proper to ask, caution

202 Ruppin was fully aware of the demographic changes in the Yemenite community in Palestine. This is evident from the report he sent to the JNF in 1908, concerning the first group of Yemenites (about 120 people) who arrived that same year, and began to work successfully in the town of Rechovot (CZA Z2/633). On this group see: (Bar-Maoz 2003, 31).
was enormous. But one day the secret was revealed to me… (ibid., 80) [to send an emissary] to Yemen in order to encourage Aliyah to the Land, and bring in [Heb. lehaalot] **poor, working** class Jews to increase the *Yishuv’s* population. He [Ruppin] didn’t care for the property but for the people [Heb. nefesh]” [my emphasis, E.B.].

Early Zionist historiography saw R’ Binyamin, Tahon and Shmuel Yavneli, as the main figures behind the initiative. According to that version, the initiative for bringing over the Yemenites came from the workers’ circle, i.e. from “below”: the young pioneer Yavneli had written a series of articles in *Hapoel Hatzair* suggesting bringing over the Yemenites and it was these articles that caused R’ Binyamin and Tahon to persuade Ruppin to put the plan into action. Nevertheless, as already implied, this version does not correspond with other historical sources, and recent historians have been led to conclude that the decision arrived from “above.” Shilo writes that the “initiative for the Aliyah [of the Yemenites] came from the PO in Jaffa” (Shilo 1988, 162) and Nini writes: “it seems that the idea of bringing in Yemenites to replace the Arab workers in the towns was Aharon Eizenberg’s, but its implementation was handled by the PO” (Nini 1996, 38). Both of them confirmed the research of Shafir, who argued that not only was the initiative Eizenberg’s and Ruppin’s, but that giving the credit for this initiative to the workers enabled Ruppin to cover up the economic (“colonialist” in the wording of Shafir) interests involved by presenting it in the context of “national revival” (Shafir 1989, 120).

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203 (Binyamin 1949, [16 Dec. 1910]). Besides the contradiction between the versions of Ruppin and R’ Binyamin, the latter’s diary entry also shows that Ruppin was interested only in a specific group of Yemenites, i.e. the “poor-working” type. The importance of this point will be elaborated in the following.
5.2.7.1.2.2 The Attitude of the Workers to the Aliyah of the Yemenites

The idea of bringing over the Yemenites caused two main reactions among the workers. Many of them were enthusiastic: Ben Gurion wrote in 1912 that the Yemenite Aliyah “is an important phenomenon in the life of the Yishuv. Because here lies the key to a radical solution of the question of Jewish labor in the towns” (in: Frenkel 1989, 467).

Zeev Smilansky wrote in Hapoel Hatzair (1912) in the same spirit:

“we must aim for the number [of the Yemenites] to grow from time to time in all the settlements of the Land of Israel…because we know that the pioneers have…already stopped working with the same enthusiasm that prevailed before” (in: ibid.).

These views were not shared by all, however, and the matter led to a debate among the young workers. In the Assembly of Galilee workers that took place in 1912, Eliezer Yafe claimed that employing “members of the ‘eastern ethnics’ [Heb. edot hamizrach]” in the towns:

“will not at all solve the problem of the Ashkenazi workers, first of all, because they are nearer to the Arab workers than to the [Ashkenazi] Jews, and secondly, because their employment will create a situation in which they will be given the hard labor, and the Ashkenazim will get the good jobs, something that stands in contradiction to the principles of the “conquest of work,” which include improving the condition of the worker and his employment” (Paz-Yeshayahu 1991,164).

The young worker Yafe expressed the solid, socialist consciousness of many of the first phase Second Aliyah workers, and for him such a plan marked a basic change of concept. If some of the workers could accept the differentiation between Arab and Jewish workers as a necessity for the national interest, importing Jewish workers – even if they were “only Yemenites” – as a cheap labor force to perform the hardest
and most degrading tasks in the economy, was in clear contradiction of socialist or national-socialist ideas even at their most flexible.

Yafe, in all probability, did not realize that, with his objections, he was contradicting the new repertoire introduced by Ruppin. Bringing in the Yemenites was a decisive point in the formation of the social Zionist space in Palestine and it exposed a principle of differentiation and exclusion that was in complete contrast to the socialist principles – vague as they were – of the first phase of the Second Aliyah.

The young worker A.M. Koler wrote in *Hapoel Hatzair*:

> “if the *Yishuv* can develop and flourish only by relying on the ignorance and inferiority of the Yemenites, if the idea of our salvation and renewal can be achieved only thus, and if only through them can our deepest hopes and aspirations be fulfilled, then it would be better for us all not to be saved and renewed. Better the wind should carry all off, than that we build the house of our freedom on the basis of slavery and humiliation!” (in: Shafir 1989, 122).

But such voices sounded more and more like irrelevant echoes from the utopist phase. Those leaders of the workers who had begun to work in the administrative field of the PO gradually internalized the new repertoire. This was a clear transformation created by Ruppin’s planning: a transformation that placed the “national interest” and “national assignments” before any ideological and certainly any socialist (and particularly Trotskyist) considerations.

### 5.2.7.1.2.3 Yavneli’s Conceptions before “Aliyat Yavneli”

Shmuel-Eliezer Varshavski [Yavneli] was born in the town Kazanka in Charason, Russia, 1883. His father was an enthusiastic Hasid from the Hasidic stream of Habad, and he named his son Shmuel-Eliezer after the Rabbi of Lubavitch, who had died around the time of the boy’s birth, as a mark of his respect and admiration for the late Admor.
At the age of twelve, Shmuel-Eliezer began to study at the yeshiva but, after his father’s death, he began to lose “his naïve belief” (Nini 1997, 191) and moved to Odessa. He spent a few years preparing for the high school matriculation examinations (which, in the end, he did not take), learned Russian, French, natural sciences and mathematics and began an intensive reading of the writings of socialist thinkers who captured his heart. After two years or so he came upon Pinsker’s *Auto-Emancipation*, a pamphlet that changed his world views: “from mending the world to mending a nation” as Nini puts it (ibid., 192).

Varshavski [Yavneli] presented himself for his army draft but when his turn came to deliver the oath of loyalty to the Czar, he declaimed an enthusiastic speech against the corruption and violence of the authorities and expressed his hopes for the Czar’s early fall. He was arrested on the spot and jailed for a short period until his friends succeeded in releasing him and smuggled him to Odessa disguised as an old man.

This story of his courage, resourcefulness and talent for disguise was perhaps one of the reasons that the PO management chose him for the mission. At the end of 1905, he came to Palestine with a faked passport. In the course of a conversation on the ship that brought them to Palestine he said to another well known pioneer, Noach Naftulski:

“[…] there are periods when the destiny of nations and states is given to individuals, and they and the few that follow them, waken the dormant powers of creativity in the masses. In our period, the few Zionists are those who demanded to go before the camp and be messengers of the nation, to save it from the life of the Galut […]” (Nini 1996, 21).

Indeed, already in his first steps Yavneli saw his function as that of a pioneer in the vanguard of the camp and as a messenger of the national revival.

In Palestine, Yavneli became well known to the group that would become the leaders of the labor movement. After a short period of working “with the hoe,” he became a guard in the vineyards. At the beginning of 1907 he began to work at Yavnel, but after a year, because of his physical weakness, he became ill and was hospitalized in Jaffa. In his first years in Palestine he seems to have been a teacher and man of vision much
more than he was a worker (he changed his name from Varshavsky to Yavneli to
commemorate his one year of working in Yavnel) (Nini 1997, 194). A few years later,
while he was the secretary of Achuzat Bait in Tel Aviv, Yavneli studied the Yishuv
in Jaffa and especially the condition of the immigrants from the Islamic countries
(Nini 1996, 22). He published the outcome of his research in a series of articles in
Hapoel Hatzair under the title The Work of Revival and the Jews from the East [Heb.
Avodat ha-Tchiya ve-Yehudei ha-Mizrach] (Yavneli 1910b).

In the first part of his first article he analyzed the potential of the Jews from the East
(Turkey, Persia and Bulgaria, and North Africa, Egypt, Tunis, Tripoli, Algiers, and
Morocco). Stressing the fact that many Jews from the East came to Palestine
independently (45% of the old Yishuv) he concluded that they had a “natural
inclination” to come to the Land of Israel:

“[…] of course, I am speaking only about the best of them. We can indeed,
point to their Arabness, their rudeness and the bad manners that stick to them.
But those of them who think of and care for the troubles of their nation know
only one way to solve it –through the renewal of the nation in the Land of
Israel. And though this dream is based more on a religious illusion as to the
future, it does not, nevertheless, keep them from coming to the Land of Israel
and finding in it their present life […] [my emphasis, E.B.]” (ibid.).

Yavneli was also disturbed by the fact that the Alliance Israélite Universelle was
gaining control of the Jews in the Arab world and pointed out that their educational
model was opposed to Zionism. He complained on several occasions that the Zionist
movement was not paying attention to the Jews of the East and their potential:

“we didn’t think that it was necessary to plant our notions of this land among
the Jews from the East who stand and wait for someone to come and bring a
spark of light into their dark lives […]” (ibid.).

204 It is very possible that Ruppin met him for the first time in that period.
Yavneli explained their poor condition and “Arabness” as resulting from the “powerful, iron-like forces of life itself” i.e., from habits and tradition. He stressed that what was blocking them from progress (and from separating themselves from their “Arabness”) was their religious conviction, which was “mere tradition – the heritage of their fathers, and not a living, creative source that makes man work with his own brain and therefore it did not have the power to really sustain the nation. And so the Jews of the East degenerated and sank into a deep abyss [emek tehomi]” (ibid.).

For Yavneli, religious belief led to degeneration not only of the mind but also of the body:

“Here is the Yemenite in front of you; this is the shortest man, we can say, in the entire Semitic race! (And it is worth checking the height of these Jews according to the laws of science, in order to learn to what extent man’s body can shrink in a state of degeneration) […] Even the Sephardi, that same Sephardi whose noble pedigree we used to mention – observe him more carefully and a life of slavery will be revealed to you, a life of spiritual emptiness, of pursuit of his brothers’ honor and flattery of the foreigner. This is the remnant that religion has left us [pleita]” (ibid.).

Nevertheless, though his analysis is harsh, Yavneli believes that “they are our brothers!” and he is optimistic concerning their mutability:

“[…] another generation will pass, and the Jews from the East will finally tear this worn out cobweb and enter into culture – good or bad. They will emerge from their religious diaper” (ibid.).

In the second part of the article, which appeared in the following issue of Hapoel Hatzair (Yavneli 1910b). Yavneli offered practical ways of fulfilling the potential of these Jews, in particular by means of the “reciprocal influence [emphasis in the original] that can be created between Hebrew literature and the Jews in the East” (ibid.). Yavneli emphasized here the important role of literature in disseminating the Zionist idea among the young Jews in Russia and suggested applying it also to the Jews in Arab lands:
“and when we turn our attention to the Jews of the East and observe their lives, we see that these people have no literature while, at the same time, their lands begin to develop, thus creating the need to broaden the world view of the public […] we can reach the conclusion that life has created here a real need for literature!” (ibid.) [emphasis in the original].

It was for this reason that Yavneli suggested a program for Zionist education that would operate according to the administrative model of the Alliance Israélite Universelle and would establish Zionist libraries for the Jewish communities in the Arab world:

“in every city, with a large Hebrew community, a library and book store will be set up […] many of us need to devote ourselves to working among the Jews in the East, as managers of the libraries and book stores that the Zionists will establish, and as teachers […] thus, when a few years have passed and we have created in the East a decent number of bases for Hebrew literature and the spirit of the revival – it will be possible to create economic contact with the aid of information centres and bank branches […]” (ibid.).

At the end of the article, Yavneli stresses that he does not see the solution only in “cultural work” but he sees the “cultural work” as a “mean to connect the Jews there to us” (ibid.).

Essentially, Yavneli’s position concerning the “Jews of the East” can be summarized as follows: they are totally ignorant and degenerate both spiritually and physically. They live in the “dark” and the “Zionist revival” can “spark” a light in their lives. Yavneli emphasized, however, that the attention paid by Zionism to the “Jews of the East” would be limited only to the “best of them.” The plan he suggested was long-term “cultural work,” as he put it, with the main aim of disseminating the Zionist idea through education and literature.205 The influence of popular social Darwinist ideas is clearly traceable in Yavneli’s text, nevertheless, it is important to emphasize that, although they may seem similar in a few respects to Ruppin’s, his ideas are

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205 Yavneli’s suggestions seem to reflect the formation of his own cultural identity in which, as noted, reading Pinsker was what made him a Zionist.
Yavneli saw in the “Jews from the East” (at least in the “best” of them) people able to join the new society in Palestine as *equals*. His racial degenerationist terminology was clearly superficial and not central to his frame of research, beliefs and plan. It is important to note in this regard, that the power of Marxist and social theories at the end of the 19th century lay not only in their social justice but also in their allegedly scientific validity. If we understand Yavneli in this context, we can see that his views and language emerged from his need to sound scientific at least in a general way.206 Thus, Yavneli’s articles reflected a quite liberal position for his time for, although he perceived the “Jews from the East” as inferior at that particular moment in time, he believed in their *mutability*; in their ability to change and become integrated into the new Hebrew society as equals. The precondition for this change, i.e. the method for integrating them, was, in his opinion, a long process of education by means of Zionist literature, which would detach them from their religious way of life and transform their worldview into a national and modern one.

It is quite clear, then, that there is something highly problematic in the claim of those historians who maintain, on the basis of his early articles, that it was Yavneli who initiated, or was involved in, the PO’s particular plan of bringing over the Yemenites. Yavneli did not deal specifically with the Yemenites in his articles (although he used them as a radical example of degeneration) and his proposals were clearly directed mainly at the Jews of North Africa (as noted, his plan aspired to compete with the *Alliance Israélite Universelle* which operated mainly in North Africa).

Yavneli’s articles received support in the workers’ circles and led to a formal decision being accepted by the *Hapoel Hatzair* party in 1910: “to influence employers through propaganda to replace foreign workers [Arabs] with the Jews of the East” and to carry out “energetic propaganda among the Jews in the East.”207 The wording of this decision – like that of Yavneli’s articles – does not specifically mention the Yemenites and confirms the assertion that they had no concrete plan beyond the general ideas of Yavneli, who concluded his article by saying that the “Jews of the

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206 Social Darwinist terminology prevailed in the social materialism writings of Marxist thinkers such as Kautsky, whom Yavneli mentioned as one of his intellectual sources.

East” must not come to Palestine without a cultural preparation of at least “one generation.”

5.2.7.1.2.4 Recruiting the Envoy

Droyan writes that, parallel to Yavneli’s recruitment, the PO tried to recruit one of the Yemenite immigrants, David Nadaf, and suggested that he accompany Yavneli to Yemen on the assumption that Yavneli would need someone to make contacts for him and help him gain the people’s trust (Droyan 1982, 118). Nadaf, however, like other Yemenites who had been asked, refused. According to Droyan those Yemenites who knew about the planned journey disapproved of it (Droyan 1982, 118).

At this stage the PO turned to Yavneli and invited him to a meeting with R’ Binyamin and Dr. Tahon (Ruppin’s most loyal secretaries), at which they told him that they had chosen him as their envoy to Yemen. It seems that Yavneli was chosen, not because of his social views but rather because he had the necessary qualifications for the mission Ruppin had in mind; a religious background, courage, a talent for disguise and the enthusiasm to take part in a “pioneering” adventure. Moreover, his darker skin made him suitable for the character he had to play. In terms of Ruppin’s classifications, Yavneli was a perfect example of the “Aschkenasisch-Negroider” type.

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208 (Yavneli 1910b).
209 According to Efrat, one of the candidates was rejected because of “mistrust in his qualifications” (Efrat 1993, 380).
210 It is not clear why. It seems that the PO was looking for someone to help Yavneli communicate with the Yemenites. According to Shafir’s narrative, the reason was that the PO couldn’t get a trustworthy collaborator.
Shmuel Yavneli (at the time Varshavski) left Palestine for Yemen at the end of 1910. At the beginning of 1911 he was already in Aden and had made contact with the Rabbi of the community and its leaders (Nini 1996, 24). He continued on his way with an Ottoman passport and a false identity – Eliezer Ben Yosef. This name contains a clear messianic charge (according to tradition the Messiah is the son of Yosef). The choice of name as well as all the other details was carefully planned. At first, the name “Eliaz Ben Mordechai” had been chosen (Efrat 1993, 380) and the character of the envoy was supposed to be that of a merchant wishing to buy artifacts, silver, jewellery etc., but finally Ruppin and his staff decided to send him in the guise of a Jewish sage (chacham) and sha”dar (Heb. an envoy on behalf of the rabbis).

Besides the change of name, Yavneli also changed his appearance: he grew a beard and side-locks, and wore the costume of a Sephardic Rabbi. Yavneli’s transformation was not only external, he actively played the part of the “sage” who came to Yemen on a religious mission. During his time in Yemen and his interactions with the Jewish community, his abilities to act and improvise improved constantly and not even once in the course of his mission was his true identity revealed.

According to his diary, Yavneli was not involved in the decision to take on the role of a Rabbi, and in his travel diary he presented this decision as one that was forced upon him by the PO:

“it was decided that this journey would be carried out in a religious way, and that I had to give a false impression of being an emissary of Rabbi Yitzchak Kook in Jaffa and present the Rabbis of the communities in Yemen with a series of questions on matters of marriage, divorce, family life (etc.) and receive written answers from them” (Yavneli 1952, 73).

Yavneli wrote that he did not fully appreciate why he should use the religious disguise; something about this decision seemed strange to him, since the Jews of Yemen held Ottoman citizenship, which meant that the authorities would have no
problem with some of them immigrating to Palestine. Nevertheless, he wrote in his
diary, “before I left Aden I bought, according to my friend’s suggestion, a prayer
shawl (Heb. talit) and I wear it in the Yemenite way” (Yavneli 1952, 81).

5.2.7.1.2.6 The Messianic Message
and the Identity of the Senders

I told him that I didn't know who was really giving [the money], I knew only
Dr. Ruppin, who was one of the Zionists, and from where he got [the money] I
didn’t know.
S. Yavneli

The pamphlet to the Yemenite Jews that Yavneli carried with him had an explicitly
messianic tone; and he himself was unlike the accepted type of the sha”’dar (Heb.
envoy on behalf of the rabbis), whom the Yemenite Jews had met before, and who
usually asked for donations. The “pamphlet calling for Aliyah” that Yavneli carried
with him opened with a mixed quotation from the Book of Psalms and the prophet
Isaiah:

“oh that the salvation of Israel [were come] out of Zion (psalms 14:7) I will
say to the north give them up and to the south [in the Heb. teiman, meaning
also Yemen] do not hold them. Back bring my sons from afar and my
daughters from the ends of the earth” (Isaiah 43:6).

The text plays on the traditional theme of salvation, and presents the Zionist colony in
Palestine as the return of the Jews to their holy land. The work in the agricultural
towns was described in Biblical language in the spirit of “the land of milk and honey”
and emphasized the success and happiness of the Yemenites who had already arrived
there. The pamphlet also emphasized in large letters that the Yemenites were invited
to a “meeting of brothers” (Heb. pgishat achim). Work and social conditions are given
a rosy description: “in most towns there is a physician who takes care of the children

211 It seems that Yavneli’s appearance was very convincing. One of the Yemenites wrote about the
shocking experience of discovering Yavneli’s true identity “We [the Yemenite immigrants] saw
Yavneli after a few months and he had already taken off the beard and side locks and was like one of
the pioneers and not honest in our eyes…” Seaadia Maswari, one of the elders of Nachliel (a settlement
near Hedera) in his memoirs, in: (Droyan 1982, 103).

212 Yavneli to Tahon [2 Jan. 1911], in: (Yavneli 1932, 75).
at a reasonable price,” free or very cheap education to include “reading and writing in the holy tongue, parasha [Heb. portions of the Torah], prophets and some arithmetic,” will be available, as well as, for three to six year olds, most pleasant kindergartens.” The pamphlet is signed by: “Eliezer Ben Yosef, envoy of Rabbi Yitzhak Hacohen, Rabbi of Jaffa and the towns” – a fictitious rabbinical authority. The pamphlet, it must be stressed, contains no hint whatsoever that the PO were involved. Ruppin was anxious to conceal any such connection since in that way the PO would be able to release itself from any kind of obligation to the Yemenite immigrants and reject any future claims made by them. It would also enable the PO to deny any responsibility should the project fail.213

The pamphlet was distributed in different versions (some of them written in Rashi script) and copies were made by local Jewish scribes (Heb. sofrei sta”m). Some versions seem to have been more embellished than others. Yavneli had a few secondary agents (local Yemenite Jews), and it is reasonable to assume that they produced a message with a more dominant Messianic tone.

In addition to the pamphlets, Yavneli also carried with him a letter to the Yemenite Rabbis which included a series of questions concerning the Yemenite version of the Halacha (Jewish law) and traditions. This letter expressed the ostensible interest of the Yishuv in the Yemenites’ customs, and it complemented the pamphlet by making a direct link between settlement in Palestine and the religious idea of kibbutz galuyot (Heb. ingathering of the exiles), which entailed, in its first stages, concentrating and reevaluating all the traditions of Diaspora Jewry. According to Ruppin, this letter was written by R’ Binyamin with the aid of Rabbi Kook (Bein 1968, II, 103). This fabricated letter is full of flowery biblical phrases and mystical allusions. The letter presents Yavneli as a scholar Rabbi who studied in the “Holy land” for a few years, was knowledgeable in the traditions of both Ashkenazim and Sephardim and now wished to study the traditions of the Yemenites for the imminent kibbutz galuyot. After a long series of questions on matters of Halacha, the letter concluded with a

213 It is quite clear that Ruppin’s strategy, from the very first moment of planning the Yemenite immigration, was to avoid any kind of obligatory link with the Yemenites. He wrote explicitly to the office in Cologne (1911) even before the arrival of the Yemenites in large numbers, that “if the Yemenites know that someone has promised to take care of their existence they will have a lot of demands” (Ruppin to the Office in Cologne [20 Feb. 1911], in: Shilo 1988, 162).
request for immediate “detailed” answers, with the stress on immediate, and presented the writers as highly interested in Jewish *Halacha* and in behaving according to its spirit (Bein 1968, II, 104-105; the full letter is in: Yavneli 1952, 187-208).

Yavneli used this letter in his encounters with the Rabbis whose legitimization and support he needed. The Yemenite Rabbis, however, were skeptical and had their suspicions about the whole story. In a letter Yavneli wrote to the PO [2 Jan. 1911] he described his problem:

“The *Chacham Bashi*\(^\text{214}\) asked me why Rabbi Kook mentioned nothing about the things I was telling him. I told him that we are afraid to write about such matters […] I think that if Rabbi Kook, or Chelouche or Professor Shatz or Dr. Ruppin write, it will be of some value to me (although I don’t know how much). So do your best to do whatever is possible” (Yavneli 1952, 75).

From this letter it is clear that, at this stage, Yavneli had no idea of Ruppin’s intention of keeping himself and the PO out of the picture. Ruppin, however, in keeping with his plan to conceal his and the PO’s involvement, obviously never sent the official letter requested by Yavneli.

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**5.2.7.1.2.7 Yavneli’s Conflict: the “Poor-Working People” vs. the “Best of Them”**

As he found himself twisting and turning more and more awkwardly at the Yemenite Rabbis penetrating questions and doubts as to his aims, and as he began to realize that the true senders, i.e., the PO and Ruppin, might never reveal themselves, Yaveneli began to feel that he was participating in a problematic mission and one that could even become dangerous. He began, gradually, to realize the true nature of his mission and as he traveled through the vast land of Yemen, he began to develop the selectivist approach and language of his senders and even started to enjoy his play-acting. He learned how to improvise and to use Rabbi Kook’s letter as his cover story: “here [Kiari] also I couldn’t find much material for us, and I limited myself only to stories about the Land of Israel and showing the questions of Rabbi Kook” (ibid, 88).

\(^{214}\) (Turkish: *Hahambaşı*) is the Turkish name for the Chief Rabbi.
Yavneli’s compliance with Ruppin’s eugenic instructions gradually became more and more noticeable in his reports. They included more and more physical descriptions which helped him to differentiate between the different Yemenite-Jews he met; for example, he described the Jews of Dala as “healthy” and as having “strong legs,” as opposed to those of Ka’atba, whom he described as having “wizened faces” (Heb. panim tzmukot) and “thin hands” (in: Shohat 1999, 31).

Yavneli understood that first of all he had to find the proper Menschenmaterial and only then try and bring them to Palestine. When he met Jews who “look good to me, as a healthy element” (ibid.) he gave them money for the journey, stressing that that was what “I was sent for” as if making it clear that his responsibility for their destiny was limited to providing them with fare money (ibid, 83).

In his letters, Yavneli frequently expressed his mistrust of the PO, and he tried over and again to obtain a clear answer from them concerning the nature and limits of his mission. The PO’s consistent concealment and vagueness fueled his anxieties. He felt the pressure of the position the PO had placed him in and began to express his tremendous emotional conflicts, revealing his disagreement with the cause and with the form of his mission. These fears grew when he began to realize the possible impact of his deeds. His emotional conflicts and feelings of guilt were aroused particularly when he met those he termed “different” Yemenites, that is to say different from the stereotypical image he had previously held. For example, when he met the Jews of Aden he wrote to the PO:

“and I will say once more that, regarding the condition of its inhabitants, and even the faces of its people.”[the emphasis is in the original] this city [Aden] seems to me like a town in Russia inside the ‘Pale of Settlement.’”

His identification with the Yemenites of Aden would appear to have resulted from his guilt feelings, impelling him to try and convince the PO to listen to his original plans – those he had expressed in his Hapoel Hatzair articles – which were based on “cultural work” and salvation through literature: “I want to stress that there is interest [in Sana’a] for Hebrew books and that there is a demand for books” [3 May 1911]. He
suggested a list of books from the Zionist canon: Achad Ha’am, Bialik, Herzl, Nordau [etc], some books for Hebrew language studies and geography, as well as reports of the Congress (ibid., 102): “What a shame you didn’t send me the newspapers and books I asked for” he wrote two months later:

“They could make a great impact here, because there are so many hearts and minds that are open to receive them. The Yemenites here, in Sana’a, are not like the Yemenites who sit in tin shacks in Jaffa and Jerusalem. Here in Sana’a there is a Yishuv of beautiful, important people who, without books or education, are already more developed than the [non Jewish] Yemenites and even than many of our orthodox Ashkenazis from Jaffa and Jerusalem. These words are not exaggerations, I ask you to consider them as true words. The intelligenzia, i.e., the sages, Rabbis and other worthies that I am talking about, do not deal with kabbala, do not believe in the antiquity of the Zohar, and study Maimonides’s The Guide for the Perplexed. This fact shows that it is not at all illusion that governs here” (ibid.).

Yavneli met in Sana’a totally different Yemenites from those he met in Jaffa and Jerusalem, and he was disturbed by “the fact that, from many points of view, the condition of the Yemenites in Jaffa and Jerusalem is much lower than their condition here in Sana’a. This is obvious, and I can’t stop thinking about it” (ibid., 103). As opposed to Ruppin, Yavneli was able to reflect on the stereotypes he had absorbed about the Yemenites, and to realize that it was not their racial constitution but rather their symbolic status that was mainly responsible for their situation in Palestine. Thus he suggested to the PO a plan for increasing their symbolic capital: they should bring to Palestine:

“two or three important, talented people from here [Sana’a], who will have a great influence on their community [eda] elevating its status and indeed also strengthening the connection between us. Their arrival in Palestine will influence the Jews in Yemen too and will generate a movement for immigration also among them. […] I repeat and emphasize: we are standing here in front of a living community of living people who want life and education […] I fear that perhaps when you read my suggestion and my words
on the importance of the Sana’a Yemenites and their will and talent for material and spiritual development you will begin to doubt my grasp of reality and wonder whether I am not adrift in a world of beautiful imagination. This is why I must explain a few matters” (ibid., 103-104).

Yavneli goes into a detailed description of the Jewish community in Sana’a. He is overwhelmed and amazed by their economic and social organization. They live in big, beautiful houses, have meat and full-corn bread to eat, take care of orphans and cripples and are on good terms with the powers that be [Heb. ha-malhut mekarevet otam]. They wear beautiful, expensive clothes and the women have precious jewels. Theirs is an independent society that looks after itself with no outside help and that, “for several years already”; has been keeping books. He suggests enthusiastically that the Anglo Palestine Company “establish a branch here.”

Yavneli’s texts negated all the PO’s stereotypes of the Yemenites. The Yemenites he met in Sana’a seemed to him to possess the qualities that the new nation needed: they seemed similar to the Russian Jews “even in the faces of the people,” they were “beautiful,” advanced, well-organized, they were not inclined to depend on philanthropy, i.e., they were productive and they were rational rather than mystical (Maimonides vs. the Zohar). By presenting the Yemenites as he did, Yavneli implied that he wished to reconsider the nature of his mission. While he had previously seen them as being in a process of degeneration, mainly because of their religious beliefs, Yavneli now found that the Yemenites he met contradicted this cultural (as opposed to racial) degeneration theory, and he tried to convince Ruppin that they could play a truly equal part in the new society. Nevertheless, as already described at length, Ruppin’s view of the Yemenites was very different from Yavneli’s humanistic approach based on “cultural work,” according, more or less to the liberal, enlightened model of the Alliance Israëlite Universelle. As opposed to Yavneli, Ruppin did not want intelligent or modernized Yemenites; he needed only the cheap-labor “natural workers,” who could be differentiated more easily from the genetic pool of the dominant group because they carried dysgenic blood.215 The Yemenites of Aden and

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215 This is the same kind of conflict Ruppin had with Sharet concerning the Ethiopian Jews; both Sharet and Yavneli reflect a perception of Judaism as a nation as opposed to the racial perception of Ruppin.
Sana’a, even if (or because) their culture was as advanced as Yavneli described, were not the elements sought by Ruppin.

Shafir has already stressed the nature of the colonialist practices of the PO in bringing the Yemenites in as “cheap labor,” nevertheless, this colonialist activity could not have evolved without the PO’s planned memory manipulation of the Yemenite Jews. Greenblat – who defined colonialism in terms of the memory manipulation of the colonized – calls such behaviour “improvisation,” i.e.,:

“the ability both to capitalize on the unforeseen and to transform given materials into one’s own scenario. The spur-of-the-moment quality of improvisation is not as critical here as the opportunistic grasp of that which seems fixed and established” (Greenblat 1980, 227).

Greenblat’s model of colonialist memory manipulation is very similar to the model used by the PO, i.e., the ability of one group to understand and activate the memory of another group and use it for its own ends in such a way that:

“the ownership of another’s labor is conceived as involving no supposedly ‘natural’ reciprocal obligation (as in feudalism) but rather as functioning by concealing the very fact of ownership from the exploited, who believe that they are acting freely and in their own interest” (Ibid. 229).

However, in the case of Yavneli’s Aliyah, the PO’s memory manipulation of the Yemenites (the consumers of their culture planning) was being mediated by an agent who was himself a victim of similar manipulation, although in his case it aimed at altering his perceptions as a culture planning reproducer. The form of Yavneli’s memory manipulation followed the general model by which Ruppin transformed the young immigrants of the Second Aliyah from the utopist and confused first phase to that of the organized second phase. Analyzing the correspondence of Yavneli with the PO during his journey reveals the way in which his perceptions were gradually transformed, from his first phase ideas, based on the concept of national equality, both

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It is important to emphasize that, in both cases, Ruppin’s perception and decision were those that were implemented in the field.
economic and racial, into Ruppin’s weltanschauung of monistic social Darwinism and racial inequality.

The correspondence between the PO and Yavneli is fragmented and it is impossible to determine exactly what instructions Yavneli received from the PO. However, it seems that, about five months after his arrival in the Yemen, Yavneli grasped and adapted himself to the mission of selective immigration (ibid., 104). At this stage, it is clear that Yavneli understood that he had to prevent the immigration of unsuitable elements and, on the other hand, try to encourage that of the “required element” by financing their journey. He seems to have internalized Ruppin’s instructions to take as little responsibility as possible, and to avoid as much as he could any direct contact with the immigrants in order to prevent later accusations and demands. For example, he wrote to the PO that this financial incentive (providing fare money) could create a problem, since it might be “a beginning of begging” [Heb. schnorerism] and dependence. Thus, he suggested not to give the immigrants the tickets but just to spread the rumor that the traveling expenses were very low. In this way:

“there is no need to talk to each one of them, but anyone who wishes to make the journey will go and will be responsible for himself. […] this is very important since it prevents the possibility of incidents being created [Heb. intzidentim] between the olim and us” (ibid., 101).

Three months later (eight months after his arrival in Yemen), Yavneli began to report that he was trying to find the “young, strong people,” (ibid., 106) and that he was unable to control the selection process and prevent the Aliyah of old people who were clearly unsuitable. He estimated their number in “tens, perhaps hundreds,” and emphasized that it was hard to find the right people: “I already told you that those who have the means don’t want [to immigrate], and those who want to, don’t have the means” (ibid., 108). In this letter he sounds less optimistic and demands clear answers from the PO regarding their intentions (ibid., 110). Two weeks later [9th Aug. 1911] he asked again for books – seven months after the first time – and suggested, in the spirit of his “reciprocal literature influences” idea, that the PO issue a brochure describing “the condition of the Jews in the world, Zionism, the Land of Israel and the
Yemenites.” He stressed the need for a clear and simple style, and “truthfulness” [emphasis in the original] (ibid., 112).

Yavneli’s anxiety surfaced again when, a month later, [4th Oct. 1911] one of the Yemenites that he had sent to Palestine returned disappointed to Yemen and began “staining the reputation of the Land [of Israel] according to the mode of the modern fashion.” His words had a serious effect on a group of Yemenites who had intended going to Palestine until they heard from him that the people of the Land of Israel “hit the workers and don’t let them rest even for a moment, and they work from the early morning and even on the Sabbath” (ibid., 116).

The testimony of the returned Yemenite was quite truthful but, at the time, Yavneli did not want to believe him and wrote that the man was certainly lying. However, he asked the PO to look after the Yemenite immigrants and

“pay attention to their conditions [...] Our comrades the workers and also A.D. Gordon need to draw closer to them; I will be helped greatly in my work by their positive attitude towards the olim that comes from here” (ibid., 116).

Yavneli added that he expected the Yemenites to arrive shortly and he emphasized that a large number of them came from places that he himself had never visited and that they were arriving “without my invitation, simply because of the stimulus that had been created in the country [in Yemen]” (ibid., 116). He concludes with a request to the PO to take care of the new olim and with the hope that their “first days in the land of the fathers will be sweet” (ibid., 117).

A month later, [9 Nov. 1911], shocked and troubled, he writes to the PO that he has received a letter from the Yemenites who arrived in Palestine and that, according to them, they live:

“in horse stables and pay for each one six franks per month. And we are in deep distress because of the houses they gave us” [...] I didn’t imagine it would be like that [...] I thought that the stables would be given to them free for the first six months. And I also promised to give them ‘places to live for
the first period after their arrival’ and I meant by that a few months. And now, if we don’t want to find ourselves ethically and morally bankrupt, we must do our best to give them the following: homes (even if in stables) **free of charge for the winter**” (ibid., 118) [emphasized in the original].

Yavneli emphasized that the PO had given him explicit permission to promise free accommodations, and that he had received no notice of any change in that regard. He also warned the PO (actually prophesized) that if they did not take care of the Yemenites the latter might eat less and “catch cold” and then diseases would spread among them and their children. He warned them to pay attention to his words, and asked to be informed whether he might continue to promise free housing. He concluded his letter with the words: “my heart is burning inside me with sorrow. Writing in sorrow, S.V [Shmuel Varshavski]” (ibid., 118).

The sorrow of Yavneli (then still Varshavski) marks an important point in his personal journey and his becoming a PO agent. He recognized painfully the gap between the promises and the actual conditions as well as between his Tolstoyan-socialist ideas concerning the integration of the Jews from the East and the differentiation model dictated by the PO’s eugenic planning.

However, two years later, in his article *After Aliyah* (1913), there isn’t even the slightest trace of the conflicts he had struggled with during his journey and he no longer mentioned his ideas of “cultural work”; his explanations were based exclusively on Ruppin’s vocabulary and the objectives he outlined. Yavneli explained here that it was impossible to bring the required elements without what he calls the “superfluous [serach odef] human beings,” the unproductive, the “old, weak, sick (sometimes cripples)” (in: Kammon 1989, 248). He explained that it must be realized that selection could never be perfect “we must take [also] the whole family, a brother can’t leave his weaker brother,” and many times the whole tribe [eda] comes together, bringing the unfit with them, “this happened in the First Aliyah and it will be always like that in the following Aliyot” (ibid.).

From Yavneli’s 1913 text we see that only two years after accusing the PO of lying, and expressing his amazement at the lack of the necessary preparations, he is
explaining the failure as due to the low level of the *Menschenmaterial*. A year later (1914), in a lecture on medical assistance to the Yemenites, Yavneli stressed above all the importance of transforming the “weak and depleted [meduldal] Yemenite” into a “healthy, strong person who works the land […] of transforming the Jew who is depleted in spirit and material into a healthy Jew who lives a healthy life in our land” (in: Kammon 1989, 254).

At this point it seems that Yavneli was still optimistic concerning the Yemenites’ prospects in Palestine. However, his optimism was misplaced. As we have seen, the conditions of the Yemenites were disastrous and their death rate was between 30% to 50%. This rate, which indicates a total collapse of the Yemenites’ immune system, explains why, four years later, (1918), Varshavski (who had meanwhile become Yavneli) described the first wave of the Yemenite Aliya as a total failure.\(^{216}\) He bluntly blamed the First Aliya plantation owners’ greed and the PO’s misconduct concerning the provision of medical assistance and housing solutions, and even accused the First Aliya landowners of stealing the money that had been collected for the Yemenites from American funds. Nevertheless, his overall perception of the Yemenites and the solutions he suggested for improving their lot are expressed in the context of eugenic regeneration through productivization. In a lecture entitled *Medical Lecture* [Heb. hartzaa meditzinit] he explained the Yemenites’ poor health conditions as resulting from genetic diseases, although he expressed this idea in euphemistic language, revealing his second-hand knowledge of eugenics:

> “the power of adaptability [coach ha-histaglut] enabled the bodies [of the Yemenites] to store the strength that allowed them to bear various diseases for many days without extinguishing in them their vague fire of life. In this way, over many generations, the type was created of the thin, anguished [davui] but living Yemenite.”\(^{217}\)

Nevertheless, those few Yemenites – “in particular the sons” – who succeeded and were able to work hard, especially at the “simplest and most important of the known occupations in the land [work with] the hoe” (ibid. 177), led him to predict that, in the

\(^{216}\) (Heb.) *On Mending the Yemenites Conditions* (1918), in (Yavneli 1952, 174).
\(^{217}\) Yavneli, (Heb.) *Medicinal Lecture*, in: (Kammon 1989, 257).
future, it would be possible to adapt the Yemenites to agricultural work and “turn stones into gold” (ibid.).

Yavneli’s texts from 1918 on are imbued with eugenic concepts. He now perceived the Yemenites as a eugenic problem to be solved by eugenic treatment – a change of perception that clearly resulted from his gradual adoption of the PO’s repertoire, for such concepts were scarcely to be found in his early essays or his letters from 1908 to 1912.

Ruppin’s attitude towards the Yemenites never changed, and their distress seems to have had no effect on his general plan. The new nation had need of a cheap and “not hostile” labor force and in some of the Yemenites – the youth, the women and the children at least – he felt he had it. In 1914, after he was already aware of the Yemenite death rate, he wrote to Yavneli “it is necessary to remotivate, to a certain extent, [mida yedua] the migration of Yemenites from Yemen to here, but in such a way that we will not be responsible for them.”

This letter, together with other items of information, shows that even though Ruppin knew of the Yemenites’ conditions and their physical and mental collapse, he did not hesitate to order Yavneli to continue manipulating their memories.

\[218\] The PO to Varshavsky, [19 Jan. 1914], CZA 74/2, in: (Shilo 1988, 162).
5.2.8 The *Kulturkampf* of the Workers and Ruppin’s Educational Principles

The term “culture war” (Heb. *milchemet tarbut* or *milchemet koltura*) and even the original German expression *Kulturkampf* was used explicitly and frequently in the workers’ leading magazine *Hapoel Hatzair* with regard to various forms of Diaspora Judaism. The *Kulturkampf* was not directed only against the mentalities of the religious or assimilated Jews of the Diaspora or that of the ultra-orthodox communities in the holy cities of Palestine, but mainly against what might be termed the internal *galut*, the one that the Second Aliya people carried in their memories and bodies.

The repertoire of the groups was based, as noted above, on the idea that the “good of the collective and the good of the individual are one” (Baratz 1948, 70), thus anything concerning the children of an individual were a matter for the entire group. In a meeting of Degania members in 1920 (a decade after its establishment) to discuss the education of the first children of the group, the member Yosef Baratz said:

“We were all educated by parents who were grocers or middlemen [sarsurim]219
We were educated haphazardly and without patience and this is being passed on to the children here…their teacher [mechanechet] must try and uproot it.”220

The other members in the group expressed the same opinion. The words of Baratz,221 and the trivializing of the individual, both reflect Ruppin’s weltanschauung as well as his own cultural identity formation.

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219 This description of the fathers was typical, e.g. Brenner: “Since the days of Yavne, and even before, we moved about and wandered, we were without land and without work, middlemen [sarsurim], dependent on others, but at the same time angering them, so what wonder that these others hate us?” (Brener 1985, 436)
221 Who years later lamented on Ruppin’s grave: “all of us were his sons.”
At the same gathering, the member Yitzhak Ben Yaakov said:

“Our only desire is to correct in the children that defect that we received in our parents’ home. First of all, we must protect them from the slackness that controls most of us […] if our children are influenced by us they will probably lack liveliness and I don’t think they will acquire it from games in the kindergarten. They need physical development; swimming in the sea and so on. […] we are all without patience…and our children have this fault as well. This is why we must enhance the children’s capacity for patience, and train them to finish what they begin” (ibid. 150). [My emphasis, E.B.]

The member Miriam said:

“The activities in the kindergarten, mostly playing with bricks and so on, are not really necessary. In my opinion working outside…tidying the flowerbeds is much more important […] it will develop in them that relationship to ‘work’ that we lacked when we arrived here” (ibid. 150). [My emphasis, E.B.].

The member Yehudit supported her:

“we would like our children to feel a greater connection to the fields and the farm…I would like Gideon and the rest of the children to feel the tree, to feel our way of work even if it demands some kind of sacrifice from them” (ibid.).

The member Zeev concluded the meeting:

“I have the feeling that in religion there are a lot of lies and we need to fight the great deception that it involves. I would see it as a disaster if my children became religious.” (ibid. 150).

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222 In other protocols we can find a call by one of the women members to moderate the “exaggerated devotion” of the mother to the child, which she describes as “sickening anxiety” (Riveka Marshak, Degania B., The Book of the Group, 39) the same complaint was repeated by others, e.g., Y. Berkowitz from Degania A. (ibid).
The group members’ views on education were a reflection of the repertoire instilled by Ruppin into the Second Aliya immigrants – a repertoire that placed the emphasis on the body and its connection to land and nature, included an intolerant repudiation of religion and rejected the ostjude galut father as a bearer of undesirable qualities. Thus the group’s problem, an expression of the Jewish cultural identity crisis and discourse, was how to rid themselves of their traumatic Jewishness and they resolved it by means of the understanding taken from Ruppin and the formative generations of Palestinian Zionism – that the Jew can transform his mind and body completely and thus no longer be the cause of his son’s disorders.

The group members’ negative perception of their Jewishness reflected the European cultural discourse of the time regarding the Jew, in which all the symptoms they mentioned – “nervousness,” “impatience,” “clumsiness,” “alienation from nature and the soil,” and so on – were considered signs of physical and mental decadence. The “nervousness” which many of them mentioned, marked all of those whom the European cultures rejected – Jews, lunatics, criminals, sexual perverts, women and gypsies – all of whom stood in contrast to the healthy vital male in control of his body and mind. This auto-stereotyping process was the reason for the group members’ tendency towards over-compensation or hyper-correction with regard to their children’ education.

5.2.8.1 Anti-intellectualism

Ruppin’s main contention with regard to the education or, more accurately, the Bildung of the new Jew, was that, because of their highly developed intellectual ability, the Jews felt a compulsion to turn to the business world where they could express their natural talents:

“So long as intelligence has a commercial value – as it has in the countries where the Jews principally reside – it will be, at best, only the less intelligent Jews who will engage in agriculture and persist in it. Paradoxical as it may sound, it is better that the Jewish agricultural schools should train unintelligent
pupils; this is the only way to prevent the majority from subsequently giving up agriculture” (Ruppin 1913a, 256).223

According to the weltanschauung of Ruppin and many other Zionists,224 the Jews were over-intelligent, which disinclined them for agricultural work. Farmers and peasants are simple and not intelligent. The moment a person receives an education, he wishes to abandon agriculture. Therefore, in order to preserve a large reservoir of Hebrew farmers, the children’s schooling must be kept free of any intellectual bent, free, one might say, of “education.”225

In 1908, in his address to the *Jewish Colonization Society of Vienna, The Picture of the Land of Israel in 1907*, Ruppin preached his ideas concerning the “excessive intellectualism” of the Jews, and declared that the schools of the philanthropic organizations (Ezra, Alliance) were actually educating the students towards leaving Palestine: “the child who studies European languages in school today,” he said, “doesn’t know what he will do with his knowledge in Palestine, he is too educated to be satisfied with the occupations that are open to him in Palestine; for this reason he feels miserable in the Land and emigrates to other lands” (Ruppin 1936, 16).

The educational perceptions of the Degania members, their attitude to their *galut* parents and to their “ghetto bodies” reflected Ruppin’s weltanschauung and suggest that the rejection of the intellectual and of intellectualism was one of the dominant factors in the natural selection of the groups. As already noted, and contrary to some of the impressions prevailing in Germany and America, the Second Aliya workers opposed any sign of intellectualism, and many of them were even against reading. In 1910, one of the workers wrote that in the Galilee:

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223 As already discussed, according to Ruppin’s racial theories, the preservation and improvement of the Jew could occur only if there was a wide base of agricultural Jews. For him the “pathological” condition of the *galut* Jews could be solved only by a reversal of the pyramid of Jewish occupations, which was built on a wide base of merchants.

224 E.g. Oppenheimer: “For certainly in the situation in which most Jews in the Diaspora find themselves today, this intellectualism is very nearly their only weapon in the struggle for existence, but it is unhealthy, it represents a one-sided, almost monstrous development, and the goal of all education and all true humanism (Menschentum) is the harmony of body and soul, a healthy soul in a healthy body” (Oppenheimer 1931, 220).

225 Ruppin’s ideas are similar to those of Borochov (Levita 1966, III, 776-777), but also to those of the *Monist League* which believed that, since man is limited by his animal nature, he can only weaken himself by attempting to impose upon life an erroneous intellectualism and rationalism (Gasman 1971, 35).
“neither the farmers’ sons nor the workers read much […] the place is ruled by the axiom that anyone who reads too many books is not qualified for work and doesn’t have the talent for it. This [not reading] is the sign of a ‘natural farmer’ and ‘natural worker’ […]” (Yardeni, in: Shochat 1930, 36).

Thus, as this quotation reaffirms, many of the Second Aliyah workers not only lacked education, they actually celebrated ignorance as a sign of a healthy mind and body (Elboim-Dror 1996, 118, 127). The poet Rachel described the aspirations of her generation in the words “we came to the Land of Israel in order to play music [lenagen] on the hoe and paint with the rake,” and educators like Yosef Kloisner wrote that a new environment should be created in which, not the book but rather the shovel and the hoe would be foremost. (Kloisner 1913, 204).

These poetic and ideological views were always connected in Ruppin’s weltanschauung to race and biology. The intellectual Jew who was exposed to the temptations of the modern Christian world would always tend to assimilate. The paradox was that the “excessive intellectualism” of the Jewish race was actually one of the reasons for its degeneration. Using the same logic that made the social Darwinists perceive the “excessive treatment” of modern medicine as an impingement on natural selection, Ruppin saw in the Intellectualismus of the Jews one of their dysgenic factors. As Gilman points out, Ruppin’s view that those who were labeled ‘intellectuals’ (intelligensia) tended to leave the faith and undergo baptism was a common turn of the century perception.

“In Vienna, fully one quarter of the Jews baptized belonged to the Intelligensia. In the discourse of the time, on the superior Jewish intelligence, belonging to the intelligentsia might signal a rejection of one’s Jewish identity and a flight into mixed-race relationships with all their attendant dangers” (Gilman 1996, 78).

226 I have translated this quotation from my recollection of a conversation I had with the historian Uri Milstein. Milstein, a relative of Rachel’s, claims that she was rejected from Degania because she was suffering from tuberculosis.
As noted already, Ruppin’s eugenic plan, and his constant anti-intellectualist position, was devised to curb this trend of European Jews.  

5.2.9 Ruppin and the Labor Movement

5.2.9.1 The Rise of the Dominant Group

The particular energy that Ruppin’s planning generated in the social field of Palestine can be regarded as producing the most radical change achievable in any social field; the rise of a new dominant group that effectively imposes a new repertoire. In his article *Culture Planning and the Market*, Even-Zohar describes the dynamics of this kind of social change:

“I contend that where a planning activity has taken place, regardless of the consequences, the relevant entity may have achieved the improvement of life. Moreover, I am more and more convinced that, for the maintenance of any such socio-semiotic human entity, the planning activity *per se* eventually creates motion of some scale, an enhancement of vitality which makes it possible for the entity involved to get access to options from which it may have been previously barred. I suggest the term ‘energy’ to cover this bundle of events, at least until a better term is found” (Even-Zohar 1994, 1).

By planning and regulating the new social space and placing selected members as agents in the new bureaucratic field, Ruppin gave the new dominant group a sense of allegiance and partnership. In this way he unified the scattered labor movement and created among its members the special kind of *bund* (allegiance) that is the precondition for every successful relationship between the *producer* of a culture plan and the *reproducers* of his planning. In other words, in addition to organizing the systematic transfer of the “means of production”; i.e. the informational, statist and

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227 It must be noted that this conflict of identity had an important impact on the political field and ideological discourse in Russia, where the Jewish intelligentsia of both left and right attacked Zionism (Goldstein 1986, 547). Thus, besides the cultural identity Palestinian-Zionism aspired to form, its struggle against the intelligentsia also had an important political aspect.

228 “The implementation of planning provides socio-semiotic cohesion to a factual or potential entity, by creating a spirit of allegiance among those who adhere to the repertoire introduced by the said implementation producer” (Even-Zohar 1994, 1).
material capital of the WZO, to the leaders and institutions of the labor movement, Ruppin also shaped their repertoire (including their ideology).
5.2.9.2 Ruppin as the “Administrative Knight” of the Labor Movement

In the years following the successes of the training farms of Kineret and Degania, Ruppin became the workers’ most popular Zionist leader. While this may well have been due, at least in part, to the young immigrants need for a father figure, Ruppin undoubtedly represented, in addition, the “administrative knight” of Völkisch mythology, the character who carried out the aspirations of the Volk. The function of this character in the Völkisch repertoire was to show that science and bureaucracy did not contradict nationalism and socialism but that, through him, it could offer the Volk the chance of unbounded existence. Mosse describes the emergence of this Völkisch hero, usually depicted as a knight (Ritter) who served the people. The knight’s actions and ideas were confined to the immediate interests of the people, which he grasped through his inner strength and molded according to his own criteria. One of the many definitions of such a knight was that he “could assume leadership over those disciples who had formulated the correct ideas but lacked the resources and guidance to implement them” (Mosse 1964, 208).

Following Mosse’s historical account, it is appropriate to describe Ruppin as a kind of administrative knight and, within the context of this Völkisch model, the symbolic dimension of the connection between Ruppin and the workers becomes clear. According to Mosse, the Volk is created through the emergence of groups of individuals who go through initiation processes within the general context of the “idealism of deeds.” These groups were developed mainly within the framework of the youth movements and their activities were closely bound up with the surrounding nature. An important part in this weltanschauung was the belief that these activities expressed the will of the Volk and its age-old longings. However, the Volk lacked the intellectual and administrative tools to achieve its desires, and thus there arose, in

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229 On the image of the knight in Völkisch mythology see: (Mosse 1964, 204-210) According to Mosse, many intellectuals and artists, among them the racial scientist H.K. Günther and the poet S. George, who were influenced by Nietzsche, interpreted his Übermensch in the context of this mythology. As we have seen, Ruppin’s interpretation of Nietzsche was very similar.
Völkisch mythology, the character of the “knight” who assisted the Volk to express and carry out its will.

The character of Ruppin as the “administrative knight” of the Volk, and his special role as the “super” expert of the workers’ movement can be seen in the following passage from Ruppin’s diary:

“Last week a delegation of workers came to me and asked me to assist them in developing a plan for building the Land of Israel […] In addition, they want to establish a ‘dictatorship’ over their economic institutions, and they asked me if I wanted to be the dictator. I rejected this suggestion but expressed my willingness to function as an advisor” (Bein 1968, III, 129 [Jerusalem, 11 February, 1927]).

Besides the importance of this text for the history of Palestinian Zionist democracy, it defines at least one of Ruppin’s functions in the development of the Labor movement. This function of “advisor,” combined with his self-perception as “administrative knight,” or, in other words, as an unaffiliated agent of the labor movement, was recognized also by the workers’ leaders and utilized in particular by David Ben Gurion.

In a confidential letter of 1930, Ben Gurion explained to the MAPAI management Ruppin’s relationship and value to the party.\textsuperscript{230} In this letter, Ben Gurion stressed Ruppin’s “amazing, total loyalty” (ibid.) to the labor movement since his first days in Palestine. Although he described Ruppin as having a “tendency to be a dictator” (ibid.) he did not see any harm in that since, after all, Ruppin “listens to advice and takes his friends’ opinions into account” (ibid.). Ben Gurion concludes by stressing Ruppin’s important diplomatic role, to the extent that “the only man capable of gaining Passfield’s [trust] and obtaining constructive plans from the [English] Labor government – is Ruppin” (ibid.)\textsuperscript{231}


\textsuperscript{231} We must remember the tense political situation in order to understand the historical context of Ben Gurion’s letter. The Passfield White Paper, issued October 1, 1930, by colonial secretary Lord Passfield, was a formal statement of British policy in Palestine previously set by the Churchill White
This confidential letter reflected the particular relations between Ruppin and the Labor movement’s leaders. Ben Gurion writes explicitly in his letter, that:

“We [MAPAI] must educate the WZO to see in Ruppin one of its central figures, and we shouldn’t try to make him a man of our party” (ibid).

In these lines Ben Gurion stressed that the value of Ruppin to MAPAI lay exactly in the fact that he was not affiliated to or officially recognized as a loyal supporter of the party, but rather as a person without any political attachment, an image that Ben Gurion felt should continue in the future because it served the interests of the party.

5.2.9.2.1 The Case of the Establishment of Bank HaPoaalim

One of the major acts of the bureaucracy described above was the establishment of the Workers’ Bank (Bank HaPoaalim), still today one of Israel’s leading banks.\(^{232}\) The idea for the bank,\(^{233}\) established in 1921, was Ruppin’s and he served on its board of directors until the last days of his life.\(^{234}\) The name Workers’ Bank and the red logo are misleading, as in other cases in which the labor party used socialist titles and symbols, for, while the bank did help the workers, it did more to lift a large group of workers out of their class and transform them into private entrepreneurs. Within a short time, the bank became a major source of loans and investments for small entrepreneurial cooperatives made up of these workers in the developed Jewish cities. These cooperatives, planned and promoted by Ruppin, were based on the same principles as the groups, insofar as the bank, under his direction, supported them with loans and economic counseling and helped them to obtain work as contractors in public projects. Ruppin saw in the bank a similar institution to the PLDC, which symbolized

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\(^{232}\) The bank also marked a renewed collaboration between Ruppin and the Brandeis group of America, see: (Raider 1998, 102).

\(^{233}\) This is written explicitly in the letter of Katzenelson to the Vaad Hapoel of Achdut haAvoda [14 Sep. 1919]. In: (Sharet 1961, letter 7, 31).

\(^{234}\) For a detailed description, see: (Friedlander 1989, 10-16).
the settlement of the land, as the *Workers’ Bank* symbolizes the “cooperative economy and productivity of the people” (Sharet 1961, 14).

The establishment of the bank reaffirmed Ruppin’s special, controlling position in the Zionist field of power. Although Katzenelson wanted the workers to have dominant control of the bank, he was forced by the WZO to make Ruppin its managing director. This demand by the WZO demonstrates Ruppin’s importance as an unaffiliated agent in the development of the labor movement while simultaneously exposing the WZO’s mistrust of Katzenelson and the labor movement at that time. However, Ruppin’s importance did not only lie in his influence on the WZO. He was essential to the bank’s establishment also because of the lack of agreement among the workers (Shapiro 1975 39), proving once again that he was as indispensible for the unity and organization of the labor movement as he was important for elevating its status and increasing its symbolic value in the various forums of the WZO, JNF and PLDC, as well in his negotiations with the Ottoman and British authorities and the non-Zionist Jewish organizations of America.

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5.2.9.2.2 The Crisis of the Fourth Aliyah (1924-1928)

The year 1924 found Ruppin very disheartened and the depression and decrease of energy that led to his resignation\(^{236}\) can be clearly detected in his diaries (Friedlander 1989, 229). The numerous causes of his condition will be explored in the following.

5.2.9.2.2.1 “Elements from Poland”:
Changes in the Selection Process

The Second and Third Aliyot had been organized to a large extent by the PO and were more or less controlled by its selective practices; Ruppin saw in these Aliyot the basis for the new society he aspired to create. However, the relative success of Ruppin’s activities between the years 1908 to 1921 was threatened following the so-called Fourth Aliya (1924-1928), known in Zionist historiography as the Grabsky Aliya,\(^{237}\) or, alternatively, the lower-middle class or “Polish Aliya,” all names that reflect the negative attitude of the Second and Third Aliyot, as well as of Ruppin himself, to the Fourth Aliya.

The demographic and economic increases in the first years of the Fourth Aliyah appear to have undermined Ruppin’s culture plan as well as the so-called “socialist constructivist” ideology of the labor movement. The immigration of the middle class who settled in the cities, and their private capital, became the dynamic elements in the social field, rather than the organized “pioneer” immigration, the national capital and the cooperative settlements (Bareli 2007, 22-23).

The political consequence of the Fourth Aliya was an increase in middle class representatives in the Congress at the expense of the workers’ supporters. This change

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\(^{236}\) Ruppin had already asked to resign from his office on September 6\(^{th}\), 1920 (CZA Z4/4032) because of the criticism voiced at the WZO London Conference (July 1920), concerning the wasteful mismanagement of Palestinian Zionism. Weizmann, however, refused to accept his resignation. (Weizmann to Ruppin [24 Sep. 1920] Weizmann 1988, vol. 10, letter 32, 79). Ruppin’s threatened resignation was discussed in various forums over several years. Many leaders of the movement pressed him to stay in his position. Weizman believed that Ruppin’s resignation would create an unbridgeable breach. Feibel thought that Ruppin had created 90% of the settlement enterprise and must stay on (Fridlander 1989, 228). Nevertheless, as we shall see, even after his formal resignation a few years later, Ruppin continued to hold a central position in the practical field of Zionism and was active and dominant until his last days.

\(^{237}\) The monetary reform (expressed in heavy taxes), of the right wing, anti-Jewish, Polish Prime Minister Wladislaw Grabsky was one of the main reasons for the Fourth Aliya.
led to many conflicts – mainly about budgets – between the workers’ representatives and the middle class groups which consisted mainly of Poles and Americans (Friedlander 1989, 232). Only a tiny minority of the Fourth Aliya immigrants would appear to have chosen to come to Palestine for Zionist, religious or national reasons, most of them having come because since 1923 the USA, their preferred destination, no longer accepted them.  

Unlike the Second and Third Aliyot, which were financed by Zionist funds and needed the assistance of the PO to smooth their way, many of the Fourth Aliya immigrants had no need of this support (Friedlander 1989, 215). They possessed capital and could therefore arrange their immigration and bypass the British government restrictions without resorting to the PO. There was therefore a great increase in the number of middle class immigrants (an unprecedented 3,000 immigrants per month) who arrived independently of the PO, leaving the latter with no control over them.

This uncontrollable flood of immigrants raised many fears within the Palestinian Zionist ranks and, in particular, among its culture planners. Ruppin was indeed interested in supporting those immigrants who conformed to his culture planning and developed concrete programs for their productivization, but at the same time he shared Weizmann’s fear of the potential danger of the Fourth Aliya, namely that “the galut ghetto” would be transferred to the Yishuv.  

At meetings of the Zionist Management, Ruppin claimed that the basis of the new immigration (the Fourth Aliya) was “unhealthy,” and lacked “enthusiasm.” He presented an economic assessment that supported the immigration of “quality immigrants,” i.e. the previously described good menschenmaterial. At another meeting, he dismissed the idea that the middle class immigrants could make suitable settlement material, and, in accordance with his consistent differentiating between the young generation and their old, galut fathers, suggested that the immigrants send their

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238 The new US immigration laws of 1921 and 1924 led to a radical reduction of about 60% in the available entry visas.


240 Ruppin, at the meeting of the Zionist Management [15 May 1925], in: (Friedlander 1989, 214).
sons and daughters ahead of them and only come themselves when their farms were already prepared. At this same meeting, Ruppin referred to the middle class immigrants contemptuously as the “500 pound sterling people” a description that reflected his fears that they might lead to the failure of his deep aspiration to overcome, in the Land of Israel, the Jewish tendency towards capitalism, greed and the “acquisitive” or “mercantile instinct” that, as we have seen, he aimed to abolish. In December 1924, e.g., he wrote, concerning the new immigrants from Poland:

“the Aliya of bourgeois elements from Poland has brought to the land and especially to Tel Aviv some creatures with low moral standards, and I am glad that I am in Jerusalem, which does not attract such people” (in: Bein 1968 III, 110).


\(^{242}\) Nevertheless, as in other cases described, Ruppin’s assertions concerning the Fourth Aliya were biased. Many of the immigrants entered Palestine under the category of “workers”; in particular the 40,000 immigrants who arrived from Poland. No more than 10,000 of them received their certificates because they were regarded as “capitalists,” a classification many of them received by proving they had 500 pounds sterling as required to be included in that category. Nevertheless, it is clear that the capitalistic and commercial perceptions they brought with them had a crucial impact on the Yishuv (Halpern & Reinharz 2000, 233). That Ruppin’s position against the Fourth Aliya was biased is clear because parallel and, certainly, later researches showed that during the years 1924-1926, the peak of the Fourth Aliya, 12 new settlements were established by the new immigrants themselves, proof indeed of their inclination towards agricultural settlement. Ruppin’s accounts of the Fourth Aliya ignored also the fact that a large proportion of the religious groups that arrived in that period settled in new settlements. As opposed to other observers such as Weizmann, Arlosorov and Weltisch, who praised the religious settlers, Ruppin belittled their part. He seems to have been unable to accept this fact because of his fixed belief that religious people could not adapt themselves to the modern and progressive framework of the PO. For a detailed comparison between Ruppin and the other researchers of the Fourth Aliya see: (Friedlander 1989, 213-216).
5.2.9.2.2 Changes in the Political Balance

The 14th Zionist Congress in Vienna in 1925 was held in an atmosphere of “crisis,” to quote the title of Weltsch’s article describing the congress:

“All the hatred that had accumulated in the petit bourgeois against the pioneers and the workers – was exposed […] a new line was declared” (in: Fridlander 1989, 235).

The meaning of the new line was that the management of the Zionist movement might exclude representatives of the workers. The new forces that gained power were those of the right wing and the revisionists. In addition to their criticism of the Zionist policy towards the Arabs, to be discussed later, they also criticized Ruppin’s support of the workers and the non-proportional control of the workers’ organizations. The revisionists believed, or at least declared, that the workers’ organizations’ cooperation with the Jewish bourgeoisie and the national funds was only a tactical move, part of their long term plan to gain totalitarian control by an elitist minority (themselves) over the majority of the Jews. The workers’ parties were a closed and elitist society, they claimed, a political structure that prevented the development of a substantial Jewish society (see: Shavit 1978, 244).

The Revisionists’ claims and fears were not without foundation. Since 1925, as Bareli notes, the discussions in the Achdut Haavoda party reflected a tendency towards creating a political force that would take control of the Zionist movement. They feared that the Zionist Organization would abandon the labor movement and choose capitalistic development in the form of the Fourth Aliyah (Bareli 2007, 24-25). Once again, they needed someone to protect their symbolic fortune and political power, and once again Ruppin was there for them and for his plan.

In his speech at the Vienna Congress, Ruppin answered his attackers by claiming that the foundation of the Zionist enterprise was national settlement and that private initiative was only secondary. He feared that this balance might be distorted by the Fourth Aliyah, and expressed his disappointment that no national authority existed to
control land purchases and thus prevent speculation and profiteering (Friedlander 1989, 238). He did, however, emphasize two positive points in the Fourth Aliya’s favour: a demographic increase and an increase in the purchase of land. As usual, he supported his argument with clear statistical figures. In 1923, he said, the number of Jews in Palestine was 90,000 (one-eighth of the general population), and in 1925 135,000 (one-sixth of the general population) while land purchasing rose by 500,000 dunams, i.e., it doubled itself. Finally, he explained that: “I am proud of the feelings of friendship that the working public shows towards me,” but added that he “had no objections to settlements being created on a different basis” (in: Friedlander 1989, 238).

5.2.9.2.2.3 Economic Changes

In addition to the changes in the constitution of the Zionist Congress and the emergence of political rivals, to which it was clearly linked, one of the things that had been disturbing Ruppin since the beginning of the 1920s was the desperate economic situation of the institutions he had established. In the report he presented to the Zionist Management in Jerusalem [21 May 1924], he warned that “the condition of the P.L.D.C., Solel Boneh and Ha-Mashbir, is distressing. All three institutions are on the verge of collapse despite being supported by the Zionist Organization. The possible collapse of these institutions may have far-reaching consequences since they owe money to non-Jewish banks” (in: Friedlander 1989, 217). He mentioned the energetic economic activity following the rapid rate of construction by the capital owners but doubted if it would lead to a long term improvement. Ruppin’s report (as well as that of Halperin, ibid.), showed that while there was an increase in the private market, there was a decline in the national economic institutions, making it impossible to purchase new lands (ibid.), Ruppin’s most important and consistent aim.

These changes in the field were part of the reason for Ruppin’s official resignation from his central position in the Zionist leadership and his decision to devote more time to research, which he considered “no less important for the Zionist movement than participation in the executive committee.”243 The main reason Ruppin gave the

243 Ruppin to Weizman, [16 Dec. 1925], in: (Fridlander 1989, 241)
committee for his resignation was that, after 17 years of work,\textsuperscript{244} he wanted to devote a year or two to research. Other reasons were his poor health, the lack of budget, which did not allow him to operate with “initiative and creative force” and, finally, the “cumbersome organization of the \textit{Vaad Hapoel HaTzioni} which had not changed despite his repeated demands” (ibid.).

\textsuperscript{244} Ruppin had been, since 1908, the head of the PO, which was divided into several bodies in 1919, among them the \textit{Jewish Agency} and the \textit{Vaad Hatzirim} (Committee of Delegates). In 1921 this forum was reorganized and changed its name to The Zionist Management in the Land of Israel. Ruppin’s position in this management was head of rural and urban settlement (the most powerful and important department). However, as already stressed, Ruppin’s roles as culture planner and culture agent were not necessarily related to the formal positions he held.
5.2.9.2.3.1 The Chairman of “the 15’s Committee”

One of the first moves Ruppin made immediately after his formal resignation was to assist in organizing the different parties of the labor movement and to mediate, once more, between the employers and the workers’ organizations. He expressed his willingness to write a constitution for labor relations and soon became the chairman of the arbitration committee between employers and workers, established in 1925 (Friedlander 1989, 242). The workers’ parties were at the time in a deep crisis that threatened the Yishuv’s economy (between 1922 and 1926, there were 158 strikes for a total of 74,912 days). The crisis resulted mainly from the continuous dispute between the employers and employees and was similar in structure to the one Ruppin had settled in the first years of his work. At that time, in 1914, Ruppin had posited the need “to establish an institution that will include both the employers and the workers in order to find a compromise in cases of conflict,” (CZA L2/70, 1-2, 4) and now, remarkably, in 1926, twelve years later, this same recommendation materialized into a culture plan, when he was elected to the chairmanship of a committee to negotiate the establishment of just such an institution and system of labor regulations. In addition to Ruppin, the committee consisted of 5 representatives of the Histadrut (the workers’ union), 5 representatives of the employers and 5 from national institutions of the Jewish settlement. “The 15’s Committee,” as it was called, determined the regulation of labor relations and workers’ rights (inter alia it determined the minimum wage, the length of the working day, social conditions, the authority of the workers’ local unions [Heb. vaadim], and a set of regulations concerning mediation and arbitration procedures in cases of work conflict). In actual fact, it was the “15’s Committee” that shaped

245 (Ben Gurion 1972 [written originally in 1927], 313)
246 In [18 Feb. 1925] the National Assembly (Vaad Leumi) decided to establish a committee that would deal with labor relations and workers’ rights.
247 The committee began its work on Feb. 18, 1925. The decisions of this committee were accepted by the Histadrut (the workers’ union) Assembly that took place on 6-11 May, 1925 (Rosenthal 1979, 110, 112). Ruppin’s function here followed the same model he had used since his early days. Generally speaking, it can be said that he formulated the framework and the regulations and the political workers’ organizations confirmed it.
the relationship between the labor movement and the owners of capital in Palestine (Ben Gurion 1972, 313-314).

According to Ben Gurion, “the 15’s Committee” formulated a regulation which particularly satisfied the workers because:

“it set the the conditions by which immigrant workers who, in European countries had been of low standing, here obtained a higher status than the native worker [Arab worker]” (Ben Gurion, 1972, 313).

“The 15’s Committee” initiated the agreement that made the Histadrut the main employer, with monopolies in many economic and social fields, as well as the provider of a variety of cultural services. As in other cases, Ruppin functioned here too as the ‘Administrative Knight,’ and worked day and night to keep the social structures and institutions he established under the control of his loyal core of workers, his ‘sons,’ – the ‘fathers’ of the labor movement.

It is important to note that Ruppin’s role in the formation of the labor movement’s cultural identity and bureaucratic field continued for a longer period than is presented in most history books. The historian Yechiam Weitz made me aware of this point for the first time and even faxed me the relevant page of his father’s (Raanan Weitz)\textsuperscript{248} biography, in which he described how Ruppin selected him in 1937 for a position in the settlement department, which was directed at the time by Ruppin (it was during the hasty settlement enterprise known as Choma Umigdal (Eng.: Tower and Stockade)). According to his description, out of the 50 applicants for this most desired job, only five were invited to an interview with Ruppin. Weitz was one of them:

\textsuperscript{248} Raanan Weitz (1913-1998), director of the settlement department of the Jewish Agency from 1949.
“Ruppin sat in the second floor of the Jewish Agency, a man of medium height, with a solid build [mivna mutzak], a wrinkled face [charushey kmatim] and a wise expression. He spoke a Hebrew that I wouldn’t call halting [megumgemet], but it was not clear and his Jeke accent reverberated afar [hidhed lemerachok]. His speech was structured in limited, short and practical sentences” (Weitz 1998, 153).

This text is evidence not only of Ruppin’s importance in organizing one of the most extraordinary expansion enterprises of Palestinian Zionism, but also of his involvement, until his last years, in the formation of the bureaucratic personnel. Raanan Weitz (1913-1998) became, a decade later, the director of the settlement department of the Jewish Agency and had a crucial role in Israel’s settlement policies.
5.3 Ruppin’s Position Regarding the Arabs

At the end of every sentence that you utter in Hebrew sits an Arab with a narghile/ even if it begins with Siberia/ or with Hollywood, with Hava Nagila\textsuperscript{249} M. Ariel, Song of Pain

The constant deterioration in the relations between the Arabs, natives of Palestine, and the new social field created by the PO and, in fact, the whole fundamental, ‘Arab question’ or ‘problem’ was yet one more reason for Ruppin’s ‘gloomy mood’ at the beginning of the 1920s. It is therefore impossible to understand Ruppin’s depressed frame of mind or indeed to conclude this work, without an account of Ruppin’s position vis a vis the Arabs.

5.3.1 The “Blind Spot”

Ruppin used the metaphor of the “blind spot” at the beginning of the 1920s in one of his critical assessments of Zionism’s treatment of the “Arab Question.” Ruppin seems also to have been criticizing his own initial assessment of the Arabs, although with him the “blind spot” period was relatively brief.

As described earlier, the colonialist approach of the German Zionists was conceived within the imperial social discourse which legitimized the invasion of various territories by creating a scientific, religious and mythological theory proving the value of colonialism to the Orient. At the heart of the 19\textsuperscript{th} century colonialist repertoire laid the perception of Western superiority, which gave moral justification to their claims and practices. This kind of rhetoric – emphasizing the role of Zionism as an agent of Western colonization – appears repeatedly in Herzl’s writings where he stressed the benefits that Zionism would bring to the Arabs in Palestine, to the Ottoman Empire.

\textsuperscript{249} Hava Nagila is a Hebrew folk song whose title means Let us rejoice. It is a song of celebration, especially popular in secular Jewish communities. In popular culture it is used as a metonym for Judaism, and is a staple of bands at Jewish festivals. Though the melody is an ancient one, of folk origin, the commonly used text was probably composed by Abraham Zevi (Zvi) Idelsohn in 1918 to celebrate the British victory in Palestine during World War I as well as the Balfour Declaration.
and also to Germany (Shilo 1988, 55). Ruppin, in all of his various positions, perceived the Jews as the disseminaters of Western culture in the East in a similar manner. His secretary Tahon wrote:

“It cannot be denied that we [the Jews] brought the culture of the East, by a thousand channels, to the West or at least assisted in promoting it. Is it not our role to some extent to lead the move of European culture back to the East?” (in: Almog 1982, 111).

Tahon and Ruppin, in their initial positions, were under the spell and impression of the powerful slogan of Zionist propaganda: “a people without a land for a land without people,” derived from the colonialists’ legitimizing Terra nullius. Most other Zionists, too, conceived of Palestine and its Arab natives in the same way, based on European perceptions and the images produced by Zionist propaganda. This state of mind created a “cultural jetlag,” which led them to believe, for example, that the source of Arab hostility lay in the Christian Arab circles (Eliav 1977, 216), and was a result of the traditional Christian anti-Semitism disseminated by mission education. This perception encouraged the belief that the Zionists might come to an agreement with most Muslim Arab except, perhaps, for the rich effendis, who saw the Jews as a potential obstacle to their exploitation of the Arab peasants.

This “blind spot” with regard to the Arabs was quite common among the Zionists, and the few observers who raised a cautionary note were ignored, repressed or silenced.

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250 Ruppin to the Executive Committee, CZA, Z1447/3, in: (Shilo 1988, 39).
251 Although the Christians were a tiny minority amongst the Arabs. their “cultural jetlag,” led them, too, to describe the first attacks on the Jews in terms of the anti-Semitic “pogroms” in East Europe.
252 In one of the central passages of Almeuland, the Muslim-Arab Rashid Bey replies to a Christian nobleman, Mr. Kingscourt, who expresses surprise that Rashid’s people do not “look upon these Jews as intruders.” The Muslim notable’s reply is unequivocal: “Christian! How strange your speech sounds! Would you regard those as intruders and robbers who take nothing away from you but give you something? The Jews have enriched us, why should we be angry with them? They live with us like brothers, why should we not love them? We Muslims have always had better relations with the Jews than you Christians”.
253 Nevertheless, the main politicians who attacked Zionism in the Turkish parliament in the spring of 1911 were the Arab Muslims (Eliav 1977, 217). The vizier Ibrahim Pasha dismissed their complaints and did not take the Zionists seriously, describing them as “ridiculous dreamers,” a “bunch of charlatans,” who cannot achieve, as they aspire, a socialist and Jewish government in Palestine (Elon 1971, 120). The underestimation of the Turkish government was an advantage for Ruppin, who constantly covered up the true scale of Zionist colonization.
254 E.g. Achad HaAm in his article Truth from the Land of Israel. The “blind spot” was typical of the Zionists. Already in 1897, the Rabbis of Vienna had decided to check Herzl’s ideas and sent two of
Ruppin however, realized almost from his first days at the PO that the second part of the slogan – “a land without people” – was far from being true.

The Zionists’ “blind spot” obscured their recognition of the existence of the native population, and of the national rights and claims of the Arabs in Palestine, and, as a corollary, led them to the wishful belief, based on the assumption that the Arabs would benefit economically and culturally from their colonization of Palestine, that the ‘Arab problem’ was solvable. In his *Die Juden der Gegenwart* (1904/1914) Ruppin, like Herzl before him, expressed the belief that Zionist colonization would be accepted positively by the Arabs because their economic and cultural conditions would improve. This would happen, of course, only “if the Arabs are clever enough to imitate the superior agricultural methods of the Jews” (Ruppin 1914, 291). Although he anticipated some cultural problems, Ruppin remained optimistic during the whole of his “blind spot” phase: “It is highly probable that the two [Jews and Arabs] would live happily and amicably together even if the Jews were to come in great numbers” (Ruppin 1914, 292). Nevertheless, the “happy and amicable” relations he anticipated did not necessarily exclude the implementation of a large scale transfer of the Arab population, whether voluntary or forced. In his “blind spot” phase, Ruppin believed that the transfer was a reasonable solution. In May 1914, to note one example, he submitted his plan for the transfer of Arabs from Palestine to Syria. In a letter to Dr. Victor Jacobson, he wrote:

“We are considering a parallel Arab colonization. Thus, we are planning to buy land in the regions of Homs, Aleppo etc. which we will sell under easy terms to those Palestinian fellahin who have been harmed by our land purchases.”

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255 For detailed information concerning Ruppin’s transfer plans see: (Hattis 1985; Masalha 1992).
256 Jacobson was from 1908 the head of the Constantinople branch of the Anglo-Palestine Company and the unofficial diplomatic representative of the Zionist Organization in Turkey.
257 The city of Homs, originally known as Emesa is in central Syria, in the great Orontes plain; Aleppo, also known as Haleb, is the second largest city in Syria, and is in the centre of northern Syria. It is important to note that Ruppin selected remote areas, far from what he conceived as the borders of Eretz Israel.
258 Ruppin to Jacobson, [12 May 1914], pp.1-2, (CZA L2/34ii); extract reprinted in: (Alsberg 1955/6, 206-07).
This “blind spot” regarding the Arabs – as defined above – continued to dominate Zionist ideology at least until the beginning of the 1920s. However, in Ruppin’s realistic and practical mind, the misplaced optimism caused by this “blindness” changed within a very short time. Landauer claimed that Ruppin was the first person to understand the “Arab Problem,” and to accept with “open eyes the fact of the Arab people in Eretz Israel.” Already in 1911, in his revised *Die Juden der Gegenwart*, Ruppin pointed out that he “considered the Arabs in Eretz Israel an important political force, not to be treated as natives were usually treated in the colonies. [he recognized that] the Arabs were confronted by a political and national development” (Landauer, 1943b, 5).

At the beginning of the 1920s, the Zionists conducted several unofficial interactions with political Arab agents, to no effect. Ruppin and Kalvirsky, (the official counselor for Arab matters of the *Vaad Hapoel Hatzioni*) as well as Weizmann and Eder, took part in these various meetings, which were mediated, for the most part, by the new English rulers (see: Cohen 1970, 184-190; Porat 1978, 37-53, 173-175). Ruppin was not at all satisfied by these contacts. At one of the meetings of the *Vaad Hapoel Hatzioni*, he dismissed Kalvirski’s “blind spot” optimism with regard to a possible agreement with the Christian Arabs: “On what grounds?” he asked in disbelief. Kalvirski proposed a joint parliament based on the premise that the basic constitution would guarantee the existence of the Jewish national home. Ruppin saw this proposal as irrelevant. In a letter to Jakobson he wrote that the negotiations must be held with the Arab states of Iraq, Egypt and Syria, and that without their understanding and agreement it would be “impossible for us to hold on.” The fact that Eder held a second meeting with representatives of the Arab world left Ruppin more optimistic, (Bein 1968, [29 March. 1922], III, 35) believing as he did that Palestinian Zionism had to come to an understanding with the Arab world and not only with the Arabs of Palestine. He emphasized the national awakening of the Arab countries, which he saw as possible ground for a dialog and suggested concrete proposals that would lead to a new understanding: youth group exchanges, a bi-lingual newspaper (Arabic and Hebrew) in Cairo, research into the history of the Semitic race, Semitic linguistics and the establishment of an institution in Jerusalem for that purpose. He also proposed a

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259 Ruppin to Jakobson [22 Feb. 1922], in: (Bein 1968, III, 33).
plan for organized medical assistance to the Arabs (against malaria and trachoma) (Friedlander 1989, 19). Ruppin recognized that the solution to the problems might take years but nevertheless he believed that the Zionist movement might become “a force that is taking part in developing human culture” (Bein 1968, [29 Mar. 1922], III, 35).

“I feel” he wrote in his diary a year later:

“that I will not be able to work in the Zionist movement unless it becomes possible to base it on a new idea. The perception of Herzl’s Jewish state was possible only because he ignored the presence of the Arabs and believed he could make world history in the diplomatic manner of French imperialism” (Bein 1968, [30 Oct. 1923] III, 76-77).

In the same year, he reported in his diary that he was beginning to collect material for a book about the Jews whose “premise will be the question of race” (Bein 1968, III, 59 [13 Apr. 1923]). He wrote that:

“We must integrate into the circle of the Oriental nations and create, together with our racial brothers the Arabs (and the Armenians), a new ethnic culture of the Middle Eastern nations. More than ever, it seems to me that Zionism can find its justification only in the Jews’ racial belonging to the nations of the Middle East.” […] (Bein 1968, III, 59 [13 Apr. 1923].

Many historians have used that quotation as proof of Ruppin’s belief in the racial affinity of Jews and Arabs. However, we must remember that this extract from his diary was written in 1923, when he had only just begun to analyse the manner in which the Jews would integrate “into the circle of the Oriental nations” and the nature of “the Jews’ racial belonging to the nations of the Middle East.” This analysis, which took him almost six years to complete, developed into his two-volume *Soziologie der Juden* (1930). As we have already seen, both in that work and in others, Ruppin’s interpretation of the Modern Hebrews’ belonging to the “nations of the Middle East,” differentiated them unequivocally from the Semitic race and from Arab culture, which he regarded frankly as inferior.
5.3.2 Ruppin’s Recognition of the Centrality of the “Arab Problem” and its Concealment

While the year in which Ruppin became fully cognizant of the true scope and nature of the “Arab problem” remains unclear, we do know that a considerable time elapsed between his coming to this realization and his public disclosure of his change of heart.

The year 1910, in which he initiated and established a special department for “frequent reading of the Arab press” (Shilo 1984, 59), can be said to mark the beginning of his new perception of the situation. Nevertheless, the most direct cause of his changed position was probably the deterioration in the relations between Arabs and Jews as a clear outcome of Zionist expansion, complicated, since its early days, by the transfer of the local Arab peasants. This rapid expansion in Ruppin’s first three years of office (which, as noted, tripled the geographical space controlled by the PO) led, in 1911, to a bloody clash at Merchavia between groups of workers and Arabs, in which an Arab was killed by a Jewish guard and another Arab injured. After this incident, a few hundred Arabs from the vicinity began to organize; they infiltrated into Merchavia and stole food and crops from the fields. Ruppin thought, like many others at the time, that it was important to take a strong hand against them in order to prove that “the Jews also know how to protect their lives and property” (Eliav 1977, 226). According to Ruppin, after this incident the Arabs accepted the existence of Merchavia, and he reported to the REC that the attacks had had a good effect and were a further step in the development of the Yishuv by organizing it in order to attack the hostile Arabs (ibid.).

The first time he wrote overtly about the change in his position was in March 1912, in a letter addressed to the REC, in which he admitted that his first impression, that anti-Zionism prevailed mainly among the Christians and had its source in anti-Semitism, was incorrect. It was the Muslims who were the main Jew haters in Palestine. In that year, too, he opened a new department in the PO, The Arabic Press Bureau, in which he employed Sephardic Jewish writers fluent in Arabic, such as Nissim Malul and Shimon Moyal, to publish articles in the Arabic press explaining the Zionist agenda
and ideology. *The Arabic Press Bureau* also enabled the PO to update itself regularly about the cultural and political processes that the various Arab societies were undergoing (Jacobson 2002).

In 1914, Ruppin expressed his new position explicitly and underlined, within the inner circles of the Zionist movement, the need to see relations with the Arabs as the central problem of Zionist policy. Later, in 1919, he stressed that dialog with the Arabs was a necessary condition for the beginning of the Zionist enterprise, for without an agreement between the Zionists and the Arabs “all our work is build on sand” (Ruppin 1919a, in: Friedlander 1989, 18).

One of the lessons Ruppin learned from the 1911 bloody clashes in Merchavia was the need for greater caution in negotiations with the peasants themselves and not only with the owners of the land and from then on both he himself and Hankin followed this principle (Eliav 1977, 226). It is clear that the 1911 incidents led Ruppin to appreciate the complexities and implications of the transfer and he tried seriously to solve them in many ways; at some point he was even willing to pay more for the land he purchased on condition that those selling it dealt with the transfer. In his diary of 1934, he described a meeting with “seven Arabs” who owned 300,000 dunams near Kineret:

“I amazed them considerably when I promised them that, of my own good will, I was prepared to pay 5,000 Palestinian pounds more if they gave the tenant farmers [arisim] who held the land today, other land in another place” (Bein 1968, III, [19 Jan. 1934] 226).

Although Ruppin’s understanding of the Arab problem changed a few years later, he did indeed try to compensate the Arabs financially. This point was stressed in Ruppin’s treatment of them throughout the whole period of his work. A few scholars

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260 The establishment of *The Arabic Press Bureau* was typical of the new models Ruppin introduced into the Zionist political and economic field. His understanding of the techniques for manipulating public opinion was certainly one of his important contributions to Palestinian Zionism.


262 Yehoshua Hankin (also Henkin, Chenkin) (1864-1945) was an agent of the WZO and was involved as a broker in most of the major land purchases of the WZO in Palestine. In 1908 he joined the PLDC at Ruppin’s request and worked with him for many years.
have claimed that the compensation to the tenant farmers was 20% of the total purchase sum (Freidlander 1989, 218) and certainly, fair compensation and care of the transferred peasants and the Arab population in general were an important part of Ruppin’s culture plan. It was important to him, for example, to emphasize that, in the first 3 years of the 1920s, the PLDC compensated the peasants fairly and, in a letter to Weizman, he took pride in the fact that no one prosecuted the PLDC for a few years. Besides his fairness and compassion, to which due credit must be given, there were also practical motives behind Ruppin’s sensitive response to the transferred peasants’ needs: the hope that it would lead to a reduction in the bitterness and hostility of the peasants and, no less vital, to an improvement in the crucially important British and world public opinion. These were the reasons for his opposition to the establishment of the “Jewish Legion” proposed by Jabotinsky, although he had previously favored this suggestion, and although he supported the first guard organizations as well as their underground activities. He expressed his agreement with the “positive aspects” of Jabotinsky’s idea, but nevertheless felt that the establishment of such a Legion at that point would arouse the suspicion and hatred of the Arabs. What worried him was that a new factor might enter the field – Arab fear – and that that factor would cancel out the advantages achieved to date (Freidlander 1989, 18). Ruppin realized, in terms of the narrative portrayed above, that the “blind spot” perception was fundamentally wrong. Nevertheless, although he wrote about it in confidential letters, he consistently avoided declaring his position publicly and continued to present the problem as having a simple and “reasonable” solution. At the Eleventh Zionist Congress, which opened in Vienna in September, 1913, both Weizmann and Ruppin insisted on cooperation with the Arabs and on achieving a *modus vivendi* in which Jews and Arabs could develop their cultures side

263 We find, for example, that one of the resolutions taken by the committee directed by Ruppin and responsible for distributing American funds to the Jewish settlements during the war (1915), was “recognition of the great importance of distributing foodstuffs in the Arab villages […] the amount that we can give from the funds will be discussed at the next meeting.” [CZA L2:569] Nevertheless, it is not clear from the decisions of the committee how much it would devote to that purpose. It also appeared that the meaning of the resolution was that the recipients of the funds had to acknowledge the importance of giving the Arabs money but were not obliged to do it.

264 Ruppin to Weizman [19 Aug., 1928], in: (Friedlander 1989, 220-222)

265 Ruppin to Jabotinsky [17 Jan. 1920], in: (ibid., 17).

266 Though he aspired to refrain from using physical force, he supported military organizations with a defense character, a “sophisticated police” or a labor battalion with military training” (in: Friedlander 1989, 17).

267 It is important to note that, as in many other cases, he did not oppose Jabotinsky’s ideas but rather his style and tactics.
by side (Reinharz 1985, 385). Weizmann himself expressed his confidence that as
“we have in times gone by cooperated with the Arabs in Spain, we shall do so again in
Palestine” (in: Berkowitz 1996, 105), but Weizman, like Ruppin, indulged in double-
speak. Already in 1913 Weizman wrote to his beloved Vera:

“There is alarming news from Syria about the Arab national movement. With
the weakening of the central authority in Constantinople, the periphery of Asia
Minor is beginning to organize, though in a very primitive manner. They
consider Palestine their own and have embarked on an intensive propaganda
campaign in their semi-national, semi-Christian, and ‘semi-anti-Semitic’ (an
expression that can hardly apply to the Arabs) pressure against the selling of
land to ‘Zionists,’ the enemies of Turkey and the usurpers of Palestine. We
shall soon face a serious enemy and it won’t be enough to pay just money for
the land.”268

Ruppin and Weizman concealed their conviction as to the centrality of the “Arab
problem,” not because they themselves were unaware of the facts or wished to deny
or repress them but mainly because they understood the harm that giving it public
recognition could cause the embryonic New Yishuv. The Zionist movement urgently
needed investors, but since investors would be discouraged by the thought of a hostile
environment Ruppin and Weizman had to play down the problem. At the Non-
Partisan Conference to Consider Palestinian Problems held in New York in 1924, the
Zionists presented the Arabs to the American Jews as a minor problem: “the relations
between Jew and Arab will become friendly” said Weizmann to the audience, and
reported on a peaceful and “cordial” correspondence with the Arab leaders.269 This
image, which changed only in the late 1930s, still held in 1928. To note one example,
in his speech at the Non-Partisan Conference of 1928 (with Ruppin and Weizmann at
his side) Lord Melchett compared the Arabs to “Red Indians” and the pioneers to the
American pioneers who “pushed out to the West on wagons […] if they hadn’t been

268 Weizmann to Vera, [23 Feb., 1913], in: (Reinharz 1985 394-95).
269 Weizmann’s speech at the Non-Partisan Conference to Consider Palestinian Problems, Verbatim
City, 27. The Arabs were not mentioned in Ruppin’s speech.
quick on the guns rather than poring over books, they would all have been
tomahawked.” Nevertheless, continued Melchet:

“Those conditions have passed. The country is settled. We are established. The
Arabs understand us. Friendly co-operation is what we ask and what we are
obtaining.”

This simplistic picture was certainly not shared by Ruppin. He was the first to be
informed in 1924 that from then on all the lands that were available for purchase were
populated and entailed the transfer of Palestinians, and, since he identified completely
with the Zionist dream, this too may have been a cause of his depression in that year.
Ruppin’s policy of concealment was coordinated with Zionist activists and
functionaries around the world who reproduced the myth that news of Arab
opposition to Zionism tended to be exaggerated, with most Arabs maintaining that
“the Jews are our brothers and Palestine can never thrive without their financial and
cultural help” (Berkowitz 1996, 105). This “blind spot” approach continued to form
part of Zionist propaganda long after its leadership recognized it as illusory.
The gap between the declarative and operative levels of the Zionist movement, a gap
of crucial importance to the success of Palestinian Zionism, is clearly manifested in
the double-speak of Ruppin and Weizmann. According to Berkowitz, the violent Arab
attacks on the Jews and Zionists – even in the Arab’s first revolt of 1929 – was
typically described as the work of “terror gangs” or hooligans who did not represent
the will of the Arab masses. Arab violence was attributed, not to deep resentment
against Zionism, but to the failure of the British police to keep order which, in some
ways, was reminiscent of the pogroms in Eastern Europe (Berkowitz 1996, 104). The
“Blind Spot” position was used now as propaganda, and with the aid of pictures,
tables and graphs, Zionist propaganda presented the transformation of Palestine from
“swamp to settlement” (Berkowitz 1996, 92); a trope of the ‘Land Without’ etc.

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270 This kind of image was promoted by Zionist propaganda in the 1920s. e.g., Bernard Rosenblatt, who
was the American representative on the Palestine Zionist Executive, wrote two articles in the NYT in 1922. He described the Zionist settlers as “the Jewish puritans,” and their colonies as “the Jamestown
and the Plymouth of the new House of Israel.” According to him, the Zionists “were building the new
Judea as the Puritans had built a new England” and their leaders were just like Daniel Boone and the
American pioneers who “crossed the ocean to face the dangers of Indian warfare” (Rosenblatt, NYT

271 Melchett’s speech at the Non-Partisan Conference to Consider Palastinian Problems, Verbatim
5.3.3 The End of Zionism’s “Blind Spot” Period

As of now, we are still living according to Herzl’s ideology that assumes a desolate country void of inhabitants but fertile for absorbing many millions. When this ideology crumbles, virtually no memory of the prevailing Zionism will remain. Thus it is important to save it from this disaster through a proper ideology that fits reality and the Jewish essence.

H. Kohn (1926).

The background to Ruppin’s shift to a new position with regard to the Arabs cannot be separated from the deterioration in the Arab-Zionist conflict which resulted both from the continuing Zionist expansion and from the development of the Palestinian Arab national movement. The Third Palestine Arab Congress was held in Haifa in December 1920 and called for the establishment of an Arab government in Palestine. The congress did not recognize the claims of the Jews to any rights in Palestine (Hattis 1970). In May of 1921, clashes between Arabs and Jews throughout Palestine compelled the Zionist leadership to face new political challenges. The violence led to new questions being raised by British domestic actors (such as the Haycraft Commision, the British Parliamentary opposition and a few administrators in the Permanent Mandates Commission), who supported reconsideration of Britain’s Mandate policy (Lundsten 1978, 9). In the following years, it became clear that neither economics nor religion were at the basis of the conflict but rather an ever increasing struggle between two national movements. This understanding was shared by all the factions of the Zionist movement. Thus the beginning of the 1920s marked the end of the “blind spot” period, and led to the emergence of a spectrum of positions ranging from the revisionists’ “Iron Wall doctrine” through the labor movement’s evading pragmatism up to the peaceful idea of a bi-national democratic state as propounded by Brit Shalom (Covenant of Peace).

5.3.3.1 The Revisionist Position

*We hold that Zionism is moral and just. And since it is moral and just, justice must be done, no matter whether Joseph or Simon or Ivan or Achmet agree with it or not.*

Z. Jabotinski, *The Iron Wall (We and the Arabs)*, Berlin [4 Nov. 1923] 273

*We Jews, thank God, have nothing to do with the East [...] the Islamic soul must be swept out of Eretz-Yisrael [...] [Muslims are] yelling rabble dressed up in gaudy, savage rags.*

Z. Jabotinski 274

It is impossible to evaluate Ruppin’s position without taking into consideration the impact of the revisionists, led by Zeev Jabotinski (1880-1940), 275 who proclaimed, with ever increasing explicitness, their uncompromising position, culminating in Jabotinsky’s call to build a “wall of iron” between the Jews and the Arabs.

By 1923, Jabotinsky had broken with the Zionist organizations by resigning from the Jewish Executive and founding Betar, a militant youth organization. By 1925, Jabotinsky had formally founded the Revisionist movement as a faction within the WZO, and immediately demanded a Jewish state on both sides of the Jordan.

Unlike the followers of the “blind spot” position, Jabotinsky acknowledged the national rights of the Arabs, and expressed this recognition vividly and relentlessly, in a rhetoric that called for a reevaluation of relations with the Arabs.


275 Jabotinsky, who founded the revisionist movement in 1925, dismissed the liberal ideas of justice and morality as irrelevant in a world without mercy and with regard to the ideal of building a Jewish state in all parts of Palestine (Mosse 1991, 126).
In 1923 he wrote that:

“They [the Arabs] looked upon Palestine with the same instinctive love and true favor that the Aztecs looked upon Mexico or any Sioux looked upon his prairie. Palestine will remain for the Palestinians not a borderland, but their birthplace, the center and basis of their own national existence” (in: Morris 2001, 36). […] “The Arabs loved their country as much as the Jews did. Instinctively, they understood Zionist aspirations very well, and their decision to resist them was only natural […] there was not a misunderstanding between Jew and Arab, but a natural conflict” (in: Mulhall 1995, 90).

Jabotinsky’s sweeping recognition of the national rights of the Arabs exposed with subversive irony the other Zionist positions regarding the Arabs:

“[…] there is no meaningful difference between our militarists and our vegetarians. One prefers an Iron Wall of Jewish bayonets, another proposes an Iron Wall of British bayonets, the third proposes an agreement with Baghdad, and appears to be satisfied with Baghdad’s bayonets – a strange and somewhat risky taste — but we all applaud, day and night, the Iron Wall” (in: Masalha 1992, 28).

5.3.3.2 The Labor Movement’s Position

The decision of the Ahdut Ha-Avoda conference at Ein Harod in 1924 to postpone the issue of negotiations with the Arabs to a distant future when the Arab leadership would be composed of the “right kind” of people, can seen as the expression of the labor movement’s continual procrastination with regard to the Arabs (Shapira 1999, 170). Ben Gurion described their position in the following way:

“Generally speaking, we will be making a heavy historical mistake if we come now to determine the destiny of the land for generations, or even for the next 10 years. Any political plan that will be fixed and accepted now must, by the logic and inner nature of the matter, be determined according to the power relations of this hour. This kind of plan will inevitably be to our disadvantage.
We must take into account the factors and power relations not only as they are at this time – but also in the next years.”\textsuperscript{276}

5.3.3 Brit Shalom’s (Covenant of Peace) Position

Many people connected to the labor party camp found the equivocal position it was taking – similar, as will be demonstrated, to Ruppin’s – unacceptable and they called on the labor movement to change it. The philosopher Hugo Bergman, for example, referring to the aforementioned 1924 decision of Ahдут Ha-Avoda, made the accusation that “a program like this directs itself towards the distant future in order to avoid dealing with the burning problem of the present” (in: Shapira 1999, 170). Bergman saw this decision as a symptom of the social development in the Yishuv and protested against the chauvinism that had “reared its head among the younger generation” in Palestine and against educating young people “in the ideals of birionim [thugs] and the cult of force” (In: ibid. 169). Bergman’s criticism reflected the growing resentment of the cultural and political developments in the Yishuv at the beginning of the 1920s, felt by a small group of mainly central European intellectuals, a group that had a very limited influence on the Yishuv but a very important influence on German Zionism.

Just before the 1925 Zionist Congress, the editor of the Judische Rundschau, Robert Weltsch, had expressed his and his circle’s attitude to the Arab question:

“[…] it is evident that the conditions for a Jewish state are non-existent. There may be people without a country, but there is no country without people. Palestine was not given to us as a national home, but we are to build that home in Palestine. […] One of the best friends of Zionism, Professor Graham Wallace, once stated with great sharpness that Zionism could only be realized if the Jews, ‘the most gifted people in the world,’ gave a new sense to the word Nationalism. As long as the principles of nationalism are recognized in

\textsuperscript{276} Ben Gurion’s speech, in: (Heb.) \textit{The Discussion at the Achdut HaAvoda Conference in Ein Harod, 1924}, in: (Karpi & Shapira 1978, 32).
their old form, Zionism will always encounter the stone wall of Arab resistance.”

Hans Kohn gave this position its most radical definition: The “evil was not only ‘here and there’; it was rapidly taking root and growing.” Militarism, he explained:

“created the new state; and, like Sparta or Prussia, on military virtue it remains based. The militarization of life and mind represent not only a break with humanist Zionism, but with the long history of Judaism. The Zeitgeist, or at least the Zeitgeist of twentieth century Central and Eastern Europe, has won out over Jewish tradition.”

5.3.3.4 Closing the Operative-Declarative Gap

Whatever the profound differences between Kohn and Jabotinsky regarding Zionist relations with the Arabs, both of them wanted to put the cards on the table, as it were; in other words, both of them called upon the Zionist movement to take a clear stand with regard to the Arabs. But this internal dispute among the Zionists threatened to destabilize the political tactic of Ruppin’s repertoire (adopted by the labor movement), which was to preserve a constant gap between the declarative and operative dimensions. Both groups, the liberals of the humanistic German Jewish tradition and the revisionists, who were influenced by Italian nationalism and fascism, wanted to abolish this political ambiguity, which was the source of Ruppin’s and the labor movement’s success. It was this threat that was the background to Ruppin’s initiative to establish Brit Shalom.

278 Kohn started his career as a Zionist official and during his period in Palestine (1925-1929) he occupied a senior administrative position as head of the Keren Ha-Yesod (Palestine Foundation Fund) propaganda division.
279 (Kohn 1958/1970, 190): Kohn quoted Achad Ha’am: “Serfs they were in the lands of the Diaspora and suddenly they find themselves in freedom, and this change has awakened in them an inclination to despotism. They treat the Arabs with hostility and cruelty, deprive them of their rights, offend them without cause, and even boast of these deeds; and nobody among us opposes this despicable and dangerous inclination” (Achad Haam, in: Kohn 1958/1970, 195). Kohn’s and Bergman’s arguments were supported by those of Buber and A. D. Gordon, and were related to the German Jewish tradition that could not accept the idea that a Jewish state could establish itself while denying the rights of other nations for national definition. Their democratic and liberal ideas preceded Jewish nationalism.
During 1924, Ruppin expressed a growing restlessness concerning the relations between the Arabs and the Jews in Palestine “the alienation is greater than it was” he wrote in his diary, “I don’t have any doubt that Zionism will have to face a catastrophe if it cannot find a common platform [with the Arabs]” (Bein 1968, III, 92 [31 Dec. 1924]). He concluded the entry with the thought that he would like to gather a small group of respected, high ranking (hochstehenden) Jews and Arabs in order to discuss this upcoming catastrophe. At the Zionist Congress of 1925, Ruppin stressed that part of the population of Eretz Israel would always be Arab, which led to the conclusion that “we must live with them in conditions of coexistence.” He demanded that a committee be established to deal with the Arab problem and emphasized that “the announcement of the establishment of such a committee must have a propagandist character, and not only for us” (Kongressprotokoll XIV. SS. 438-439, in: Friedlander 1989, 25).

The comment quoted above concerning the “propagandist character, and not only for us” reflects a neglected aspect in the historiography of Brit Shalom: the bi-national idea – or, for that matter, even a bi-national forum that would discuss it as an option – could have produced a considerable change in the atmosphere and relations between Arabs and Jews (Elam 1990, 265). Similarly to Lavsky’s historiographical conclusion that Brit Shalom “assisted Zionist historiography in its desire to promote an image of the Zionist movement as seeking peace” (Lavsky 1996, 162-167), I will argue in the following that Ruppin’s involvement in the establishment of Brit Shalom was meant, or at least served, to promote an image of the Zionist movement as humanistic; an image that made an impact on both the British authorities and ‘the humanist Zionists.’ It must be remembered that the bi-national idea was the plan that Ruppin presented to the British Shaw Committee (1929) (Bein 1968, III, 168, 180-181), although, as we shall see, he himself never believed in its plausibility, certainly not as an immediate political solution. Ruppin’s presentation to the Shaw Committee was part of the carefully calculated Zionist strategy to feed the hopes of British administrators who, though obligated by British domestic politics and imperial interests to uphold
Balfour’s policy, nonetheless tried to convince themselves that they were “balancing” Arab rights and Zionists demands (see: Lundsten 1978, 27).  

In his meeting with the Yishuv’s leadership on 7 July 1926, Ruppin opened the discussion by claiming that the British authorities would sooner or later suggest a law regarding a “constitutional assembly or something similar” and that it was important “to influence it now rather than to change it later” (ibid., 1). This protocol demonstrates Ruppin’s typical way of anticipating political changes two steps ahead, and also reveals how the Yishuv’s leadership used Brit Shalom as part of their political tactics. In this protocol, Ruppin once again positioned himself as belonging simultaneously to the dominant circles of opposing political groups. He, the founder of Brit Shalom, talks about its role with the labor leadership (the alleged opponents of Brit Shalom), most of whom, Ben Gurion and Katzenelson, for example, clearly expressed, at that meeting and elsewhere, their total disagreement with the very idea of Brit Shalom.

Ruppin founded Brit Shalom immediately after his final, official retirement from the Vaad HaPoloel Hatzioni (Friedlander 1989, 230). In April 1925, the core members of Brit Shalom met for the first time. They were composed mainly of Zionist activists and intellectual figures from the intimate circle of the Hebrew University. Among the members were Ruppin’s most loyal secretaries since the early days of the PO: Tahon and R’ Binyamin (Yehoshua Radler-Feldmann Ha-Talmi), and a group of scholars, and university faculty members, Judah Magnes (chancellor and first president of the Hebrew University), Martin Buber, Hugo Bergmann, Ernst Simon and Gershom Scholem; most of whom had immigrated from Germany or Prague to the Land of Israel in order to work at the Hebrew University (Ratzabi 2001, xiv).

Their first goals, formulated by Ruppin, were to study the Jewish-Arab conflict, to find a proper juridical arrangement for relations between Jews and Arabs, to clarify problems in administration, to consider methods for cooperation and, in general, to

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280 As to the Arab point of view: it seems that “they were unable to grasp the idea that such a proposal [bi-national] on the Jewish side could be a sincere proposal rather than a diplomatic maneuver

281 The list of those present appears at the head of the protocol: “Dr. Ruppin, R’ Binyamin, Aharonovich, Yaakov Rabinovich, Y. Shapira, Berl Katzenelson, Rubashov, Ben Gurion, Riger, Luftban, Shertok, Idelson, Vilkinski, Beilinson, Asaf, A. Berlin and others...” (LBI Archive Berlin, The file of Brit Shalom).
respond to both the moral requirements of Brith Shalom’s founders and the demands of the Arabs. All this was to be done without harming the foundations of Zionism as the members of Brith Shalom understood it. Ruppin was chosen to write the regulations of the new association (Bein 1968, III, 97 [10 Jun. 1925]). However, almost from the first days, differences of opinion came to light, both in terms of ideology and in terms of tactics (Ratzabi 2001, xiv). The main conflict was between Ruppin and the so called “radical wing” of Brit Shalom, members such as Weltsch, Kohn, Buber, Bergman and Magnes, who were appalled and worried by Jabotinsky’s attendant demands to form a Jewish Legion as well as by the evasive position of the labor movement. As Lavsky described it, they felt compelled to offer a solution which would “remove the contrast between the realization of Zionism and the fulfillment of the spiritual and moral vocation of Jewish Nationalism” and to commit themselves to creating a realistic alternative to radical and violent nationalism (Lavsky 1996, 652). They believed that Palestine could not be taken by force. For these men, writes Mosse, Zionism was a moral crusade or it was nothing (Mosse 1996, 126). It is important to note that the members of the “radical wing” were in continuous interaction over a long period: Weltsch, Kohn and Buber had been in contact as early as 1909, conceiving Zionism as a movement through which they could realize their most fundamental personal convictions – pacifism, liberalism, and humanism (Mosse 1985, 75).

Two years after its establishment, and after long hours of discussions, Kohn and Bergman sought operative action and political involvement. In their credo, issued in Jerusalem in 1927, Brit Shalom said it was intent on creating in Palestine:

“a bi-national state, in which the two peoples will enjoy totally equal rights as befits the two elements shaping the country’s destiny, irrespective of which of the two is numerically superior at any given time.”

Kohn and Bergman tried to convince Ruppin that Brit Shalom should support an English magazine dealing with general humanitarian problems that were common to

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282 Kohn wrote that Jabotinsky was impressed by the “realism” of toughness. “The old liberal world of the West seemed doomed. New forces, which scornfully rejected humanitarianism or concern for the rights of others, claimed to represent the wave of the future. National egoism alone seemed to guarantee survival in a world which gloried more in biological vitality than in ethical rationality.”
Arabs and Jews and, mainly, take a stand in favor of a constitution. Ruppin dismissed their aspirations out of hand. In his letter to Kohn he explained his decision to reject their demands: *Brit Shalom* must be a “club for studying and research and not for quarrels,” and also not a movement trying to engage in political activity:

“In founding *Brit Shalom*, what mattered to me was the fact that the Zionist aim had no parallel in history. This aim is: to bring the Jews as a second nation into a country that is already settled by a nation – and to achieve that by peaceful means. History knows such intrusion […] only by way of occupation, but it has not yet happened that a nation agreed of its own good will to let another nation come and demand complete and equal rights as well as national autonomy. The uniqueness of the case precludes, in my opinion, treating it according to the accepted official and legal concepts. It requires a special study and consideration. *Brit shalom* should be the forum in which this problem will be discussed.”

Ruppin claimed that there were deep and manifest conflicts of interests between Arabs and Jews, conflicts which would worsen as the Zionists gained more control of the land:

“Land is the essential condition for putting down economic roots in Palestine […] wherever we purchase land and settle people on it – its current workers [the Arabs] must of necessity be removed, whether they be owners or tenants […] in future it will be much harder to purchase land, because sparsely settled land is no longer available – what is left is land settled with considerable density” (ibid.).

Ruppin pointed out a series of fundamental disagreements in the fields of immigration and economics, and concluded that if, under present conditions, a constitution were to be written, logically the Arabs would use the rights promised them by that constitution in order to prevent, as a majority, any economic development of the

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284 Immigration is against the Arab interest because the immigrants are poor and they take their jobs. The existence of varying wage rates for equal work is bound to cause bitterness amongst the Arabs (ibid.).
Jewish minority. That would mean the end of the Zionist movement, pure and simple (ibid.).

Another important point in Ruppin’s letter to Kohn considered the Arabs preparedness for democracy: “I am doubtful whether it will be simple to realize the principles of democracy in Palestine” he wrote, predicting that “the masses will follow a few leaders blindfolded […]” and condescendingly pointed out that “we can predict what form the civil representation of the Arabs will take” (ibid.). Nevertheless, as usual, he expressed good will and self-justification: “the situation would be different if there existed amongst the Arabs a party – even a small party – that accepted Zionist activity in principle. […] but such a party does not exist” (ibid.). Ruppin concluded his letter by emphasizing that he did not consider the act they suggested loyal; it was not appropriate “to take such a declaration to the Arabs and to bypass organized Zionism” (ibid.).

A year later, prior to the 1929 Riots, Ruppin resigned from his position as head of Brit Shalom. He expressed reservations about the publications of Bergman and Magness, and differentiated himself from them bluntly: “this is not the time for peace preaching […] the appeasing tone […] might be interpreted by the Arabs as weakness.” However, Ruppin continued to be a member of Brit Shalom, and took part in its meetings and even in wording its declarations. This fact is important because it meant that Ruppin had accurate information about the moves of Brit Shalom and was able to inform the agents of “organized Zionism” of its activities; as he did in the above quoted protocol and probably on other occasions too.

Apart from his important function as “organized Zionism’s” informer about Brit Shalom’s activities, it was important to Ruppin to be seen as part of Brit Shalom because of his relations with the German Zionists. The Convention of Delegates of the Z.V.f.D (Zionist Federation of Germany) held in Jena in 1929 assembled under the impact of the 1929 Riots in Palestine in August of that year. Welsch and Blumenfeld put their weight behind the bi-national state formula and succeeded in gaining approval for its support.

285 Ruppin to Kohn [24 Nov. 1928], in: (Bein 1968, III, 179).
From the point of view of Ruppin’s personal and cultural identity, it can be said that by establishing Brit Shalom Ruppin wanted to clear his conscience, or at least to build a clearer position which would legitimize his past and future practices for it can be argued, after all, that Ruppin had actively created the problems that he then seemingly tried to solve by means of Brit Shalom’s bi-national formula.

5.3.3.5 The Final Position – Ruppin’s Verschiebungstaktik

The 1929 Riots seem to have marked a significant change in Ruppin’s position. At this point, he no longer believed in even the slightest chance of a productive dialog with the Arabs and thought that “the propaganda of Brit Shalom might do more harm than good” (Bein 1968, III, 181, [31 Dec. 1929]). In 1931, he couched the conclusion he was to use repeatedly over the next few years (and that would be adopted by many others): “What we can get from the Arabs we don’t need, and what we need we can’t get” (Bein 1968, III, 203 [Dec. 1931]. His attitude to Brit Shalom was one of reluctant disbelief:

“[Magnes] wrote a proposal entitled: ‘Land of Israel – an Arab-Jewish State,’ which outlined a gradual development towards a democratic constitution. I made some changes in the proposal. But what is the use of our agreeing in our narrow circle, if there is no chance of this proposal being accepted by the Jews and the Arabs? Sometimes I think that, with regard to the East European Jew for whom Zionism is the only ideal and solace in the misery of their lives, it is better to leave that ideal in its utopist and far from realistic form, instead of suggesting some kind of Zionism which is indeed reasonable and takes reality into consideration, but will taste in their mouths like water and not wine” (Bein 1968, III, 205 [4 Feb. 1932]).

The above text includes the seeds of Ruppin’s final position and demonstrates, too, his self-perception as the ‘Knight of the Volk;’ the Knight should provide the Volk with utopist belief and hide from it the true reality; this is the way nation states evolve without taking “reality into considerations” (ibid.). Two years later he wrote that:
“The function of the unconscious,\textsuperscript{286} of instinct in social life – preoccupies me, as I am gradually disassociating myself from rationalism and from belief in the rule of the intellect and of ‘progress’ ” (Bein 1968, III [30 Sep. 1934], 233).

And two years later, after the eruption of \textit{The Arab Revolt} (1936), he reaffirmed his old-new position to himself:

\begin{quote}
“If we can learn any lesson from the history of the world in the last decades, it is that the political stance of nations is conditioned not by reason but rather by instinct.”\textsuperscript{287}
\end{quote}

After the Nazis’ rise to power and the violent events of \textit{The Arab Revolt} or \textit{Riots, Brit Shalom} reached its final phase of activity. A few of the most stubborn activists approached Ruppin and demanded clear answers from him concerning his true position. Magnes wrote to Ruppin that there were only two options for solving the problem:

\begin{enumerate}
\item The revisionist way of a Jewish Palestine based on imperialism and militarism.
\item Pacifist politics in which the national Jewish state (\textit{Heimat}) and the Jewish majority are secondary to a spiritual, educational and religious Jewish state. For that option it would be necessary to reach an agreement with the Arabs.\textsuperscript{288}
\end{enumerate}

The confidential letter which Ruppin wrote to Magnes in reply went also to Weltsch; it had the tone of a bitter farewell.\textsuperscript{289} Ruppin summarized in it some of his former ideas and formulated his final position in a decisive manner. He expressed again his opinion that “objectively” he saw no common basis for an understanding between Jews and Arabs (ibid.).

\begin{footnotes}
\textsuperscript{286} It is interesting to note that Ruppin could not perceive both Nietzsche and Freud through his social Darwinist Weltanschauung.
\textsuperscript{287} Ruppin to Weltsch, in: (Bein 1968, III, 203 [18 Mar. 1936]).
\textsuperscript{288} Magnes to Ruppin [18 Apr. 1936] in: (Herzberg 1971 312).
\textsuperscript{289} Ruppin to Weltsch, in: (Bein 1968, III, 203 [18 Mar. 1936]).
\end{footnotes}
In trying to understand the blunt tone of Ruppin’s letter, it is important to bear in mind his position at that time in Palestinian Zionism’s field of power. In those years he was the main figure involved in promoting the vital program for transferring much needed capital to the very poor Zionist settlements in Palestine – a program known as the *Transfer Agreement* (Heb. heskem ha’avarah). Its most important achievements were the transfer of about 60 thousand German Jews to Palestine, in addition to the transfer of the aforementioned capital. The *Transfer Agreement* is considered a crucial step in the establishment of the State of Israel and the improvement of its social structure. It was also the basis for the Fifth Aliya (1934-1940), in whose planning Ruppin played such an important role; he established and directed a special department, the so-called *German Department* (with the official title of *The Central Office for the Settlement of German Jews*) in the framework of which he established *RASSCO (Rural and Suburban Settlement Corporation)* for the purpose of building agricultural settlements and suburbs especially for the German-Jewish newcomers (Lichttheim 1953, 172). These immense changes in the field, all promoted and planned by Ruppin, ensured his most powerful position.

This was the historical background to the painfully important points that Ruppin emphasized for the first time in such a clear manner. Now, for the first time, he admitted that what differentiated him from Kohn and Bergman, was his lack of faith.

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290 The German Jewish immigrants made up about 15% of Palestine’s 1939 Jewish population. Many of them transferred considerable personal wealth and were recognized by the Zionist immigration authorities as valuable *Menschenmaterial*. Their absorption was handled by a special department directed by Ruppin. The *Transfer Agreement* rapidly grew into a substantial banking and trading house with 137 specialists in its Jerusalem office at the height of its activities (Feilchenfeld 1972, 75; Encyclopaedia Judaica 1971, 1013).

291 60% of all capital invested in Palestine between August 1933 and September 1939 was channeled through an agreement with the Nazis (Rosenthal 1974, 23).

292 If for the Second Aliya Ruppin was “the father,” for the German and Austrian Jews of the Fifth Aliya he was the “good old uncle from Palestine.” According to researchers of the *Jekkes*, Ruppin is the person most often mentioned in the document bank of what Sela-Sheffy designates as “the Jekkes pack.” The daughter of Zmora, a distinguished member of the pack, described a party in their house in 1941: “In one corner of the living room a group of admirers gathered around Arthur Ruppin […]. His work had already yielded blessed fruits and made him […] the lion of the pack” (Zmora 1997, 20-22). Indeed, there is a clear parallel between the economic and career development of the “Jekke pack” and the development of the workers’ organizations. See for example the case of Moshe Zmora in: (Sela-Sheffy 2004, 32). See also the case of Felix Rosenblüth (1887-1978), the first Israeli Minister of Justice. Ruppin gave Rosenblüth a personal loan to enable him to come to Palestine, and helped him to establish his career (Bondi 1990, 143). Rosenblüth, who can be considered one of Ruppin’s many sons, wrote that “Ruppin is superior to all those who surround him (even those who oppose him), in his intelligence, in his sharp mind and in his wisdom. It is true he has a few faults but they are as nothing compared to his virtues” (Bondi 1990, 163).
in democracy, while they saw it as their “foundation pillar” (Grundpfeiler). In the
eyes of “some of Brit Shalom members,” he wrote, as if the affair already belonged in
the past:

“Democracy was the pillar of their political thought. They couldn’t get rid of
the perception that democratic institutions are desirable in any period and in
all conditions. This is the perception of all parties of Judaism from the time
they achieved their equal rights in the new era, while they raise on high the
flag of democracy.”

Contrary to this view, Ruppin claimed that “one should not see democracy and the
good of the nation as identical concepts […] the Arabs will use the constitutional
assembly in all possible ways to fight against the Jews and Zionism” (ibid.). Ruppin’s
attitude to democracy was always skeptical and, like his mentor Heackel’s Monist
League he opposed bourgeois liberalism, constitutionalism and the separation of
the individual and the state. They believed that elected governments were usually
monstrous, that they led, of necessity, to the abuse of quality by quantity, the best by
the majority and the fit by the unfit. They believed, too, that democracy was
Germany’s most immediate danger (Gasman 1971, 84-86). They called for the
supremacy of the racial community and of the state over the individual and the latter’s
subordination to the impersonal drive of the Volk towards greater power and strength
that would ensure favorable conditions for its continued existence. The state was to be
seen as a “product of the human struggle for existence and [of human] striving for
organization.” Fritz Lenz, whom Ruppin quoted on many occasions, maintained
unequivocally, in 1931, that there was an “essential relationship”
(Wesensverwandtschaft) between race hygiene and the “fascist idea of the state”:
“[…] whereas the liberal, and, in essence, also social democratic ideas of the state
were based on an individualistic ‘weltanschauung,’ fascism did not recognize the

293 Ruppin to Weltsch, in: (Bein 1968, III, 203 [18 Mar. 1936]).
294 Ibid.
295 The resemblance of Ruppin to this strain of thought, as well as the misrepresentation of him as part
of the German Jewish groups for whom democracy was fundamental, is aptly expressed in his diary
when he describe his views about dictatorship: “I am not against dictatorship in principle, as long as the
dictator is truly the most talented person in the Volk. But what happens after his death? (Bein 1968 III,
286).
296 Seidel, Das Wesen des Monismus, in: (Gasman 1971, 44).
value of the individual. Its ultimate goal was eternal life, which was perpetuated through the chain of the generations, and that meant the race” (in: Weingart 1998, 403).

5.3.3.5.1 The Verschiebungstaktik

Ruppin’s strong language against the line of Brit Shalom shattered the basic tenets of Brit Shalom’s members. His self-confidence was reinforced by his powerful position which resulted, as noted, from the new status of Palestinian Zionism following the Transfer Agreement and the German Jews’ growing understanding of the importance of Palestine. Leo Beack’s visionary lecture in Köningsberg on the eve of Hitler’s victory in the 1933 elections may mark this turning point: “it is possible that your children and grandchildren will need the Land of Israel in order to find shelter from the furious dictator” (CZA A198/1, in: Meir 1994, 123).

Nevertheless, in this farewell letter Ruppin explained to the intellectuals from Mount Scopus, for the first time, how his culture planning really worked. The concept he used to explain his tactic with regard to the Arabs was: “Verschiebungstaktik” (Bein 1968, III, 255). A German term which can mean the ‘tactic of postponement or the ‘tactic of displacement’ or both.

“It is right that a government [will] develop step by step […] but since no specific time has been defined for the establishment of these self-governing bodies, we absolutely have the right to demand a postponement [Verschiebung] of their establishment to a later moment. That was the tactic that the Zionist executive pursued for five years, i.e. since the question of the Legislative Council was raised anew. I see one proof of the rightness of that decision in the fact that, if the Legislative Council had been set up in 1931, it would have been based on a Jewish population of 17 per cent, whereas today it is based on 28 per cent.”

297 Lenz took pride in the fact that Hitler had taken many of his ideas for his own writings (Weingart 1998, 403).
298 According to Dan Diner this concept also had the connotation of “repression.”
299 Ruppin to Weltsch, in: (Bein 1968, III, 255 [18 Mar. 1936]). “Es ist richtig, dass das Mandat die gradweise Entwicklung Regierung sich an dieses Versprechen gebunden hält. Aber da für die
Ruppin’s tactic was very simple: it was not wise to solve the dispute immediately. It would be better to wait at least until the Jews constituted a majority. Nevertheless, Ruppin was fully aware to the risks of his *Verschiebungstaktik*:

“Nun kann man zwar gegen Verschiebungstaktik sagen, dass wir dadurch das Risiko laufen, dass die Gegnerschaft der Araber sich dadurch blutige Unruhen oder gar in einen allgemeinen Aufstandverwandeln kann. Diese Gefahr besteht in der Tat und könnte für unser Aufbauwerk sehr schwere Folgen haben” (ibid.).

Ruppin was ready to take the risk of an all-inclusive war with the Arabs in order to continue the *Verschiebungstaktik*; the demographic problem had to be solved before Zionism could tackle the Arab problem. This tactic also meant the perpetuation of the gap between the declarative and operative levels of Zionism that *Brit Shalom* aspired to abolish. Ruppin’s *Verschiebungstaktik* enabled the Zionist movement to seem to accept democratic principles, to present itself as willing to achieve agreement through compromise, and, simultaneously, to postpone all practical steps towards achieving such an end, by constantly producing a variety of technical, bureaucratic and diplomatic obstacles that would help them gain enough time to create demographic facts that would postpone the solution of the “Arab problem” to a vague point in the future, when the Jews of Palestine would constitute a majority and with it, the power to control the state.

“any kind of negotiations with the Arabs today will not lead us forward, because the Arabs are still hoping that they will get rid of us […] not negotiations, but the development of Eretz Israel by increasing our part in the population and strengthening our economic power may dissolve the tension […] the existence of the Zionist movement is dependent on our ability to...
succeed – with the aid of the mandatory government – in increasing our numbers and strength here, over the next five or ten years, until we will be, more or less, on an even keel with the Arabs. This is perhaps a bitter truth, but according to my understanding it is the truth itself…” (Ruppin, ibid. 257-258).

Ruppin’s *Verschiebungstaktik*, like many other models he produced or developed, became central to Palastinian Zionism and the State of Israel’s policies and stands with regard to the Arabs. In his research on the relations between Israel and the Arabs, Avi Shlaim gives many examples of this model of perception and its practical implementation. One of the more striking examples, which is very similar to Ruppin’s main idea even in its wording, appears in a chapter entitled “Postponement Tactics.” In it he quotes an interview with former Prime Minister Yizchak Shamir regarding his “peace talks” with the Arabs:

“Without a dramatic demographic change [in Israel] there is no sense in speaking about autonomy [for the Palestinians], because there is a risk that it will become a Palestinian state. What is this talk about ‘political settlements’? I would negotiate about autonomy for ten years, and meanwhile increase by half a million people the population of Judea and Samaria.”

**5.3.3.5.2 Constant Warfare and Transfer**

A month later, in April 1936, following the riots in Jaffa (sixteen Arabs and three Jews were killed) Ruppin formulated his final position:

“I have formulated a theory: the nature of things and the necessity of things is that the resistance of the Arabs to Jewish immigration will find its release from time to time in such outbursts; we are destined to live in a state of constant warfare with the Arabs, and there is no escape from blood sacrifices. It is possible that this is an undesirable condition, but this is reality, and if we want to continue our work in Eretz Israel against the will of the Arabs we must take such victims into considerations” (Bein 1968, III, 258 [Apr. 1936]).

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300 Maariv [26 June 1992], in: (Shlaim 2005, 470).
At this point Ruppin returned to the solution of transfer, but this time it was clear to him that the transfer must be carried out by force. In his speech at the 20th Zionist Congress (Zurich, 1937) he expressed this view explicitly:

“First we must prepare land in the Arab states that will suit the peasants, and only then must we transfer them there, of their own free will as far as possible and, only if we can find no other way, by expropriation [i.e. by forcing them].”

According to Ruppin, without the transfer of the Arabs, the new Jewish state would have “tremendous difficulties with them, from all aspects: internal politics (defence of minorities), external politics (the relationship of the Arabs in Eretz Israel with the Arab states) and economics (because we will be forced to give them equal rights).” Ruppin continued to ponder out loud:

“from the first day of my stay in Eretz Israel I saw the Arab question as our central problem […] [but] I don’t believe that the Arabs will agree to leave their places of their own free will […] we are speaking of about 300 villages […] it is not a matter of transferring individuals” (ibid.).

Morris points out that: “Those parts [of Ruppin’s speech] that meant that the Arabs had to be transferred by force and that Ruppin did not despise such means, were completely deleted from both the newspaper and the stenographic account of the 20th Zionist Congress.”

It must be emphasized that even though Ruppin talked about forced transfer being a last resort, he believed that it would eventually be unavoidable. In May 1936, for

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301 CZA S5/1543, in: (Moriss 2000, 115)
302 Ibid. A year later [12 June 1938], at a meeting of the Jewish Agency Ruppin repeated the same points: “I don’t believe in the transfer of individuals. I believe in the transfer of whole villages. And I think that PLDC needs to build there [Transjordan] a few settlements so that the Arabs here will see what they can get there. I believe that we will be capable, even if not immediately, of transferring 100,000 Arabs or 25,000 families of peasants within 10-15 years” (CZA Protocol of the Jewish Agency Executive’s Meeting on [12 June 1938], vol. 28. no. 53, in: (Masalha 1992)).
example, he broke into Ushiskin’s speech when the latter suggested a sweeping transfer that would be “morally justified”.303

“I [Ruppin] also entertained the same dream as you [Ushiskin]. I once said that Iraq would absorb the Arab of Palestine and that all the nations of the world would recognize the morality of our just demands. I have stopped hallucinating and dreaming. How can you imagine that the Arabs will leave Palestine and go to Baghdad? What will they gain from it? What do they lack in Palestine? Their material conditions are good... why should they go to Iraq? Simply because it is an Arab country? In their opinion Palestine today is also still an Arab country and they intend to wage war to preserve its Arabic nature. And Palestine possesses an additional advantage over Iraq: a number of Europe’s advantages have penetrated into this country. The Arab can wander through the city’s streets and ogle the young girls with uncovered faces, which he cannot do on the outskirts of Baghdad.”304

Ruppin’s text and tone – one of the rare moments in which he mildly lost his temper in public – reveal that he realized that the act of transfer could not be justified by liberal morality, and that he understood profoundly that the Palestinian Arabs were a nation connected to its land. Ruppin’s text exposes as well the morbid resentment he felt towards the Arabs, whom he marked here as a threat to Jewish women; using the same trope that expressed the 19th century German resentment and fear of the Jewish male.

303 Benny Morris, in: (Makover 2002). “Usishkin said unequivocally that it is ‘moral to move the Arab population because it is necessary for the solution of the problems of the Jewish people’. The Zionist leaders understood that the transfer had an immoral smell, and in most cases they avoided speaking about it publicly” (Benny Morris, in: Makover 2002)
304 CZA Protocol of the Jewish Agency Executive’s Meeting on [22 May 1936]; in: (Katz 1998).
The same line can be found in his article for the American-Zionist journal *Maccabaean, The Relation of the Jews to the Arabs* (1919) in which he characterized the Arabs’ “materialistic conception of life”:

“Now it is true that the Arab actually has a strongly materialistic conception of life. [...] it is also true that, in the daily life of the Fellahs, [peasants] the question of making money plays the principal role and that, when two Fellahs converse, they are almost never heard to speak of anything except the Beshlik [Ottoman coin]” (Ruppin 1919, 109).

This description of Semitic materialism reflects Ruppin’s projective identification: the same qualities that threatened him in German culture – Jewish materialism and greed – are projected onto the Semitic element. As already noted, Ruppin’s plan of segregation was devised in order to detach the new Jews from the negative influences of the Semitic culture and race. The qualities that Ruppin attached to the Arabs – obsession with money and excessive sexual desire – are the opposites of the ideal model of the Modern Hebrew – the Maccabean type – whom Ruppin consistently treated as non-Semites both in their culture and their biology. The differentiation generated by Ruppin was one of the main factors that accelerated the process described in Said’s *Orientalism*:

“The Semitic myth bifurcated in the Zionist movement; one Semite went the way of Orientalism, the other, the Arab, was forced to go the way of the Oriental.”

The bifurcation that Said described falls also on those groups among the new Jewish *Volk*, who were perceived by Ruppin to have a bio-cultural inclination towards the Arabs. In terms of culture planning, these groups were limited, in Ruppin’s repertoire, to be merely the *consumers* of the models produced and reproduced by the agents of the dominant groups, who were meant to pass on the European Promethean light to the darker oriental races and nations. With this kind of perception and scientifically legitimized bias of projective identification, Ruppin could accept the Arabs only if they would be subordinate to the Modern Hebrews, and ready to accept Modern Hebrew superiority in agricultural, economic, educational and hygienic development.
From the beginning of his activities, Ruppin realized that the workers’ fantasy of the “conquest of work” was impossible, and he therefore created an economic system that elevated the Hebrew workers both symbolically and materially. His analysis, which was accepted by the dominant groups in the field, asserted that there was an abysmal difference between the Jewish and Arab standards of life: “The falachs (peasants) do not go to school and do not want a planned medical system. They have no demand for vacations and entertainment or for cosmetic or hygienic products,” their diet is drab and includes “bread, mush (from oats), cheese and olives. The Jewish worker, on the other hand, however much he reduces his demands, cannot give up the minimum comforts of western civilization” (Ruppin 1919a, 269).³⁰⁵ The Arabs must realize that they can only benefit from the colonization of Palestine by the Modern Hebrews, who are the messengers of European culture (Ruppin 1926b, 141-142). Nevertheless, as he wrote two years later, the very fact that the “Jew in Eretz Israel wants to remain a civilized man” and has greater financial needs than the majority of the population, who have none of the demands of civilized people, this fact is the cause of all the difficulties that agricultural settlement must fight and has not, up till now, managed to control” (Ruppin 1928, 12).

As already discussed, Ruppin refuted the assertion that the Jews and Arabs belonged to the same race, a contention that opposed the mainstream historiographical assertion, eloquently worded by Penslar, that “Zionism certainly contained Orientalist elements, yet it differed from colonial movements in its assertion of familial propinquity, however distant, with the Arabs” (Penslar 2001b, 87). I am not suggesting here that Zionism is a colonialist movement, whatever that means, but merely pointing out that it is impossible to negate such an assumption using Penslar’s argumentation. The “familial propinquity” was clearly part of Palestinian Zionism declarative dimension and was a rhetorical tool of its Verschiebungstaktik. To be sure, Ruppin did indeed believe that there was and is a connection between the Jews and the Arabs, but this connection was not based on racial affinity but rather on racial segregation and clear cultural borders. Thus, in the operative dimension Ruppin saw and treated the Arabs as inferior, and operated according to the perception that the

³⁰⁵ Ruppin also used this argument in his letter to John Hope-Simpson of [Dec. 7, 1930], (CZA), when he explained to him why “it is impossible for the pioneers to compete with the Arab peasant in the work market.”
only way the Palestinian Arabs could cooperate with the Zionist entity was by accepting Zionist superiority. Even in his last years Ruppin believed that the Arabs lacked the ability to develop the lands of Palestine; having neither the capital, the knowledge nor the energy to develop its latent economic resources (Ruppin 1940, 361). Moreover, although he realized that a national movement was spreading throughout the rest of the Arab world, he believed that the Palestinian Arabs had yet to develop national feelings and that their political system was backward:

“It is obvious that common ground for basic discussions is missing. How can we expect to find understanding of our national feelings in the Arabs when they have not developed any national feelings or social awareness of their own? […] The leading Arabs who, in Palestine, are mostly landowners and rich effendis (absentee landlords), do not care for their own people, who wallow in ignorance and poverty […] it is no wonder that they are in opposition to the wishes of a totally different nation.”

On the one hand, the Arab mob had not yet acquired a national or even social consciousness and on the other hand, the Arab upper class was seeing Zionism as an economic threat.

5.3.3.5.3 Conclusion: “Words are not Important”

As already described, Ruppin was the first to persuade the leading groups of the Zionist Congress of the need to conceal information and plans and to mask the Zionist modus operandi. Ruppin’s strategies of concealment or masking introduced a new model into Zionist politics which reinforced the “practical” Zionist repertoire by creating a gap or discrepancy between the movement’s declarative and operative dimensions. Thus, for example, although Ruppin realized that there were deep conflicts of interest between the Zionists and the Arabs which could be settled only by force, he created a declarative narrative which presented the Zionist side as defensive, willing to negotiate and compromise in the humanist spirit of western democracy and the Arab side as not yet mature enough for a rational dialog. In his articles and

speeches he formulated the legitimating texts for what was to become the classic Zionist position: “there is no one to talk to” (Heb. ein im me ledaber).

Ruppin’s attitude towards the Arabs seems ambiguous, and two-faced: on the one hand, he presented himself as one who was “truly” seeking a reasonable and just political solution, and on the other, he was planning and supporting practical policies which differentiated, excluded and transferred them. As Shilo sums up:

“If an improvement in relations with the Arabs constituted an impediment to additional land purchases or setting up another settlement, preference was expressly given to achievements in terms of settlement over improving relations with the Arabs” (Shilo 1988, 60).

Ruppin’s two-faced position with regard to the Arabs, his manipulation of the declarative and the operative dimensions based on his Verschiebungstaktik, included many declarations at the Zionist Congress and in his meetings with the mandatory government, allegedly supporting equality between Arabs and Jews. At the same time, however, he voted against the employment of Arabs in Jewish factories, supported a boycott of Arab products, and acted relentlessly to implement a culture plan aimed at creating a closed Jewish cultural space and economy in which accumulated capital would go to further internal expansion rather than flowing outward (Kolatt 1996, 621).

Ruppin’s attitude to the Arabs and in particular this practical Verschiebungstaktik became the main strategic position of Palestinian Zionism and in particular of its dominant labor movement group. Shlaim, who compared Jabotinsky’s and Ben-Gurion’s analyses of the “Arab Problem,” concludes that although “Ben-Gurion did not use the term ‘Iron Wall,’ his analysis and conclusions were identical to those of Jabotinsky” (Shlaim 2005, 41). Nevertheless, Ben-Gurion’s ‘Iron Wall’ politics (which were an extension of Ruppin’s Verschiebungstaktik), were different from Jabotinsky’s in that they always preserved the gap between the declarative and operative dimensions, while the “Iron Wall” ideology of Jabotinsky and his followers sought explicitly to abolish this gap (which, as noted, was one of the sources of
Palestinian Zionism’s success). In a retrospective interview in 1967, Ben-Gurion defined this difference in a few short sentences:

“Words are not important. What counts are deeds. That was really Jabotinsky’s big mistake: too much talk.”

The difference between the labor and revisionist movements lay mainly in terms of tactics. By adopting a more accommodating language, associated for example with groups like Brith Shalom and other ‘humanist Zionists,’ and on occasion denouncing the chauvinism and the vigilant methods of Jabotinsk’s group, the leadership of the labor movement and the Yishuv was able to appear as a mainstream, appeasing force, a position which enabled them to advance significantly toward their political objectives.

5.4 Passing the Torch to Ben-Gurion: The Institute for Economic Research and Planning

Ruppin served the Zionist leadership’ as an ‘Administrative Knight,’ translating the national Zionist ethos and ambitions into concrete culture plans, worded in a professional and technical language, full of statistics and figures that often reflected the interests and aims of the leadership of which he was a part more rather than the full economic and social factual knowledge he had obtained.

Ruppin’s self-perception as the ‘Administrative Knight’ of the labor movement, and, in particular, his assistance to Ben-Gurion, was apparent even in his last major project for the Zionist movement, as the head of The Institute for Economic Research and Planning which he established in 1935.

It is important to note in this regard that Ben-Gurion was a close disciple of Ruppin’s and many of his ideas and concepts derived from the Ruppinian lexicon and weltanschauung. Ben-Gurion, certainly, was one of Ruppin’s ‘sons’ and in his

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307 Ben Gurion, interview, Maariv [12 May, 1967], in: (Shapira 2001, 74). This trope of referring to the revisionists as prattlers appears in Ben Gurion’s texts many times: e.g., when he referred to Menachem Begin and others who supported “the whole of Eretz Israel” (Eretz Israel hashlema) as “verbal maximalists” (maximalistim miluliim) (Ben Gurion 1982, 937).
writings he quotes long paragraphs from Ruppin’s speeches and theories, and praises him on many occasions for his “deep wisdom” (Ben-Gurion, 1972, 389).\(^\text{308}\)

Even as World War II raged in Europe, Ben-Gurion was promoting a plan for mass immigration after the war.\(^\text{309}\) As part of his preparations for the 1942 Extraordinary Zionist Conference at the Biltmore Hotel in New York, he was anxious to convince the Americans that the Land of Israel could hold far more than the 1.5 million inhabitants it already had in 1941. It was a very difficult task, he wrote, since “from America, the Land of Israel seems even smaller than it is” (Tevet 1987b, III, 273).

In February 1941, Ben-Gurion suggested that Ruppin accompany him to the US in order to aid him in his efforts. Ruppin refused, but accepted Ben Gurion’s offer to oversee the trip’s planning:

“The only work in which I find interest is preparing data and proposals for the awaited peace conference [at the end of World War II]. The status of the Jews at this conference will be very poor if they do not obtain rich factual material and form well-organized plans; no one else will do the work for them. […] [Ben-Gurion said:] ‘I hope that you will prove demonstrably how we can bring [lehaalot] five million Jews to the Land of Israel’. I said that I did not want to set a number in advance; the research will show what the maximal number is that can be managed (and over what period of time). In any case, it seems that it [Ben-Gurion’s offer] gave me much room to maneuver” (Bein 1968, III, 335; see also 350).

This text demonstrates Ruppin’s important role in the movement even in his last years of activity,\(^\text{310}\) as well as his self-perception as the ‘Administrative Knight,’ ready and

\(^{308}\) I have already discussed elsewhere (Bloom 2003) the connection between Ruppin’s culture planning and Ben-Gurion. Most references to Ruppin in Ben-Gurion’s memoires are accompanied by long quotations from his lectures and books, see, e.g., a four-page summary of Ruppin’s lecture to the 1930 Zionist Congress in Berlin. Ben-Gurion was impressed by Ruppin’s assertion that “the Hebrew language is unifying the Jewish race” (ibid. 444) as well as by Ruppin’s theory concerning the degeneration of the Jews from Arab lands (ibid. 440-444). On Ruppin as advisor to Ben-Gurion see also (Ben Gurion 1972, II, 230-229, 364-366).

\(^{309}\) For a detailed description of Ben-Gurion’s idea regarding mass immigration see: (Barel 2004).

\(^{310}\) In addition to the case described, Ruppin was also an important factor in the 1942 discussions with regard to the immigration of Romanian Jews and supplied Ben Gurion with the required
duty-bound to serve the *Volk*. It also shows how ambitious he was to translate the Zionist leadership’s new interests into a coherent culture plan. ³¹¹

Ben-Gurion continued to pressurize Ruppin relentlessly, even writing to him bluntly:

“Facts and mainly facts; the more facts the better, to show the Americans that Palestine is capable of absorbing several million refugees after the war […] I consider your work to be of the utmost political importance.”³¹²

In 1942, after Ruppin completed the first draft of his plans for the peace conference, he sent Ben Gurion a short summary of his work. By analyzing various researches and statistical data on demography and economics, Ruppin devised a series of solutions to the “post-war problems.” The sources for his research were various Zionist research bodies from America and Palestine (in the fields of agriculture, industry, economics, population, technology and employment). Ruppin’s paper to Ben-Gurion included a general description of Palestinian Zionism’s aims, including possibilities for expansion over the next 10 to 15 years in terms of analogy with the previous 20 years.³¹³ Ruppin suggested a plan for the preparation required for such fast absorption of Jewish immigrants, to be financed by the “victorious democratic governments,” especially the US and Britain, through a fund for the resettlement of the Jews, mainly in Palestine.³¹⁴

Ben Gurion wrote to Ruppin that his “work and the work of his institution have supreme political importance […] I read [the report] with great interest, more than any detective story”.³¹⁵ Ruppin ended his last report to Ben-Gurion with the words:

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³¹¹ Ruppin functioned as a representative of Ben-Gurion also at the Évian Conference (1938). See: (Beit-Zvi 1977, 176-189).
³¹² Ben Gurion to Ruppin, [28 Apr. 1942], CZA S25/4754.
³¹⁴ “According to my estimations” he noted “the sum that was robbed from the Jews by the Nazi government is around 2,000 million mark – 400 million dollars (a special research into that matter is in preparation). I tend to believe that an international loan could be raised on the basis of a German commitment to pay that amount” (ibid., note 89).
³¹⁵ (Tevet 1987, 273). Ben Gurion had a known penchant for detective stories.
“Hoping that these remarks will be of service to you, I remain, with kind regards and best wishes for the success of your work.”³¹⁶

Ruppin’s report and warm words for Ben-Gurion were a way of passing on the ‘torch’ of statist knowledge from the master of Zionist political science and practice to the first leader of the Modern Hebrew/Jewish state, who was fully aware of the importance of such knowledge for feeding his “craving for centralization” and the construction of his uncontested leadership (Leibler 2004, 129).

Latour presented a conceptual frame which asserts that in order for practices conducted by statisticians and political scientists to be distributed as facts, an alliance with political patrons should be made. At the core of the action of making allies is the practice of translation, in which scientists translate their interests according to the patrons’ world view, language, and concerns, while, at the same time, keeping their scientific goals disconnected from political interests. When such strategies of recruitment succeed, scientists gain high prestige for not abusing their science in exchange for political benefits (Latour 1987, 116). This image of an ‘impartial’ and ‘objective’ scientist, as described above, was one of the sources of Ruppin’s powerful status in the movement. Nevertheless, there was, in his case, congruence between the functions of the scientist and the politician. Ruppin can indeed be considered an “agent for legitimacy” of Palestinian-Zionism, but he was also, at least in the first phase of Zionist colonization, the ‘creator’ of ‘the creators’ – the group of politicians and bureaucrats who established the State of Israel.

³¹⁶ Ruppin to Ben Gurion [14 Jan. 1942] CZA, S25/4754, copy in: (Penslar 1987, appendix H). at the end of 1942, when Ben Gurion returned to Palestine he asked Ruppin to organize a conference of experts for discussing the settlement and immigration plans of Palestinian Zionism in the years to come. This conference was the first step in the establishment of the “planning committee” established in March 1943, which had a crucial role in the social planning of the State of Israel (Barell 2004, 24-26).
5.5 The Understanding of Misunderstanding: 
Ruppin-Günther Relations and the Transfer Agreement

The function of the unconsciousness, of the instinct in social life – preoccupies me, as I am gradually disassociating myself from rationalism and from the belief in the rule of the intellect and “progress.” Ruppin [30 Sep. 1934].

No party supported the Transfer Agreement on principal. The only ones who did, were the delegates of the workers’ party, Ben Gurion and Ruppin. Goldstein Y.

Many researches and texts have been written on the subject of the relations between the Zionists and the Nazis. These accounts have generated a discourse which, at one extreme, depicts the Zionist movement’s connection with the Nazis as premeditated, and sometimes even portraying it – explicitly and implicitly – as resulting from cynical and cruel calculations, and stressing the mutual interests and the tangential ideological lines of the two, while at the other extreme we have the common Zionist narrative, which dismisses Zionism’s relations with the Nazis as merely pragmatic, something that could be instrumental in minimizing the imminent danger posed to European Jewry by the Nazi rise to power.

In the following, I will try to understand how Ruppin’s career can enlighten us as to the nature of Nazi-Zionist relations, which is linked to the inevitable question regarding the evolvement of the ‘final solution.’

One of the first obstacles we encounter in describing Ruppin’s relations with the Nazis lies in our very generalized manner of relating to the term ‘Nazis.’ Any mention of this term is immediately besmirched by the memory of muss-murder, endless cruelty and evil, an emotional reaction which tends to disrupt our ability to make detailed distinctions. However, it is not only a subjective emotion that stands in our way, but also the task of understanding one of the basic components of the post-

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317 (Bein 1968, III [30 September 1934], 233).
318 (Goldstein 2003, 189).
Holocaust Jewish and Israeli collective memory and identity. “Through a dialectical process of appropriation and exclusion, remembering and forgetting,” writes Zertal, “Israeli society has defined itself in relation to the Holocaust: it regards itself as both the heir to the victims and their accuser, atoning for their sins and redeeming their death” (Zertal 2005, 3). “The Holocaust” as Bartov puts it, “is both at the root of the extraordinary revival of Jewish life after the genocide and the cause of the deep anxiety and bewilderment that characterizes much of postwar Jewish thought and creativity” (Bartov 2005, 800). In other words, the Holocaust (of the common Israeli narrative) was and is a primary text for legitimation: “by means of Auschwitz – which has become, over the years, Israel’s main reference in its relations with a world defined repeatedly as anti-Semitic and forever hostile – Israel rendered itself immune to criticism, and impervious to a rational dialogue with the world around her” (Zertal 2005, 4).

I suggest that some of the pregnant tensions and charged boundaries between ‘us’ and the ‘Nazis’ described above, can be resolved in part, by making a distinction between the ‘pre-mass murder Nazis,’ or, better, the ‘primary solution Nazis’ and the Nazis of the ‘final solution.’ These concepts are indeed historical although, as I use them, they indicate a cultural position rather than any specific periodization.

The definition ‘primary solution Nazis’ refers simply to those Nazis (including their non-affiliated supporters, followers and so-called ‘bystanders’) who thought, believed or merely felt, that the Jews were aliens in Germany (fremdes Volk), that they should be segregated gradually and that mixed marriages should be avoided, not necessarily for the traditional religious reasons, but mainly for the sake of the German Volk’s unique Blut. Thus, the ideal solution to the “Jewish problem,” as seen by the ‘primary solution Nazis,’ was the expulsion of the Jews from Germany, with special preference to Palestine. Anti-Semitic intellectuals and politician and their adherents in late nineteenth–early twentieth century Germany almost universally endorsed Zionism, the Zionist rejection of “Jewish assimilation,” and Zionist efforts to promote Jewish immigration to and settlement in Palestine (Nicosia 2005, 366). The Völkische logic already described at length produced, certainly since Wagner but probably before, what would become a slogan of European Anti-Semitism, used frequently by Nazi
propagandists: “Juden raus! Auf nach Palastina!” In other words, the idea of physically removing the Jews from the German Lebensraum was the only consistent perception for dealing with the so-called “Jewish problem” prior to the ‘final solution.’ Thus, the ‘primary solution Nazis’ perceived the Jew as mutable (though mainly through Zionism) while the ‘final solution Nazis’ perceived the Jew as essentially immutable.

The distinction between the ‘primary’ and ‘final’ solutions is important also because, as Moses put it in his criticism of Goldhagen’s Hitler’s Willing Executioners: “it is one thing to be a Christian anti-Semite or disillusioned liberal, who may have tolerated or even welcomed the dissimilationist measures of the Nuremberg laws, and quite another to be a genocidal killer and supporter of the physical extermination of every last Jew in Europe. Goldhagen’s model of eliminationist anti-Semitism elides this crucial difference. This is the problem with calling the different ‘solutions’ to the ‘Jewish problem’ ‘rough, functional equivalents’” (Moses 1998, 196), as Goldhagen does, presenting a “simple, strangely comforting answer for which we have all been longing […] appealing to a public that wants to hear what it already believes” (Bartov 1996, 38).

For Ruppin, as for many others, the ‘primary solution Nazis,’ seemed to have a reasonable weltanschauung some of whose racial conceptions and practices were similar and prevalent, one way or another, also in the rest of Europe (and its colonies) and in America, Australia and Palestine. The ‘primary solution Nazis’ could and

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319 For an analysis of the use of the “nach Palastina!” slogan in the Nazi press and culture see: (Brenner 1986). According to Zindel Grynszpan, who testified in the trial of Eichmann, when the Jews of Hanover were taken in prisoners’ lorries to the railway station to be deported to Poland on 27 October 1938, the streets were full of people shouting: “Juden raus! Auf nach Palastina!” (Arendt 1963, 228). During the April 1, 1933, boycott of Jewish businesses, Nazi pickets handed out an imitation “one way ticket to Palestine” to Jewish-looking passers-by. The Nazis worked with the Zionists toward that end in the 1930s, and even maintained some contact during the war. Kurt Tuchler, an executive of the German Zionist organization, took Baron Leopold Itz Edler von Mildenstein of the SS on a six-month tour of Jewish settlements in Palestine. When Tuchler visited Mildenstein’s office after the tour, in 1934, he was welcomed by Jewish folk tunes played by Mildenstein, who had on his wall maps showing the increasing strength of Zionism in Germany. Mildenstein wrote a report about the Jewish settlements in Palestine which Goebbels ran as a twelve-part series in his newspaper, Der Angriff. Mildenstein wrote that Palestine was “the way to cure a centuries-long wound on the body of the world: the Jewish question.” “The soil has reformed him and his kind in a decade. This new Jew will be a new people.” Goebbels had a medal struck to commemorate Mildenstein’s trip. On one side was the swastika, on the other the Zionist star (Lively & Abrams 1995, 135).
indeed did, mock, the hypocritical position of the west towards German racial segregation and pogroms.\footnote{According to Koonz, one of the main public relation strategies of the Nazis, was denouncing foreign critics’ hypocrisy. E.g., the editors of the SS newspaper Das Schwarze Korps (Black Corps) of November 1938, dismissed the accusations of German “barbarism” (following the Crystal Night), by mocking the French for their unwillingness to admit more Jewish-German refugees. In the same way Churchill and Roosevelt were linked to crimes against civilians in the USA and the British Empire. E.g., pictures and descriptions of race riots, and segregation and lynching of the black community (Koonz 2003, 249). For ‘primary solution’ Nazis, the deeds of their party to the Jews was no different from what the Americans were doing to the Afro-Americans or the American-Indians. On that subject see also: (Bartov 2005, 800-801). Regarding the treatment of the Kooris by the British settlers in Australia and its similarity to ‘primary solution Nazis’ see: (Foley 1997).}

Most historians accept the view that many Nazi policies, including their attempt to annihilate all the European Jews, were improvised and crystallized only after the beginning of the Second World War (Goldensohn 2006, 27). Nevertheless, if we consider the ‘final solution’ as one of at least two Nazi solutions, we can clearly see that the ‘final solution’ existed as a \textit{cultural position} (as opposed to a \textit{concrete} historical plan) much earlier than the beginning of the Second World War.

Already in his \textit{Mein Kampf}, which was published in two parts during the years 1925 and 1926, Hitler clearly expressed his ‘final solution’ position. He began his argument by claiming that his first position towards the Jews had been humanistic:

“\begin{quote}
In the Jew I saw only a man who was of a different religion, and therefore, on grounds of human tolerance, I was against the idea that he should be attacked
\end{quote}

(Hitler 1925-26/1943, 60).

Nevertheless, after his encounter with the east European Jewish immigrants in Vienna, his feelings towards the Jews became ambivalent and obscure:

“\begin{quote}
Once, when passing through the inner City, I encountered a phenomenon in a long caftan and black side-locks. My first thought was: Is this a Jew? Is this a German? I bought some anti-Semitic pamphlets. But most of the statements made were superficial and the proofs extraordinarily unscientific
\end{quote}

(ibid.).
It is interesting to note that according to Hitler’s description in *Mein Kampf*, what made him finally changed his position towards the Jews was actually his encounter with Zionism:

“But any indecision which I may still have felt about that point [his attitude to the Jews] was finally removed by the activities of a certain section of the Jews themselves. A great movement, called Zionism, arose among them. Its aim was to assert the national character of Judaism [des völkischen Charakters der Judenschaft] [...]. To **outward appearances** it seemed as if only one group of Jews championed this movement, while the great majority disapproved of it, or even repudiated it. But an investigation of the situation showed that those **outward appearances** were purposely **misleading**. Those **outward appearances** emerged from a mist of theories that had been produced for reasons of expediency, if not for purposes of downright **deception**. For that part of Jewry which was styled Liberal did not disown the Zionists as if they were not members of their race but rather as brother Jews who publicly professed their faith in an unpractical way, so as to create a danger for Jewry itself. Thus there was no real rift in their internal solidarity [inneren Zusammengehörigkeit] […] This **fictitious** [scheinbare] conflict between the Zionists and the Liberal Jews soon disgusted me; for it was false through and through and in direct contradiction to the moral dignity and immaculate character on which that race had always prided itself” (ibid., 60-61, my emphasize, EB).

What Hitler expressed in this position was a clear opposition to the ‘primary solution Nazis,’ many of whom considered the Zionists ‘good Jews’ and hence asserted the mutability of the Jew (at least to become a Zionist). About 300 pages later, the second time Hitler mentions Zionism in his *Mein Kampf*, he again stresses the immutability of the Jew and formulates his ‘final solution’ position in the most blatant way:

“A section of the Jews [Ein Teil seiner Rasse] [i.e., the Zionists] avows itself quite openly as an alien people [fremdes Volk], but even here there is another **falsehood**. When the Zionists try to make the rest of the world believe that the new national consciousness [völkische Selbstbesinnung] of the Jews will be
satisfied by the establishment of a Jewish State in Palestine, the Jews thereby adopt another means to dupe the simple-minded Gentile [dummen Gojim]. They have not the slightest intention of building up a Jewish State in Palestine so as to live in it. What they really are aiming at is to establish a central organization for their international world swindle [Organisationszentrale ihrer internationalen Weltbegaunerei]. As a sovereign State, this cannot be controlled by any of the other States. Therefore it can serve as a haven for convicted scoundrels and a university for budding crooks [eine Hochschule werdender Gauner]” (ibid., 356).

This text reflects the age-old German mistrust of the Jew, and in hermetic, stereotyped language, stresses his immutable difference, even if the Jew accepts the Zionist solution, i.e., recognizes that he is alien in Germany, and, according to the Völkische logic, returns to his original soil. For Hitler and the ‘final solution Nazis,’ ‘a Jew is a Jew is a Jew,’ his “outward appearances” is, to use the key words emphasized above: “misleading,” “deceptive,” “fictitious,” “false” – he is absolutely irreparable and immutably different, and thus will always pose a dangerous threat. Hitler’s position in Main Kampf, is a clear formulation of the ‘final solution;’ it legitimates the need for a total exclusion of the Jew, not only from Germany but from this world. For Hitler and his like, the annihilation of the Jews was a fundamental precondition for the re-creation of the Germans as the Aryan master race in a new, thousand-year Reich. His calls for the elimination of the Jewish influence in Germany, made as far back as the early 1920s, always maintained that “Judaism” must be removed, uprooted, or annihilated in order to preserve Germany from degeneration and decline (Bartov 1998, 782).

But Hitler’s ‘final solution’ position, which did not change even in his last days in the doomed bunker, where he continued obsessively to advocate the extermination, had to be concealed in the initial stages in order to secure his regime. Thus, as Koonz observed, from an early stage of their activity, Hitler and his inner circle, used the ‘primary solution’ as a rhetoric for gaining the sympathy of most of their German supporters, whose perception concerning the solution to the Jewish problem was shaped by the “nach Palastina!” propaganda of the ‘primary solution Nazis’: 
“Although Hitler made disparaging remarks about Jews, he did not invest his immense political capital in popularizing the measures that would achieve the racial cleansing at the heart of his program. His reticence may have resulted not only from concern about foreign criticism but from his attentiveness to mainstream opinion in Germany. Even passionate anti-Semites in the party realized that rage against the Jews (Judenkoller) could be counterproductive and understood that moderates had to be convinced by other means” (Koonz 2003, 12).

Bearing in mind the dominance of the ‘primary solution’ both as a genuine weltanschauung or position and as a legitimating political rhetoric, it should not surprise us that, in his writings, Ruppin enthusiastically quoted the words of many who are regarded in Holocaust historiography as the “Nazi scholars,” “Nazi experts,” “Nazi professors,” “Nazi intellectuals” or “Nazi scientists,” and even corresponded and discussed cordially with some of them, mainly because most of them were ‘primary solution Nazis,’ and their weltanschauung and basic theories were essentially similar to those of Ruppin.321

321 See for example the way Steinweis summarized their basic theories as identifying “racial difference as a fundamental, if not always obvious, factor of historical causation. Because, as they [the Nazi scientists] maintained, all humans possess an instinctive sense of racial difference, anti-Semitism in Germany could be explained as the manifestation of a natural revulsion of Germans toward Jews. Similarly, they regarded the Jewish religion as an external manifestation of the Jewish racial essence rather than as a faith system that could and should be understood on its own terms” (Steinweis 2006, 18). This description can equally be attributed to Ruppin, as already described in length.
5.5.1 Hans Günther’s Theory and Career

One of the most important figures among the “Nazi scholars-experts-professors” was the notorious racial scientist Dr. Hans Friedrich Karl Günther (1861-1968), a member of the Nazi party from 1929, who is considered one of the predominant agents of their weltanschauung, and with whom Ruppin interacted in several ways, as will be described in the following.

Günther was a prolific writer on a number of anthropological and Völkisch subjects, and he has been mentioned frequently in recent Holocaust historiography, since his career illustrates the interaction between institutional science and the Nazis. Günther’s reputation as one obsessed with racial thinking gave him, in German post-war discourse, the nickname “Rassengünther” or “Rassenpapst” (race pope) and, in the Simon Wiesenthal internet site, he is described as “the leading ideologist of Nazi racist theory.” Naturally, both the nickname and the description are misleading in their singularity. The former, because many people at the time – not only in Germany – were obsessed by race and devoted themselves religiously to racial purity, and the latter, the definition of Simon Wiesenthal, because Günther was considered, at least until the 1960s, a scientist or scholar, and not an ideologue. Though he was a member of the NSDAP, he had no significant function in Nazi bureaucracy, and it is impossible to establish any direct incriminatory connection between him or his work and the Nazis crimes. Though keeping a low profile, he continued to research and to publish his works even after World War II. Günther did not revise his thinking, denying the Holocaust until his death. He continued to argue that sterilization should remain a legal option, and played down the mandatory sterilization used in Nazi Germany. In one of his last eugenics works (published in 1959) he argued that unintelligent people reproduce too numerous in Europe, for which the only solution is state-sponsored family planning.

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322 Günther played an important role in identifying and promoting the racial question in the public domain. For a detailed presentation of Günther’s theory see: (Hoßfeld 1999, 2001; Hutton 2005, 35-63; Steinweis 2006, 25-41).
324 The Simon Wiesenthal Center, [http: motlc.wiesenthal.com/pages/t028/t02804.htm]. The site reference is: (Wiederfield & Nicolsa 1982).
Günther’s career and interaction with the Nazis began in 1920, just after he published his *Völkische* mythology book *Ritter, Tod und Teufel: Der heldische Gedanke* (Knight, Death and the Devil: a heroic thought). This work brought the author to the attention of Richard Walther Darré (1895-1953), the future agricultural specialist of the Third Reich, and gained him entry to the social and intellectual circles of the National Socialists. It was a favorable beginning, and Günther eventually became one of the principal racial experts under the Nazi regime. In May 1930 Günther, until then a non-habilitated philologist and publicist, was appointed a full professor to the university chair in Racial Anthropology (Lehrstuhl für Sozialanthropologie) at Jena (Hoßfeld, Jürgen & Rüdiger 2002, 198). This nomination was given to him due to the intervention of the first National Socialist state minister, Wilhelm Frick (1887-1946), who forced the university – against the recommendation of the Rector and the decision of the Senate – to give the chair to Günther.

Günther’s meteoric career in the Nazi era was due, to a large extent, to his function as a provider of scientific legitimization as well as to his popular presentation of their agenda. His definitions were simple and clear, his texts full of pictures and communicative diagrams. His basic assumption was that certain character traits accompany certain body types. According to his analysis, “races” are groups of people who have the same physical characteristics and therefore the same “character.” Günther’s most famous book, *Rassenkunde des deutschen Volkes* (Racial science of the German people) was published in 1922 and rapidly gained an immense readership – it was issued 15 times before 1933, and sold 500,000 copies until 1945 (Weindeling 1989, 472; Hoßfeld 2001, 48). Günther’s name was mentioned in every lexicon in the Nazi era as the highest scientific authority concerning racial theory and as a specialist on the Aryan race. He continued to produce innovations until the early forties and became known as the scientist who coined the term “human genetics” in 1940 (Weingart 1998, 404).

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325 Frick was a prominent Nazi official, serving as Minister of the Interior of the Third Reich from 1933 until 1945. He was executed for war crimes after the end of World War II.
326 (Hoßfeld 2001, 53). See also (Mosse 1964, 202). The most detailed description of that affair is in: (Hoßfeld 1999, 47-103).
328 See e.g., *Der Volks-Brockhaus*, [popular lexicon], Leipzig, 1937.
In *Rassenkunde des deutschen Volkes*, as in his other widely read books such as *The Racial Elements of European History*, Günther outlined his theories about the worth of Nordic racial purity and the perils of Jewish contamination: “The influence of the Jewish spirit, an influence won through economic preponderance, brings with it the very greatest danger for the life of the European peoples and the North American peoples alike.” Nevertheless, Günther’s tone, here, and in many other places, was not radical, and in many respects was not so different from Ruppin’s own analysis and criticism of the Jews.

Günther used to contribute to Nazi magazines and his educational programs qualified many young Nazi officers who were keen to study at the University of Jena in one of its four chairs for race studies (the highest number in Germany). Günther was much admired by leading Nazi politicians such as Alfred Rosenberg (1893-1946), Darré and Frick and, in particular, had a close friendship with Paul Schultze-Naumburg (1869-1949), the leading National Socialist art ideologue and the author of such works as *Kunst und Rasse* (Art and Race) (1935). In February 1941, Rosenberg formally honored Günther by presenting him with the Goethe Medal. Rosenberg expressed his appreciation by stating: “Your work has been of the utmost importance for the safeguarding and development of the National Socialist Weltanschauung.”

Together with Eugen Fischer, Günther was a guest of honor at the inaugural conference arranged in March 1941 for Rosenberg’s creation, the *Frankfurt Institute for Research into the Jewish Question*. The proceedings of the conference were uniformly anti-Semitic. Günther’s colleague at the University of Berlin and at the Nazi Party’s Racial-Political Office, Walter Gross (1904-1945), set the tone in his address entitled *The Racial-Political Premises of Solving the Jewish Question*. His solution was in keeping with the ‘final solution’ position of the Führer:

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330 For example *Neues Volk*, published by the Nazi Party’s ‘Racial Politics Department’ and edited by Walter Gross who, like Günther, was a professor at Berlin University.
331 On the importance of Jena to the NSDAP see: (Hoßfeld, Jürgen & Rüdiger 2001, 200-205).
332 Reported in the Nazi newspaper *Völkischer Beobachter* [16 February 1941].
“We look upon Jewry as quite a realistic phenomenon which was exceptionally clever in matters of earthly life but which likewise is subject to historical death, and as far as the historical phenomenon of the Jew in Europe is concerned, we believe that this hour of death has come irrevocably” (in: Weinreich 1946, 112).³³³

Rosenberg invited Günther to the *International Anti-Jewish Congress* in 1944, which was due to be attended by Nazi top brass such as von Ribbentrop and Goebbels. Owing to the war situation, the Congress was cancelled at the last moment and Günther was unable to deliver his paper: *The Invasion of the Jews into the Cultural Life of the Nations*.

However, it is my contention that, although Günther was in contact with many ‘final solution Nazis,’ he himself was, at least at the time Ruppin met him, a ‘primary solution’ Nazi. One of the indications of this is that, contrary to Hitler’s position described above, he always welcomed Zionism as a positive development, praising it for recognizing the genuine racial consciousness (Volkstum) of the Jews. The “segment of Jewry that thinks in a Jewish-Völkisch way,” he observed, properly recognizes the “process of mixing” as a “process of decomposition” that threatens their own people (Günther 1929, 305; in: Steinweis 2006, 39-41). The “racial-biological future of Jewry,” he asserted, could take one of two paths, either that of Zionism or that of “decline (Untergang) […] only the clear separation of the Jews from the non-Jews, and the non-Jews from the Jews,” he concluded, would provide a “dignified solution to the Jewish question” (ibid., 345).

³³³ Günther’s only recorded comment was that the meeting was boring.
5.5.2 The Meeting

A worthy and evident solution of the Jewish question lies in that separation of the Jews from the Gentiles, that withdrawing of the Jews from the Gentile nations, which Zionism seeks to bring about. Within the European peoples, whose racial compositions is quite other than that of the Jews, these latter have the effect (to quote the Jewish writer Buber) of a ‘wedge driven by Asia into the European structure, a thing of ferment and disturbance.’

H. Günther (Günther 1927).

Ruppin saw in Günther’s works a treasure chest of material (Krolik 1985, 422) and soon after reading and quoting him, he corresponded with him and sent him a copy of his own work on the Jews. In August 1933, they met in Jena. Ruppin’s diary entry is one of the two direct pieces of evidence concerning that meeting: 335

“Günther war sehr liebenswürdig, lehnte die Autorschaft für den Arierbegriff ab, stimmte mir bei, dass die Juden nicht minderwertig, sondern anderswertig seien und dass die Judenfrage in anständiger Weise geregelt werden müsse.” 336

Ruppin (like Günther in his own record of that meeting) described their correspondence and meeting in terms of understanding and agreement. Their scientific accord is easily understandable: both of them had published, at almost the same time, their anthropological-racial studies concerning the Jews, both very similar in method and content (Günther 1929; Ruppin 1930). 338 In his Sociology, Ruppin

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335 To the best of my knowledge, these are the only existing sources for their correspondence and meeting. The three archives that hold Günther’s documents, in Freiburg (Universität Freiburg), Berlin (Bundesarchiv) And Jena (Universität Jena, Ernst-Haeckel-Haus) could not find, at a first search, any specific document. Mitchell Hart, who is the only historian I know of to have mentioned the Ruppin-Günther correspondence (though in a footnote), told me, via the net, that he could not obtain any material either.
336 “Günther was very pleasant, rejected the authorship for the concept of Aryans and agreed with me that Jews were not inferior but different and that the Jewish Question had to be fairly dealt with” (Ruppin, Tagebücher, [16 August 1933]), (Krolik 1985, 422; Bein 1968, II, 223).
338 In 1930, Ruppin wrote in his diary about Günther’s Rassenkunde des Jüdischen Volks: “he [Günther]
accepted Günther as an important authority in the field and rarely contradicted him, trying rather to justify some of his ideas.  

Underlying the first point in this diary entry of Ruppin’s, there is a perceptible sense of jockeying for scientific status and acceptance. Ruppin writes with satisfaction that, after he pointed out to Günther the inappropriateness of the latter’s taking all the credit to himself, Günther accepted that he did not have sole rights to the definition of the Aryan race – This apologetic agreement appears to have placated Ruppin.

The second point they “agreed upon” dealt with the race hierarchy issue; Aryans are not better than Jews, only different (nicht minderwertig, sondern anderswertig). Here the agreement seems somewhat problematic since, according to common Holocaust historiography, the hierarchy of races and the superiority of the Nordic and Aryan races lie at the core of Günther’s theory. Can Ruppin have accepted Günther’s concurrence as sincere at that time?

There are at least two possible answers to this question. One states that, since Günther is generally represented in historiography as a ‘final solution Nazi,’ his ‘primary solution’ mild tone, very different from the explicit, hierarchical representations of the Nazi press and propaganda aimed at the masses, is usually ignored. Mosse, for example, describes Günther’s theory as locating the Aryans, the purest, most beautiful and most creative people, at the peak of the racial pyramid – and the Jews at the bottom, with characteristics the complete opposite of those of the Nords and the Aryans (Mosse 1964, 209). This interpretation of Günther’s theory is perhaps a very accurate retrospective analysis, but Günther himself never expressed this view explicitly or openly, any more than Ruppin ever gave forthright expression to his theory concerning the oriental Jews. Günther’s theory was more complicated than is usually presented; for example his assertion that the upper classes of all nations are considerably more Nordic than the masses, i.e., the higher the social stratum the more

includes many ideas and photographs of ancient reliefs that I want to insert into my book” (Bein 1968, III, [31 January 1930], 182). This was a few months before Ruppin published his monumental work Sociology of the Jews, yet he managed to incorporate into his text many of Günther’s ideas and theories, and to do exactly what he had planned in his diary. This intertextuality underlies the academic status of Günther in the field of racial anthropology as well as his special significance for Ruppin.

See for example Ruppin’s presentation of Günther’s explanation for the question of Jewish blonde-haired people, see: (Ruppin 1930, 34).
Nordic blood there is in it (in: Hertz 1970,176), problematizes the ‘final solution Nazi’s’ clear cut terminology, since it implies that the higher strata of even the Jews have Nordic or Aryan blood, reminiscent of Ruppin’s assertion concerning the Indo-Germanic affinity of the Ashkenazi Jews.

The second possible answer is that, as Mosse asserts, the Nordic school (to which Günther belonged) only gave overt expression to its belief in the superiority of the Aryan race after 1935, that is to say, after the Ruppin-Günther meeting. One must also remember that the so-called “Nazi scholars” did not explicitly promote the popular, radical Nazi propaganda concerning the racial superiority of the Aryan or Nordic races (although reading between the lines, as Mosse did, one might reach such a conclusion). The change that Mosse described in general may, however, have resulted from the demand of the Nazi Party’s Racial-Political Office, headed by Walter Gross, who wanted the “Nazi scholars” to write about Jewish racial characteristics primarily in terms of inferiority rather than in terms of difference (Steinweis 2006, 47).

In fact, at the time of the Ruppin-Günther meeting, the language used by Günther was much milder than the Nazis propaganda texts produced by the Racial-Political Office, which were designed to appeal the less intellectually discerning among the masses. Günter’s anti-Semitism was mild and reflected the mainstream German stereotypes (most of which were accepted by many Zionists) in a way very similar to that in which Ruppin described the Oriental Jews in his own work, for example.

Though the Nazis used Günther’s texts to promote their ideas, these texts were not straightforwardly radical or ‘final,’ and functioned more in the setting of the general frame for racial perception and recognition, endowing scientific legitimization to the Nazi propaganda system. Thus, for example, Gunther’s book *Rassenkunde des jüdischen Volkes* (1929) by which Ruppin, as noted, had been influenced, was

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340 Among those considered racial anthropologists or scientists there was no explicit suggestion that the Jews were an inferior race. At one extreme of the racial discourse was fundamentalist Nordicism, which argued for the absolute supremacy of the Nordic race. At the other was the view that the German Volk had benefited from its hybrid quality, as each race had had a specific contribution to make to the success of the whole (Hutton 2005 110, 114). There were even many who referred to the Jews as Aryans (Kelly 1981, 109).

341 On Nazi propaganda in this context see: (Steinweis 2006, 14-15).
distributed in only 12,000 copies (as opposed to the almost half million copies of his book on the German *Volk*) (Hossfeld, 2001, 50). Compared to Nazi propaganda, *Rassenkunde des jüdischen Volkes* was too general and inconclusive a text; the Jews were presented in it as one race among others, were still perceived in terms of *difference* rather than *inferiority*, and more important still, were perceived as mutable, (although only through Zionism). A pertinent example of the reception given to Günther and his way of portraying the Jews can be found in one of the reviews of *Rassenkunde des jüdischen Volkes* (1929) in the American Jewish press:

“Dr. Günther carefully refrains from any indication of ill-will to the Jews and, I have no doubt, really entertains none. But when most of the desirable human qualities have been allotted to Nordics, there are not many left for the unfortunate persons who have not even nordischen Einschlag [Nordic impact]. His solution is the simple one of Zionism or disappearance, and since he is determinedly opposed to assimilation by intermarriage, we can only assume that the disappearance is to be effected in other ways, perhaps by mass-suicide” (Radin 1935, 282).

To conclude this point, according to their theoretical writings and paradigms the basic understanding between Ruppin and Günther would seem to be quite clear; at that time, both of them firmly opposed the emancipation model of acculturation, and agreed that the Jewish race could not change only by cultural means; “Jews do not transform themselves into Germans by writing books on Goethe” as one of their common sources and colleague wrote.\(^{342}\)

From his relations with Günther as understood in the above context, it would appear that, at least in the first years of the Nazi regime, some of its eugenic plans seemed very reasonable to Ruppin and other Zionists. Their agreement was based in part on a common understanding between two scientists who were trying to tackle a problem in a professional and “fairly dealt with” (“die Judenfrage in anständiger Weise geregelt werden müsse.” Krolik 1985, 422). Paradoxically, their understanding emerged from

their common belief, as Günther put it, that each race had a particular moral and cultural standard of its own and that therefore mutual understanding between them was impossible (Hertz 1978, 180). In 1934, shortly after their meeting, Ruppin expressed unequivocally the same view in his book, Jews in the Modern World:

“Such an attempt at a peaceful settlement of the problem would have been possible if [...] Jews [...] had recognized that their peculiar position among the Germans was bound to lead to conflicts which had their origin in the nature of man, and could not be removed by arguments and reason. Had both sides realized that the present position was due, not to bad will, but to circumstances which had arisen independently of the will of either side, it would have been unnecessary to attempt the solution of the Jewish problem in an orgy of unbridled hatred” (Ruppin 1934, 256-257).

Ruppin’s “understanding of misunderstanding” theory was the pre-text to the concluding practical remark of the above paragraph: “Various intermediate and partial solutions will be required to reach a modus vivendi” (ibid.).

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343 It is important to note that the term modus vivendi in this context was used by many “primary solution Nazis.” E.g., the most influential and notorious literary agents of legitimation of the Nuremberg Laws, W. Stuckart and H. Globke (both were high-ranking functionaries in the Reich Ministry of the Interior), used the same term. The Nuremberg Laws they argued, would bring about a “clear separation based on blood between Jewry and Germandom,” thereby providing a “modus vivendi” that would be “just” for both peoples (Stuckart & Globke 1936, 15; in: Steinweis 2006, 45).
5.5.2.1 The Political aspect of the Meeting

The encounter between Günther and Ruppin had also important practical implications, and, from this aspect, must be seen as part of Ruppin’s series of “friendly” meetings with the Nazi Foreign Office and the Treasury Office$^{344}$ as well as with Jewish and Zionists leaders and functionaries, in which he promoted a plan for the immigration of the German Jews to Palestine, the US and other countries (Bein 1968, III, 222-223). Ruppin’s series of “friendly” meetings were actually the preliminary discussions for the Transfer Agreement, crystallized during 1933 and signed between the Nazis and the Zionists whose most important outcome was the transfer to Palestine of about fifty five thousand German Jews, as well as substantial material capital, the importance of which, for Palestinian Zionism in general and Ruppin in particular, has already been mentioned. Viewing the Ruppin-Günther meeting in this context reveals the political dimension of their understanding and the fact that both Günther and Ruppin functioned in this affair not only as scholars but also as political agents and mediators.

According to a letter in Günther’s file at the CZA, he informed Wilhelm Frick, the Nazi minister of the Interior (Reichsinnenminister), of the contents of their “train of thoughts” and the latter expressed enthusiastic agreement. “Herr Frick hatte viel Verständnis für diese Gedankengänge” (Mr. Frick had a fine grasp of this train of thoughts).$^{345}$ Günther concluded his short letter in a most clear manner: “Die Angelegenheit war: Anbahnung geordneter Regelungen des Verhältnisses zwischen Juden und Deutschen” (the issue was the initiation of well-regulated arrangements for the relationship between Jews and Germans) (ibid.).

On the basis of these historical fragments, it is very reasonable to assume that Ruppin wanted to send, via Günther, a direct message to the top levels of the Nazi regime and, possibly, that he wanted to reassure the Nazis as to the Zionist movement’s deep understanding of the therapeutic and eugenic dimension of such an agreement. As

$^{344}$ The agreement with these offices (16 Aug. 1933) was that each German Jew who chose to come to Palestine “would be permitted to take with him 1000 pounds in foreign currency and 20,000 marks (and even more) in merchandise, through a trust fund” (Bein 1968, III, 222). Actually this was a kind of proto-model for the Transfer Agreement to be discussed in the following.

noted above (fn. 344), it was Ruppin who made the first contacts between the parties and set the “spirit of the contract,” an important understanding that gave impetus to the most official implementation of the agreement. Naturally, as always, Ruppin tried to stay behind the scenes, \(^{346}\) but after the murder of Haim Arlozoroff – the official negotiator and a protégée of Ruppin’s \(^{347}\) – he became the leading figure in the handling of the negotiations with the Nazi government (Bein 1968, I, [19 June 1933], 221).

Lewis Namier (1888-1960), a former Political Secretary of the WZO in London and the personal secretary of Weizmann during the thirties (Weizmann 1967, 103), as well as a major historian of the British aristocracy, prefaced Ruppin’s *Jews in the Modern World*, which appeared in 1934, a few months after the Ruppin-Günther meeting. Knowledgeable Zionists, including Nahum Goldmann, saw in Namier an intense Jewish anti-Semite (Goldmann 1970, 112) while many others, members of the Zionist Executive found him unacceptable because he “had no patience for them” (Weizmann 1967, 103). Weizmann, nevertheless, “liked him a lot” (ibid.) and Ruppin admired his “first class English style” and was very happy that Namier was writing the preface and editing his text (Bein 1968, III, [15 Jan. 1933], 215).

In his devotion to the aristocracy, Namier despised the Jews as the epitome of capitalism, of vulgar ‘trade’; actually, his criticism was even harsher than Günther’s. As might be expected, his introduction expressed his ‘understanding’ of anti-Semitism – “not everyone who feels uncomfortable with regard to us must be called an anti-Semite, nor is there anything necessarily and inherently wicked in anti-Semitism” (Namier, in: Ruppin 1934, xiii). In fact, the original draft was even stronger. Weizmann – who worked closely with Ruppin – read it and had to warn Namier not to be so open in expressing their common toleration of Nazism:

\(^{346}\) According to Edwin Black, “Ruppin saw to it that most drafts of his speech deleted any reference to the *Transfer Agreement*. Dr. Ruppin apparently preferred history to believe he had never even mentioned the subject” (Black 2001, 306). On Ruppin’s presence in the negotiations with the Nazis in regard to the transfer agreement see also: (Halamish 2006, 254-259).

\(^{347}\) Ruppin believed that Arlozoroff should be his successor: “I saw Arlosoroff as my student and heir, Almost as my son” (Bein 1968, II [19 June 1933], 221).
“On p. 6, the lines ‘but what has happened etc.’ marked in pencil seem to me dangerous, although I agree with your conclusion. But it’s a book by Ruppin and a preface by you and it will be quoted in Germany and the louts will say, ‘the Jews themselves think that it will be all for the good, etc.’ I would omit it if possible.”

Ruppin’s attitude towards the Nazis, then, reflects the general reaction of many Zionists, including “liberals” like Weizmann. Six months after Hitler came to power – and two months before Ruppin’s official negotiations with the Nazis began – the Zionist Federation of Germany (ZVfD), by far the largest Zionist group in the country, submitted a detailed memorandum to the new government that reviewed German-Jewish relations and formally offered Zionist support in “solving” the vexing “Jewish question”. The first step, it suggested, had to be frank recognition of fundamental national differences:

“Zionism has no illusions about the difficulty of the Jewish condition, which consists above all, in an abnormal occupational pattern and in the fault of an intellectual and moral posture not rooted in one’s own tradition (ibid.). [...] Our acknowledgment of Jewish nationality provides for a clear and sincere relationship with the German people and its national and racial realities. [...] We, having been brought up in the German language and culture, can show an interest in the works and values of German culture with admiration and internal sympathy” (ibid. 30).

349 Memo of [21 June 1933], in: (Dawidowicz 1976, 150-155); see also (Weber 1993, 29–33).
The *Jüdische Rundschau* proclaimed the same message:

“Zionism recognizes the existence of a Jewish problem and desires a far-reaching and constructive solution. For this purpose Zionism wishes to obtain the assistance of all peoples, whether pro- or anti-Jewish, because, in its view, we are dealing here with a concrete rather than a sentimental problem, in the solution of which all peoples are interested.”

As in many other cases, Ruppin was only a *Weichensteller*, or a surfer on the waves of the *Volk*. The WZO saw Hitler’s victory in much the same way as its German affiliate, the ZVfD: not primarily as a defeat for all Jewry, but as positive proof of the bankruptcy of assimilationism and liberalism. Their own hour was at hand. Hitler was history’s flail to drive the stiff-necked Jews back to their own kind and their own land. The then world-famous popular biographer Emil Ludwig (1881-1948), was interviewed by a fellow Zionist on a visit to America and expressed the general attitude of the Zionist movement:

“Hitler will be forgotten in a few years, but he will have a beautiful monument in Palestine. You know, the coming of the Nazis was rather a welcome thing. So many of our German Jews were hovering between two coasts; so many of them were riding the treacherous current between the Scylla of assimilation and the Charybdis of a nodding acquaintance with Jewish things. Thousands who seemed to be completely lost to Judaism were brought back to the fold by Hitler, and for that I am personally very grateful to him.”

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350 *Jüdische Rundschau* (Berlin), [13 June 1933], in: (Höhne 1971, 376-377).
351 (Steinglass 1936, 35). See also Chaim Nachman Bialik’s observation that: “Hitlerism has perhaps saved German Jewry, which was being assimilated into annihilation. At the same time, it has made the world so conscious of the Jewish problem, that they can no longer ignore it” (Bialik 1934, 6).
5.5.3 Ruppin as a ‘primary solution’ agent of legitimacy

In the year following the Günther-Ruppin meeting, in their efforts to justify the Nuremberg Laws, the Nazis published a pamphlet entitled Warum Arierpargraph? Ein Beitrag zur Judenfrage (Why the Aryan law? A Contribution to the Jewish Question), which summarized the “Aryan Law” and argued in favor of its beneficial effects. In this fifty-four page pamphlet designed for mass distribution, Schulz and Frercks, the literary agents who wrote the pamphlet, quoted Ruppin extensively. However, there is a paradox in the way they use him, an inconsistency which exemplifies the ambiguous relations between modern anti-Semitism and Zionism. At the beginning of the pamphlet they write:

“The Jew will naturally oppose any discussion of race, since the denial of any significant differences between people is the foundation of his infiltration of Western European society. The Jew finds any mention of the racial question an attack on his current existence” (ibid., 3).

However, a few pages later, when they explain the racial character of the Jews, they quote Ruppin:

“It is not true, as is often claimed, that the Jew was systematically forced into commerce by the laws of the various nations; rather, commerce particularly suits the Jew’s nature. This is supported by Dr. Arthur Ruppin, a scholar respected by the Jews” (ibid., 25)

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There follows a long quotation from Ruppin’s *The Jews of the Present* (“2nd edition, Cologne and Leipzig, 1911, p. 45”), to which the writers add remarks in brackets:

“Thanks to their significant commercial gifts (!), the Jews soon enjoyed great success in commerce and industry. For 2,000 years they have seemed predestined to work in commerce. It is false to claim, as some do, that Jews became merchants primarily because the Christians denied them other occupations during the Middle Ages. The Jews did not become merchants in Europe, rather they entered the profession in growing numbers ever since the Babylonian Captivity, in Syria, Egypt and Babylon (because they dislike labor and prefer to have others work for them! The Editor)” (ibid.)

This text supplied Schulz and Frercks with the proof for their claim that the Jewish race developed a “mercantile instinct” even before they came to Europe, i.e. before Christian society allegedly forced them to become usurers.\(^{353}\) It is interesting to see the intervention of the editor (emphasized above), which exposes the alleged subtext of Ruppin’s description. It is a demonstration of the way the ‘final solution’ Nazis altered and radicalized the ‘primary solution’ argumentation.

\(^{353}\) This use was not an exception. According to Steinweise, Ruppin was quoted extensively by many Nazi scholars, both directly and indirectly (Steinweise 2006, 124, 126, 144). Actually, one can say without exaggeration, that most of the so-called Nazi scholars used Ruppin’s works to legitimize their position.
5.5.3.1 The Transfer Agreement

The Transfer Agreement is considered as being a crucial step towards the establishment of the State of Israel and the improvement of its social structure – a fact fully recognized by the Nazis themselves. A December 1937 internal memorandum by the German Interior Ministry reviewed the effect of the Transfer Agreement:

“There is no doubt that the Transfer Agreement arrangement has contributed most significantly to the very rapid development of Palestine since 1933. The Agreement provided not only the largest source of money, but also the most intelligent group of immigrants, and finally it brought to the country the machines and industrial products essential for development.”

Between 1933 and 1941, some fifty five thousand German Jews immigrated to Palestine in the framework of the Transfer Agreement, about ten percent of Germany’s 1933 Jewish population. The German Jewish immigrants made up about 15% of Palestine’s 1939 Jewish population. Many of them transferred considerable personal wealth and were recognized by the Zionist immigration authorities as valuable Menschenmaterial. Their absorption was handled by a special department directed by Ruppin, with special programs and a special construction company that planned settlements and neighborhoods in accordance with their particular needs.

The Transfer Agreement bureaucracy rapidly grew to become a substantial banking and trading house with 137 specialists in its Jerusalem office at the height of its activities. The regulations were always changing in response to Nazi pressure, but in

354 Interior Ministry internal memo (signed by the State Secretary W. Stuckart), [17 Dec., 1937], in: (Weber 1993, 36).

355 It is important to note that Ruppin believed that he would manage to get most German Jews out of Germany, as is evident from his diary entry of April 1938: “the problem of the Jews in Germany is solvable. I talked about it with the advisor of the British embassy [in Germany]. There are still in Germany about 360,000 Jews (together with Austria – 530,000) […] if 20,000 immigrate each year to the USA, South America and Palestine, after ten years only 230,000 Jews will remain in Germany and Austria, most of them elderly. The government should leave these Jews alone; because most of them – with the exception of a few tens of thousands – will die eventually within 20 years” (Bein 1968, III, 299). This text indicates that Ruppin perceived the ‘primary solution’ as realistic even on the verge of World War II.
essence the agreement was always the same: German Jews could put money into a bank inside Germany, which was then used to buy exports which were sold outside Germany, usually but not exclusively in Palestine. When the immigrants finally arrived in Palestine and the goods they purchased had finally been sold, they received payment for them. Fiscal ingenuity extended the Transfer Agreement’s operations in many directions, but throughout its operation, its attraction for German Jews remained the same: it was the least painful way of shipping Jewish wealth out of Germany. However, the Nazis determined the rules, and these naturally worsened with time; by 1938, the average person was losing at least 30% and even 50% of his money. Nevertheless, this was still three times, and eventually five times, better than the losses endured by Jews whose money went to any other destination (Wischnitzer 1949, 212).

The maximum amount of money per emigrant was, according to the Transfer Agreement scheme, 50,000 Marks ($ 20,000 or £ 4,000), which made it unattractive to the richest Jews. Therefore only $ 40,419,000 went to Palestine via the Agreement, whereas $ 650 million went to the United States, $ 60 million to the United Kingdom and other substantial sums elsewhere. Yet, if in terms of German Jewry’s wealth, the Transfer Agreement was by no means decisive, it was crucial to Zionism. Some 60% of all capital invested in Palestine between August 1933 and September 1939 was channelled through the Agreement with the Nazis (Rosenthal 1974, 23). In addition, the British set the annual Jewish immigrant quota using the weak economic absorptive capacity of the country to limit their number; however, ‘capitalists’ – those bringing in over £ 1,000 ($ 5,000) – were allowed in over quota. The 16,529 capitalists were thus an additional source of immigrants as well as an economic harvest for Palestinian Zionism. Their capital generated a boom, giving Palestine a wholly artificial prosperity in the midst of the worldwide depression.

Many historians consider the influx of the Transfer Agreement goods and capital an indispensable factor in the creation of the State of Israel. Much as it distorted the common Zionist narrative, the fact is that Hitler’s Third Reich did more than any other government during the 1930s to support Zionist development in Palestine. It is quite evident that, since the rise of the Third Reich, the Zionists flourished in Germany. The circulation of the weekly Jüdische Rundschau grew enormously.
Numerous Zionist books were published and, as Encyclopedia Judaica notes, “Zionist work was in full swing” in Germany in those years.\(^{356}\)

On 19 September 1933, the heads of the central office for the settlement of German Jews – Weizmann, Ruppin, David Werner, Senator, Landauer and Rosenblüth (Rosen) – met in Maran, Switzerland. Among other things, Ruppin proposed a plan by which 1,000 young people without means would be assembled in retraining centers inside Germany and given a few months’ training to qualify them for physical work. Those who failed to work would be rejected; those who were suitable would be sent to Palestine to complete their professional-agricultural-education.\(^{357}\) Ruppin’s plan was approved (Bein 1968, III, 224), and implemented most successfully; it was a variation of the training farms system and the particular Palestinian Zionist bildung.

According to the material Nicosia found in the Osobyi Arkhiv (special archive) in Moscow (available to Western scholars since the early 1990s) and in other archives, the Zionists and the Nazis implemented Jewish occupational retraining programs which served both the ideological aim of reducing the effect of “assimilationist” culture among German Jews, and also the practical aim of removing Jews from Germany and in fact the countless police memoranda and reports reveal that the authorities did indeed encourage Zionist activities and lessen the effect of the “assimilationist” Jewish organizations (Nicosia 2005 367).\(^{358}\) The SS and the Gestapo considered the occupational retraining programs of young Jews a key element in the campaign to remove Jews from Germany (ibid., 371, 377).

\(^{356}\) (Encyclopedia Judaica, entry: Berlin, vol. 5, 648). Polkhn, points to the “paradoxical fact” that of all papers, it was the Zionist press that for years retained a certain degree of freedom which was completely withheld from the Jewish as well as the non-Jewish press (Polkhn 1976, 62). Ruppin himself notes in his diary that at the end of 1933 the number of subscribers’ to the *Jüdische Rundschau* rose from 7,000 to 30,000 (Bein 1968, III, 223).

\(^{357}\) The Summary of the meeting in Maran [19/09/1933], CZA, S 25/8909, in: (Gelber 1998, 251-252).

\(^{358}\) The German Zionist movement had established several occupational retraining camps in Germany before 1933. A systematic network of these centers operated by the Zionist youth movement *Hehaluts* (der Pionier; the pioneer), which had the task of preparing its members (aged 17-35) for the realities of Palestine. Other Zionist-oriented organizations sponsored by various Zionists groups and relief agencies, began operations within a year of Hitler’s appointment as chancellor. By March 1934, there were already 6,069 Jews in Zionist occupational retraining programs in Germany, almost 2,400 of whom were in agricultural retraining camps. By 1936, *Hehaluts* had organized thirteen administrative districts in Germany with some 12,000 members, and had established forty-five occupational retraining centers throughout the Reich. In those years the Zionists claimed that their youth organizations included about three-quarters of all Jewish youth in Germany (Nicosia 2005, 368-369).
This description indicates that the ‘primary solution’ was an important factor in Nazi policies, and enabled them to maneuver between the contradictory assertions of themselves and their allies concerning the Jews – especially the conflicting perceptions of the mutable/immutable Jew – at least in the early period of their regime, until they established their control over Germany.

Rosenberg, the chief ideologue of the Nazi party, wrote as far back as 1937 that: “Zionism must be vigorously supported so that a certain number of German Jews is transported annually to Palestine or at least leave this country” (Rosenberg 1937, 153). It is indeed possible to claim that Rosenberg’s statement was hypocritical, and if so, it is yet another example of the use of ‘primary solution’ rhetoric for political ends. This assertion however, is less plausible in the case of Himmler’s SS, which was particularly enthusiastic in its support of Zionism and, by 1934, had become the most pro-Zionist element in the Nazi party, to the point where other Nazis were even calling them “soft” on the Jews (Brenner 1986). An internal SS position paper of June 1934, urged active and wide-ranging support for Zionism by the government and the party as the best way to encourage the emigration of Germany’s Jews to Palestine. This would require increased Jewish self-awareness. Jewish schools, Jewish sports leagues, Jewish cultural organizations – in short, everything that would encourage this new consciousness and self-awareness – should be promoted, the paper recommended (Schleunes 1990, 178-181). In 1935, the official SS newspaper, Das Schwarze Korps, proclaimed its support of Zionism in the front page editorial: “our good wishes, together with official goodwill, go with them.”

Although the Nuremberg Laws forbade Jews from displaying the German flag, Jews were especially guaranteed the right to display the blue and white Jewish national banner. The Jews were allowed, in Hitler’s Germany, to display what would become the flag of Israel (Dawidowicz 1976, 254). Nevertheless, the SS support of Zionism was not only at the important level of declaration; the SS also cooperated with the Haganah, the Zionist underground military organization in British-run Palestine, and secretly supplied weapons to Jewish settlers for use in clashes with Palestinian Arabs (Nicosia 1985, 63-64, 105, 219-220).

359 Das Schwarze Korps, [26 September 1935], in: (Nicosia 1985, 56-57).
360 There is a long list of Nazis who defined themselves – naturally in other words – as ‘primary solution Nazis.’ Alfred Rosenberg (1893-1946) claimed that the ‘primary solution’ for the Jews was his
As I claimed at the beginning of this section, it would appear that, in the first period of their regime, some Nazis had a different model of perception from that of the ‘final solution’ that we commonly identify with “Nazism.” Thus, we must recognize that at least some Nazis, and many of their “non-participant” supporters, acted according to their acceptance of the ‘primary solution.’

In 1935, “the blonde beast” and “Himmler’s evil genius,” Reinhardt Heydrich (1904-1942), head of the SS security at that time, unequivocally expressed a ‘primary solution’ position in his article “The Invisible Enemy,” published in the Schwarze Korps:

“We must separate the Jews into two categories, the Zionists and the partisans of assimilation. The Zionists profess a strictly racial concept and, through emigration to Palestine, they help to build their own Jewish state…our good wishes and our official goodwill go with them” (Höhne 1984, 333).

However, such expressions of the ‘primary solution’ were invariably in conflict with the dogmatic ‘final solution’ position of such Nazis as the Führer himself. To him, the Zionist enterprise in Palestine was part of the Jewish conspiracy and in his estimation the Jews were not really interested in building states or even capable of doing so. Zionism he stressed, was not a proof of their immutability. On the other hand, as mentioned above, Hitler and his government understood that collaboration with Zionism might prove very useful in the process of achieving their political goals.361 Whatever Hitler’s ideological beliefs and personal desires were, they were

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361 See for example: (Hitler 1941, 447-448). See also: (Nicosia 1992, 129).
inextricably tied to the political conditions and problems that the Nazis faced in the first stage of their regime. “The Nazis,” writes Diner, “faced a dilemma in their prejudice against America. Ideologically, America was seen as the incarnation of all that is degenerate. Politically, Hitler wanted nothing more than to keep the United States away from the European continent, and he therefore avoided any possible conflict (Diner 1993, 82). 362 Foreign opinion was crucial at this time: Germany was dependent on the world market, and Hitler’s anti-Semitism became a problem for the German economy. The Jews were powerful in the emporiums of the world, particularly in two of Germany’s biggest markets – Eastern Europe and America. German businessmen were by no means certain of their loyalty to the new Chancellor; if they were to suffer losses because the Jews and other foreign foes united in a boycott of German exports, they, together with their friends in the army, felt they might have to restrain Hitler or even replace him, the regime’s own economic experts frankly discussed this grave weakness and were extremely concerned that the New Order might not survive resolute opposition from abroad (ibid., 86).

The Nazi’s fears were enhanced by a few attempts made by American Jews to announce a trade boycott; the most stressful of these attempts, from the Nazis point of view, was the demonstration in support of boycott that filled Madison Square Gardens at the end of March 1933. 363 The Nazis were worried about the effect a spontaneous and, lamentably for them, well-organized boycott might have on their balance of trade. But the Zionists came to their aid. The London Boycott Conference in 1933 was torpedoed from Tel Aviv because Ruppin, in close contact with the consulate in Jerusalem, sent cables to London:

“Our main function here is to prevent, from Palestine, the unification of world Jewry on a basis hostile to Germany [...]. It can damage the political and economic strength of Jewry by sowing dissension in its ranks” (in: Yisraeli 1971, 132).

362 “The regime attempted to justify the initial political restraint it had shown the United States by arguing that President Roosevelt should not be given a reason to abandon the neutrality that Congress had adopted. The instructions of the Propaganda Ministry to the press in the 1930s had the effect of protecting the United States and its president” (ibid., 86).

363 On the attempts at boycott see: (Brenner 1986).
Although, as the above cable demonstrates, the Zionists used every way they could to prevent the boycott, Ruppin’s official explanation to those who criticized the Zionist cooperation with the Nazis was: “the Transfer Agreement in no way interferes with the boycott movement, since no new currency will flow into Germany as a result of the agreement” (in: Black 2001, 328). This was quite true, as Bauer writes, “Germany gained little if any hard currency from the Transfer Agreement” (Bauer 1994, 13). Nevertheless, as Ruppin himself knew, it was a matter not of material but of symbolic capital. The bond between the Nazis and the Zionists had an important function for the foreign relations of the Nazis and their image in America. The mechanism of this political relationship had been well recognized by Ruppin already as far back as the period of First World War, when he worked closely with the German consulate, as he describes in a memoir:

“my task was to halt, as far as possible, with the aid of the German consulate that wished to buy the heart of world Jewry, the harsh laws decreed by Jamal Pasha on the Jews of the Land of Israel” (Bein 1968, II, 272) [my emphasis, E.B.].

Ruppin and the Zionists gained crucial support from their cooperation with the Nazis, but some of their achievements were a reward for preventing other Jews from encouraging the boycott movement. The Transfer Agreement assisted the Nazis in that it demoralized Jews, some of whom were Zionists, by spreading the illusion that it was possible to come to some sort of modus vivendi, as Ruppin worded it, with Hitler. This modus vivendi position of Zionism was actually, in the words of Werner E. Mosse a “systematic Jewish non-participation in German public life” (Mosse 1996, 32). It rejected, as a matter of principle, any participation in the struggle of Jewish organizations in Germany against the Nazi regime. It also demoralized non-Jews to know that a worldwide Jewish movement was prepared to come to terms with its enemy. In his autobiography, Goldman (the president of the WZO) described a meeting with the Czech Prime minister, Edward Benes, in 1935. Benes accused the Zionists of having broken the boycott against Hitler by signing the Agreement, and reproached the WZO for its refusal to organize resistance against the Nazis. Goldman wrote in his autobiography:
“I have had to take part in many painful meetings in my life, but I have never felt as miserable and ashamed as during those two hours. I felt with every fiber of my being that Benes was right” (Goldman 1970, 260).

Indeed, the Transfer Agreement removed the Zionist movement from the front line of anti-Nazi resistance. The WZO did not resist Hitler, but sought to collaborate with him and, as can be seen in the proposals of Arlosoroff and Weizmann for a liquidation bank, only Nazi unwillingness to extend their linkage prevented the development of an even greater degree of co-operation (Brenner 1986, 121). One of the main reasons for that seems to be that the Nazi fear of a boycott diminished when they realized that the power of World Jewry was weaker than they had imagined (Bauer 1994, 15).

The agreement between the Nazis and the Zionists was reached in the light of many understandings and interests. Whatever the reasons and consequences may be, as far as the particular story of Ruppin is concerned, we must realize that his understanding and modus vivendi with the [primary solution] Nazis cannot be dismissed as stemming from mere economic or pragmatic interests, but is clearly also the outcome of a congruent weltanschauung. Their mutual perception – which served their mutual interest – was that the Jews must be excluded from German culture and eventually expelled from Germany. To be sure, Ruppin and many others, Zionists and Nazis alike, did not realize the outcome of their Weltanschauung as we comprehend it today: ‘exclusion stood at the center of the Nazi utopia. Killing operations were only the most radical, final stage of exclusion.’ 364 They did not see that the Nazi exclusion policy might easily lead to pathological hatred and murder and they certainly did not foresee the ‘final solution’ and the Holocaust. In this regard, it is important to bear in mind – as many historian have emphasized – that the attempt to annihilate the Jewish race in Europe was devised and its monstrous methods crystallized only after the beginning of the Second World War; murder in death camps was not even imagined by most Nazis at the time when Ruppin interacted with them.

364 See: (Friedlander 1995, 17).
In his diary, Ruppin described his impressions of one of Hitler’s first speeches after he assume power in 1933: “two days ago, I heard on the radio Hitler’s speech in the Reichstag. It was a much better speech than all his election speeches – full of content, interesting, fascinating” (Bein 1968, III, 219). Ruppin was referring to Hitler’s Reichstag speech, of 23 March 1933, in which Hitler said among other:

“[…] this political purification of our public life, the Government of the Reich will undertake a thorough moral purging of the body corporate of the nation. The entire educational system, the theatre, the cinema, literature, the press, and the wireless – all these will be used as means to this end and valued accordingly. They must all serve for the maintenance of the eternal values present in the essential character of our people. Art will always remain the expression and the reflection of the longings and the realities of an era. […] it is the task of art to be the expression of this determining spirit of the age. Blood and race will once more become the source of artistic institution.”

For Ruppin, as well as for many other eugenicists who fantasized about a state that applied eugenic practices, the pre-mass-murder Hitler – masked with ‘primary solution’ rhetoric – seemed a refreshing politician. His appearance marked the possibility of fulfilling the race hygiene utopia. Thirty years before, Ruppin had sketched in *The Modern Weltanschauung and Nietzsche’s Philosophy* what probably seemed to him a similar biomedical vision; he could perceive of Hitler as the first politician to work Haeckel’s recognition that: ‘politics is applied biology’ into world history.366

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365 Hitler Speeches Internet Site: [www.hitler.org/speeches/03-23-33.html.]
366 A quote used also by Nazi propagandists. See: (Stein 1988, 50–58).
5.5.3.2 The congruence of the ‘primary’ and ‘final’ solutions

What is the relationship between the ‘primary’ and the ‘final’ solution? Is the latter the necessary outcome of the former? What is the function of ‘primary’ solutions in legitimating genocides? This bundle of questions requires further investigation, beyond my limited attempt to comprehend the interaction and relations between Ruppin, Zionism and the Nazis.

Nevertheless, the differences between the ‘primary’ and ‘final’ solutions, in terms of intention and responsibility, should not distract us from seeing their most crucial similarity, i.e., the perception of human culture that lies at the foundation of both. “if the materialists confused the self [le moi] with the body,” writes Levinas,

“it was at the price of pure and simple negation of the spirit. They placed the body in nature, and accorded it no exceptional standing in the universe. […] the biological, with the notion of inevitability it entails, becomes more than an object of spiritual life. It becomes its heart. The mysterious urgings of the blood, the appeals of heredity and the past for which the body serves as an enigmatic vehicle, lose the character of being problems that are subject to a solution put forward by a sovereignly free Self […] the assimilation of spirits loses the grandeur of the spirit’s triumph over the body. Instead, it becomes the work of forgers. A society based on consanguinity immediately ensues from this concretization of the spirit. And then, if race does not exist, one has to invent it!” (Levinas 1990, 68-69) – And with it all the practices such perceptions generate.
6. Conclusion

6.1 Ruppin as a Culture Planner of the Modern Hebrew Social field

*A life without a plan – is not to my taste.*
Ruppin.

As described in the introduction, the common Zionist narrative sets Ruppin’s historical persona in an ambivalent position and marginalizes, ignores, misrepresents and suppresses his formative role and heritage. Part of the reason for this is that, in many ways, his history causes a crack to appear in the Zionist national ‘cover stories.’ By way of conclusion I will address some of the possible reasons for his effacement from the common narrative

6.1.2 Ruppin’s Self-Effacement

Perhaps the first reason for his obscure position in historiography lies with Ruppin himself, and with his dual cultural identity, which prevented him from feeling a secure sense of belonging to either Germans or Zionists and left him constantly in limbo – as a distant, even alien observer who often seemed to fulfill the outsider’s particular fantasy of becoming invisible. The clearest expression of this double-bind cultural position, which is reflected explicitly and implicitly throughout his diaries, was his inability to learn Hebrew, a disadvantage that left him feeling somewhat dim-witted in its culture space, relying as he did, on German, which he likened to a Stradivarius violin, for his comprehension, reflection and expression.

However, Ruppin’s elusive presence in history can also be interpreted as one of his “virtues,” and indeed, in many history books and memoirs he is described as “humble” or “modest.” These representations tend to stress his immunity from what was known in the *Yishuv* period as the “street disease,” that is, the tendency of many

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367 (Bein 1968, III, 243).
leaders and functionaries to ensure their eternal memory or boost their symbolic capital by having a street named after them. As has been demonstrated in several cases, Ruppin often gave others credit for things he himself had thought, planned and produced. Nevertheless, as has been said: “it is easy to be the best and at the same time humble, when everyone knows you are the best.” Having this wisdom in mind, we can assume that Ruppin’s alleged humility stemmed also from the particular satisfaction of the culture planner who prefers the recognition of political leaders and scholars and, even more, of history itself, over the vulgar and temporary admiration of the masses and feels fulfilled and rewarded merely by seeing from afar – like a Moses standing on the mountain of ‘biological time,’ – how his plans materialize.

6.1.3 Ruppin’s Janus face[s]

But whatever Ruppin’s personal inclinations and desires, they were always tied to the social field. In this regard we must see Ruppin’s particular position as the tip of an iceberg, and himself as a cultural agent surfing on the waves of political conditions and circumstances. However, it is apposite to stress that without his remarkable ability to present himself as a ‘neutral,’ ‘impartial,’ ‘objective’ and ‘external’ expert, scientist and jurist, he would never have been able to become, Zelig-like, a distinguished and indispensable member of so many different social groups and bureaucratic bodies. His post-ideological Weltanschauung – which we may see as dogmatic ideology – facilitated his becoming a distinctive culture planner and a mediator between many conflicting groups, parties, states and persons. He was the dominant figure in the German based PLCD and the JNF, which included mainly conservatives and members of the bourgeoisie who were deeply averse to socialism, while at the same time gaining the personal trust of the rebellious and confused, allegedly socialist youngsters of Degania. He managed to gain the confidence and support of multi-millionaires such as Baron de Rothschild and Julius Rosenwald (1862-1932), he reached agreement with the non-Zionist leaders of American Jewry such as Louis B. Marshall (1856 – 1929) and simultaneously mediated between the many factions of

368 Woody Allen’s “Documentary” from 1983, about a man who can look and act like whoever he is with, and who meets various famous people. Probably from the Yiddish word: selig; blessed, happy.
369 An important example of Ruppin’s ability to connect between different groups is demonstrated in his long journey (1922-1924) to America, in which he established a most crucial connection between Palestinian Zionism and American Jewry. Ruppin recognized that the only way to acquire significant
the labor movement. He also succeeded in forming personal connections with diplomatic German circles and, in being seen as a trusted ally by the British mandatory regime, as well as by the Nazi regime during the 1930s. He was a main figure in the collaboration between Palestinian Zionism and the American Brandeis-group, and, at the same time, a close colleague and ally of their rival, Chaim Weizmann. He was the founder of the democratic-liberal group Brit-Shalom and at the same time kept their political rivals informed of their every move. He was admired, moreover, by their most “demonic” rival, Zeev Jabotinsky, whom Ruppin helped get released from jail and who gave him the title of “the architect of construction” (Heb. adrichal habinyan). Ruppin, in fact, seems to have been accepted by most of the dominant forces and camps of his time; according to his wife, he was even invited by the Soviet Russians to be an advisor in the planning of their kolkhozes but, after visiting Russia and thoroughly inspecting their plans and practices, he refused the offer (Reuveni 1984, 32).

The different ways in which Ruppin presented the idea of the agricultural group is an excellent example of his ability to create links between different parties by presenting to each one exactly what it wanted to hear. In the lecture Die Auslese des Menschenmaterials für Palestina that he delivered to a bourgeois, central European, Jewish audience in Vienna, he presented the group as a mechanism for the eugenic upgrading of the Ostjuden. In his lecture to the land owners and independent farmers he presented it as a tool for creating productive and reliable workers, and when he addressed the Second Aliyah youngsters, he presented it as a step for advancing up the social ladder as well as a framework for expressing their aspiration for freedom.

Ruppin’s ability to mediate between these often contending groups demonstrate his extraordinary comprehension of the dynamics of culture planning, which gave him his sums of money from the American Jews would be by collaborating with their wealthy, non-Zionists leaders (Bein 1968, III, 54 [20 Feb. 1923]). “It was clear to me,” he wrote in his diary, “that a company like that [investment company] could be established only if one of the German-Jewish leaders were to take this initiative” (ibid.) A month later, after realizing that the most important person for such a matter was Louis Marshall, he met him and together they formed a new basis for negotiations between Palestinian Zionism and the non-Zionist Jewish groups. It is very hard to know the contents of the Ruppin-Marshall meeting, which was held in the German language upon Marshall’s request. What is known is that since that meeting Marshall preferred Ruppin to everyone else in the Zionist movement, even Weizmann (Weisgal 1969, vol. 11, [Letter 386] 336).
particular position. Norbert Elias described the dynamic of this position in the following way:

“If, in this situation of utmost tension between groups pulling the same rope in opposite directions and yet bound together by this rope, there is a man who does not belong entirely to either of the two contending groups, one who is able to interpose his own strength so as to allow the tension itself to be reduced or one of the sides to obtain a clear advantage, then he is the man who actually controls the whole tension” (Elias 1939/1982, 174).

Elias’ description may explain some of Ruppin’s successes as well as to define one of the sources of his power.

6.2 The ‘Sons’ as Constructors of the Past

It is by now common knowledge among many scholars that Israel, like any other nation, invented a tradition according to which the dominant group unified the Jewish people and established the state and its educational system (Smith 2003, 77). However, most historians are unaware of the central role of Germany, German Zionism and Ruppin in shaping this very dominant group, or of how formative and crucial for its evolvement, survival and development was the transfer of informational and material capital from Germany and the German Zionists to the embryonic Palestinian Zionist labor movement. One of the main reasons for this is that Ruppin’s ‘sons,’ i.e., the leaders of the dominant group shaped by his policies, based their claim for hegemony and dominance, or their legitimization to rule, on the specific symbolic fortune of the ‘founders’ and accordingly constructed a narrative which presented them as the producers rather than the reproducers of the New Yishuv’s development. The narrative they constructed was that the ‘new Hebrew’ culture evolved through the ideological agents of political activity – especially those of the worker parties, and that pre-Israel society “sprouted” of its own accord, with no particular or calculated culture planning. The historical descriptions of the Second Aliyah (1903-1914) period, the earliest of which were produced at the end of the twenties (among others by the leadership of the workers’ parties: David Ben Gurion, Berl Katznelson and Yitzhak Tabenkin) emphasized the motif of “Anu bemo yadenu” (we with our own hands);
i.e., the originality, exclusivity and creativity of the leaders of the workers’ parties. This was in accordance with their attempt to accumulate symbolic fortune towards the establishment of Mapai (The party of the Land of Israel Workers; the dominant workers’ party) (Zachor 2005).

To paraphrase Bourdieu’s well-known article, Ruppin’s history gives a good answer to the question of the ‘blind spot’ in Second Aliya historiography: ‘Who created the creators?’ It reveals that the myth of the new Yishuv ‘sprouting of itself’ repressed the fact that the appearance of the ‘creators’ was due to massive economic and informational capital within the context of a highly calculated culture plan.

6.3 The Problematic Contact with Germany

As already described at length, Ruppin’s culture plan transferred from German culture to Modern Hebrew culture not only economic, technological and administrative models but also models of cultural identity. The omission of this formative cultural contact from the common historiography and certainly from Palestinian Zionism’s collective memory, stemmed from the troubling associations evoked by mention of such contact in the construction of Holocaust memory. The narrative constructed, by the same dominant group’s literary agents, tended to simplify the historical complexity of the Holocaust and render it as a black and white schema of victims and perpetrators - the absolutely ‘innocent Jews’ vs. the absolutely ‘evil Nazis/Germans.’ This black and white schema that was so essential for building Israel’s self-image and collective memory resulted in the exclusion of all historical elements that might distort it. This immanent need of the field inclined many agents to dismiss point blank any narration that might problematize the accepted and expected image of the Holocaust.

Ruppin’s history illuminates the crucial cultural interaction between Zionism and Germany and demonstrates the conceptual links between the so-called German

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370 To note just one example regarding this issue, Ruppin was the first to conceive the idea as well as to research the possibilities for settling the Negev (Goldstien 2003, 265), (it seems that he was following Aaron Aharonson (1876-1919), who researched it even earlier). In the common narrative however, the idea and enterprise for settling the Negev is attributed to Ben-Gurion; it is one of his main symbolic virtues.
Sonderweg, with all its proto-Nazi and Völkische ideas – and Palestinian-Zionism. It shows how the perceptions of the main Zionist leaders’ coincided with the weltanschauung of some of the Nazi party leaders, members and supporters at least until the mid-1930s. Contrary to the common narrative, which dismissed such links as merely ‘instrumental’ or ‘pragmatic,’ Ruppin’s case reveals how these links were based on a number of congruent assumptions that cannot be ignored by researchers of the Modern Hebrew cultural identity.
6.3.1 Internal Jewish Racism

Related to the former is Ruppin’s comprehensive theory concerning the Sephardic-Oriental Jews. His analysis of Judaism, as described at length earlier, and, more important, its practical implementation, exposes the roots of Palestinian Zionism’s discrimination against the ‘Oriental Jews,’ and clearly demonstrates the presence of internal Jewish racism and the anti-Semitic aspect of Modern Hebrew culture, facts which make it difficult to define anti-Semitism in essentialistic terms as if it existed only among non-Jews, as the dominant Israeli, American and European narratives tend to present it.

6.4 Zionism and Judaism

Researching ‘the father of Jewish/Zionist\textsuperscript{371} settlement in the Land of Israel’ revealed how the formation stage of Palestinian-Zionism’s dominant group generated a repertoire of perceptions and practices that reduced Judaism to mainly racial and Völkische categories. The Jewish body – the obstacle to be overcome by both Zionists and anti-Semites – was perceived in Zionist Palestine as the heart of the New Hebrew tradition, as the vehicle for the imagined Jewish biological past, a weltanschauung that limited pluralistic and multidimensional Jewish history and culture[s].

The research into Ruppin’s life and career thus opens the way for further research into the profound differences between pre-Zionist Judaism and the Zionist weltanschauung as it evolved in Israel, and challenges the common and popular narration that tends to identify Judaism and Zionism to the point where they become more or less synonymous in the public memory.

\textsuperscript{371} The title appears in the historiography in both forms: Jewish/Zionist; reflecting the same ambiguity I tried to decipher.
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תקציר

מחקחordo התقَקחאחרדמרוחקרוארוורפין(1876-1943)כספנסרורצןהרבות.ובוחראהאר CUDA בעריכת-ffitiולות
באורינוירסטרמאשה1908עד1943.הואמנתהאהתפיסותשהנתאהאריאשלשידדואארציירואלייבווחולשלרופין
 RTECN américנשת pioneרטשהשתהלהתחרותהעבירהמודרנהשחלהלתבששותכ"י,בחיתהלתמאואוועטריםואראלדריםיוושימיתאוח.
דרכיהבהאילקרואואיתשתרורה.”

החלקהראשונה,מסכתбитשלטול,ברעיונותובידוייםשהשליינרומקטישולישראליםולשלשלוחותםבדבר
הключаלהותרותיהוא,’”החבריהמודרניתבאה.”

החלקהשניונית,מסכתבשואלתנוגעותלדרכיההמעשיתבהןוישתפיסותאלהלתבדרה
הארץישראלית

נקודותמרכיבותנפסותבכתנופסמהתקיר:

• התהליכיםשבשאבותהתווחתהקבוצותהמודננותבישיבתהחבריהמודרנית,ובדריכיםבההצלה
ולשלטיואהל퍼турודור

• הדרכיםבהניצוץ퍼טורודורוהדישואהל퍼טריםבולﰙהתהנהבשותהארשוניםשהשוהית
החבריההחבריה,רבמהותאבדל퍼טורודורימיתחתימים.

• התרבויות(transfer)שהPagerודורשזירעערבר族自治县-“א.עבירהסהלאכליך
דג-scal הצרחייםאלᐝעםבהירשפתשלמסדתוומселתשהawahםבראירופת.המחקיםמנתאותהננתה
ואמה🌤ה לביןPager늑יה族自治县-“אעלחברתאראונף,אריאוהתוכניןשלמסדותאל.”

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בכפוף לאוניות, המסורת והמרדוך של המחקר ומחסרים להventus בטיה וההתקדמות של התרבות העברית המודרנית.

המהדורה המפותחת והзванתלאיתת של המחקר מנשטה על התאזריזויות והיתדות בממשק התרבות ובברית thereof. 

המקדים (בלפור), יוזם על התמיסת התרבותית, העלתה, הערכה וצוות מוחש של השולחן העממי לעריכים.

המשמעויות על השדות התרבותיים, בווית בהדרם ושפתון על 숵�ון ההדרם על יבשון התרבותית.

של הקבוצות והרמיות.

על פי האוניות של, השדה התרבותי מועטע על ידי היבטיה ויווית המשולשת של הרפרטואר שלף על

החברה וקריאתkırית בכיוון של ודיבורי התבנית המשולשת יאנות את התרבותית – האישית והומוסידית - ושנתון. היבטיה של יבשת ויווית של הרפרטואר שלף ביכולת שלוליה של השולחן העממי לעריכים.

שעבירה בדריך "ויווית" יבלוף ייבשות ואינה היבשות והומוסידית את השולחן.

ה клубים ( במקרים אחרים, ייבשות ייבשות, ישם ויבשות, וכלי), וה務ר (בעל ויווית, למנהל ויווית ויווית).

ליאו וויס. 

בכפוף, אם, מיתון ויווית ייחי של המחקר התרבותי עם הרפרטוארים, המבוסס, חכמים בני ביתו, והיתדות התרבותית, הפרטנית והתרבותית, ליתלות בני הרפרטוארים ורמיות הרפרטוארים והארצי-איראניים.

אחת התוכנות המרכזיות של המחקר הוא שיווה ויווית משולשת של הרפרטואר ובו ויוצרת אנרגיה ומגיעה והוראה את

ה наук המ��ק ומתחבר לסימונדרי, ויווית-social עלershית (1903-1914)

(מועשה המספק את הנסבלת מחזות ישנים) Họcוסיה של הרפרטואר האיראני-איראני, לים, פעורד ממקוםchnerו בני הרפרטוארים על התבנית והביוויתית.

בשלובים שובם של הרפרטואר הסיני, מחלק זה החופעה המרכזית של המחקר והיווית

המודרנה האיראני-איראני ויווית ייבשות ויווית, ישם המה היבשות היבשות, אנרגיה ויושביה


המרק做不到,봉ידוקוסן שלברוק, הפיכול המרחק והארסי-איראני ויווית בulings היבשות הרפרטוארים

והשם של הרפרטואר הרבחתי לא רק של העלייה התרבותית, אלא גם מדענטונים על ידי בגעליה

רהראות של התרבות העברית. פינית המ האחרונים של הרפרטואר והشهدיה הבינוראהבייך, עליה א-ו שית

כ-יפן.  

1. מבוא
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‫לחלק את העלייה השנייה לשתי תקופות‪ :‬בחלק הראשון שלה )‪ (1903-1908‬היו הלכי רוח‪ ,‬תפיסות‬
‫ופרקטיקות שהיו שונות ביסודן מאלה שהתפתחו עם הופעת המשרד בחלק השני שלה )‪.(1908-1925‬‬
‫במהלך הדיון על ההיסטוריוגרפיה של העלייה השנייה ועל ייצוגו האמביבלנטי של רופין במסגרתה )כפי‬
‫שיפורט בהמשך(‪ ,‬סוקר המבוא את הקריירה העשירה והמגוונת של רופין בתנועה הציונית‪.‬‬
‫בשנת ‪ ,1907‬נשלח רופין לפלשתינה כמומחה מטעם הוועד הפועל המצומצם למחקר גיחה על אפשרויות‬
‫הקולוניזציה שלה‪ .‬בתום חודשיים של עבודה קדחתנית הגיש להם חוות דעת שכללה הצעה לתכנית פעולה‬
‫מעשית‪ .‬כעבור שבועות אחדים הוא מונה על ידם לנציג התנועה בפלשתינה ולמנהל המשרד הארצישראלי‬
‫שאותו הקים ביפו ב‪ .1908-‬בעמדה זו היה רופין‪ ,‬כמו שהגדיר אותו ברל כצנלסון‪ ,‬ה"קולוניזאטור"‬
‫המרכזי בקולוניה העברית החדשה‪.‬‬
‫בין ‪ 1908‬ל‪ 1942-‬היה רופין מעורב ברמות הגבוהות ביותר כמעט בכל פעילות או תוכנית גדולה בשדה‬
‫החברתי הארצישראלי‪ .‬מיום כניסתו לתפקיד הוא פעל ליישום תוכניתו ליצירת שדה חברתי יהודי‪ ,‬על פי‬
‫דגם של מדינה‪ .‬רופין היה האחראי על רכישת הקרקעות בפלשתינה ועל הקמת כל צורות ההתיישבות‬
‫האפשריות בה‪ .‬פיזור האוכלוסין בתוך המובלעת היהודית בפלשתינה‪ ,‬כמו גם הגבולות של תוכניות‬
‫החלוקה מ‪ 39-‬ו‪ 49-‬נקבעו במידה רבה כתוצאה מהמדיניות שהכתיב ל"חברת הכשרת היישוב" – אותה‬
‫יזם והקים – ולקק"ל שבה היה חבר מרכזי‪.‬‬
‫היסטוריונים של החינוך רואים בו את מייסד מערכת החינוך הארצישראלית‪ ,‬והיסטוריונים של השדה‬
‫המשפטי מגלים שפעילותו בתקופת היישוב הובילה באופן שיטתי להתהוות משרד המשפטים הישראלי‪.‬‬
‫למרות שסיים את תפקידו הרשמי כראש המשרד הארצישראלי ב‪ ,1925-‬הוא המשיך בפעילות‬
‫אינטנסיבית ובעלת השפעה עד סוף ימיו בראשית ‪ .1943‬רופין היה הדמות המרכזית בגיבוש "עסקת‬
‫החבילה" כפי שכינה אותה שטרנהל‪ ,‬בין "הבורגנות הלאומית" לבין תנועת העבודה‪ .‬בשנות העשרים הוא‬
‫ייסד את בנק הפועלים‪ ,‬ובשנות השלושים היה גורם מרכזי בגיבוש "תכנית ההעברה" שנחתמה עם‬
‫המשטר הנאצי וביישומה‪ .‬באותן שנים הקים גם את "המכון למחקר ולתכנון כלכלי" שעסק בתוכניות‬
‫כלכליות וחברתיות עתידיות‪ ,‬ובכללן תביעת פיצויים מגרמניה לאחר המלחמה‪ .‬הוא מימן ותמך בארגונים‬
‫החשאיים דוגמת "בר גיורא"‪ ,‬ו"הקבוצה היפואית" במסגרתה טיפח את אליהו גולומב )לימים מפקד‬
‫הפלמ"ח(‪ .‬היה הראשון שהגה את הרעיון בדבר יישוב הנגב‪ ,‬ואחד ממתכנני ומנהלי המבצעים הגדולים‬
‫של יישובי חומה ומגדל‪ .‬בתחום מדיניות החוץ‪ ,‬רופין היה הראשון שהבין את חשיבות יהודי אמריקה‬
‫ליישוב הארצישראלי‪ ,‬ובמסעו לאמריקה בתחילת שנות העשרים‪ ,‬הצליח לייסד את תשתית גיוס הכספים‬
‫לתנועה; הראשון שהצליח לגייס את המולטי מיליונרים היהודים‪-‬גרמנים‪ ,‬שלפני שפגשו אותו הפנו עורף‬
‫צוננת לציונות‪.‬‬


A handful of key figures in modern Jewish history, including Prof. Zvi Rofin, have contributed significantly to our understanding of the Jewish community in the modern period. Prof. Zvi Rofin is recognized for his work in sociology and anthropology, demography, and international sociology, and has published numerous works in Hebrew, as well as translations into European languages.

His articles are considered one of the earliest scientific studies of Jews in modern times. His research, through historical research, has contributed significantly to the Zionist movement, and many historians agree that Rofin is responsible for the establishment of the Jewish settlement in the early 20th century until the establishment of the State of Israel.

He is also known as a figure who is often referred to as a “post-Zionist” in the Encyclopedia of Judaism and by historians who, according to some, do not consider him a true Zionist despite his progressive views. He is generally portrayed as an expert on Judaism and Jewish culture, and his name is often mentioned in discussions of the modern Jewish identity and its dominant models and practitioners.

The historiography of Zionism, “post-Zionists” and the meaning of the term, however, is subject to debate. Some, like Goran, argue that the term “Zionist” is used in a manner that makes it a false concept, while others, like Rofin, believe that it is a meaningful concept.

The work of Prof. Zvi Rofin, and other key figures in modern Jewish history, has contributed significantly to our understanding of the Jewish community in the modern period. His research, through historical research, has contributed significantly to the Zionist movement, and many historians agree that Rofin is responsible for the establishment of the Jewish settlement in the early 20th century until the establishment of the State of Israel.
זהות תרבותית

לניתוח הזהות התרבותית הציונית באירופה באמצעות מעקב וניתוח של הזהות התרבותית ק JsonResult

זהות מודרנית. פרק זה מואר את המתרבכיםVectorizerו, ואת התהליכים וחזרות של התורים

הנהorna, כמו גם את האופנים בו דוחה את החותם

אחת הקצודים המורכבים שנבעתה בפרק זה היא מעורבת בkinson מפרים על רופם vb אָלֶברט -זֶחק

האוסטודן התורם, שיצר את הנפש המ膨תית תרבותה במגוון המודרניים יהודה וזרמי ויודר

וכמסתerton באנטוניוויטק. רופי החביש ראו כי הר פספסה בחזרות, וה maçן עם נעוריה

המורכבים "הזריךואנילית". ר步入 האירופה של רופים ידילים, ובו נבנה מגמה של הליכים הקשורים

של מסמך והאנגלאים לגלובלי הלימודים בבעית,ارتגון והתורמים במקומם

מסתת הולכת ו六大ן. רופים יתנו את תרבותם מבראשית דר וויצא דר הביניים במקומם

יריבים, התוכן בו מצרך כלד ובר, ובוור מהמיתון המפריזים בין, ובריתנות של הליכים

ibbean ש𑘁 אוסטרים ותרבויות医用. ואולם, לטרם התורמים האוסטרים עדולם הליכים של

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היהוכיח, או שינו בפיזור המספים של הישירים בפיזור של דווקא, והפיזור של המספים של דווקא

נכתב ואת עליון על המספים של דווקא, והפיזור של המספים של דווקא

תרבויות, דמיון משמע את המספים של בגרות בין ציון ליצירת, ואת חסיפה עין הפיזור של דווקא

פרימים בין הוליכים תרבותיים.

יהו בנוב של רופים בו ואיבר ל денежн העד מפרים "הספוק". באולימפה של איבר, שויוכו דג מז'בל

בريسוריים של הזהות המפרישות והזריך בוורכיז: הבא להלכתי ואת∠ר, והמאז עדין

"מאסטרון", באולימפה של פיזור המספים של דווקא פיזור הפיזור הזריך והזריך۩

המודיעות עלולים בבוקס המאה התשע עשרה.
במחיית המאות העשרים, לע רקע עלייה האנטישמיות בארצות הברית,ишאול tensors ממחלף של "מטח שלגית" ומול סכמת חברתי,óstב וה॥ בנויה ציונית ארצי בה גדלתי /באין לי מולדת אשר תאהבת לייבי מה כבד ועצבו. "לחברה בה הוא בלתי רצוי הוא כתב בשיר "אני עליה אהוב /חובתי Kein Vaterland קבוצת המשבר זו. על אכזבתו מגרמניה. היה היא התגרס לחודש והייתה בסיס להכיב ההתייחסות של רופין – קבוצת ההתייחסות של "רופין של" קבוצת ההתייחסות – פרוטסטנטית, שפשית את היהדות והיהודים, כמו רבים מ pci האירואים. בשנות המעבר מנערות לבחרת החל רופין להתנסח יותר ויותר במונחים גזעיים ששיקפו את הטקסטים ודרוויניסטית שהשתמשה בתפישות מדעיות פופולריות ספרות פולקיסטי. שקרא בקדחתנות, התפעלותו מהספרות הזו הייתה גדולה."האלוהים מת" פוזיציבית כדי להעניק משמעות לדור שבו, שעשויה לגאול אותו או להוביל אותו להרס מוחלט" אמת" כאילו אצרה בחובה בשארם בתקופת המשבר זו. על אכזבתו מגרמניה, היה היא התגרס לחודש והייתה בסיס להכיב ההתייחסות של רופין – קבוצת ההתייחסות של "רופין של" קבוצת ההתייחסות – פרוטסטנטית, שפשית את היהדות והיהודים, כמו רבים מ pci האירואים. בשנות המעבר מנערות לבחרת החל רופין להתנסח יותר ויותר במונחים גזעיים ששיקפו את הטקסטים ודרוויניסטית שהשתמשה בתפישות מדעיות פופולריות ספרות פולקיסטי. שקרא בקדחתנות, התפעלותו מהספרות הזו была大きה."האלוהים מת" פוזיציבית כדי להעניק משמעות לדור שבו, שעשויהLEG לגאול אותו או להוביל אותו LE הרס Mוחלט" אמת" כאילו אצרה בחובה.
Weltanschauung.

Bachar and his research team, led by Alekshun, worked on the Weltanschauung from the 1890s to 1898, focusing on the relationship between the Jewish people and the study of nature. Their work was aimed at understanding the Jewish worldview and the cultural and intellectual currents of the time. Bachar believed that the Jewish people, before the destruction of the First Temple, were farmers connected to the land, but after the destruction of the Temple, they developed a reflexive approach to the world.

Bachar saw himself as a Jewish reflexive thinker, working within the context of the Jewish people's Weltanschauung, which was characterized by a constant desire to change reality, a quality shared by Alekshun. Bachar believed that his work was important for the Zionist movement, and he worked closely with several leading scientists and philosophers of the day, including the sociologist of Jewish society, the biologist Ernst Haeckel, the economist Werner Zumbro, and the anthropologist Felix von Luschan.

Bachar's research was based on the work of these leading figures and showed a strong influence from Max Nordau, who was the only Jewish-Zionist and one of his personal contacts. Bachar's research was focused on understanding the Jewish people in their world and the cultural and intellectual currents of the time.

Bachar's work was important for the development of the Jewish reflexive approach, which was characterized by a constant desire to change reality, a quality shared by Alekshun. Bachar believed that his work was important for the Zionist movement, and he worked closely with several leading scientists and philosophers of the day, including the sociologist of Jewish society, the biologist Ernst Haeckel, the economist Werner Zumbro, and the anthropologist Felix von Luschan.
בבשiframe the attribution to Darwin and the German philosophers, the new paradigm, as Ernst Haeckel, the biologist and theologian in Germany, saw it. "The German noble type" was cherished and seen as important in the tim, influenced by German theologians, in the light of Darwin and Marx, who saw all elements and forces of the world as monistic. The culture was a result of natural selection, with organic and human beings descended from the same force of life, the chemical, physical events that the environment works on directly on organisms and creates species and races, was monistic and Marxian, and he remained until the influence of Haeckel on the world view of Röpfin was deep. At the end of his life, he was able to, his identification with Haeckel was a sign of his belonging to the German culture. The scientist, "Objectively referring to the cultural pressure through choice in a position, the position he took allowed him to live as the ideal of the non-aligned scientist supporter of the German state, to identify with the people he sought to identify with and serve in loyalty of his father's replacement."

Vaterland.

It is known later, in support of his friends and teachers at the university, he approached an academic competition in which he won to the surprise of many, the academic competition, which was managed and formulated by Haeckel, "the Kröpf prize". He asked the writers to deal with the issue of applying the Darwinist theory in the organization of the community and the state, the second of the bodies he founded, Ernst Haeckel, was supported by "Darwinism as a Völkerschaft" for the distribution of ideas that widened in the late 19th century, by the German owners of companies, a formula that changed the industry of Germany into the largest industrial company in Europe, especially the ideas about selection; these hoped to apply the Darwinist theories in their work (Selektionstheorie), of their labor forces.

Geek or avenger, a community and, therefore, was also from this, he identified with the community, by the end of the 19th century, and the identification of the owners of companies, who sought to apply their theories in social reality, during those years when he founded, the movement against the professional unions and the social association of the period, and the establishment of the land, in the forests of Kröpf at the company, "Vaterschaft". And developed a new style of management, which came from the idea they called the body of society and health (Volskörper), which is based on the assumption that the relationship between biological forces and economic efficiency, of the community's production, and the productivity of the body's body and the efficiency of the body (Leistung). And the productive was in the fields of work.
 categoría: Darwinismus und Sozialwissenschaft

ประสงכים להיות רופין,.*(Darwinismus und Sozialwissenschaft)

לזכות בפרס וה高速增长ו של האוניברסיטאות, התווספה והרחבת חיבורי מפעל

הרופין protections משני רכיבים של "דרוויניזם ומדעי החברה",

("דרוויניזם ומדעי החברה"
Darwinismus und Sozialwissenschaft) ,

"דרוויניזם ומדעי החברה"
Darwinismus und Sozialwissenschaft)

מסיבה של מה שנכתב במחקרים של הרופין: "דרוויניזם ומדעי החברה",

,... "דרוויניזם ומדעי החברה"
Darwinismus und Sozialwissenschaft)

1903, "דרוויניזם ומדעי החברה"
Darwinismus und Sozialwissenschaft)

הזחלות וה bloginfoיה של הרופין, הביאו לתחילה של מבחן במחקרים של הרופין: "דרוויניזם ומדעי החברה",

,. "דרוויניזם ומדעי החברה"
Darwinismus und Sozialwissenschaft)

מהדורה בצורתה Quốcית, והפרסות הדוברות, ישנה המשך של תיאוריה של הרופין: "דרוויניזם ומדעי社会科学",

1902, "דרוויניזם ומדעי社会科学",
Darwinismus und Sozialwissenschaft)

1902, "דרוויניזם ומדעי社会科学",
Darwinismus und Sozialwissenschaft)

יתדהו במחקרים של הרופין: "דרוויניזם ומדעי社会科学",

, "דרוויניזם ומדעי社会科学",
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במחקרים של הרופין: "דרוויניזם ומדעי社会科学",

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הפולק היהודי זהה במבנהו להסברים שנתן שנתיים קודם התנוונות הסברו של רופין ל, "היהודים בהווה"ב ידוע ועלילה  הלכקריסת המסגרת הדתית מאיימת על. לכן בנוגע לדת בגרמניה ובעולם המערבי בכלל ביצא את הרעיון הזה פעם אחר פעם בקונגרסים הציוניים ובפורומים אחרים בדרכו בתנועה הוא היהודית. לפי פירש רופין את מנהגי היהדות ככאלה המגלמים עיקרון של שימור גזעי, תקווה'בעקבות צ קנים הגזעי בדרכים רבות ובעיקר על ידי היהודים ידעו כיצד לשמר את הטו, ורופין בעקבותיו, תקווה'צ שתרוקשה של עזרא ונחמיה על הקפדה מדוקדקת של "יהודים בהווה"רופין טען ב, מניעת התבוללות היהודית לפי רופין. עיקרון זה. המצוות היהודים על עץ יעם מזרחי ו시험 מים של תרבות העם היהודי. הלכה лечения של רופין, והם קודם לropolis (Aztec) ואצל מזרחי – המקובלים של השתייה והרפואה פקידים. המשיינוший ליושב בין יהדות מסורתית ופוריז לסיפוח של הפאוליס – עמדה של רופין עצמית, אף שהתקינה בבחירת העבירות המתחדשות. הוא בוחר בין אומץ, מילא אחר מונח מקרה בברית העבירה המתחדשת. התיאוריה של רופין ליושב של תרבות העם היהודי של ים מזרחי, ולארどのような התנאים של הדורות הא العراכים של ים מזרחי, או תרבותם החדש והמודרנית. שניהל הדורות יושב של ים מזרחי הז peeled על התרבויות האחרות בעולם (היו קודם כל רופאים, יהודים אחרים Ärzte), המקבילה של הרשויות הרפואיות ופקידי – אדם מדינה, עמדה של רופין עצמו. בריאות המוסרית והפיסית של הפולק שמשימה لهم לשמר את ה–הסניטציה. ימלא בתוך זמן קצר בתרבות העברית המתחדשת, כפי שאיתנו בהמשך. אחר הדרך הנכונה והטובה, התיאוריה של רופין היה התוצאה של החיפוש הארוך שלו מאז נעוריו. שינוי השטחי לפי המודלים של המקום ה. ביותר להעביר את היהודים טרנספורמציה פיסית ומנטאלית. תהליך ארוך ועמוק של שיפור ביולוגית הוא, האמנציפציה. אחד הליקויים המרכזיים, הוא או התיאוריה כיושב הוא ניסיון להכנעה, ובדとしても ה bảng האינסטיקט או התיאוריה. את הרעיון הזה הוא. האינסטיקט הזה ניתן לשינוי, למרקיאנית. הביע במפורש בקונגרס הציוני האחד עשר בוינה [1913], והתרומתה החזקה של עיון בווריאץ, "אלא אם אני הייתי סוחר שנים רבות והאינסטיקטים המסחריים, באמת אומר לכם": "להתיישבות החדשה, שאף רופין ליושב בברית היהודים הוא על לחוות. האמנציפציות הוא, או התייה של ההתנהגות הקפיטליסטית. אם לא מתרוכמות שליה – אומך גם את עמקו של כל יהודיtrer. אבל אני אף על העם של פיתוח נמוך כל יהודי ב. באולביא, ישחזיאת של ההיתוי של הרעיון המאומך במאומך ובזאת אליהם, האנשי קשרים המסחריים של הלאומיות."
逖עבש התא שחרת מתנה, שווא בהבושה התומדון קרובותƞ לנתן שונו אחר האידיאלי הזה. המתרן מתנה
חדל על פי רובו המורכבות, החשובים המתרים תרומתו_profile המורכבים או צוות המיתרי, לשעבש
והברזילאיות התחברות, והברזילאים התחברות הטרים="הטיה"דו, וחו ביות השכבות ב становится השערתי ויתרה והספק
איננה על בסיס גזעי רחב ומגוון.xes, אולם קורא המייל
המשוב הוא רופי ולשונאי, והשכבות הת造血ס באנוגרוף תsurname, אלולוון דל תפש שאחה
בכפרה באומל: העשרה המרכיבות "ה_COMMUNITY בהתחלת, (Orudge)"/
היהשל עליון הפסד הנונה, והערת התפשות, והברזילאים
שמתי בפלפל בודדים. בירה זו לב הטיפוס ההאוריינטאלי, השמי בפולק היהודי
שתית תפקודurtles וחרrestaurant, ונטש בצק, והשתתפות ושכונת למקומות לא-שכונת. בלשל
מסויים עם התחלותborg, יเครดים עם השמנים מביא לה,new_focus, ואולק יעורほうג
בגון הפולק שברדונור ipad מיון, קיץ את הפולק, ואולקוי וה雖חתים והולכים בו.
היאנסשיקט המרכיבות בלשל שלושה.

המשהים והאבניים מסויית ממשפחה תעוקוב בו השערתי הלום את קשותיה החרדיים המוקדנים וא
"האומנותים" – כ-10, אלא שאר לה חש ברויסיי שיש קלחubishi קרב מתחבר הת domingo, שחרור הנונה.
אלא ביצת יighet את האול. התפשות המפלקשין ל�� פלפל מתחרת, גזעים בו תכלות
המקורות הם קחשמ ברויסיי, אשר בו בלולו המקוב לליי במוד אנוגרוף מוביר, התרפסמידיה
הבירוניות של היהודים החרדה ואככ לכל רונית הקוחר או Laden תמקמי. אולק יעור הוואלה
של היהודים ארמר עד לברה את האינפאמאות אלי, רופי ממקל התעלה עד לפלפל מאוהב
המכסה על פי התיאוריה nouve. הוא אחר של ¥, לרשתבוקס התורה בעבר היהודים
שוחרי בנתונ, והוא שערתי מסוק מתלה את המבסים لماלפי היהודים שחררה, חירב לזרת המחבר
這裡 מחוז ראפיה והם מחוז תכלות רבה וחרר את מחוז aplik שיאנס ש IDictionary.
כברון התשובה וההברזילאיות התחברות בלשל החרדי התחברות ממקב ממקק עם פחו הקSalir שחררה, השערתי
בנושאים של התיאוריה התちらות והחרדיות התחברות בבית הפרדיסCHR שחררה את פוחו הקSalir שחררה, השערתי.
בראיון המנה, גואל היהודים התספורים ומר츠플ים, אנטנטמרמרוס אככ כפת שיאנס ממלכיה וא
הספנותול התחלות יידענו והת iarופיוס בקבר תילו מחרדי מחרדי, אלא שיאנס ממלכיה.
אבלולית התafortון ביוגונליוס עפריםמסקר אככ אני מיצירוני עד פוחו הקSalir.
כתה התריון התספורים בלשל זה הוא של החירת אל פוחר, בראיון השבשנוזי אני פוחד, בראיון השבשנוזי אני
המודוכי עיניו המוסר, ספריו אל כלכל מתחרות על מדרו החרדי התՃ�� היוצר, אולקוי רוחני, הדורים
TableName, בנות יונון את התא להצלアナ תא רודריעם התספורים בלשל החרדי שחררה, המדרר, הדורים.
החברה הציוניתíc וחברי הפרק זה עוסקים ב"ציונות המעשית" גרמנית שהובילה את המעבר ל"ציונות המודרנית" של "הידל" על ידי התיאוריה אל המעשה. דרך בה תפעולו עמדה על כך ובתוך, ואת עמדתם ביחס ליהודי המזרח; הליברלית של יהדות גרמניה, והציונים הגרמנים ואת מעורבותם בפעילות הקולוניאלית של שהחלו לעבור המרכזים והמוסדות, "המעשית" אל הציונות "הדיפלומטית". ה переход מהציונות הסופי, אלא גם ציון העניין טכני או, ימים מאירופה לארץ ישראל הציונית, הרעיון המדינה היהודית בנוסח הציוני. המובהקת של תכנון תרבות כולל מעשי תואר באופן לא רק כצודק, תוכן ידע מדעי, והדגש הוא מתבסס על, מבחינה מוסרית אלא גם כ לתתתי, ומבחינה מעשית, ושקול.

הפרק בין פרקים נוספים מבוא משמש כפרק זה סקירתектור, גם הפרק והציונות ויצירותיו של של היסטוריית הייצוג, תיאור וניתוח, באמצעות, הארצישראלית הציונית, ויחסיו של רופין עם הציונות כולל הפרק זה סקירה וניתוח של, כמו כן, הגרמנית והציונית, בתWebKit היהודית את יחסם למסורת, תפקידם בתנועה הציונית, ואלא, הוא רק עניין טכני או, ימים מאירופה לארץ ישראל הציונית. הרעיון המדינה היהודית בנוסח הציוני. המובהקת של תכנון תרבות כולל מעשי תואר באופן לא רק כצודק, תוכן ידע מדעי, והדגש הוא מתבסס על, מבנה מוסרי, ומבחינה מעשית, והדרשו שהובלו מחשבוניות, ועל דוא מותר, וה_FINISH_ המבנה מוסרי, אלא גם מחויבות, מחשבוניות, ומבחינה מעשית, והדרשו שהובלו מחשבוניות, ועל דוא מותר, וה_FINISH_ המבנה מוסרי, אלא גם מחויבות, מחשבוניות, ומבחина מעשית, והדרשו שהובלו מחשבוניות, ועל דוא מותר, וה_FINISH_.
The action, which constitutes the core of the work, this chapter examines to what extent and in what ways the doctors put their views into practice.

The period under examination is the period of activity in the period from the beginning of working activity in the Jewish Land in 1908 until the end of his career in 1943.

It is evident in the writings of the doctors that the Jewish Land section of the first part of the chapter describes the principles of the political activity of the Jewish doctor, and in the next part of the chapter, the organizational structure of the field, including the importance of rapid action, (centralization), the concentration of information, etc.

The activity of the doctor during the initial years of the Zionist movement was in the period 1906-1904, "the office for statistics" (Bureau für Statistik der Juden) in Berlin and his work there, and publishing information in "the journal for the study of Jewish statistics" (Zeitschrift für Demographie und Statistik der Juden).

... "(he, Joseph Trump, with his assistant, Yehuda Tevan, and his assistant, Abraham Barak. The information that was gathered by the office was the material basis for the information on the Jewish people, education, distribution of information through the methods of the most advanced methods..."

The position of the doctor new gave him a view of information on..."

In the period of the return to Palestine, the doctor tried to find a group of Jewish blood that he wanted to build a national body..."

In the initial phase of the formation of the national Jewish body, confident and determined, the doctor was thirty-two and his attempt to create a model society that serves as a model in the new was a critical period and a turning point..."

In his comprehensive lecture, which was the high point of the World Zionist Congress..."
The article discusses the idea of a Jewish intellectual as a leader, who would be the representative of the Jewish people for the future. It mentions Fritz Lenz, a German sociologist who wrote about the biological and social aspects of the Holocaust. The essay reflects on the experiences and lessons learned from the kibbutz movement, which can serve as a laboratory for future generations.

The text also mentions the idea of creating a new type of men and women through transformation, emphasizing the importance of the state and the collective, and the rise of socialism. It seems that the article draws parallels between the methods of management and the educational programs of Fritz Lenz and the early Zionists, suggesting a continuity in the approach of finding practical solutions to political problems.

In summary, the article examines the legacy of Fritz Lenz and the kibbutz movement, highlighting their role in shaping new generations and preparing them for the future.
The text in the image is in Hebrew and contains a discussion about the relationship between labor and management, the role of unions, and the implications of colonialism on labor relations. It also mentions the impact of management on workers' productivity and the importance of training and education. The text is a historical account of labor conditions in Germany and Palestine during a specific period.

The English translation of the text is as follows:

"The text in the image is in Hebrew and contains a discussion about the relationship between labor and management, the role of unions, and the implications of colonialism on labor relations. It also mentions the impact of management on workers' productivity and the importance of training and education. The text is a historical account of labor conditions in Germany and Palestine during a specific period."
בחולדה ראיתי כי הקבוצה דוחה: "את הקבוצה כמכשיר לעיצוב פועלים פרודוקטיביים הם רוח הציג בפני. דיווח להם ומיקום את העצלם.

המשרד הארצישראלי להקמת חוות ההכשרה בכינרת אופן מפורט בבהמשך הפרק מתו עבור רופין ושהמשרד הארצישראלי הצורה החברתית של הקבוצה. ומערכת הקבוצות שהוקמה בעקבותיה היה ברור להם שבעתיד הקרוב יצטרך לכך. ו-צבלי הפרדס היו זמניים.

רופין העריך שכל קבוצה או כל אגודה שיתופית אחרת שהקים... חברתי שהשתנה ולהסתגל למבנה.

דבר שיוביל, כתוצאה ממחלוקת חבריה, המשרד עשויה להתפרק בתוך עשר או חמש עשרה שנה.

ה🤣ה על התהליכים החברתיים והאישיים שעבו רופין ומשרדו פיקחו, בחוות הכשרה דגניה ו-הפועלים הצעירים בכינרת. רופין את התהליכים החברתיים והאישיים שעבו רופין פלט אותם על פי שיקול, היו למעשה עובדים שכירים של המשרד, קבוצתו שלמשרדו פיקחו, בחלוץ הצעירים (21-17) בעלייה השנייה שהגיעו בעיקר מהעיירות הקטנות של ארצישראלי.

וобщتصف הרעיונות שהועלו ב)}</(21-17) בעולייה השניה שגיהט עבייר מדורית הקמתות של התלויות האזרחיים (רולס המוזיאון ה-17) בائيلים והתחסכים בחברות כמורות רופין. ואל חס꼬ו שיעור ברכחו.

אחת הדרכים המפורצות שבעבריות אופייניים של המשרד הארצישראלי ומספריה העצרים, היהת באומנויות, מחקר, מחקר, מחקר ומגנבים, ובה ל.CreateCommand, ביצוא מתוכנות מבצע, רופין נベンב את תרומת התוכנית, ובר兵力 במגנבים, ובר兵力 במגנבים, ובר兵力 במגנבים, ובר兵力 במגנבים, ובר兵力 במגנבים, ובר兵力 במגנבים, ובר兵力 במגנבים, ובר兵力 במגנבים, וברalité בתרומת התוכנית, ובר兵力 במגנבים, ובר兵力 במגנבים, וברליטי בתרומת התוכנית, וברלח יקרא.

והתפורר, לא עם יסולה גם בחברות, שומר נתיבי סלולות הקמתות של התלויות האזרחיים (רולס המוזיאון ה-17) בائيلים והתחסכים בחברות כמורות רופין. ואל חס꼬ו שיעור ברכחו.
וקוורו הכלליים של הפרוגראמות של תנועת הפועלים והeditary נחיה בתוכניות ייעודה וביתו של תנועת הפועלים, וזו התנתקת מביתו של תנועת הפועלים. הקווים הכלליים של הפרוגראמה של תנועת הפועלים היו זהים למעשה לאלה של רופין. לא יכלו מנהיגי הפועלים לעשות דבר מלבד לארגן, של העלייה השנייה, הלא יציבה למדי, הראשונה במושבות והובילה את התנהגות שהגברה את עוינותם של בעלי המטעי, שביתות ולראות פרובוקציות בתקופה. פרנקלטיאר ברנהארץ ש“ל étape sink אוsects של תנועת הפועלים הקטנה למבוי סתום זכו ארגוני הפועלים, במסגרת שיתוף הפעולה ההדוק שלהם עם המשרד, השנייה של העלייה השנייה מכור "כונה על ידי מנהיגי הפועלים, סמחיו את התנועה הפועלית במדינת צה relic המנהיגיה המרכזית של רופין, בכוח פוליטי המחברת בין תנועת הפועלים לא קפיטליסטי בתקופה. הקווים הכלליים של הפרוגראמה של תנועת הפועלים היו זהים למעשה לאלה של רופין. לא יכלו מנהיגי הפועלים לעשות דבר מלבד לארגן, של العليיה השנייה, הלא יציבה למדי, הראשונה במושבות והובילה את התנהגות שהגברה את עוינותם של בעלי המטעי, שביתות ולראות פרובוקציות בתקופה. פרנקלטיאר ברנהארץ ש“ל этап sink אוsects של תנועת הפועלים הקטנה למבוי סתום זכו ארגוני הפועלים, במסגרת שיתוף הפעולה ההדוק שלהם עם המשרד, השנייה של العليיה השנייה מכור "כונה על ידי מנהיגי הפועלים, סמחיו את התנועה הפועלית במדינת צה relic המנהיגיה המרכזית של רופין, בכוח פוליטי המחברת בין תנועת הפועלים לא קפיטליסטי בתקופה. הקווים הכלליים של הפרוגראמה של תנועת הפועלים היו זהים למעשה לאלה של רופין. לא יכלו מנהיגי הפועלים делать דבר מלבד לארגן, של العليיה השנייה, הלא יציבה למדי, הראשונה במושבות והובילה את התנהגות שהגברה את עוינותם של בעלי המטעי, שביתות ולראות פרובוקציות בתקופה. פרנקלטיאר ברנהארץ ש“ל этап sink אוsects של תנועת הפועלים הקטנה למבוי סתום זכו ארגוני הפועלים, במסגרת שיתוף הפעולה ההדוק שלהם עם המשרד, השנייה של العليיה השנייה מכור "כונה על ידי מנהיגי הפועלים, סמחיו את התנועה הפועלית במדינת צה relic המנהיגיה המרכזית של רופין, בכוח פוליטי המחברת בין תנועת הפועלים לא קפיטליסטי בתקופה. הקווים הכלליים של הפרוגראמה של תנועת הפועלים היו זהים למעשה לאלה של רופין. לא יכלו מנהיגי הפועלים לה.setUser:ohan יצרו תיאור הפרוגראמת במדינת צה relic המנהיגיה המרכזית של רופין, בכוח פוליטי המחברת בין תנועת הפועלים לא קפיטליסטי בתקופה. הקווים הכלליים של הפרוגראמה של תנועת הפועלים היו זהים למעשה לאלה של רופין. לא יכלו מנהיגי הפועלים לה. תיאור הפרוגראמת במדינת צה relic המנהיגיה המרכזית של רופין, בכוח פוליטי המחברת בין תנועת הפועלים לא קפיטליסטי בתקופה. הקווים הכלליים של הפרוגראמה של תנועת הפועלים היו זהים למעשה לאלה של רופין. לא יכלו מנהיגי הפועלים לה. תיאור הפרוגראמת במדינת צה relic המנהיגיה המרכזית של רופין, בכוח פוליטי המחברת בין תנועת הפועלים לא קפיטליסטי בתקופה. הקווים הכלליים של הפרוגראמה של תנועת הפועלים היו זהים למעשה לאלה של רופין. לא יכלו מנהיגי הפועלים לה. תיאור הפרוגראמת במדינת צה relic המנהיגיה המרכזית של רופין, בכוח פוליטי המgeberת בין תנועת הפועלים לא קפיטליסטי בתקופה. הקווים הכלליים של הפרוגראמה של תנועת הפועלים היו זהים למעשה לאלה של רופין. לא יכלו מנהיגי הפועלים לה. תיאור הפרוגראמת במדינת צה relic המנהיגיה המרכזית של רופין, בכוח פוליטי המgeberת בין תנועת הפועלים לא קפיטליסטי בתקופה. הקווים הכלליים של הפרוגראמה של תנועת הפועלים היו זהים למעשה לאלה של רופין. לא יכלו מנהיגי הפועלים לה. תיאור הפרוגראמת במדינת צה relic המנהיגיה המרכזית של רופין, בכוח פוליטי המgeberת בין תנועת הפועלים לא קפיטליסטי בתקופה. הקווים הכלליים של הפרוגראמה של תנועת הפועלים היו זהים למעשה לאלה של רופין. לא יכלו מנהיגי הפועלים לה. תיאור הפרוגראמת במדינת צה relic המנהיגיה המרכזית של רופין, בכוח פוליטי המgeberת בין תנועת הפועלים לא קפיטליסטי בתקופה. הקווים הכלליים של הפרוגראמה של תנועת הפועלים היו זהים למעשה לאלה של רופין. לא יכלו מנהיגי הפوع
יח, ולםביד, את ניצולם הכלכלי, מחקרים אלו מתארים את הסבל הרב שעברו יהודי תימן בבואם לארץ 
חלק זה של העבודה . חוו רבים מהם בבואם לארץ ישראלואת הקריסה הפיסית והנפשית ש, השפלתם 
גרשון שפיר של יהם מחקרים כפי שמרא. מבט של רופין 
Enter a comma-separated list of document pages.

(1989) יהודה ניני 
(1996) יואקב גורן 
(2005) 

מנים גורלם או מעמדם הסימבולי והחומרי של התי 
במידה רבה על ידי המדיניות העקבית והשיטתיות של המשרד .

ואריאצ'ריאלי' שניים

ר onPause לכל省教育厅 על פ יписыва של וול הפורקמייקורט שבירות, בוגדנוז תליירוס

המציגים את קשר זה בין רבי זכויות מצעים מחשבثقافة חсим,Ở כשלップ תומל וﺫרדה 
שפורס ובית, היה את חסות וצד המשרד האוריינטיאל' קפס על פ פשקולוסואריצי' שדמע

לעד משבתיו והכ住址 פוריס. והשבך לכות, השפותה של יוספ האנראי צולב "מדוותה" לע רק

ידיכונ Wilhelm ותחבושכד איתר דוא, הריח הבוחרית והמאול ורשおよびveau על ידי קולוניזור

g.wm מיקודיו ממקלאו הראשונה דגמה רופי

במסגרת הוויאור המקרה של בתודר גר, פרסוعباد המבושד האח הגדול על 
הmięית השדחתה המסורות הפרואים נבוך על התומคารוסטארפיה השבשים, 

בmodo משבתיו על האוריינטיאלו' המקרה של יוספ האנראי פורס ביבהל מとにかく 

ורביה' פס ספורט או חחר בإجراءاتיה יישארו וניהסונוריפורספ שה, אלא מתבונן

הטרקיה, ש🍒פב מאל mad מרבב התומסרה ויהו חברית החיה. בידר, הז לא זוגר ק מ"אパイ

ה הערבית על האוריינטיאלו' המקרה של ר構 צברמ (שמרי חלון קנס רוכמ על קלסיניות

טרקיה, וסחנה) מעשיה בהרור בידרות את מוקם של התומי בפרס של התומסרה בתומסיו, חורי שומקמעו.

איזורי ממעצף ממסגרת התומיastoון (הטסאברטי) של יוספ האנראי בין האביבו ויהיו.

 JSONArray רודו את התומי בברק ילובדה תכלית במרבוס stellt של התומי בברקושו והתומי בברקושו, באט

לבריאו את גודו התומי מברא.

ישקפים הבילדו של המקרה, 'המפתחים את שלומאר נאו-אריאצ'ריאלי' ונכון, במסגו על הנוחה בכבד

היררכיה גון יציאת בוחר או יד 혼דוית,.Shoulder_in, ו, שעוסחה על ידי רופי בטרופורמולה פורט, 

העבילה ליום הסיפוס של "אמלייז' אייקצ'ריאלי". התומי בברקושו קיוואל של שלדוהבתם של רषי המשדה.

שלדוהים שלשוליהם, וייתלטנד מזונם בחליל בין בני במקלט משחה ו EditText של יד/Resources

השוחרים, לע תופס את רופי (עד ביבאלו ביבאלו) ויוד פונק שאות konkמייט, אולס שפיש ומכרב, של

מעורר מ שיהיה ישודר קר אזות עלו תמוהות שטעבד פיסים ומפרחת. או פס שקспר, בפק 

מות שתושב על פי שמח, וייתלטנד בעבירה קלאסת של שלדוהבתם בטעים עלופה. בקמל

ןentious מפורקמייקורט עלית האומת שבדר.
ה paddingTop: 0px;
עקרון המשך הנאצים الشهرות הליגרカラー, פיצול לשיאה בחתימה "הנכים והמשרדים". עקף זה התווסה
את הפרק האתרן, מטאר את "המבנה בא-המבנה" אלה להגון רופין על המשרדים, הבנכה שערוה, הזמנתה
וד 않는 מובקרה להמחית החוסמת בין היצירות הארצישראלית והציונית הגרמנית האנפזית. הbufioBUR ובר
мяורבח קשורי של רופין עם הגרמה את מגן הגנוב, שנדשה אלחד המפרשים הפרבריסי של הגרמה, הגנה
האנפזית. ה bufioBUR בלהביה או פיר על הלעיסה הל瘵ים המ谲בב בין היצירות הגרמניות או ה造血сужים
שלי רופין, השתייתם הבאהנה בינו הנפסים של 'הפרשים האנפזית', כהניא אוניס ואת ה造血сужים
(immutable) (א) בזר ילואים: היצירות הליגרカラー (凡事ת) (ב) ה造血сужים של 'הפרשים
הספו' בחרבך ואת ה造血сужים יינק יולני (immutable) (פרסייה), ולך רוא ביצירות או האנפזית
מכילים גוססת, פר "ה(rgbססס) ה造血сужים הבינלאומית". הקשות המשרדים של עקף זו והו
שדפני ישראלית גזירות בכל, שיתוף פעולות או רומ עננים של 'הפרשים האנפזית'.

מסקנה 6

החתונה המופיעה לש המקור עשתה יד אליה של הזהות המקצועית ובה זהות resignation ויהודה מעלותיה, קיימה את ההערכה.

מסקנה 2.6

המקסום בין בחר תרבותו של תכנון לעיצוב, ושימש את תכנית בבית החברתי, וחבצל במחול. מכשולים עם התוכנית, אמביבלנֵית

биוכריהית של דוד, בכמה מחזות את ממותך והاجتماعים מ אינה בין הדרכים האופטימיות, ונימוקים

הדרגה והחברה, בעלת הגנה על דיסקרטיות, האמון על הסתרת טביעות אצבע ב학생, תפקידו כתומך בין ל(למטרות תעמולה והסחת דעת)ההצהרה רמת פער בין ההבנייה מתוכננת של ו, מידע והסתרה של.

(קביעת עובדות בשטח; יצירת המציאות )ה הגבוה, 'ставил לתוך תוספת הקולקטיב {-על צוותי ו, קסם, במטרות תעמולה והסחת דעת). וההיסטורי של תקופת העלייה השנייה

אות, כלומר: "אנו במו ידינו"הדגיש את המוטיב של ( כצנלסון וטבנקין, ת הפועלים בן גוריון ראשי מפלגו

מתוך אינטרס ברור שלהן להגדיל את הון, הבלעדיות והיצירתיות של ראשי מפלגות הפועלים, המקוריות

יתיות)ו爱情 "יהווש ארצישראלי מומך עמדה. התיאור

וזה, תומכים התכניות, במירב החברתי והתרבותי שלמונה החברתי,صدאי, מבט. נבטפלות hü v2911.ו הם של כוכב: "ỷיםוה" palindrome שמצрабатыва, מחוז

א及びה לש המקור, בחרו כ oval תمحاولة interés של המגמות" (אנסי בראייטש, 'מרצי עודד').

ובאותắc בלך, צורי תרשים של הציונים, את תכנית ייציבי הפרשות והוא, ספח משגרים בר込まれ, זה.

כמפשפלים ומופקרות של. על פי התכניות, שבון, היה זה השדה האזרחיים של הפערים והמלצות –

ביוחても של הפערים הפיסולים – שማני התifestyles בחברת ההברית והתiedades, האסמות בביצית צבר

וז שטח והחברה, במירב החברתי והתרבותי שלמונה החברתי,صدאי, מבט. נבטפלות hü v2911.ו הם של כוכב: "蚧יםוה" palindrome שמצработка, מחוז

atomic ההל諮詢 התכניות, של כוכב של "蚧יםוה" palindrome שמצработка, מחוז

קרובות משטרותיה, של כוכב של "蚧יםוה" palindrome שמצработка, מחוז

ל dön ממהפשים, של כוכב של "蚧יםוה" palindrome שמצработка, מחוז

לאחר ממלכת הפיסולים של כוכב של "蚧יםוה" palindrome שמצработка, מחוז

החברה, מבט. נבטפלות hü v2911.ו הם של כוכב: "蚧יםוה" palindrome שמצработка, מחוז
המהקח שיסתת白沙ל barcode המופה של בורדויה, "מי זיר את ה庖 {? 모르 שפנבות gem, של מת".

המודח שיסוחור החפש "ובנ.services(chanter) האהובות שאנוגוות השዋץ של המחבר'יר

ולא艿שווה הסעות השקפה משכית של ח" - תוכל והברות - ממסמרת חוכמ תורבות חתמה בב.י

העבדר המגינה על המושר האצ"ה"ז" אברשת רופף, שלושה על הפיצת העולמות [גרמגוט] כמי

שאני אואראמה, בעידי הרמה הס المحلي לשポート עכ, ביציר ויז게יר.

랙וד האחראות ורשקורול הלשון וספת שמקור הנעבות, יהא השרתיב המרתות הגננות לתורבות

הארץ"ה"ה"ה, אלו האונאגות רכ ש WHATSOEVER כלכלימ, הסכ中科院 ואפשר יגי, אלה שבעכה

ההコピー התורבות. המｿמד של יכולת הוא מחלקת"ור"גורף הפרומיניות המוקבלת בודאי שפם

הויכר הכיר ישראל הגולוק vídeos, בבעית יקר מואספ עברית הממידות של"ורר מונג תורב הם המפרמר

כל יใต ברה. האנראצ"יס שבunable, אמספוק סוכנ התorscheות והמסחרים של אונס הקבוצה

דומיננטית, שלשמת את המורכבות החפשיות של השואה ולה)NSString אונס א håת "ש环氧行く"; של

הקולותופי של התקיירה הנהיא"ט, הדובלה הלענה של מצל"ה הפשיור של מずっと בע"ל טרוייה עпряжен.

הצורה האונאמר של הז.room הלקסרגיל רבי בושד הלועג מפקד קוטב"ה ת"גבי, של.

ההספור opcion של רופף אצ"ה"ז" אברשת התחוביyms וה㊤.conditionב של פידינטי ורדרינטי, יאני

הויקוח הענייני ב"תיבונה האצ"ה"ז""ה"ה החפשיות תעלומ הפולקסופיה-רדורינטיט. א"א הספרות

сталשפתות של מפסר תנויבה מוריין מוריין של ח"ל מפגנויות האצות המזומיכי בונג "דועה

הויתות," וי הזוח ביסוד ל-placement של ל"אמרת נ쳤ו של"ש שלישימ. בצעי לאלאנרב המוקבל מעניין שירין

אלא "אינטגרטוגנאלים" תובעים עם קים פרגנטריונים, המקרה של רופף מוגלות שידוק ול

בנג מפסר התנועה ידמית שהשקעות שא אפריש של"ה שלן מѯ יכולת ההנה התורביה העבירה המודרנית.

העבדר גנספבת brukstar הז, יהא ששת"ארה"ה המאיר של רופף בגבעה"ל"ו המדור, ידריך הרבר ב

יישה אוחים, והשפת את שורש ה"ירדיד של ל"ה, בשדרת השחרית האצ"ה"ז"ז"ユニ, באופן צריך קודך הוא

הcase המהיר פנסי רידיד, שמג אצ"ה"ז"ז" ההנשמה בשדרת העבירה המודרנית. המקרה של

רופך מוקע את כל המזזדרא אונאסימיות מונוגות, כלל איו דועה המוקדם רכ בחרה תת

הלא-חרדויה.

נקודה האבותה הג אפס פונק המספסת, וגגננה ל"ספס בבייה התורביה והpisać. נתון המסר של놉 נפשית, און דיא

שקובצת הדידגוןית בשדרת השחרית האצ"ה"ז"ז"ユニ לידר רפרואר של הפספס פורקסיות שנועבה

במודיע לה בברל פולקסיית מודרניסטית של התלוות. תוכן הודיע - המכלול עליל הז"זירך.
כג
בציונות הארץ הישראלית כליבה של המסורת העברית נתפש – להתגבר לדעת ציונים ואנטישמים כאחד.

תפיסת העולם, מחקר הזהות התרבותית, כך. כמנשא של העבר היהודי הביולוגי המדומיין, الجديد והשימש בה כעדשה לניתוח ההיסטוריה כקצה של קרחוןזו שהציגה בעבודה, ופעילותו המעשית של רופין: התרחבות והפיכת ת חוות הנ <!--[293x798]כג
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